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ABSTRACT 
 
There is an urgent need to improve our understanding of the influence of 
culture on the onset and maintenance of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
Substantial evidence indicates that appraisals and self-concept, both of which are 
central to the understanding and treatment of PTSD are found to differ across 
cultures. This thesis therefore investigated the influence of cultural variation in self-
construal on a) trauma appraisals, b) posttrauma self-concept and c) posttrauma 
psychological adjustment.  
The thesis was comprised of three parts with a total of seven studies; the 
methodology adopted a questionnaire and interviewing approach on British and Asian 
participants. Part 1 and 2 explored the objectives in a non-clinical sample (n = 75; n = 
14; parts 1 and 2 respectively). Part 3 examines the objectives in a clinically relevant 
sample of trauma survivors with and without PTSD (n = 95).  
In relation to trauma appraisals, the thesis’ findings relay that there are cultural 
differences in trauma appraisals, including a significant cultural difference in 
perceived personal control for those with PTSD compared to trauma survivors 
without PTSD. However, appraisals of those with PTSD tended to be similar, 
suggesting cultural similarities in trauma appraisals for clinical groups. Second, the 
Public and Communal Self Appraisal Measure (PCSAM) which measures 
collectivistic type cognitions was developed and demonstrated good internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, convergent validity, and discriminative validity. 
This measure further demonstrated collective self-appraisals to also play a significant 
role in PTSD development and/or maintenance, suggesting both independent and 
interdependent self-construal are impacted and damaged by trauma. Findings in 
relation to post-trauma self-concept  (i.e. traumatized and trauma-centered self-
concept) suggest a pan-cultural relationship to PTSD. Additionally, an ambivalent 
post-trauma self-concept was found to directly impact British trauma survivors but 
not Asian. However, when mediated by trauma-related appraisals, self-ambivalence 
was found to indirectly influence PTSD for the Asian and British groups. Finally, the 
influence of cultural variation in self-construal on post-trauma psychological 
adjustment, and theoretical and clinical implications of the thesis are discussed. 
Limitations and future directions are considered. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Overview 
 
Trauma and culture are intertwined because traumatic experiences are part of 
the life cycle, universal in manifestation and occurrence, and typically demand 
a response from culture in terms of healing, treatment, and interventions. 
 
(Drozdek & Wilson, 2007, p. 8) 
 
 Trauma is a universal phenomenon, experienced the world over and across time. 
Poets and novelists as far back as Homer and Shakespeare were among the first to 
record the profound impact of trauma and its subsequent stressors on human cognition, 
behavior and emotion (Friedman, Resick, Bryant, & Brewin, 2011). Exposure to 
traumatic events, such as war, conflict, natural and human-made disasters, assault and 
life threatening illnesses are common, with over two thirds of the general population 
likely to be exposed to a traumatic incident in their lifetime (Neria, Nandi, & Galea, 
2008). Exposure to such events can consequently have a series of serious adverse 
psychological affects. In the last three decades there has been an increase in the 
discussion of trauma and its effects, with particular focus on posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) (Jones & Wessely, 2005). Previous systematic reviews have 
documented PTSD to be the most commonly studied psychopathology in the aftermath 
of trauma (Breslau, 2002; Neria et al., 2008; Norris, Friedman, Watson, Byrne, Diaz & 
Kaniasty, 2002). 
 PTSD is a relatively common mental health problem for people exposed to 
traumatic events. The disorder is characterized by symptoms of repeated and unwanted 
re-experiencing/reliving of the traumatic event, hyperarousal, emotional numbing and 
avoidance of stimuli which act as reminders, according to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV-TR [DSM-IV-TR] (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2000). There is an increasing recognition that PTSD is observed 
in many different societies and cultures (Foa, Keane, Friedman, & Cohen, 2009; 
Jobson, 2009). However it remains largely unknown as to whether the processes 
involved in its development and maintenance are culturally similar. Our understanding 
surrounding the development, maintenance and treatment of PTSD is informed 
predominately by research using Western populations (Jobson & O’Kearney 2009; 
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Markus & Kitayama 1991). Consequently, little is known about the etiology, 
maintenance and treatment of PTSD in non-Western cultures (Foa et al., 2009). It is 
important to consider the relationship between trauma and culture in order to arrive at 
culturally informed and appropriate treatments for psychological disorders, such as 
PTSD; as Boehnlein (2002) asserts, the place of culture in trauma studies is becoming 
increasingly important, because while extreme physical and psychological distress 
may be experienced at an individual level, it frequently arises from, and is resolved 
within, a social and cultural context. 
This thesis investigated the influence of culture on two psychological 
processes involved in the development and maintenance of PTSD; appraisals and self-
concept. Prominent cognitive models of PTSD implicate appraisals and self-concept 
(DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) in the development and maintenance of PTSD. 
Specifically, self-relevant appraisals of the trauma experience and/or its sequelae 
function to maintain a sense of current threat in the survivor’s life and are instrumental 
in promoting the use of maladaptive strategies intended to control this threat and 
current symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Empirical evidence suggests that cognitive 
factors are the most useful of a set of pre-trauma factors, trauma specific factors and 
other predictors for identifying chronic PTSD (Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007). 
Furthermore, appraisals are potentially modifiable and thus, provide important targets 
for treatment (Resick, 2001) and the proposed revision of PTSD criteria for the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5 (DSM-5) includes negative 
alterations in cognitions (i.e. appraisals about the self, others, world, self-blame, and 
trauma causes and consequences), which have subsequently come to pass with its 
inclusion as Criterion D (DSM-5, APA, 2013). In terms of self-concept, trauma 
shatters an individual’s understanding of the self, causing internal disorganization and 
disintegration, shattered assumptions and feelings of self-annihilation (Abernathy, 
2008). Due to these fractures and inconsistencies in self-concept, empirical research 
has found trauma can become central to self-concept, influencing one’s self-definition 
resulting in a trauma-defined self-concept (Sutherland & Bryant, 2005). Consequently, 
this sense of a trauma-centered self-concept leads to increases in PTSD symptom 
severity (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007).   
  The cross-culture psychology literature suggests cultural differences in the 
way individuals perceive their self-concept and appraise everyday events. Research 
suggests that people in different cultures have strikingly different understandings of 
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themselves, of others and the interplay of the two (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1994). 
Markus and Kitayama (1991, 2010) outline that individualistic cultures (typically 
Western) tend to emphasize the independent side of the self (i.e. perceive the self to be 
unique, independent, autonomous and separate from others), whilst collectivistic 
cultures (typically non-Western) tend to emphasize the interdependent aspect of self 
(i.e. perceive the self to be interdependent with others and emphasize relatedness, 
group norms and group harmony). It is this difference in self that can influence how 
individuals view and perceive trauma; these culturally diverging self-construal have 
been found in many cases to govern the very nature of individual experience, 
including self-concept and how one appraises events (Jobson & O’Kearney, 2009; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Markus and Kitayama (1991) propose that these construal 
of self and other are conceptualized as part of a repertoire of self-relevant schemata 
which is subsequently used to evaluate, organize and regulate a person’s experience 
and actions, thereby causing patterns of past as well as current and future behavior 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Neisser, 1976). It is important to note that variation exists 
in the degree to which individuals exhibit an independent versus interdependent 
orientation both within and between collectivistic and individualistic cultures; 
however, normative differences between collectivistic and individualistic cultures are 
marked (e.g. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998). Despite this impressive body 
of literature, to date, limited research has examined the influence of culture on these 
processes in relation to trauma. This then leads to fundamental questions as to whether 
these processes also differ across cultures when the event is traumatic and what the 
implications are for PTSD. This, therefore, could result in differing cultural 
perspectives on how trauma is understood and processed by individuals. This then 
lends itself to potentially inform culturally appropriate treatments, as it cannot 
automatically be assumed that advances in Western psychotherapeutic techniques can 
be exported and applied to non-Western cultures (Summerfield, 1999; Marsella & 
White, 1989). 
In light of this, and to explore and reflect any nuanced cultural distinctions 
that could arise within these domains in relation to trauma and to examine the cultural 
appropriateness of current PTSD models, the overall objective of this thesis is to 
advance our understanding of the manner in which cultural differences influence the 
underlying processes appraisals and self-concept play in the development and 
maintenance of PTSD. Specifically, the thesis considers six specific research questions 
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related to the following themes: 
 
Appraisals of trauma: 
1. How do cultural differences in self influence autobiographical memories of trauma 
appraisals? 
2. How do these differences in appraisals compare to cultural differences in appraisals 
of other types of autobiographical memories (i.e. positive and negative memories)? 
3. How do these differences impact on posttraumatic psychological adjustment 
(PTSD)? 
 
Self-concept following trauma: 
4. What are the cultural differences in self-concept following trauma? 
5. How do cultural differences in self-concept influence posttraumatic psychological 
adjustment? 
 
Appraisals, Self-concept and Culture 
6. Does culture influence the relationships between appraisals, self-concept and 
posttraumatic adjustment? 
 
To address these questions, the thesis is comprised of three parts. Part 1 
explores the influence of cultural variation in self-construal on trauma related 
appraisals and self-concept following trauma in a non-clinical sample. Part 2 uses a 
qualitative design (focus groups and key informant interviews) to explore how 
collectivistic cultures appraise trauma and the appropriateness of the commonly used 
Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999) 
as a measure of trauma related cognitive appraisals within collectivistic cultures. 
Based on the responses of the interviews and focus groups, Part 2 also developed a 
new measure of trauma-related cognitive appraisals that are more appropriate for the 
interdependent aspect of self. The aim of this new measure is to work alongside the 
PTCI and other established measures in ascertaining dysfunctional cognitive 
appraisals, especially within collectivistic cultures. Part 3 extends the ecological 
validity and theoretical and clinical implications of Parts 1 and 2 by exploring the 
impact of cultural variation in self-construal on trauma appraisals and self-concept 
following trauma in a clinical sample of Asian and British trauma survivors with and 
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without PTSD. Additionally, Part 3 explores the psychometric properties of the 
measure developed from findings in Part 2. 
 The subsequent chapters in the Introduction firstly, outline the cognitive models 
of PTSD. In particular, the importance of appraisals and self-concept in the 
development and maintenance of PTSD is emphasized and extrapolated. The empirical 
work supporting the role of appraisals and self-concept in the development and 
maintenance of PTSD will also be considered. Chapter 3 will then review the cross-
cultural theories relating to the self and highlight the influence of cultural differences 
in self-construal on appraisals of everyday events and self-concept. Finally, Chapter 4 
will unite the accounts, providing a conceptual framework that expands upon 
cognitive and cultural understandings of PTSD and their theoretical connections with 
the self; helping bridge initial resistance and hesitancy to include cultural factors in the 
conceptualization and treatment of trauma (Marsella, 2010). The chapter will finally 
provide a rationale for the research questions and outline the studies developed to 
investigate the various hypotheses pertaining to the overall research topic; the 
influence of cultural differences on the psychological processes, appraisals and self-
concept, involved in the development and maintenance of PTSD.  
To summarize, traumatic events are common happenings and for a significant 
number of those exposed to such events PTSD can be a manifestation of post-trauma 
maladaption. Appraisals and self-concept have been found to hold a prominent place 
in PTSD development and maintenance and thus, are linked to key cognitive models 
of PTSD (e.g. Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Cross-cultural 
research demonstrates culture to have an influence on appraisals and one’s self-
concept in everyday situations. This gives rise to fundamental questions pertaining to 
the manner in which these components differ across cultures when the event is 
traumatic. Thus bringing us to the crux of the thesis, the overarching aim of this thesis 
is to facilitate further understanding into how appraisals and self-concept can act as 
mechanisms for the development and maintenance of PTSD across cultures. 
  6 
CHAPTER 2 
Socio-Cognitive Models of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 
“As always, I immediately checked my mental state, trying to assess what was 
wrong. I knew a change in my biorhythms had brought Tuesday over, because 
he was always monitoring me, but I couldn't figure out what it was. 
Breathing? Okay. Pulse? Normal. Was I glazed or distracted? Was I lost in 
Iraq? Was a dark period descending? I didn't think so, but I knew something 
must be wrong, and I was starting to worry...”  
 
(Montalvan & Witter, 2011, p.154) 
 
As denoted by the words of Montalvan and Witter (2011) experiencing a 
highly stressful and traumatic event can have enduring and long lasting consequences. 
In its extreme form these enduring and long lasting consequence can manifest as a 
number of psychological disorders, such as anxiety, depression and PTSD. The 
purpose of Chapter 2 is to explore PTSD and discuss and reflect on its current socio-
cognitive models as a means by which to understand and treat the disorder, and to 
find if they can be expanded upon. 
 
2.1 Definition of Trauma 
 Trauma is a universal phenomenon and for the purposes of this thesis refers to 
an event, which must be a) severely negative and posing a physical threat to the 
individual, such as assault, natural or human-made disasters or severe accidents, and 
(b) psychologically overwhelming for the individual exposed; thereby in keeping with 
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria.  
 From an etymological standpoint, trauma goes back to the Greek work meaning 
‘wound’. However, its application has become increasingly important to clinicians 
and scholars from a wide array of disciplines to account for violence and its aftermath 
(Hunt, 2010). In particular, attention has been drawn to the manner in which the body 
and mind has been wounded and implications for the affected individual’s recovery. 
Studies have demonstrated that experiencing a traumatic event is common, with most 
adults expected to be exposed to at least one traumatic incident over their lifetime 
(Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). This is increased in certain geographical areas in 
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which large numbers of populations are constantly and consistently exposed to 
traumatic events, such as natural disasters, wars and conflicts (Neria, et al., 2008). For 
instance, those living close to the Pacific Ring are exposed to tsunamis, the Pacific 
coastlines are exposed to storms and East Africa is tempered with drought. Whilst 
those in the Middle East, North Africa and Sub Saharan Africa are exposed to 
violence through civil unrest and conflict. Other unique populations are also 
consistently exposed to traumatic events, such as search/rescue teams, other first and 
second emergency responders (e.g. police, firemen), military personnel and refugees 
and asylum seekers (Gradus, 2007). 
 
2.2 Clinical definition of PTSD 
 PTSD was characterized as an anxiety disorder and has now, in the latest edition 
of the DSM, moved into a new class of “trauma and stress-related disorders” (DSM-
V, APA, 2013). Exposure to a traumatic event is a necessary condition of PTSD; its 
initial DSM-III formulation defines this event as being outside the usual range of 
human experience and one that would be manifestly distressing to almost anyone 
(DSM-III, APA, 1980). The research accrued in this thesis was attained prior to the 
release of DSM-V (2013), at the time of this research, the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) 
criteria in diagnosing and assessing PTSD was used. For a diagnosis of PTSD to be 
made certain criteria must be met, this included both criteria in criterion A, at least 
one criterion B intrusive symptom, three criterion C avoidance symptoms and two 
criterion hyperarousal symptoms (see Table 1 for greater detail). Moreover these 
symptoms need to last for more than a month (criterion E) in addition to bringing 
about considerable functional impairment (criterion F). 
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Table 1 
PTSD DSM-IV-TR symptom criteria (APA, 2000) 
Criterion A: stressor: 1. The person has experienced, witnessed, or been confronted 
with an event or events that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a 
threat to the physical integrity of oneself or others. 2. The person's response involved 
intense fear, helplessness, or horror.  
Criterion B: intrusive recollection: 1. Recurrent and intrusive distressing 
recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions. 2. Recurrent 
distressing dreams of the event. 3. Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were 
recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and 
dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur upon awakening or when 
intoxicated). 4. Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues 
that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event. 5. Physiologic reactivity 
upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the 
traumatic event. 
Criterion C: Avoidant/numbing: 1. Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or 
conversations associated with the trauma. 2. Efforts to avoid activities, places, or 
people that arouse recollections of the trauma. 3. Inability to recall an important 
aspect of the trauma. 4. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant 
activities. 5. Feeling of detachment or estrangement from others. 6. Restricted range 
of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings). 7. Sense of foreshortened future (e.g., 
does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span). 
Criterion D: Hyper-arousal: 1. Difficulty falling or staying asleep. 2. Irritability or 
outbursts of anger. 3. Difficulty concentrating. 4. Hyper-vigilance. 5. Exaggerated 
startle response. 
Criterion E: Duration:  Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) is 
more than one month. 
Criterion F: Functional significance: The disturbance causes clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
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2.3 Origination of PTSD 
 The derivation of PTSD is founded in experiencing a traumatic event. This 
etiological agent (the traumatic stressor) makes PTSD unique among other psychiatric 
diagnoses (Friedman, 2007) as a diagnosis cannot be made without first experiencing 
criterion A (stressor criterion). As outlined above, there are many examples of 
traumatic events, some of which include natural disasters (e.g. earthquake, tornados, 
typhoons); human-made disasters (e.g. gas leaks, nuclear power plant explosions, oil 
fires); road traffic accidents; assault; abuse; wars; and organized violence and 
terrorism (Breslau, 2002; Kessler, Berglund, Delmer, Jin, Merikangas & Walters, 
2005; Shalev et al., 1997). Additionally, while trauma events are frequent (see trauma 
prevalence rate section below; Section 2.5.2) and not everyone who experiences a 
trauma develops PTSD, a significant portion of trauma survivors do, with research 
indicating this figure to be around 25-30 % of trauma survivors going on to develop 
PTSD (Kessler et al, 1995). Therefore, as Friedman (2007) asserts, trauma cannot be 
standardized as the trauma experience cognates differently before being appraised as 
an extreme threat. Thus, individual differences in one’s appraisal processes protract 
for a more protected or vulnerable disposition/trauma threshold (Friedman, 2007). For 
those that do go on to develop PTSD there are many resultant consequences, these can 
result in long-term behavioral problems, drug and alcohol abuse, loss of employment, 
interpersonal problems, mental health problems, physical behavioral problems and a 
lowering of immune functioning (Kessler et al., 1995).  
 
2.3.1 A Brief Historical Overview of PTSD 
PTSD can be purported to be both an enduring and universal disorder, 
affecting a significant number of trauma survivors through the annals of time and 
conflict. The disorder has been described in ancient history, classical literature (e.g. 
Shakespeare perhaps best described war trauma in Henry IV, Part 1), diaries (e.g. 
Samuel Pepys recorded the nightmares he has for months following the Great Fire of 
London) and letters (e.g. Tolstoy’s recollections of the Crimean War), poetry (e.g. 
Wilfred Owen poems concerning First World War), through to modern popular 
culture (e.g. characters in current books, films, TV series). The construct appears to 
be a widely recognized and documented consequence of war and conflict (Jones, 
2013).  
The disorder has transitioned through a number of names and labels. Some 
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examples include “nostalgia”, “soldier’s heart” “war neurosis” and “shell shock” to 
“combat exhaustion” and “PTSD” (all of which chronicle psychological reactions to 
combat); while “railway spine” (a diagnosis for the posttraumatic symptoms 
following railroad accidents) (Jones, 2013; Jones & Wessely, 2005) and “rape trauma 
syndrome” moved away from war veterans and toward trauma disorders in other 
populations. Individuals diagnosed with these disorders reported similar symptoms to 
current criteria for PTSD. However, evidence indicates that those who experienced 
such symptoms (e.g. flashbacks, dissociation, startle response) were often seen as 
witchcraft or acts of God (Hunt, 2010). It can be argued that the construct has been 
around for a significantly longer period of time than first anticipated, under the guise 
of alternative names reflective of times and events. However, as Hunt (2010) asserts, 
it would be unwise to over-represent and interpret recorded accounts, as individuals 
from alternative eras described things differently, reflecting contemporary attitudes 
and beliefs.  
The term and construct of PTSD initially emerged into the diagnostic canon of 
the American Psychiatric Association, DSM-III in 1980 under the nosologic 
classification scheme in a response to Vietnam War veterans (Friedman, 2007). The 
concept was initially controversial as the significant change brought about by the 
concept was the stipulation that the etiological agent was outside the individual (i.e., a 
traumatic event) rather than an inherent individual weakness (i.e., a traumatic 
neurosis) (Friedman, 2007). This introduction of a uniform criteria for psychiatric 
disorders related to trauma changed the social and research landscape. The 
legitimization of PTSD in DSM-III led to a new generation of treatment studies as the 
new disorder achieved widespread interest (Jones & Wessely 2005). 
Further, in the last two to three decades there has been a dramatic increase in 
the discussion of trauma and its effects; specifically, in the use of PTSD as a concept 
and in the frequency of PTSD as a diagnosis (Jones & Wessely 2005). PTSD has 
periodically been the focus of much debate in consideration of its symptoms, etiology 
and appropriate definitions (Jones & Wessely, 2005). This debate is still very much 
occurring today. For instance, currently the APA’s DSM-V has been published 
placing PTSD into a new “trauma and stress-related disorder” category. The DSM-V 
committee argued that PTSD be included in a separate class of disorders. This was the 
result of the need to distinguish disorders that are precipitated by traumatic stressors 
and secondly, because it became evident that PTSD is not only a fear-based anxiety 
  11 
disorder (Friedman et al., 2011). Instead, anhedonic/dysphoric presentations (i.e. 
negative cognitions and mood states, disruptive behavioral symptoms) are most 
prominent. However, others, such as Zoellner, Rothbaum, and Feeny (2011) believe 
that there is insufficient evidence for PTSD to be considered separate from anxiety 
disorders and would negate the significant role of fear and anxiety in PTSD. Thus 
PTSD is still very much a disorder up for debate, whose diagnoses, symptoms and 
definitions will most likely continue to undergo modification and adjustment, aligning 
with contemporary thoughts, beliefs and attitudes (Hunt, 2010). 
 
2.4. Problems with PTSD as a construct 
Whilst PTSD may be a useful construct to aid in the treatment for traumatized 
individuals, it comes with its own conceptual problems. Hinton and Lewis-
Fernandez’s (2010) review on the cross-cultural validity of PTSD found support for a 
global presence of the PTSD syndrome, further supporting the notion that PTSD is 
both timeless and universal. Conversely, there are many who believe PTSD cannot be 
exported to non-Western cultures; expressing the construct to be a Western concept 
that therefore only makes sense in a western context. For instance, Bracken, Giller, 
and Summerfield’s (1997) stance, demonstrated in the quote below, is somewhat 
sceptical of Western assumptions about trauma and PTSD being applied universally: 
 
Trauma projects which seek to objectify “suffering” as an entity apart, 
converting it into a technical problem to which are applied technical solutions 
like Western talk therapies, are discounting indigenous knowledge, capacities, 
and priorities. Such projects aggrandize the Western expert who defines the 
problem (e.g. PTSD) and brings the cure; too often it is the same problem and 
the same cure, whether to Cambodia, Rwanda, or elsewhere. (p.430) 
 
Thus concerns regarding the PTSD construct focuses on certain symptoms 
being viewed as ‘Western constructs’ (Jones, Vermass, & McCartney, 2003). It is 
therefore important to also consider that the specifics of trauma and trauma responses 
do also vary across time, place and social subgroups and are not open to universal 
standardization (Hinton & Lewis-Fernandez, 2010; de Jong, Komproe & Van 
Ommeren, 2003).  
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2.5 PTSD Prevalence and Co-morbidity 
 2.5.1 Prevalence of trauma and trauma experiences 
 The National Comorbidity Survey (1995, cited in Gradus, 2007) had a large 
representative sample of over 5,000 U.S. adults and presented several prevalence rates 
of trauma and trauma experiences. It delineated that over 60% of men and 50% of 
women reported experiencing at least one DSM-III-R traumatic event in their lifetime 
and over 25% of individuals had experienced more than one traumatic event. The 
survey also included that the most prevalent events for men were witnessing someone 
being injured or killed (36%), being involved in a life-threatening accident (25%), and 
being threatened with a weapon (19%). The most prevalent events for women were 
slightly different: being in a fire or natural disaster (15%), witnessing someone being 
injured or killed (14%), being in an accident (14%) and being molested (12%). 
  
 2.5.2 Prevalence of PTSD 
 Most people who experience a traumatic event do not develop PTSD. In fact the 
majority of research points to individuals as being highly resilient (Southwick & 
Charney, 2012). Breslau and Kessler (2001) found that 75% of adults have 
experienced a trauma that would fulfill DSM-IV criteria but only 12% went on to 
develop PTSD. Similarly, The National Comorbidity Survey (1995, cited in Gradus, 
2007) found that while more than half of U.S. adults experience a trauma, about 7% 
go on to develop PTSD at some point in their lives. However, the prevalence rates 
may be higher for other groups such as ethnic minority groups (Norris, 1992; Norris, 
Friedman, Watson, Bryne, Diaz, & Kaniasty, 2002), refugee and asylum seeker 
populations (Silove, Sinnerbrink, Field, Manicavasagar, & Steel, 1997) and in 
countries with socio-political unrest, war and conflict. Conversely, prevalence rates 
may appear lower in certain countries due to differing expressions/reactions to a 
traumatic event. For example, Jenkin’s (1999) study on Salvadoran women following 
exposure to trauma found that 19 out of 20 women did not engage in avoidance 
behaviors nor did they experience emotional numbing. Further, the survey found that 
approximately twice as many women develop PTSD compared to their male 
counterparts; this is similar to gender differences for depression and other anxiety 
disorders (Gradus, 2007). Similarly, Kessler et al. (1995) found the risk of PTSD after 
a traumatic event is 8.1% for men and 20.4% for women. However, once more higher 
rates are being seen in women, with approximately 20 % of women and 8 % of men 
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developing PTSD after exposure to a traumatic event (Gradus, 2007). Moreover, 
young urban populations appear to be at higher risks of PTSD, with an overall risk of 
23.6 %; with a 13 % risk for men and 30.2 % for women (National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence, 2005).  
Thus as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2005) surmises, while 
men appear to be inclined to experience more traumatic events than women, women 
experience higher impact events which are consequently more likely to lead to the 
development of PTSD (Kessler et al., 1995; Stein et al., 1997).  
 
 2.5.3 Prevalence of PTSD in Western and non-Western Countries 
 Research indicates lifetime prevalence of PTSD do differ from country to 
country. As previously mentioned, the National Comorbidity Survey (1995) found 
approximately 7% of U.S. adults develop PTSD at some point in their lives (Gradus, 
2007); Javidi and Yadollahie (2012) assert that in New Zealand the lifetime rate for 
PTSD is 6.1 %; the lifetime rate of PTSD in Canada is estimated at 9.2 % and current 
PTSD of 2.4%, and estimates for a 12-month prevalence for PTSD was at 1.3% for 
Australia (Creamer, Burgess & McFarlane, 2001). However, Ferry et al. (2008) 
estimates that for Northern Ireland, the 12-month prevalence for PTSD in the adult 
populations was 5.1 % and the estimated lifetime prevalence was 8.8 %. Moreover, 
they assert that Northern Ireland has the highest level of 12-month PTSD prevalence 
rate among all comparable studies undertaken across the world, including in other 
areas of conflict. 
 Studies have also researched PTSD prevalence rates in non-Western countries. 
For instance, Wang et al.’s (2009) study on the Sichuan earthquake in China found 
probable prevalence of PTSD to be 37.8% and 13.0% in two respective communities. 
Zhang et al.’s (2012) study on the prevalence of PTSD among adolescents after the 
Wenchuan earthquake in China found rates to be 9.7%, 1.3% and 1.6% at 6, 12 and 
18 months following the earthquake. Conversely, Fu et al. (2013) found PTSD 
prevalence after the Wenchuan earthquake in college students who were in the 
severely affected area to be 14.1% and rates were still high after one year. In conflict 
and post-conflict zones PTSD prevalence rates have been found to be higher. For 
instance, PTSD prevalence rates have been recorded as high as 30 % among ex-
political prisoners in Gaza (Gaza Community Mental Health Program, GCMPH, 
1996, cited in De Jong, Komproe et al., 2001) and 18 % among civilians in Gaza (a 
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site of regular tension). In other conflict and post-conflict areas rates have been found 
to be 37 % in Algeria, 28 % in Cambodia and 16 % in Ethiopia (16%) (De Jong et al., 
2001). De Jong et al. (2001) conducted an epidemiological survey between 1997 and 
1999 among survivors of war or mass violence. The age range of the participants were 
not included in demographic data, however, mean age were as follows: 40.6 years for 
Algeria, 36.3 years for Cambodia, 33.9 years for Ethiopia and 31.6 years for Gaza. 
Additionally, while it would have been informative, the time since participants were 
assessed after their index trauma was not measured. Thus, respondents potentially 
encountering difficulties in recalling events and traumatic experiences that occurred 
decades ago were mentioned as a limitation of the study. To measure traumas, De 
Jong et al. (2001) used an adapted version of the Life Events and Social History 
Questionnaire. In the case for their Cambodian sample, episodes used in the 
instrument were at the time of the Khmer Rouge regime in addition to the period of 
the Vietnamese occupation that toppled the regime. De Jong et al. (2001) evaluated 
PTSD in relation to adverse events from the aforementioned life events. It does 
however need to be noted that De Jong et al. (2001) assert their study is not a national 
representative study, as they could not provide nationally representative data. Instead 
their study indicates the extent of trauma sequelae in selected catchment areas 
affected by conflict. Thus the generation linked to the Khmer Rouge could well 
approach trauma differently to the younger generation; further the younger generation 
could potentially have lower rates of PTSD, however, comparable data between 
respondents who reported traumas during the Khmer Rouge regime and those living 
in the more stable period since was not included. Further, some studies, such as that 
of Sachs, Rosenfield, Lhewa, Rasmussen and Keller (2008), have found that among 
some refugee groups (e.g. Tibetan), there were low rates of PTSD. These studies 
demonstrate some cross-cultural variation in PTSD prevalence rates. 
 
 2.5.4 Prevalence of PTSD in unique populations 
Some individuals are exposed to trauma through their professions, such as 
combat veterans, ambulance personnel, police officers, firefighters and journalists. 
These individuals have been found to have differing lifetime prevalence rates of 
PTSD. For instance in terms of armed forces, The National Center for PTSD proposes 
that the lifetime prevalence of PTSD among male combat veterans is very high at 
approximately 39 %, with the prevalence rates ranging from 6-12 % in Afghanistan 
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and 12-20 % in Iraq (Gradus, 2007). If one looks back at the data concerning Vietnam 
veterans, similar results were found, with lifetime prevalence rates of 30 % (Kulka et 
al., 1990). Regarding ambulance workers, research demonstrates that this group is 
consistently exposed to illness, injury and death and rates of PTSD have been found 
to range from 5.6% - 23% (Bennett, Beck & Clapp, 2005). Bennett, Beck and Clapp 
(2005) found that PTSD predictors for this group include high organizational stress, 
greater frequency of traumatic events and spending a longer time in the profession.  
Studies have found that police officers are regularly exposed to those who have been 
wounded/killed and are present at accidents, involved in shooting another person, and 
are shot at/assaulted (Maguen et al., 2009; West et al. 2008). Consequently, the 
group’s rates of PTSD range between 8.9 % - 31.9 % (e.g. Asmundson & Stapleton, 
2008) with predictors of PTSD involving negative work environment, boredom, 
discrimination and problems with management/equipment (Maguen et al., 2009). 
Finally, in the instance of firefighters, research has shown that this group are exposed 
to a range of traumatic incidents including injury of self or others, accidents, 
recovering bodies post-disaster, toxins/chemicals, child fatalities and serious 
accidents, with the latter two being reported as the most stressful (Haslam & Mallon, 
2003). Rates of PTSD for this group range between 5 to 16.3 % (e.g. Del Ben, Scotti 
Chen & Fortson, 2006) and risk factors include witnessing death of a child (Haslam & 
Mallon, 2003), being of a younger age, second emergency job, greater frequency of 
life stressors, previous psychological treatment and high aggressiveness and low self 
efficacy (measured during training) (Del Ben et al., 2006). 
 
 2.5.5 Significant predictors of PTSD  
 Ozer et al. (2003) found predictors for PTSD included prior trauma, prior 
psychological adjustment, family history of psychopathology, perceived life threat 
during the trauma, posttrauma social support, peritraumatic emotional responses, and 
peritraumatic dissociation. Javidi and Yadollahie’s (2012) work further asserts that 
female gender, intensity and nature of exposure to the traumatic event, and lack of 
social support are risk factors for work-related PTSD. In non-Western countries, 
Wang et al. (2009) found significant predictors for PTSD symptom severity included 
female gender, lower educational level, lower social support, and higher initial 
exposure level. In addition Zhang et al. (2012) assert that depression symptoms, 
female gender and having siblings to be further predictive factors for PTSD.  
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 2.5.6 Comorbidity  
 The comorbidity between PTSD and several other disorders is very high. 
Kessler et al. (1995) propose that there is an 84% rate of comorbidity overall. Javidi 
and Yadollahie’s (2012) puts forth that PTSD has a 9.5% comorbidity rate with panic 
disorder, 28% with social phobia, 48% with major depressive disorder, 31% with 
substance abuse/dependency, 40% with alcohol abuse/dependency, 29% with conduct 
disorder and 9% with mania.  
 
2.6 Economic and Social Costs associated with PTSD 
 The Rand Corporation’s (2008) report place the economic cost of PTSD in the 
USA at up to US$6 billion over two years. Ferry et al. (2008) found the total 
estimated costs of resources used and lost among individuals with PTSD in Northern 
Ireland (direct and indirect costs) were estimated to be £172.8 million over 12 months 
(2008 prices). The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2005) report on the 
United Kingdom states that in 2003–4, social and welfare costs of claims from severe 
stress and PTSD amounted to £103 million, which was £55 million more than was 
claimed 5 years previously. Thus, PTSD has an enormous economic cost to society, 
presenting an economic burden on the patients, their families, health services and 
society as a whole. 
 
2.7 Development of Cognitive Models of PTSD 
Theories of PTSD endeavor to explain the failure of some trauma survivors to 
successfully cope after experiencing a traumatic stressor and the failure for 
posttraumatic symptoms to abate amongst a significant minority of individuals 
exposed to traumatic events (Kessler et al, 1995). Socio-cognitive models delineating 
the etiology of PTSD have grown in explanatory power since PTSD’s inception into 
the diagnostic canon. Recent studies, using predominately Western samples, identify a 
number of factors which impede post trauma recovery, maintain post traumatic 
symptoms and potentially predict the development of ongoing PTSD (see Brewin, 
Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Ozer et al., 2003, for 
reviews). Perhaps one of the most widely researched, and prominent features of 
PTSD, is that of autobiographical memory. Disruptions in autobiographical memory 
are one of the unique characteristics of PTSD, with hallmark features focusing on the 
unwanted and intrusive involuntary recollection of the trauma event (see Brewin & 
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Holmes 2003 for review). Given the prominence of autobiographical memory in 
PTSD, an increasing body of literature has been investigating the influence of culture 
on the remembering of trauma and implications for PTSD (e.g. Jobson, 2009).  
Other important psychological processes involved in PTSD include cognitive 
appraisals (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007), self and self-
concept (Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Conway, 2005; Dalgleish, 2004), cognitive 
schemas, motivation and cognitive-affective reactions (see Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, 
& Orsillo, 1999 for further details). While this list is by no means exhaustive it 
highlights several processes involved in the development of cognitive models of 
PTSD. This thesis will be focusing on two, namely appraisals and self-concept. These 
two processes are centered upon due to their underlying implications for PTSD 
development, maintenance and treatment and given that cross-culture psychology 
literature clearly demonstrates culture to influences both how one perceives their self-
concept and how one appraises events (which will be further elucidated in Chapter 3). 
Appraisals and self-concept are subsequently discussed in relation to current models 
of PTSD. 
 
2.8 Definition of Appraisals 
 As defined by DePrince, Chu, and Pineda (2011), and for the purposes of this 
thesis, trauma appraisals are an individual’s assessments of their thoughts, feelings 
(inclusive of affective states) and behaviors in regards to their trauma exposure. This 
also includes the assessment of the presence and severity of an affective state resultant 
due to the trauma event, such as self-blame, fear, anger. Several theorists have 
proposed that appraisals play a key role in understanding the etiology and 
maintenance of PTSD (e.g., DePrince, Chu & Annaheen, 2011; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Foa et al., 1999). The DSM-V (APA, 2013) also highlights the importance of 
appraisals in criterion D (negative alterations in cognitions/mood), which aims to 
assess the individual's subjective appraisal of the trauma event. Kleim et al. (2007) 
also support the importance of cognitive appraisals in PTSD development and found 
appraisals to be useful in identifying chronic PTSD. In sum, an impressive body of 
literature now indicates that those with poor posttraumatic psychological adjustment 
have particular negative appraisals about the trauma and the events following trauma 
(e.g. Dalgleish, 2004; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), 
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2.9 Definition of Self-Concept 
 Self-concept represents one’s personhood and acts as the reference point from 
which all else draws meaning (Combs & Snygg, 1959; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). It 
is an active, continuous and changing array of accessible self-knowledge and a 
framework for the perception and organization of one’s life experiences (Markus & 
Wurf, 1987). Trauma has the potential to shatter an individual’s understanding of the 
self  (Janoff-Bulman 1992). Indeed research suggests that trauma causes internal 
disorganization and disintegration, shattered assumptions and feelings of self-
annihilation (Abernathy, 2008) and in so doing disrupts one’s continuity which is vital 
to maintain a coherent self-concept (Erikson, 1980).  
Disruptions in identity can affect the self by damaging or altering the self’s 
worth, motivations, goals, sense of security and ultimately self-concept. In order to 
regain continuity and coherence, research suggests that individuals engage in a 
schema change to arrive at new understandings of oneself and the world (Abernathy, 
2008; Brennam 2001). This schema change allows for the formation of a new sense of 
self or self-concept which research suggests helps one to overcome trauma 
(Neimeyer, 2006). Therefore, one’s self-concept or identity is not static (Bradley, 
Calvert, Pitts, & Redman, 2001; McAdams, 1993). 
 
2.10 Cognitive Models of PTSD  
2.10.1 Autobiographical Memory and the Self-Memory System (SMS) 
Memory functioning has been identified as a significant factor in PTSD, with 
a bias towards enhanced recall of trauma-related material and difficulties in retrieving 
autobiographical memories of specific incidents (Williams et al., 2007; see Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003 for further details). The hallmark symptom of PTSD is the intrusive 
recollection of autobiographical memories of the trauma which often occur as vivid, 
highly emotive, sensory-laden flashbacks, reliving experiences, intrusive thoughts and 
images, and nightmares (Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996). Paradoxically, this 
elevated involuntary access to memories of the trauma is often accompanied by 
compromised voluntary access to coherent accounts of what happened during 
traumatic experiences (Brewin, 2011). Hence, the phenomenological properties of 
trauma accounts often include being fragmented, temporally disorganized and laden 
with sensory-perceptual features (Brewin 2011; Brewin et al., 1996; Foa, Molnar, & 
Cashman, 1995; O’Kearney & Perrott, 2006). These autobiographical memory 
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difficulties have been found to extend beyond the trauma memory to more global 
autobiographical remembering. For instance, research has found that those with PTSD 
have significant difficulties in providing specific autobiographical memories of 
everyday events (i.e. memories of an event lasting less than one day and occurring at 
a particular time and place). Instead PTSD sufferers tend to retrieve categoric 
overgeneral memories (i.e. memories for collections of events) – a phenomenon 
known as reduced autobiographical memory specificity (AMS) (see Moore & 
Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). Another example of a global autobiographical 
memory difficulty relates to memories of experiences that reflect and inform one’s 
self-concept (Singer & Salovey, 1993). Research has shown that when asked to 
provide such self-defining memories, the responses of those with PTSD, when 
compared to trauma survivors without PTSD, tend to be strongly associated with their 
trauma experience (Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008a; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005).  
 Moreover, there is a strong intuitive and theoretical tradition linking 
autobiographical memory and the self. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) purport 
autobiographical memory to be of fundamental significance for the self and for the 
experience of personhood, and propose that autobiographical memories function as a 
“resource of the self that could be used to sustain or change aspects of the self” 
(p.264).  
 Conway’s Self-Memory System (SMS; Conway 2005; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) is a conceptual framework that emphasizes this interconnectedness of 
self and memory. It is a cognitive model of autobiographical memory, which has also 
been used to account for PTSD, given the prominence of autobiographical memory in 
this disorder (Conway 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The SMS has two 
principle components: the autobiographical knowledge base (i.e. a hierarchically 
arranged database of one’s memories), which supports our sense of self, and the 
working self, which is comprised of a goal hierarchy and motivations, which acts to 
maintain a stable and coherent set of goals and provides a framework for 
understanding present experience. This in turn allows for a stable self-image based on 
the coherence of the goal hierarchy, as information consistent with the contents of the 
working self is more easily integrated into the autobiographical memory database.  
The SMS framework also recognizes a working self-conceptual knowledge 
base, which regulates autobiographical remembering alongside the working self. The 
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conceptual self is comprised of abstracted information about self over a longer-term 
perspective (Conway, 2005). They are representations of socially constructed schema 
and categories that define the self, others, and typical interactions with others and the 
surrounding world. These schema and categories are “drawn from the influence of 
familiar and peer socialization, schooling, religion, as well as the stories, fairy-tales, 
myths, and media influences that are constitutive of an individual’s culture” (Conway, 
2005, p. 597). Consequently, the SMS’ conceptualization of the self is sympathetic to 
cultural considerations (i.e. a self which is in part informed by its culture).  
The SMS proposes that in the case of trauma, a trauma event has the potential 
to contradict one’s goal hierarchies and in so doing undermines the coherency of the 
self. Consequently, this violation of current plans and goals does not allow for the 
integration of the trauma experience with the autobiographical knowledge base and 
therefore the self is unable to adapt (Conway, 2005). Rather the memory remains un-
contextualized event-specific knowledge (Conway, 2005). The fact that the trauma 
memory remains an un-contextualized experience can account for several of the 
memory problems associated with PTSD. For instance, this lack of integration gives 
the memory a sense of “nowness”, which research suggests is an important feature of 
intrusive memories (Kleim, Wallott & Ehlers, 2008) and is associated with 
“flashbacks” for those with PTSD. Empirical work supports this; trauma survivors 
with PTSD describe their intrusive memories occurring in the “here and now” to a 
greater extent than those without PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). What is more, while 
intrusive memories are common immediately precipitating traumatic events, neither 
their presence nor their frequency have been found to be good predictors of PTSD, 
instead autobiographical memories described with this sense of “nowness” have been 
found to be more predictive of PTSD (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2004).  
In sum, the SMS model considers autobiographical memories to be “primarily 
records of success or failure in goal attainment” (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, p. 
266). It also proposes that a tension exists between maintaining a correspondence 
between the self and real life experiences and maintaining a sense of coherence in self 
across time. If inconsistencies arise due to a trauma event acting as a “threat to current 
plans and goals” (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, p.281) this subsequently renders 
the working self unable to adapt. Further, it can lead to a lack of integration of the 
trauma memory and thus the trauma memory remains un-contextualised within the 
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autobiographical knowledge base/life story. This in turn increases susceptibility to 
intrusions and other memory problems associated with PTSD (Brewin et al., 
1996; Dalgleish & Power, 2004) perpetuating a failure to adapt posttrauma. The 
trauma memory is therefore poorly elaborated and inadequately integrated into its 
context in time and place with other autobiographical memories and the conceptual 
self. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) SMS model therefore provides a 
conceptual bridge linking the large body of research on autobiographical memory 
retrieval and self. Additionally, Conway (2005) proposes, socialization and culture 
must play some role in remembering as one’s conceptual self is represented in 
socially constructed schema and categories that define the self. Such assertions make 
this framework sympathetic to cultural considerations.  
2.10.2 Ehlers and Clark’s Cognitive Appraisal Model 
The prominent cognitive model of PTSD, put forward by Ehlers and Clark 
(2000), as shown in Figure 1, suggests that PTSD becomes persistent when 
individuals process the trauma in a way that leads to a sense of serious current threat. 
One way in which this sense of current threat can arise, is due to excessively negative 
appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae, which can be external (e.g. the world is a 
more dangerous place) or internal (e.g. a threat to one's view of oneself as a 
capable/acceptable person who will be able to achieve important life goals); and 
secondly, disturbance of autobiographical memory. The importance of the role 
appraisals play in the development and maintenance of PTSD is highlighted 
throughout this model. Ehlers and Clark (2000) maintain that appraisals of the trauma 
and its consequences serve to cultivate a sense of continued current threat; this is 
often accompanied by intrusions, arousal symptoms and other distressing emotional 
responses. Therefore, the individual is motivated to engage in cognitive and 
behavioral strategies to reduce perceived threat and distress. Namely, as Figure 1 
illustrates, these appraisals maintain PTSD because they directly produce negative 
emotions, such as anxiety, depression or anger while encouraging individuals to 
engage in dysfunctional coping strategies which to their detriment have the 
paradoxical effect of enhancing PTSD symptoms; because while avoidance and safety 
behavioral strategies reduce distress in the short-term, they maintain the disorder in 
the long-term by preventing cognitive change. 
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The two main types of negative appraisals purported by Ehlers and Clark 
(2000) are that of over-generalization, whereby the individual perceives a range of 
normal activities to be more dangerous than they are in reality (e.g. avoidance of 
driving after a car accident), from exaggerations of the probability of occurrence of 
further catastrophe in general, and from interpretations of the occurrence of the event 
happening to them and not others (e.g. “bad things always happen to me”). The 
second is negative appraisals of the way one felt or behaved during the event (e.g. ``I 
deserve that bad things happen to me''), which can have long-term threatening 
implications.  Other appraisals include one’s interpretation of their PTSD symptoms. 
For instance, if a trauma survivor does not perceive their symptoms to be part of a 
normal recovery process it could lead to appraisals of having permanently changed 
for the worse (e.g. “I am permanently damaged”); while the interpretations of other 
people’s reactions (e.g. “Others think I cannot cope”) are likely to lead to PTSD 
symptoms of estrangement from others and social withdrawal.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A cognitive model of PTSD. Taken from Ehlers, A., & Clark, D. M. (2000). 
A cognitive model of posttraumatic stress disorder. Behavior Research and Therapy, 
38(4), 319 -345. 
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While not the focus of this research, the appraisal model also emphasizes the 
role of autobiographical memory in PTSD. Specifically, the model proposes that 
intrusive characteristics and patterns of retrieval characteristic of persistent PTSD 
(e.g. poor intentional recall, vivid unintentional re-experiencing with ‘here and now’ 
quality) is due to the way the trauma is encoded and laid down in memory (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). It is due to this poor encoding during the trauma that individuals are 
unable to elaborate or incorporate the information in to their autobiographical 
memory base, which Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose explains problematic 
intentional recall and the “nowness” quality of the memory. Namely, the trauma 
memories are experienced as if they were happening in the individual’s current time 
and space rather than from one’s past. Therefore, the awareness of remembering that 
is part of autobiographical memory (remembering oneself in the past in the present) is 
absent (Ehlers & Clark 2000; Foa & Rothbaum 1998); which only serves to 
perpetuate this sense of current threat (see Figure 1 and Ehlers & Clark, 2000, for full 
details). Moreover, a reciprocal relationship between the trauma memory and trauma 
appraisals is noted. Specifically, when an individual with persistent PTSD recalls the 
traumatic event, their recall is biased by their appraisals. This in turn results in 
selective retrieval of information that is consistent with negative appraisals. 
In sum, the appraisal model purports PTSD as a resultant of excessively 
negative appraisals of the trauma and/or sequelae and a disturbance of 
autobiographical memory which is characterized by poor elaboration, strong 
associative memory and strong perceptual priming which subsequently go on to 
produce a sense of serious and current threat. Moreover, throughout the appraisal 
model the association between the self (i.e. one’s understanding of one’s self-concept 
and the manner in which it is at least in part constitutive of an individual’s culture) 
and appraisals are highlighted (e.g. the impact of trauma appraisals on self and 
subsequent future appraisals concerning self), thereby opening this model up to 
cultural considerations. 
 
 2.10.3 Multiple Self-Representations 
 Many theorists believe one’s self-concept to be a collection of ‘multiple selves’ 
(Brewin, 2003; Higgins, 1987; McConnell, 2010). The dual representation theory 
(DRT, Brewin & Holmes, 2003) elucidates multiple selves to be experienced at 
different times and in different contexts due to the manner in which they correspond 
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to structures in long-term memory. DRT proposes there are two or more memory 
systems that operate in parallel to each other but with the ability for one to take 
precedent over the other at any time (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). Therefore, one’s self 
is experienced as different self-experiences at different times and in different contexts 
and therefore creates multiple self-representations or identities, which then compete to 
be retrieved. These identities provide “a series of high-level frameworks that 
summarize experiences with the world and with close relationships, and within which 
specific thoughts, images, or impulses are organized” (Brewin & Holmes, 2003, 
p.359).  
The DRT (Brewin et al., 1996) suggests there are two memory systems that 
operate in parallel but one system can take precedence over the other at different 
times. The Situationally Accessible Memory (SAM) system is limited to material that 
was encoded using lower level perceptual processing of the traumatic scene, such as 
sights and sounds, and thus, can only be accessed involuntarily through situational 
reminders of the trauma. The Verbally Accessible Memory (VAM) system includes 
material that was consciously processed during the traumatic event and can be 
accessed through voluntary recall and described verbally. Ideally, SAMs are 
integrated with VAMs to form an elaborate and coherent account of the trauma event. 
However, under extreme stress the conscious processing that leads to VAMs is 
impaired resulting in the domination of the SAM system (Brewin et al., 1996). As a 
result of very little information being encoded in the VAM system, memories of the 
trauma are repeatedly brought to mind as sensory and emotional fragments. As the 
SAM system does not use a verbal code, these memories are difficult to voluntarily 
communicate to others and the memories do not necessarily interact with, and get 
updated by other autobiographical knowledge (see Figure 2). More recently the VAM 
system has been referred to as contextual memory (C-memory), which is abstract, 
contextually bound representations and its representations as C-reps. Similarly, SAMs 
has more recently been referred to as low-level sensation-based memory (S-memory) 
and its corresponding representations (S-reps) (see Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & 
Burgess, 2010, for further details). 
  Additionally, when considered in the context of trauma and PTSD, 
individuals often have common negative identities that perceive the self as powerless, 
inferior, futureless, namely, vulnerable identities (Brewin, 2003). These negative 
cognitions are evoked due to difficulties in retrieving positive self-identities or 
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negative self-identities are reactivated due to the trauma experience, thereby 
delineating the competition in self-concept retrieval. Therefore, the trauma event can 
be seen to have power over one’s cognitions (views of self and world) and more 
worryingly, threatening one’s sense of self (Brewin, 2003). The exploration of 
alternative identities is used as a source to reduce and or modify negative cognitions 
and addressing vulnerable identities. Further, the self-concept of those with PTSD can 
become fragmented, dominated by thoughts and memories of trauma and altered as a 
result of the trauma memory becoming the turning point in construction of self-
concept and dominating much of a person’s mental life (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 
Brewin, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2. Completeness of verbally accessible memories and activation of the fear 
system. Taken from Brewin, C. (2001). A cognitive neuroscience account of 
posttraumatic stress disorder and its treatment. Behavior Research and Therapy, 
39(4), 373-393. 
 
 In sum the DRT (Brewin, 2001; Brewin & Holmes, 2003) proposes, many of 
the features and details that arise after experiencing a traumatic event (e.g. sounds, 
smells) are initially retained in the SAM system, as this system represent sensory 
information and spatial images. The information stored in this system is not 
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understood or integrated, therefore, cues or stimuli associated with the trauma can 
therefore activate or prime content in this memory system, resulting in subsequent 
experiencing of intrusive images and/or flashbacks, both of which are hallmarks of 
PTSD (Brewin 2001). The VAM system is engaged when the trauma exposed 
individual endeavors to integrate information relating to the trauma event. Therefore 
if SAM information is integrated with material that was consciously processed during 
the traumatic event in the VAM then an elaborate and coherent account of the trauma 
event can be formed, thereby reducing subsequent maladaptive experiences. Finally, 
research proposes the self is made up of multiple identities, however, following a 
trauma negative self-identities (the self as powerless, inferior, futureless) can emerge 
and have been found to hold clout over one’s cognitions. This subsequently affects 
one’s future self-concept, as the self is still perceived to be under threat. The 
exploration of alternative identities can help redress such vulnerable identities. 
2.10.4 The Schematic, propositional, analogue and associative 
representational systems (SPAARS) model 
The SPAARS model put forward by Power and Dalgleish (1997; Dalgleish, 
2004) delineates an integrative cognitive model of emotion, in which emotions are 
described as appraisal-based goal-discrepancy accounts. Traditional models of 
cognition and emotion present the relationship between the two as a single sequential 
process (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962), as expressed in Figure 3.  
 
 Cognition    Emotion 
 
Figure 3. Cognition and Emotion 
                                                                     
However, the SPAARS model suggests a more complex multi-level 
processing system, which has four levels of representation (see Figure 4). The 
analogical system refers to a collection of primarily sensory-specific systems (e.g. 
vision, hearing, taste, smell, touch), which provide the initial processing of external 
events that are often emotion provoking. The associative system in general operates 
automatically and outside one’s awareness. The propositional system represents 
verbal-linguistic statements (propositions). Finally, the schematic model system is the 
high-level system that is similar to the notion of schema and represents abstract, 
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generic knowledge. This level of representation refers to the “dynamic and ever-
changing models of the self and the world are constructed and which provides overall 
executive control. In relation to emotion, effortful appraisal of events and situations 
leads to schematic models that generate emotions; appraisals typically evaluate events 
and situations in relation to key goals, both personal and interpersonal, with the 
appraisal outcomes generating different emotions” (Power, 2007, p. 138). 
 
 
Figure 4. SPAARS model of emotion. Taken from Power, M. J. (2009). Cognitive 
psychopathology: The role of emotion. Análise Psicológica, 2(XXVII), 127-141. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4, these four proposed systems combine to produce 
two routes to emotion. The first is the appraisal driven route, in which event and event 
interpretations are appraised at the schematic level of meaning. For instance, “fear is 
generated when there is an appraisal of threat because a schema is constructed in 
working memory, which represents the possible future interpretation or non-
completion of a valued goal” (Dalgleish, 2004, p.248). The second proposed route is 
the automatic route via associative representations. Namely, emotions that are 
activated without appraisals are a result of “biologically prepared, repeated or 
overlearned relationships” (Dalgleish, 2004, p249).  
 When thought of in relation to PTSD, the SPAARS model stresses the 
importance of the emotional content linked to PTSD. For instance, appraisals of the 
trauma information produce an intense experience of fear (Dalgleish, 2004). These 
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chronic activations are believed to configure one’s cognitive system to attend to 
trauma related cues, which are then selectively processed. This in turn re-enforces the 
sense of current and constant threat. Thus demonstrating one’s cognitive system’s 
persistent inability to resolve discrepancies between trauma-related information and 
pre-existing mental representations (i.e. schemas) based on appraisals. Further, they 
go on to act as a basis for the disorder (Dalgleish & Power, 2004), because it leads to 
characteristic symptom patterns of PTSD, such as re-experiencing and avoidance of 
trauma-related material (Dalgliesh & Power, 2004). In addition to this idea that 
trauma cannot be assimilated to any preexisting knowledge structures, other theorists 
have suggested that it may be assimilated to negative schematic models of the self 
(Dalgleish, 1999; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998), negative beliefs (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), or 
negative identities (Brewin, 2004), all of which are analogous to PTSD development 
and maintenance.  
 
 2.10.5 Trauma as Central to Self-concept Model 
 Theorists have posited that trauma can become central to one’s self-concept and 
a trauma-centered self-concept leads to increases in PTSD symptom severity. While 
somewhat contentious, Berntsen and Rubin (2006, 2007) postulate that the trauma 
event affects self-knowledge through the violation of an individual’s schemata 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). They theorize, in contrast to the above theories, that the 
trauma memory is not poorly integrated or fragmented. Instead, they believe the 
trauma memories are distinct, emotionally charged, and due to enhanced integration 
are highly accessible and act as cognitive reference points for the organization of 
other autobiographical memories. This in turn can potentially go on to effect 
interpretations of future non-traumatic experiences and future expectations (Berntsen 
& Rubin, 2007; Smeets et al., 2010). Namely, the trauma event becomes highly 
salient to the individual’s life script and acts as a major causal event on which to base 
future interpretations, thereby subverting self-concept and maintaining a trauma 
centered self-concept. This account is also reflective of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
conception of a continued perceived sense of current threat. Evidence to support 
enhanced integration of trauma memories was further investigated by Bernsten and 
Rubin (2006) to examine their previous claims. They went on to developed the 
Centrality of Event Scale (CES), which measures the extent to which one’s traumatic 
memory forms as a central component of their self-concept. This measure advocates 
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enhanced integration of the trauma memory to one’s self-concept and has increasingly 
been used by researchers to assess the influence of trauma on self-concept (e.g., 
Robinaugh & McNally, 2011). These studies have reported positive associations 
between CES scores and PTSD symptom severity in undergraduate students (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010) combat veterans 
(Brown, Antonius, Kramer, Root, & Hirst, 2010) and women reporting a history of 
childhood sexual abuse (Robinaugh & McNally, 2011). Other studies using other 
methodologies, such as self-defining memory tasks (i.e. participants are asked to 
provide memories that they remember very clearly, is important to them and engender 
strong feelings) have demonstrated how useful this method can be. As Blagov and 
Singer (2004) assert, people use important memories as a reference to cogitate about 
current situations or goals. Further, self-defining memories have a tendency to contain 
meaningful content, and demonstrate what kinds of situations or events a person is 
inclined to avoid or attain. Sutherland and Bryant’s (2005) study on self-defining 
memory in PTSD used this methodology and found those with PTSD had greater 
trauma-centered self-definition. Specifically, individuals with PTSD were more likely 
to recall trauma-related memories than individuals without PTSD. Further, holding 
trauma-related goals was an independent predictor of recalling trauma-related 
memories. Jobson and O’Kearney’s (2008) study investigating cultural differences in 
goals, self-defining memories, and self-cognitions in those with and PTSD found 
similar results. In their study, trauma survivors with PTSD from independent cultures 
reported more goals, self-defining memories, and self-cognitions that were trauma-
related than those with PTSD. Collectively, these studies suggest that a trauma-
centered self-concept is associated with PTSD symptoms.  
 To summarize, evidence suggests that trauma can potentially become central 
to self-concept and inform one’s self-concept, in turn this has been found to be 
positively correlated with PTSD symptoms (Rubin, 2005). Further, Berntsen and 
Rubin (2006) assert that the recollections of emotionally charged memories [e.g. 
trauma memories] are potentially shaped by culture. Indeed, they insist that theories 
of autobiographical memory minimize the impact of culture on the content and 
structure of autobiographical memory, when instead they should be looking to culture 
to help further inform theories of autobiographical memory. Subsequently, their 
approach is clearly drawn into the cultural sphere due to their inclusion of self-
  30 
concept, life scripts and cultural expectations in regards to self-concept and in the 
development and/or maintenance of PTSD. 
 
2.10.6 Summary of Cognitive Models 
The models delineated above are internally sound and account for much of the 
phenomena observed in PTSD. Conway’s (2005) SMS models proposes the self and 
memory are interconnected. Within this framework the working self (conceived as a 
complex set of active goals and associated self-images) has a reciprocal relationship 
with long-term memory. However, threats to current plans and goals (i.e. the self) can 
lead to the working self not adapting, this in turn potentially leads to a lack of 
integration, remaining as un-contextualized within the autobiographical knowledge 
base/life story. This in turn increases susceptibility to intrusions and other memory 
problems associated with PTSD. Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model proposes PTSD 
becomes persistent when individuals process the trauma in a way that leads to a sense 
of serious and current threat. Further, this sense of threat arises as a consequence of 
excessively negative appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae and a disturbance of 
autobiographical memory characterized by poor elaboration and contextualization, 
strong associative memory and strong perceptual priming. These dysfunctional and 
negative appraisals and dysfunctional trauma memories consequently influence 
problematic behavioral and cognitive strategies, which are the underlying factors for 
PTSD development and maintenance. In Dalgleish’s (2004) SPAARS model 
emotions are described as appraisal-based goals-discrepancies and there are two 
routes for the generation of these emotions; an appraisals driven route and a direct 
route in which the appraisals have become automatized. Thus the SPAARS model 
serves as a useful approach for understanding the affective deficits in various 
disorders, such as in PTSD. 
Brewin’s (2003) model focuses on DRT and elucidates multiple selves to be 
experienced at different times and contexts due to the manner in which they 
correspond to structures in long term memory. The model accounts for the 
unsuccessful adaption of trauma by emphasizing its relation to trauma processing in 
memory, namely the trauma gives rise to two memory systems, the SAM and VAM. 
However, when under extreme stress, such as during a trauma, inhibited processing 
can occur, which gives rise to PTSD phenomena such as reliving experiences. Whilst 
Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006, 2007) model proposes that trauma can become integral 
  31 
to self-concept, and this trauma centrality is associated with PTSD symptoms. 
Overall, Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006, 2007) and Brewin’s (2003) approaches are 
predicated on self-concept, social roles and life scripts, all of which implicate the self 
(which in turn is influenced by culture) in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD, consequently drawing their models into the cultural sphere. Additionally, 
Conway’s (2005), Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) and Dalgleish’s (2004) models all center 
around and implicate the self (via memories, appraisals and emotions), thereby also 
drawing these models in to the cultural sphere. 
 
2.11 Empirical evidence relevant to Appraisals and Self-concept 
Here we review the current evidence relating to the role of cognitive 
appraisals and self-concept, given their centrality in this thesis and in PTSD 
development and maintenance. 
 
2.11.1 Appraisals 
The importance of the role of negative appraisals in PTSD has been well 
substantiated. There is a large body of evidence showing that the way in which an 
individual appraises events posttrauma has significant implications for their mental 
health (e.g. Bryant & Guthrie, 2005; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Foa & Riggs, 1993). For 
instance, Dunmore, Clark, and Ehlers (2001) investigated negative appraisals of the 
traumatic event and negative appraisals of the sequelae of the trauma. They found 
cognitive variables that significantly predicted PTSD severity at both follow-ups 
were: cognitive processing style during assault (mental defeat, mental confusion, 
detachment); appraisal of assault sequelae (appraisal of symptoms, perceived negative 
responses of others, permanent change); negative beliefs about self and world; and 
maladaptive control strategies (avoidance/safety seeking). Further, relationships 
between early appraisals, control strategies, and processing styles and subsequent 
PTSD severity remained significant after statistically controlling for gender and 
perceived assault severity. 
Further work on negative trauma-related cognitive appraisals has found 
appraisals referring to the self, world and self-blame (as indexed by the Posttraumatic 
Cognitions Inventory; PTCI, Foa et al., 1999) have been established as being 
significantly related to PTSD symptom severity and in predicting chronic PTSD (e.g. 
Agar, Kennedy, & Kind, 2006; Beck et al., 2004; Kleim et al., 2007). Additionally, 
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other work on negative appraisals has also found a relationship with PTSD severity, 
such as negative appraisal of actions (Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs & Murdock, 1991; 
Frazier & Schauben, 1994;) negative appraisals of PTSD symptoms (Clohessy & 
Ehlers, 1999; Dunmore et al., 1997; Ehlers et al., 1998; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Steil & 
Ehlers, 2000) and negative perception of other’s responses (Davis, Brickman, & 
Baker, 1991; Dunmore et al., 1997, 1999). These empirical findings have much 
bearing on PTSD definition and diagnoses and treatment plans, their application in 
redressing PTSD symptoms are discussed below under the Clinical Implications 
heading (section, 2.12). 
 
2.11.2 Self-concept 
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between self-concept 
posttrauma and PTSD (e.g. Brennan, 2001; Brewin, 2011; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). 
These studies have found self-concept to be of significant importance to 
psychological well-being. The trauma event acts as a catalyst for a re-defining or re-
evaluating one’s self-concept, as one is prompted to make sense of the experience. 
Finding meaning in an otherwise incomprehensible situation potentially leads to a 
possible schema change, and in so doing, one’s possible selves are subject to change 
and potentially result in a new or discrepant self-concept (Brewin, 2011). Western 
psychological theories purport such inconsistencies and discrepancies in self-concept 
(i.e. a fractured or incongruent self) have been linked with various forms of 
psychological maladjustment (Brewin, 2011; Higgins, 1996; Strauman & Higgins, 
1987; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008).  
 Other work demonstrates trauma can have a negative impact on self-concept; 
specifically for some trauma survivors, self-concept can become trauma-centered. 
These alterations have been found to be associated with disrupted posttraumatic 
psychological adjustment (e.g. Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007). Groleau, Calhoun, 
Cann and Tedeschi’s (2013) study examined the contribution of centrality of event to 
the development of posttraumatic distress and found the centrality of the event to be a 
unique predictor. Brown, Antonius, Kramer, Root and Hirst (2010) support this 
assertion, professing research to have demonstrated that the extent to which an 
individual integrates a traumatic event into their self-concept (i.e. trauma centrality) is 
associated with PTSD and PTSD symptom severity. Their study investigated the role 
of trauma centrality in PTSD in a sample of veterans returning from Iraq and 
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Afghanistan. Brown et al (2010) found that even in a sample of individuals exposed to 
combat stress, trauma centrality (using the abridged CES) did indeed predicted PTSD 
symptoms. Indeed, since its inception, progressively more researchers are using 
Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006) CES to examine the impact of trauma as a central aspect 
of one’s self-concept. These studies have found CES scores for traumatic events to be 
positively associated with PTSD symptom severity among undergraduates (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010) among combat 
veterans (Brown et al., 2010) and in adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse 
(Robinaugh & McNally, 2011). Ogle, Rubin, Berntsen & Seigler (2013) examined the 
frequency and impact of exposure to potentially traumatic events in a nonclinical 
sample of older adults. In their sample approximately 90% of participants experienced 
one or more potentially traumatic events. When these events occurred with greater 
frequency early in the life course, they were associated with more severe PTSD 
symptoms compared to events that occurred with greater frequency during later 
decades. Thereby suggesting that trauma does become central to self-concept and 
identity, especially when they occur early in life. 
 
2.12 Clinical Implications 
 The socio-cultural models of PTSD have guided current clinical practice. 
Generally, the models (e.g. Conway, 2005; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) predict that positive 
adaption to trauma should involve the development of conceptual associations 
between appraisals of the event, autobiographical memory of the event and current 
self-concept. As illustrated throughout the models of PTSD cited above, a core 
treatment mechanism is the change in dysfunctional appraisals of the trauma and its 
aftermath. Namely, contemporary clinical theories propose cognitive restructuring to 
modify catastrophic appraisals about current threat and future harm (using cognitive 
behavior therapy) is critical for positive outcome when treating people with disrupted 
adjustment following trauma. This often involves targeting the coping strategies 
developed in response to the trauma experience that can extend and/or worsen the 
symptoms. Additionally, exposure therapy is also used to lessen the fear (and 
therefore fear appraisals) about the trauma memory. In addition, it helps individuals to 
understand their thoughts about the trauma in respect to their self-image, self-concept 
and goals. Thereby facilitating the integration of the trauma memory, subsequent 
trauma appraisals and posttrauma self-concept into existing self-knowledge (Hembree 
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& Foa, 2004). This facilitation can also be achieved through cognitive therapy using 
self-schema work, to aid in the reintegration of a healthy self-concept/posttrauma self-
concept. This aspect of cognitive therapy aims to address traumatized identities and 
“vulnerable identities” such as the self being powerless, inferior, nonexistent and 
futureless (Brewin, 2003). It works to integrate the individual’s current view of the 
self following trauma such as “I am a victim” or “I am damaged” with pre-trauma 
views and their life story.   
Furthermore, Herman (1992) proposed the core experiences of psychological 
trauma were disempowerment (i.e. a loss of autonomy) and disconnection from others 
(i.e. loss of relatedness/interdependence). Treatment, therefore, is based upon the 
empowerment of the survivor, “She must be the author of her own recovery." 
(Herman, 1992, p. 133) and assisting the survivor to make new 
connections/relationships. Thus the role of significant others is brought to light and 
their role is to help the survivor in rebuilding their former and positive self. Monson, 
Rodriguez and Warner (2004) second this and propose interpersonal relationship 
functioning has been implicated in the development, maintenance, and possibly the 
amelioration of PTSD. For instance, Ehlers, Maercker and Boos (2000) find this 
interpersonal support assists the trauma survivor in correcting negative beliefs about 
themselves and others. While Brewin, Andres and Valentine (2000) have also found 
social support to be one of the more robust and consistent factors predicting the 
development of PTSD. Hence there appears to be a clinical emphasis on increasing 
autonomy in trauma survivors and a secondary focus on the role of relatedness and 
interpersonal relationships in the treatment of maladjustment following trauma.  
 
2.13 Overall Chapter Summary 
Since the emergence of PTSD into the DSM-III (1980) there has been a wealth 
of research and findings delving in to its etiology, maintenance and treatment. 
Answers are needed to help alleviate the burden and cost generated by PTSD, as 
research has demonstrated PTSD is of great economical, social and emotional burden 
to sufferers, their families and national health systems. 
 Braquehais and Sher (2010) report that while many of the signs and symptoms 
of PTSD are universal patterns of post-traumatic distress, there still remain culture-
specific expressions of this distress which could account for differences in PTSD 
prevalence rates from country to country (e.g., Braquehais & Sher, 2010; Pham, 
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Weinstein & Longman, 2004). Thus, whilst there is increasing recognition that PTSD 
is observed in many different societies and cultures (Foa, Keane, Friedman & Cohen, 
2009; Jobson, 2009), it remains relatively unknown as to whether the processes 
involved in its development and maintenance are culturally similar or distinct.  
 The cognitive models delineated above inform current understandings of PTSD 
and indicates that PTSD becomes persistent when the trauma is processed in a way 
that leads individuals to believe the threat is serious and current. One way in which 
this sense of current threat can arise is due to excessively negative appraisals of the 
trauma and/or its sequelae, which can be external (e.g. the world is a more dangerous 
place) or internal (e.g. a threat to one’s view of oneself as a capable/acceptable person 
who will be able to achieve important life goals) (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Other risk 
factors for developing and maintaining PTSD are tied to a fracturing or discrepant 
self-concept, which can lead to incongruent and maladaptive cognitions that in turn 
reinforce a traumatized self and disrupted sense of self-concept. While not the focus 
of this thesis, it is important to note there are several other influencing factors 
pertaining to the development and maintenance of PTSD including disruption to one’s 
motivations and goals, disturbance of autobiographical memory and dysfunctional 
schemas/core beliefs. 
PTSD as a construct has been criticized, however, it needs to be noted that it 
has been found to be useful in guiding the treatment of traumatized individuals (Hunt, 
2010). Yet, while models of PTSD do account for much of the phenomena observed 
in the disorder, each model discussed above has resolute links to the self, yet they 
have stopped short of considering the theory of self-construal (discussed in Chapter 3) 
and its cultural implications. Therefore, considering a cross-cultural and intercultural 
approach is needed to better understand how PTSD manifests, especially if this 
construct is to be applied in a global setting.  
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Chapter 3 
Culture, the Self and PTSD 
 
“If we see from Buddhist point of view, then we Tibetans are suffering because of our 
collective bad karmas which we had done. Otherwise there are no reasons why should 
we suffer so much in our life. So, I accept whatever happens in my life as results of 
my past karmas. One cannot do anything about it.” 
 
(Hussain & Bhushan, 2010, p. 528) 
 
In the ever growing face of globalization the impact and influence of culture 
and cultural diversity is of increasing importance for cross-cultural and trauma 
psychology. This is of particular importance because culture can mediate responses to 
situations, including traumatic ones. Further, as Hussain (2001) asserts, the very 
essence of what is considered traumatic experiences can vary across cultures. 
Additionally, in the aftermath of trauma meaning making processes are shaped by 
preexisting cultural factors (e.g. values, norms, mores, religious interpretations) which 
can result in culture specific disorders and culturally weighted symptoms (Hussain, 
2007).  
As previously outlined in Chapter 2, many have criticized PTSD, asserting 
that its global construct is problematic due to potential cultural differences in 
symptom meaning (Bracken, Giller & Summerfield, 1995), psychological resilience 
and vulnerability (Hussain & Bhushan, 2010). Despite this, accumulating research is 
continually demonstrating that PTSD is observed in many societies and cultures 
(Jobson, 2009). Therefore, the construct of PTSD may provide a useful way to 
investigate psychological maladjustment in trauma survivors universally and 
consequently, there is a need to improve our understanding of the role of culture in 
development, maintenance and treatment of the disorder (Foa et al., 2009).  
It is with this in mind that Chapter 3 will outline the place of culture in trauma 
studies and its influence on psychological well-being, specifically in relation to 
PTSD. The chapter draws upon prominent theories of cultural variation in self-
construal and their impact on the concepts fundamental to current socio-cognitive 
models of PTSD; paying particular attention to appraisals and self-concept. Thus the 
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links between these concepts and cultural differences in self will be drawn upon to 
transport the PTSD models into the cultural sphere. 
 
3.1 What is culture? 
 Culture, as operationalized in this thesis, is a “group’s characteristic way of 
perceiving its social environment” (Triandis, Malpass, & Davidson, 1972, p. 3), 
which includes the group’s particular array of shared beliefs, norms, and values which 
are pronounced and apparent in one’s everyday social practices. One’s culture can be 
seen as products of past behavior in addition to shaping future behavior; thus culture 
is both a product and shaper of human behavior (Segall, Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga, 
1999). 
 
3.2 Cultural Models of Variations in Self-Construal 
There are a number of prominent theories of cultural variation in self-
construal. All pertain to a marked divergence in the manner in which individuals view 
and understand the self, others and world around them, and the interactions between 
these three variables. Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that the manner in which we 
think, feel and act make up an individual’s construal of the self and this in turn is 
influenced by culture. Thus, culture affects how we construe our self-concept and 
subsequently this self-construal influences our subjective experience in various 
domains. For instance, research demonstrates that members of different cultures vary 
in their social cognition and basic social psychological processes, such as value 
orientation, attitudes, attitude-behavior relations, person perception and attribution of 
observed behavior (Cheng 2009; Kuhnen & Haberstroh, 2004; Suh, Diener & 
Updergraff, 2008). These differences can lead to disparities between the two cultures 
in perception, attention and in high-level social cognition such as self-representation 
(Zhu & Han, 2008).    
 
3.2.1 Hofstede’s Model of Cultural Dimensions 
Perhaps the most commonly used dimension in explanations of cross-cultural 
differences in behavior is the individualism-collectivism dimension, put forth by 
Hofstede (1980). This cultural dimension proposes Individualism reflects the extent 
that people emphasize personal goals, while Collectivism is instead giving preference 
to in-group goals over individual goals.  
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 Based on a large body of research, Hofstede (1980; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004) 
ranked societies on this individualism-collectivism dimension. Whereby those 
societies (e.g. Western European) high in individualism were ranked as such due to 
dominant indications of individuality, independence and autonomy. Conversely, 
societies low in individualism (therefore high in collectivism) (e.g., Asian, African, 
Middle Eastern) were ranked as such due to emphasis on interconnectedness with 
others and relatedness (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004). This construct has been 
measured in several ways and has been used to describe, explain and predict 
differences in attitudes, values, behaviors and cognitions and self-concept (Hofstede, 
1980) (for a further overview, see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). 
 Typically, individualist traits characterize those from a Western context (e.g. 
United Kingdom, North America, Australia), whilst collectivistic traits characterize 
individuals from non-Western contexts (e.g. Asian, South American, African). The 
typical characteristics and attributes of individualistic cultures are based on autonomy, 
self-reliance, uniqueness, achievement orientation and competition, having control 
and taking responsibility for one’s actions (Green, Deschamps & Pez, 2005). 
Conversely collectivistic attributes are associated with a sense of duty toward one’s 
group, interdependence with others, a desire for social harmony, and conformity with 
group norms (Green et al., 2005). Thus demonstrating behavior and attitudes of those 
from collectivist cultures are determined by norms or demands of the in-group (i.e. 
those of the family/community). Although there have been many critiques of 
Hofstede's work (see Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1996, for summaries of 
critiques), there is general agreement that the dimensions he proposed hold.  
 
 3.2.2 Allocentrism vs. Idiocentrism 
 Triandis and colleagues (Triandis, 2001; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis & 
Suh, 2002) put forth that cultures differ in levels of cooperation, competition, or 
individualism; and at the psychological level they posit these differences are reflected 
in a personality dimension, which they termed allocentrism versus idiocentrism. 
These dimensions pertain to groups being distinguished based on individualist and 
collectivist values. Idiocentricism places importance on independence, competition, 
and superiority, whilst allocentricism places value on interdependence, in-group 
harmony, and solidarity. Subsequently, research proposes that relational aspects of 
self-view are salient to allocentric individuals, whilst independent aspects of self-view 
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are salient to idiocentric individuals (Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, Iwao, & Sinha, 1995). 
However, within a culture, individuals vary in the degree to which they define 
themselves as being separate from or connected with others (Matsumoto, Weissman, 
Preston, Brown, & Kupperbusch, 1997). Therefore, individual differences in 
allocentrism and idiocentrism would occur in the same manner as with the 
individualism/collectivism dimension (Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985). 
 
 3.2.3 Markus and Kitayama’s Self-Construal Theory 
 It was Markus and Kitayama (1991) who put forth the theory of self-construal; 
the notion that pertains to cultural differences in self. In particular, their theory 
differentiates between two fundamentally differing perspectives on the self, namely, 
an independence vs. interdependence self-construal. An independent or individualistic 
self-construal places the self as being perceived to be fundamentally different from 
others, whereby emphasis is placed on attending to the self and the appreciation of 
one’s difference from others. Thus, important features of an independent self-
construal are centered on one’s autonomous features (e.g. traits, abilities and personal 
attitudes) and the self is conceived as unique, independent and self-contained. 
Moreover, the self behaves in a manner that is consistent with these internal attributes 
and is therefore seen as being detached from the social context; this type of self-
definition is most prominent in Western, individualistic societies (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991, 1994, 2010), where the normative imperative is to be independent 
from others and to discover and express one’s unique attributes. This view of the self 
gives rise to processes such as ‘self-actualization’, ‘realizing oneself’ and ‘developing 
one’s distinct potential’. The Western, independent view of the self is illustrated in 
Figure 5. Expressed in this figure, the large circle represents the self and the smaller 
circles represents specific others, which are separate and outside the self.   
 Conversely, an interdependent self-construal is a typical perspective for those 
from collectivistic cultures such as East Asia. This self-definition places emphasis on 
attending to and fitting in with one’s culture/social context, inter-connectedness of the 
self with others and the importance of harmony and interdependence with others. 
Thus, key features of this interdependent self perspective refers to one’s social roles, 
group memberships and personal relations to important others (Kuhnen & Haberstroh, 
2004). Experiencing interdependence requires perceiving oneself to be part of an 
inclusive and encompassing social relationship in which behavior is determined, 
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contingent on, and to a large extent organized by, the perceived thoughts, feelings and 
actions of others in this relationship (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) in order to achieve 
the normative imperative of maintaining this interdependence among individuals. 
Thus from the perspective of this construal, the self takes on meaning when it is cast 
in the appropriate social relationship; unlike the independent self, this self-construal 
motivates individuals to find a way to fit in with others, fulfill and create obligations 
and in general to become part of various interpersonal relationships, thus becoming 
more interdependent and highlighting the more public aspects of the self. 
Additionally, while this self-construal also possess internal attributes such as traits, 
opinions and personality characteristics, they are understood as situation specific and 
are unlikely to assume a powerful role in regulating overt behavior. The 
interdependent self is illustrated in Figure 5 which expresses that it cannot be 
characterized as a bounded whole.  
 
 
Figure 5. Independent and Interdependent Self-Construal. Taken from Markus, H. R., & 
Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and 
motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224–253. 
 
 In addition to differences in definition, other key differences between an 
independent and an interdependent self-construal pertain to its structure, important 
  41 
features, tasks, role of others and basis of self-esteem. Markus and Kitayama (1991) 
propose that the structure of an independent self is bounded, unitary and stable, while 
an interdependent self is flexible and variable, able to change structure depending on 
the nature of the particular social context. Important features of the independent self 
are internal and private aspects of the self (e.g. abilities, thoughts, feelings), while 
external and public aspects of self are important for the interdependent self (e.g. 
statuses, roles, relationships). The tasks of the independent self are to be unique, 
expresses the self, realizing internal attributes, promoting own goals and being direct, 
such as stating what is on one’s mind. Conversely, tasks of the interdependent self are 
belonging, fitting in, occupying one’s proper place, engaging in appropriate actions 
and promoting others’ goals and being indirect, such as reading or preempting what is 
on others’ mind. The role of others for the independent self is self-evaluation, namely, 
others are important for self-evaluation, social comparison and reflected appraisals; 
while for the interdependent self self-definition is based on relationship with others in 
specific contexts. The basis for self-esteem for the independent self is the ability to 
express the self and validate internal attributes, while for the interdependent self it is 
the ability to adjust, restrain the self and maintain harmony with the social context. 
There is a large body of research holding that individuals from different cultures hold 
divergent views regarding the self, however, Markus and Kitayama (1991) propose 
that these differences are pronounced and that these construal between self, others and 
the relationship between the two are powerful and clearly influenced by differences 
amongst cultures. Thus when a psychological process implicates the self (such as 
those outline in the PTSD models), the degree to which one emphasizes either 
independence or interdependence in their self-concept will affect the outcome 
(Kuhnen & Haberstroh, 2004). Furthermore, Markus and Kitayama (1991, 1994) 
argue that a person’s sense of the self is influenced by his or her cultural background 
and influences in turn how the person thinks, feels and acts. Thus self-construal can 
affect core conceptions, salient identities, self-schema and appraisals; these 
representations govern behavior and individual experiences, including cognitions, 
emotion and motivation. 
 
    3.2.4 Sato’s Self-Organization Theory 
Sato (2001) proposed that there are two basic systems of self-organization. 
Much like Markus and Kitayama, he too groups these two components of the self into 
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two similar categories, autonomy (independence) and relatedness (interdependence), 
which he proposes are essential to a person's well-being regardless of their cultural or 
societal allocation. Autonomy, as put forth by Sato (2001), is characterized as the 
sense of competence, control, achievement, or agency. This aspect of the self is 
focused on control over one’s environment and bodily functioning and serves to 
enhance well-being or sense of self-worth. Subsequently, relatedness is characterized 
as the sense of being "at one with others," of communion or affiliation (i.e. group to 
which the individuals perceived they belong to/with). Additionally, if the individual 
feels this connection to the group and its members, it then becomes essential to belong 
to this group for the individual's well-being. 
In this model, individuals are motivated to achieve both systems of self-
organization. When these systems of self-organization are coordinated effectively, the 
individual is able to understand and behave in accordance with achieving feelings of 
both autonomy and relatedness, which leads to a sense of well-being (Sato, 2001). 
Further, Sato (2001) proposes that despite all individuals holding both sets of self-
systems, autonomy is the most emphasized in individualistic cultures. In addition 
those in individualistic (primarily Western) cultures require high levels of autonomy 
and moderate levels of relatedness to maintain mental health. In contrast, relatedness 
is emphasized in collectivistic cultures (primarily East Asian), with individuals in 
these cultures requiring high levels of relatedness and moderate levels of autonomy to 
maintain mental health. Thereby demonstrating the degree of autonomy and 
relatedness required to maintain mental health in a specific society is affected by 
cultural mores.  
 
3.2.5 Suh’s Theory of Self-Consistency 
As stated above, research demonstrates that all individuals have multiple 
views of themselves. However, the question arises: do all these views need to be 
consistent? Is self-consistency (i.e. maintaining a consistent sense of self across time 
and context) important to everyone? This is the line of enquiry that Suh (2000, 2002) 
adopted when developing the theory of self-consistency. Ingrained in social 
psychological research is the premise that individuals strive to resolve inconsistencies 
which have subsequent effect on mental health. However, Suh (2000, 2002) theorized 
that this emphasis on an internally coherent self-concept is essential to psychological 
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well-being in individualistic societies but not in collectivistic societies where 
consistency among the different aspects of self-concept is not emphasized. Instead 
“multiple selves” are often viewed as coexisting realities for these cultures. 
 Suh (2002) draws upon well-established theories of a stable, consistent self as a 
staple of mental health for individuals from individualistic cultures. He details how 
well a consistent sense of self ingratiates with the cultural beliefs of individualistic 
cultures, namely, holding absolute autonomy of oneself as an individual. He further 
suggests that the individual integrates various components of the self, is consistent 
across situations and allays or realigns information that is inconsistent with a 
congruent self view. This demonstrates a highly self-centered cultural scheme (i.e. the 
self is the principal source of personal meaning and guidance). It is not surprising then 
that in such cultures, self-consistency has been found to be associated with 
maintaining well-being (Heine & Lehman,1999). This is evidenced in many of the 
PTSD models (e.g. Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007; Brewin, 2002; Conway, 2005) 
outlined in Chapter 2. Namely, the traumatic experiences, such as anxiety, tension and 
PTSD originate from a lack of consistency among self-concepts. However, central to 
the self-consistency theory, is that the notion that the importance of self-consistency 
and its relevance for well-being  does not hold true for those in collectivistic cultures 
who instead emphasize interpersonal harmony and therefore are guided by situational 
forces; thereby calling for a self-system that is relatively malleable and highly context 
sensitive (Cousins, 1989; Kitayama & Markus, 1999). Thus the belief that behavior 
should be consistent with internal thoughts is less salient in these cultures, 
demonstrating the collectivistic self to have a high tolerance for inconsistencies. 
Indeed a rigidly held self-consistent view is perceived to be immature or arrogant 
within these cultures due to the value they place on variations in self when engaging 
with various self-relevant groups (e.g. family, friends, work). Thus self-consistency is 
weighted differently across cultures, due to differences in self-beliefs, social context, 
and the relationship between the two. As previously denoted, individualistic cultures, 
view the self to be autonomous, distinct, and self-sufficient (Fiske, Kitayama, 
Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Conversely, collectivistic 
cultural selfhood is augmented through feelings of connectedness with significant 
others (King & Bond, 1985), namely the self is a social product. 
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3.2.6 Higgins’ Self-Discrepancy Theory 
Higgins’ influential self-discrepancy theory (1987) argues that the self can be 
divided into three domains, the ‘Actual self’ (representation of the attributes that one 
believes they actually possess and is one’s basic self concept), the ‘Ideal self’ 
(representation of the attributes that someone would like to possess) and ‘Ought self’ 
(representation of the attributes that someone believes they should or ought to possess 
such as duty, obligations and responsibilities). When these domains are discrepant 
from one another negative affect can occur (e.g. Strauman, 1990; Strauman & 
Higgins, 1987). Furthermore research has found that discrepancies within these 
domains and the significance of these discrepancies differ across cultures. For 
instance East Asians have been found to have a more flexible self-concept than their 
Western counterparts and are more tolerant of apparent contradictions in self-concept 
(Choi & Choi, 2002). It is not surprising then that research has found that those from 
collectivistic cultures have higher self-discrepancy scores than those from an 
individualistic culture (Cukur, 2002).  
Moreover, this tolerance for self-discrepancy and for inconsistencies as 
denoted by Suh (2000, 2002) has also been documented in various other 
psychological domains. For instance, research has found East Asians to be less 
disturbed by cognitively dissonant situations (Heine & Lehman, 1997), they are less 
likely to believe their behavior needs to align with private attitudes, are able to 
accommodate oppositional emotions simultaneously (e.g. happy and sad) 
(Schimmack, Oishi & Diener, 2002) in addition to being less critical of incongruent 
acts displayed between private and public situations (Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001). 
This tolerance in thinking provides further convincing evidence that East Asians have 
a very different self-concept than those individuals in the West. 
 
3.2.7 Dialectic Self-Concept and Dialectic Thinking 
 Further work on the differences in self-concept and cognitive thinking was 
outlined in Peng and Nisbett’s (1999) seminal paper on cultural differences in the 
cognitive tendency toward acceptance of contradiction, which they defined as 
‘dialectical thinking’. This manner of thinking is considered to consist of 
sophisticated approaches towards seeming contradictions and inconsistencies. Much 
research has denoted East Asians as dialectical thinkers, (e.g. Peng & Nisbett, 1999), 
emphasizing change, contradiction, and co-variation, whereby the world is viewed as 
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inherently contradictory (Spencer-Rodgers, Williams & Peng, 2010a). 
Briefly, dialecticism (see Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 
2004 for full details), lends credence to the theory of change (i.e. the universe is 
unpredictable, dynamic, and in constant flux); the theory of contradiction (i.e. two 
supposedly contradictory and oppositional propositions can both be true at the same 
time) and holism (i.e. the part can only be understood in relation to the whole). Using 
these suppositions, research has indeed found East Asians to be more comfortable and 
able to accept psychological contradiction (e.g. conceive themselves as both good and 
bad simultaneously); display greater change and holism in their spontaneous self-
concept (Peng & Nisbett, 1999); and greater inconsistency in their implicit self-beliefs 
and well-being judgments (Schimmack et al., 2002). Moreover, this occurs despite 
research indicating that East Asians do indeed experience cognitive dissonance hence 
making incongruent choices for important others; or when faced with social 
disapproval (Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004), they are nonetheless less 
troubled by such contradiction in their private, self-relevant thoughts, emotions, and 
behaviors (Heine & Lehman, 1997). On the contrary, as Spencer-Rogders, Boucher, 
Mori, Wang and Peng (2009) put forth, Westerners, and those low in dialecticism, 
have been found to strongly endorse polarized responses (i.e. accepting or providing 
positively keyed items and rejecting negatively keyed ones), namely, seeking to 
reconcile inconsistencies, because such discrepancies in their cognitions, emotions 
and behaviors give rise to a state of tension, disequilibrium or dissonance, all of 
which have been linked with poorer psychological well-being (Spencer-Rodgers et al 
2004; Spencer-Rodger, Williams & Peng, 2010; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010a). In 
contrast, in Asian cultures an inconsistent and discrepant self is considered normative 
and therefore these qualities of self are more strongly associated with psychological 
well-being and not psychological distress (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). For 
instance, a study by Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, and Wang (2010) found self-
ambivalence was unrelated to life satisfaction, anxiety, and depression among their 
Chinese sample but it was significantly related among their European American 
sample.  
 
3.2.8 Summary of Cultural Models of Self 
 The theories described above highlight that people in different cultures have 
very different understandings of the self, others and the relationship between the two. 
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These differences are based on cultural understanding and emphasis on self-construal. 
In short, one’s self-construal refers to one’s self-definition and whether this self-
definition is defined as independent of others or interdependent with others. The 
general consensus across the aforementioned theories pertained to those from 
individualistic cultures emphasizing an independent self-construal, while for those 
from collectivistic cultures an interdependent self-construal is emphasized. 
Accordingly, the independent self-construal is defined as separate from the social 
context, bounded, unitary and stable entity, which promotes private aspects of the self 
and self-goals. Its primary aim is to be autonomous, self-reliant and unique (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991). Contrastingly, the interdependent self-construal is perceived as 
connected with the social context, it is flexible, variable and promoting external, 
public aspects of the self. Its primary aim is centered on relatedness with significant 
others, to belong, occupy one’s proper place and engage in appropriate action 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These diverging self-construal have been found in many 
cases to govern individual experience, including self-concept, self-coherence, self-
consistency, appraisals, behavior, motivation, memory, schema and emotion. Despite 
these prevailing cultural differences, it still needs to be borne in mind that individuals 
do have both aspects of self (Sato, 2001).  
 
3.3 Empirical work relating to Cultural Differences in Self-Construal’s Influence 
on Appraisals and Self-Concept 
As outlined in Chapter 2 appraisals are an important mechanism to 
understanding the development and maintenance of PTSD and they offer a means by 
which to provide effective treatment of PTSD symptoms. Their links with the self 
also bring them into the cultural sphere. What is more, while appraisals have not been 
investigated in relation to trauma research within a cultural domain, there has been 
work done on everyday appraisals, which has collated substantial evidence indicating 
appraisals to differ across cultures. This part of the thesis therefore examines to what 
extent culture influences appraisals. 
 
3.3.1 Appraisals 
A basic premise of appraisal theory is that appraisals give rise to emotions and 
can determine the intensity of emotions (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 2001; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). Lazarus (1968) was one of the first to elaborate and explore 
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appraisals and its relationship to emotional consequences of an event and as a result a 
large number of ‘appraisal theories of emotion’ have emerged, in an attempt to predict 
the elicitation and differentiation of emotion on the basis of a derailed set of 
appraisals (van Reekum & Scherer, 1997). Early cross-cultural studies were 
exclusively based on Scherer’s (1984) model, which proposed five evaluative 
appraisal dimensions; novelty, pleasantness, goal/need significance, coping potential 
and self/norm compatibility. The hypothesis of appraisal universality has been tested 
in a number of studies using cross-cultural questionnaires. In these studies 
participants were asked to report instances of specific emotion from their past and 
answer questions about how they appraised these situations/events.  
The most extensive cross-cultural study on appraisals was conducted by 
Scherer and Wallbott (1994). They examined evidence for universality and cultural 
variation of differential emotion response patterning. Using data from a series of 
cross-cultural questionnaire studies in 37 countries on 5 continents, they found strong 
evidence for universality as well as cultural differences in emotional experience, 
including both psychological and physiological responses to emotions.  Specifically, 
results demonstrated highly significant main effects and strong effect sizes for the 
response differences across 7 major emotions (joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, 
shame, and guilt). They reported cultural similarities for joyful situations (e.g. 
reported as very pleasant, enhancing self-esteem); fear (e.g. reporting as unpleasant, 
obstructing goals, hard to cope with); and anger (e.g. unpleasant, unfair). However, 
cultural differences in appraisals across geopolitical regions were also reported. 
Specifically, African countries appraised antecedents of all negative emotions as 
significantly higher on unfairness, external causation and morality. Conversely, Latin 
American countries reported lower ratings of immorality than countries in other 
geopolitical regions. Frijda, Markham, Sato and Wiers (1995) found similar results 
albeit with different emotions and slightly different appraisal dimensions using 
students from the Neatherlands, Indonesia and Japan. 
However, Mauro, Sato and Tucker’s (1992) study used a somewhat different 
methodology, in a comparative study with students in the United States, Japan, Hong 
Kong and the People’s Republic of China. Their method differed in that they asked 
participants to remember times they felt 16 different emotions and to then rate each of 
the eliciting situations on 10 appraisal dimensions (pleasantness, goal/need 
conduciveness, coping ability, norm/self compatibility, control, responsibility, 
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attentional activity, anticipated effort, legitimacy, certainty). Following this, Mauro et 
al. (1992) compared the absolute and relative position of the 16 emotion episodes on 
the appraisal dimensions. They concluded that there were no substantial differences in 
appraisal dimensions among their sample, especially on what they called the more 
primitive dimensions (pleasantness, attentional activity, certainty, coping ability and 
goal/need conduciveness). However, the most substantial differences were found in 
three of the five more complex dimensions (control, responsibility and anticipated 
effort). Roseman, Dhawan, Rettek, Naidu and Thapa (1995) used students from the 
United States and India to study emotions of sadness, anger and fear in a similar 
fashion to Mauro et al. (1992). Using a MANOVA with emotion and culture as 
predictor variables and appraisals as the dependent variable, they found a main effect 
for emotion, which pertained to a universal appraisal-emotion relationship. 
Additionally, significant culture effect and emotion-culture interaction effect was 
found, demonstrating culture to influence the appraisal-emotion relationship. 
Therefore, taken together, these results demonstrate both cultural universality and 
cultural differences in appraisals.  
Since these pioneering studies, cross cultural research has been accumulating 
evidence to suggest that there are culture-specific tendencies to appraise events 
differently (Mesquita and Ellsworth, 2001; Mesquita & Fridja, 1992; Mesquita & 
Walker, 2003; Scherer, Schorr and Johnson, 2001). Mesquita and Ellsworth (2001) 
propose cultural models foster culture-specific appraisal tendencies, which account 
for the cultural differences in the selection and/or prevalence of certain appraisals. 
Mesquita and Frijda (1992) assert that this cultural differentiation may occur due to 
evaluating the event differently in different cultures; that particular appraisals are 
assigned more importance in one culture than another. Alternatively, the nature of the 
appraisal may differ across cultures, whereby individuals in one culture can evaluate 
an event similarly, however, while both may appraise the event to be unpleasant, 
unpleasantness may be more unpleasant for one person than for another (Mauro et al., 
1992; Schimmack et al., 2002). 
These tendencies to appraise events differently have been found in a number 
of studies. For instance the study of agency appraisal (attribution of responsibility for 
and control over event) has been found to differ across cultures. Those from 
individualistic cultures tend to appraise success through a personal sense of control, 
while in collectivistic cultures, agency is not valued as much but rather fate, 
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secondary control, adjustment to the situation, multi-determination of events and the 
interdependence of an individual and their social environment are stressed (Mesquita 
& Walker, 2003). Furthermore, studies have found that these cultural differences have 
even been observed when comparing those from individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures living in a Western, individualistic culture (e.g. Australia, USA; Jobson, 
2009; Jobson & O’Kearney 2008; Mesquita & Karasawa, 2002; Wang & Ross, 2005). 
As demonstrated throughout the empirical studies, independent and 
interdependent cultures appear to differ on appraisals of agency. This particular 
appraisal dimension has a significant impact on psychological well-being. Sastry and 
Ross (1998) investigated the relationship between the sense of personal control and 
psychological well-being using a sample of Westerners, Asian Americans and Asians 
in Asia (Japan, South Korea, China and India). The study found a negative 
relationship between personal control and psychological well-being for Westerners. 
However for the Asian Americans and Asians both reported lower levels of perceived 
control, which they found, might not be related to psychological well-being. 
Reasoning for these relationships were believed to be reflective of individualistic and 
collectivistic values and its emphasis on the importance of personal autonomy 
(Hofstede, 1980). Specifically, when compared to individualistic Western cultures, 
Asian collectivistic cultures emphasize family and community, which could result in 
decreased levels of personal control. Further, within collectivistic cultures, high levels 
of personal control could very well be a norm violation; therefore it may have 
relatively little effect on psychological well-being for non-Western ethnic groups 
(Sastry & Ross, 1998). More recently, Imada and Ellsworth’s (2011) study on cultural 
differences in appraisals and corresponding emotion found that in success situations, 
Americans reported stronger self-agency emotions (e.g. proud) than Japanese, who 
conversely reported stronger situation-agency emotions (e.g. lucky). This could 
possibly be due to Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) proposition that, when 
compared with Westerners, East Asians hold stronger ‘‘situationism’’ or beliefs in the 
importance of the behavioral context. That is, East Asians tend to view the world and 
reason holistically, and attribute causality to interactions between objects and the 
world. In other words, they may be highly aware of the various situational and causal 
factors that influence their judgments and behaviors.  
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3.3.2 Self-Concept 
 Self-concept (i.e. one’s identity) is a key component when examining whether 
cultural differences may influence the development and maintenance of PTSD. Self-
concept is at the very core of who one is and plays an important part in how an 
individual navigates through life (Abernathy, 2008). As discussed above, cross-
cultural research indicates that people in different cultures have strikingly different 
understandings of the self, of others and the interplay of the two (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Wang and Ross (2005) propose these conceptual representations of 
the self vary across cultures due to differing values and social orientation. These 
cultural differences in self understanding can influence how individuals view and 
evaluate themselves (i.e. their self-concept), their goals, and appraisals of everyday 
events including traumatic ones. In relation to perceiving the self to be independent of 
other, autonomous and unique, empirical evidence on dispositional information found 
individuals from individualistic cultures were reluctant to consider information 
external to themselves in explaining the behavior of others (Wang & Ross, 2005). 
While research on those from collectivistic cultures found that they too attend to 
dispositions of individuals, however, they do so less than their individualistic 
counterparts (Choi, Nisbett & Norenzayan, 1999).   
Research on the contradictory, changeable, and holistic nature of the East 
Asian self-concept as previously detailed, has found naïve dialecticism to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding these differences. Empirical 
work by Choi, Koo and Choi (2007) support this framework, reporting significant 
associations between general beliefs about contradiction (as measured by the Attitude 
toward Contradictions subscale of the Analysis-Holism Scale) and general beliefs 
about change (as measured by the Perception of Change subscale) differed culturally. 
Specifically, the Korean participants in their study who endorsed change were also 
generally more inclined to endorse contradiction items than the American participants 
who took part. 
 In relation to well-being, self-concept consistency is less central to 
psychological well-being among East Asians (Heine & Lehman, 1999; Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2009) and a stronger predictor of subjective well-being for Westerners 
(Church et al, 2008; Suh, 2002). For instance Suh’s (2000) study on culture, identity 
consistency and subjective well-being found consistency across situations was 
associated with greater degrees of well-being for their American participants, but this 
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relationship was weaker for their Korean participants.  Campbell et al (1996) found 
Japanese participants had weaker correlations to their Canadian counterparts in self-
concept clarity (a construct capturing consistency of the self across situations and 
time) and self-esteem. Thus research demonstrates that instead of leading to 
maladaptive adjustment, inconsistencies in self-concept could be adaptive in 
dialectical cultural contexts (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009), as reflected by higher 
self-esteem and subjective well-being (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). Much empirical 
work supports these contentions concerning self-consistency views. Kanagawa, Cross 
and Markus (2001) on their study investigating the cultural psychology of self-
concept found Japanese respondent to provide self-descriptors that varied 
significantly depending who was in their room than the American respondent, 
demonstrating the ease with which the Japanese participants were able to switch 
between multiple selves. In a similar vein, Suh (2002) asked Koreans and American 
to evaluate themselves on a number of traits in relation to hypothetical situations. 
They found the Americans showed relatively little change in their self-descriptors 
across situations, suggesting a need to maintain a consistent self. The Koreans 
conversely viewed themselves in highly variable terms, again suggesting that 
maintaining self-consistency is not as important to this group. Peng and Nisbett 
(1999) found that when two contradictory propositions were presented to their 
participants, the Chinese were moderately accepting of both propositions, whereas the 
American participants were polarized in their views, yet again demonstrating cultural 
differences in approach to self-consistency and tolerance for contradictions in self-
views.  
Thus, it is imperative to explore the links among culture, self-concept 
inconsistency (or flexibility) and psychological well-being. As Spencer-Rogers et al. 
(2009) propose, self-coherence is regarded as a fundamental human motive in 
Western psychology and according to self-verification theory (Swann et al., 2003), 
people strive for internal consistency and temporal stability in their thoughts, feelings, 
and actions. While these qualities may be viewed as normative and desirable in 
independent cultures, and are generally associated with psychological well-being 
(Suh, 2002), it need not necessarily be a fundamental motive for those from 
collectivistic cultures. Instead coherence may be achieved in a strikingly different 
manner, whereby for those in dialectical cultures, individuals may be striving for 
equilibrium (i.e. balancing positive and negative attributes, traits or characteristics) 
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(see Kitayama & Markus, 1999). Thus cultural differences in self-construal and 
traditional belief systems can serve to provide a comprehensive and theoretical 
framework for understanding cultural differences in well-being outcomes. 
3.4 Linking theory and empirical findings with PTSD models 
 The cross-cultural theorists (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mesquita & 
Walker, 2003) reason that diverging self-construal impact on and in many cases 
govern the very concepts believed to be critical in understanding the development and 
maintenance of PTSD. Specific to this thesis these key concepts are appraisals and 
self-concept. This section of the thesis aims to generate issues and concerns that arise 
when theories of cultural variation in self-construal and associated research are 
applied to PTSD models. Hence a number of questions arise, which will be addressed 
in the next chapter. 
The appraisal model put forth by Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that 
appraisals differ between those with adaptive adjustment from those with maladaptive 
adjustment. Dysfunctional and negative cognitive appraisals centering on the self, 
world and others and trauma sequelae can lead to the development and maintenance 
of PTSD, due to a sense of continued an on-going threat perceived by the trauma 
survivors. Additionally, Mesquita and Walker (2003) have illustrated both 
theoretically and empirically that cultural differences in one’s self-construal influence 
the manner in which events, situations and life encounters are interpreted, evaluated 
and appraised. In short, individualistic cultures appraise situations as being under 
personal agency while those in collectivistic cultures appraise these same events in 
interdependent with others and their social environment is stressed. The sense of 
agency which is valued in individualistic cultures is not stressed or heavily weighted 
here. Additionally, cultural differences in self-construal have found to influence one’s 
affective responses in a culturally systematic manner. For instance, individualistic 
cultures tend to achieve positive affect as a subsequence of agency in a situation, 
conversely, collectivistic cultures do not. Therefore, due to cultural specific appraisal 
tendencies being evidenced for everyday events, in addition to the key role appraisals 
play in PTSD development and maintenance, fundamental questions as to whether 
similar culture specific appraisal tendencies will occur following a traumatic event are 
raised. Specifically, how do cultural differences in self influence autobiographical 
memories of trauma appraisals? How do these differences in appraisals compare to 
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cultural differences in appraisals of other types of autobiographical memories (i.e. 
positive and negative memories)? How do these differences impact on posttraumatic 
psychological adjustment (PTSD)? 
Berntsen and Rubin (2007), in their centrality of trauma approach argue that 
trauma can become central to self-concept. Markus and Kitayama (1991) have 
espoused self-construal differs across cultures. In independent cultures self-definition 
is derived from a set of internal personal attributes, whilst in interdependent cultures, 
self-definition is derived from others and relationships with others. Whilst SMS 
(Conway, 2005) DRT (Brewin, 2001) and the centrality of trauma approach (Berntsen 
& Rubin, 2006) delineate the deleterious effects of trauma on self-concept, they also 
promote self-consistency in their models. Suh (2000; 2002) theorizes that self-
coherence and self-consistency needs are culturally variable. This then leads to 
questions concerning the influence of cultural variation in self-construal on the 
relationship between trauma and self-concept. Specifically, what are the cultural 
differences in self-concept following trauma? Further, how do cultural differences in 
self-concept influence posttraumatic psychological adjustment? 
Socio-cognitive models (e.g. DRT, Brewin, 2001; SMS, Conway, 2005; 
appraisal model, Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggests trauma threatens the self, appraisals, 
self-goals and motivation of the autobiographical memory system. Further research 
suggests, appraisals and self-concept are related, as negative and dysfunctional 
appraisals can impact negatively on self-concept, whist both are implicated in PTSD. 
Moreover, cultural variations in self have been found to moderate all these aspects. 
This then raises questions as to the relationship between appraisals, self-concept and 
culture. Specifically, does culture influence the relationships between appraisals, self-
concept and posttraumatic adjustment? These questions make up the crux of this 
thesis and are addressed in Chapter 4’s conceptual framework. 
 
3.5 Culture and Clinical Implications 
In addition to the conceptual considerations outlined, there is a practical 
element for conducting this research, namely to arrive at culturally appropriate 
treatments for trauma exposed individuals. However, research examining the 
relationship between culture and psychopathology has not reached equilibrium in 
cross-cultural clinical research thus far, even though literature points to a number of 
cultural differences in a number of cognitive processes linked to maladjustment and 
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PTSD. Draguns & Tanaka-Matsumi, (2003) concluded that the interrelationship of 
culture and psychopathology should be studied in context as to not do so can have 
negative implications for clinical psychology. The socio-cognitive theories of PTSD 
have been founded in research conducted primarily in individualistic populations. 
Therefore it remains largely unknown as to whether these same cognitive theories are 
culturally adaptable in order to accommodate cultural disparities in self.  
Emergent research in this area has far reaching clinical implications for 
multicultural Western societies such as the United Kingdom, for psychosocial work 
with populations at risk of trauma exposure (e.g. refugees, asylum seekers, unique 
populations) and for work in non-Western cultures. Finally, there is a general need to 
refine, prevention and treatment measures to make them more culturally appropriate. 
 
3.6 Overall Chapter Summary 
There is a resolute link between trauma and aspects of the self. As outlined in 
the chapter, culture does indeed influence conceptions of the self and further on the 
processes the socio-cognitive models of PTSD elucidate to be predictive of PTSD 
development and maintenance; specifically appraisals and self-concept. The chapter 
commenced with a summary of the prominent cultural theories of self-construal. 
These theories posit that people in different cultures have strikingly different 
understandings and interpretations of the self. The overarching consensus is that while 
individuals are made up of both an independent and interdependent self-construal, 
individualistic cultures emphasize an independent self-construal which is defined as 
separate from the social context, promoted private aspects of self and aims to be 
autonomous, unique and self-reliant. Conversely, collectivistic cultures emphasize an 
interdependent self-construal, which is defined, as connected with the social context 
and others, promoted external and public aspects of self and aims to belong (i.e. 
promotes group relatedness/group harmony). Subsequently, an investigation into the 
influence self-construal had on appraisal and self-concept from an everyday 
perspective was undertaken which found cultural distinctions in both process. This 
subsequently raises fundamental questions as to the influence culture will have on 
these two component processes when the event is traumatic, in addition to its 
subsequent implications for posttrauma adjustment. The objective of Chapter 4 is to 
develop a conceptual framework to amalgamate the socio-cognitive models of PTSD 
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with current understandings of cultural differences in self-construal and self-
understandings. 
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Chapter 4 
Conceptual Framework 
 
The “struggle to transcend the effects of trauma is among the noblest aspect of human 
history” (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 1996, p. 574). 
 
4.1 Review 
As detailed in Chapter 1, PTSD diagnoses and criteria have undergone much 
change and modification since its inception and inclusion in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (APA; 1980) third edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-III). Further, whilst PTSD was once included to provide an 
account for the mental health issues faced by Vietnam Veterans, this is no longer its 
predominant focus. Since the disorder’s establishment, it is now predominantly used 
as a diagnosis in civilian populations.  
Chapter 2 provided an account of the prominent socio-cognitive models of 
PTSD. In the majority of these models a central focus has been on the role of 
appraisals and self-concept in distinguishing between those with and without 
disrupted adjustment following trauma. It is important to note, that although not the 
focus of this thesis, these models also emphasize that other cognitive concepts such as 
autobiographical memory, world-views, schema and non-cognitive concepts such as 
emotions, goals and motivation play a role in distinguishing between those trauma 
survivors who go on to develop PTSD from those who do not. 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the prominent theories of cultural 
differences in self-construal. The chapter demonstrated that the cultural distinctions in 
self have repeatedly been found to impact on appraisals and one’s self-concept, self-
consistency needs, autobiographical memory, goals, motivation, schema and emotion: 
the very processes posited to play a role in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD.  
The purpose of Chapter 4 then, is to bring together these prominent cognitive 
models of PTSD with these theories of cultural differences in self-construal into a 
conceptual framework. The conceptual framework will provide a context from which 
to base the consequent studies detailed in this thesis. Accordingly, these studies will 
allow for the investigation of the influence of culture on the proponent features of 
  57 
appraisals and self-concept and examine the implications for the development and 
maintenance of PTSD. 
 
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
 Many propose that using Western therapeutic interventions cannot be simply 
transported and used in a non-Western context, due to differing cultural 
understandings of trauma, appraisals of trauma, appraisals of self, and understandings 
of self-concept and personhood. The recommended treatment for PTSD is trauma-
focused cognitive behavioral therapy (TF-CBT; National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence, 2005). TF-CBT is generally an individual focused therapy that is based 
on theoretical models that propose that the key factors in PTSD are disturbances in 
autobiographical memory and negative appraisals associated with the trauma (see 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Resick, 2001). However, the basis for these modes of 
intervention, which have been found to be relatively effective in Western cultures 
(Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), has tended to be developed in the 
UK and the USA and hence influenced by Western cultural norms. However, as 
previously stated many people who experience trauma and develop PTSD and thus 
require treatment do not share the same cultural backgrounds, norm and practices 
(Friedman et al 2011; Marsella & White, 1989). In fact as mentioned above, 
appraisals and self-concept have been found to differ across cultures (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, it is potentially incongruent to simply apply Western 
therapeutic interventions to the needs of traumatized populations from non-Western 
cultures. Using such techniques and practices could delay or at its worst impede 
recovery (Summerfield, 1999). Therefore, providing traumatized populations from 
non-Western cultural backgrounds with interventions that are more tailored to their 
cultural requirements are needed if trauma survivors from these cultures are to be 
provided with effective psychological care posttrauma. 
Consequently, it is both timely and necessary to expand our current 
understanding of PTSD and cognitive models of its etiology by incorporating cultural 
elements to arrive at culturally appropriate treatments. This issue is critical as it 
applies to multicultural societies such as the UK. Further, it applies to the global 
situation as the majority of trauma survivors are from non-Western cultures. 
Subsequently, for those being treated in-country by foreign health workers, 
understanding the trauma within the context of the country and culture is needed to 
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provide the traumatized individual with unbiased and culture specific care. Finally, it 
applies to refugees and asylum seekers, who go on to seek asylum in countries such as 
the UK. 
The objective of this chapter is to unite current cognitive models of PTSD and 
theories of cultural differences in self-construal. It has been established in Chapter 3 
that people in different cultures have strikingly different understandings of the self, of 
others and the interplay of the two (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Wang and Ross 
(2005) propose these conceptual representations of the self vary across cultures due to 
differing values and social orientation. What is more, these cultural differences in self 
understanding can influence how individuals view and evaluate themselves (i.e. their 
self-concept), their self-goals, self-appraisals and appraisals of everyday events. In 
fact, culturally diverging self-construal have been found in many cases to govern the 
very nature of individual experience, including appraisals, self-concept, self-goals, 
autobiographical memory and emotion; the very elements central to the understanding 
and treatment of PTSD (Jobson, 2009; Jobson & O’Kearney 2009; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, fundamental questions arise, as to whether these 
contentions also hold true following a traumatic event or situation.  
Of the various models relevant to understanding PTSD, the conceptual 
framework outlined in this thesis is based on Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive 
appraisals model, Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006) trauma as central to identity (i.e. self-
concept) model, and Brewin’s (e.g. 2011) notions of the impact of trauma on self.  
The thesis argues these models not only allude to conceptualizations of the self but 
that the self is an integral part of these models, consequentially making them 
sympathetic to cultural considerations. The conceptual framework argues that culture 
serves as a pervasive context from which to understand PTSD, cognitive models of its 
etiology and posttrauma adjustment. In addition, culture will influence on these two 
component processes (i.e. self-concept, appraisals) and their impact on PTSD and 
adjustment. 
 
4.3 Linking Cultural Differences in Self-Construal and Trauma Appraisals 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive appraisal model provides an initial 
framework from which to derive and inform this thesis. First, they theorize that the 
context in which the trauma occurs and the state of the individual influences cognitive 
processing during the trauma, which subsequently influences trauma appraisals and/or 
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its sequelae. This then leads the individual to feel a sense of current threat. Here the 
very first component in their models (refer to Figure 1) – “characteristics of the 
trauma and/or its sequelae, prior experiences, beliefs, coping and state of the 
individual” focuses on the conceptual self and environmental factors, which 
consequently draws upon a cultural element. For instance, when highlighting 
“characteristics of the trauma and/or its sequelae” and “prior experiences”, the model 
is calling upon the environment (or cultural domain) in which the trauma event 
occurred and its characteristics, such as the social climate in which the trauma event 
happened. Referring to the “state of the individuals” and their “beliefs” calls attention 
to the conceptual self, which includes the individual’s personal characteristics, 
resources, cognitive abilities, personality traits and social competence (Chun, Moos & 
Cronkite, 2006). Mesquita and Walker (2003) propose the conceptual self is derived 
from its social and cultural environment, and is comprised of self-appraisals, self-
schemas, possible selves, self-guides, attributes and beliefs. They further contend that 
these cultural differences impact on the way in which events, life situations and 
encounters are appraised. Consequently, it would appear that the conceptual self is 
also drawn upon during and follow the trauma and has an influence on the cognitive 
processes that occur during these times as outlined in Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
cognitive appraisal model. Additionally, Markus and Kitayama (1991, 1994, 2010) in 
their theory of self-construal also demonstrate cultural variation in self-construal and 
its influence on self-appraisals, self-schemas and internal attributes. Therefore, this 
thesis believes that an important cultural distinction that influences the nature of the 
conceptual self is the distinction between an independent versus an interdependent 
orientation. 
Second, Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that for individuals with poor 
posttrauma psychological adjustment, they have dysfunctional negative appraisals, 
which have a reciprocal relationship with the trauma memory. Thus negative 
appraisals are biased with a recall of the trauma memories, thereby perpetuating their 
appraisals of ongoing (internal or external) threat. These appraisals are centered round 
the self and contribute to the maintenance of PTSD, as survivors of the trauma 
continue to perceive their current situation as threatening and dangerous. Further, they 
perceive themselves as being unable to cope and that they are inadequately equipped 
to deal with their current situation (e.g. “I am a lousy coper”). Additionally, Ehlers 
and Clark (2000) suggest appraisals about others and interpersonal relationships may 
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also maintain PTSD, because survivors have on-going negative appraisals of 
interactions with others and as a consequence withdraw from social interactions. Due 
to this withdrawal, they are less likely to receive social support, and are thereby 
unable to correct negative beliefs about themselves and others. Further, in relation to 
beliefs about internal threat to self, such as negative beliefs about the self (e.g., ‘I am 
inadequate’, ‘I am weak’), have been found to be related to PTSD symptom severity. 
O’Donnell, Elliot, Wolfgang and Creamer (2007) investigation into posttraumatic 
appraisals in the development and persistence of posttraumatic stress symptoms found 
an internally driven sense of threat is a more powerful mechanism in the development 
and persistence of PTSD than an external sense of threat. Subsequently, not only are 
appraisals an important mechanism to understanding the development and 
maintenance of PTSD, they have firm links with the conceptual self. Consequently, 
with these established linked between appraisals and the conceptual self and the 
influence of culture on self-construal, the conceptual framework postulates that it is 
theoretically possible for these cultural distinctions in self to also be relevant when 
making appraisals of a traumatic event, life situation or encounter. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is that trauma appraisals will differ across cultures and they will reflect 
cultural differences in the conceptual self. 
Next, due to the work focusing on everyday appraisals, the conceptual 
framework is able to predict specific cultural differences in trauma-specific appraisals 
and its subsequent bearing on psychological adjustment or maladjustment posttrauma. 
For instance the studies of agency appraisal (attribution of responsibility for and 
control over an event) found those from individualistic cultures tend to appraise 
success through a personal sense of control. Conversely, for those from collectivistic 
cultures, agency is not valued as much, instead fate, secondary control, adjustment to 
the situation, multi-determination of events and the interdependence of an individual 
and their social environment are stressed (Mesquita & Walker, 2003). However, what 
is important to note, is that this particular appraisal dimension (i.e. agency appraisals) 
has a significant impact on one’s psychological well-being. Sastry and Ross (1998) 
found a negative relationship between personal control and psychological well-being 
for those from interdependent cultures, which they believe to be reflective of Western 
values and its emphasis on the importance of personal autonomy (Hofstede, 1980; 
Triandis, 2001). Conversely, these strong and detrimental effects on psychological 
well-being (Al-Zahrani and Kaplowitz, 1993), was not found for those from 
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collectivistic cultures. The determinants of the sense of personal control are learned 
and something Asian collectivistic cultures place less weight on, therefore it may have 
relatively little effect on psychological well-being for non-Western ethnic groups 
(Sastry & Ross, 1998).  
The conceptual framework expects the same culture specific appraisal 
tendencies to apply to trauma events, with potentially an even more pronounced 
influence on posttraumatic psychological adjustment to that found following everyday 
events. For instance, the relationship between the sense of personal control and 
psychological well-being has been well established (Sastry & Ross, 1998). If a lack of 
personal control following an everyday event can lead to psychological malcontent 
and perceived lack of control following a negative event can lead to lower levels of 
psychological well-being, then it would be expected that perceived lower levels of 
personal control following a traumatic experience could very well be associated with 
posttraumatic psychological maladjustment, such as PTSD. Indeed research on PTSD 
has illustrated that lack or loss of control is a predictor of the disorder. For instance 
Palyo and Beck (2005) in their study on PTSD symptoms, pain, and perceived life 
control used structured equation modeling to develop two models hypothesizing a 
relationship between PTSD symptomatology, pain severity, and perceived life 
control. They found, perceptions of life control did further explain severe PTSD 
symptoms by acting as a mediator between pain complaints and PTSD symptoms 
with disability in the domains of psychosocial and physical functioning. Furthermore, 
there has been ongoing examination of the theoretical-derived cognitive appraisal 
domains of mental defeat and control strategies. Both of which refer to survivors’ 
appraisal of their cognitive, emotional and behavioral responses during the traumatic 
event. Several studies have found mental defeat and lack of control to be associated 
with PTSD severity (Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2001; Ehlers et al., 1998; Ehlers et 
al., 2000; Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998) and mental defeat has been found to be 
associated with persistent PTSD following assault (Dunmore et al., 2001). Ehlers et 
al. (2000) found that when compared to political prisoners without PTSD, political 
prisoners with chronic PTSD were more likely to perceive mental threat; while 
Ehlers, Clark, et al. (1998) found that rape survivors whose memories reflected 
mental defeat or the absence of mental planning/control strategies showed little 
improvement following exposure therapy. 
  62 
Research has detailed that a sense of personal control is a learned, generalized 
expectation that events and circumstances that happen to an individual are contingent 
on their personal choices and actions (Sastry & Ross, 1998). Individuals from 
individualistic cultures have been found to have high perceived personal control (e.g. 
mastering and altering their environment and determine outcomes in their lives); 
while those low in personal control such as those from collectivistic cultures do not 
value primary control, again due to learned generalizations that outcomes of situations 
are determined by external forces to oneself, such as powerful others, luck or fate 
(Sastry & Ross, 1998). Additionally personal control amongst those from 
collectivistic cultures may be seen as norm violations, as they are encouraged to 
subordinate their personal goals to the family and community (Triandis, 1986). 
Therefore, it is predicted that such appraisals will reflect the interdependence of the 
trauma survivors and their social environment and will subsequently moderate 
psychological adjustment. Specifically, given the importance of control in PTSD and 
to those from individualistic cultures, it is hypothesized that perceived personal 
agency, personal control (i.e. ability to change the environment to adapt to the self) 
and responsibility will be more important to trauma survivors from individualistic 
cultures, and their subsequent psychological adjustment than those from collectivistic 
cultures. Those from collectivistic cultures will instead appraise personal agency to be 
less relevant in the trauma than their Western counterparts.  
 
4.4 Linking Cultural Differences in Self-Construal and Self-Concept Posttrauma  
 Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006) trauma as central to identity model also informs 
this thesis and provides further structure to the conceptual framework’s development. 
Their model proposes that the trauma can become central to self-concept because the 
memories of the trauma event(s) become highly accessible and easily evoked. 
Subsequently, the trauma event is perceived as “a major causal agent … [and] thus a 
highly salient turning point in the person’s life” (2006, p. 221). Similarly, Brewin 
(2011) suggests that in those with PTSD self-concept can become fragmented, altered 
and dominated by thoughts and memories of the trauma. It is proposed in this thesis 
that there will be some universally in the aftermath of trauma, namely, the trauma 
memory of those with PTSD will not align with the desired goals of the self-concept 
and will be hard to integrate with previously held assumptions about the self and 
world (Conway, 2005). Consequently, the trauma becomes central to people’s mental 
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life as they struggle to resolve these discrepancies resulting a great deal of time being 
spent recalling these events and ruminating about them (Brewin, 2011; Horowitz, 
1976, Janoff-Bulman, 1992). As a result, the trauma becomes highly associated with 
self-concept (Brewin, 2011) and the traumatic event forms a turning point in people’s 
construction of their own identity and a cognitive reference point for the organization 
of autobiographical knowledge (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).   
Culture is instrumental in self-concept construction; it is at the very centre of 
who an individual is and how they will make sense of themselves, of others and the 
world and their place within it, as well as in understanding the situations and events 
which they encounter and experience (Abernathy, 2008; Stone, 2006) including 
traumatic experiences. Based on the notions related to the influence of trauma on self-
concept and cross-cultural literature on self-construal, the conceptual framework 
suggests self-concept will be impacted in a number of ways. First, the pervasive and 
ubiquitous nature of trauma will act as a salient turning point in the life story for 
individuals from both individualistic and collectivistic cultural groups. There has been 
much research in the way of clinical case studies and theoretical literature on trauma 
pertaining to the trauma event causing disturbances to self-concept, instability of self-
image, identity confusion and poor or negative self-representations (Briere, 1992; 
Reviere & Bakeman, 2001). Therefore, it is proposed that regardless of culture, 
trauma creates a disruption in the continuity and stability of the self and one’s 
experiences. That is not to say that there are no cultural differences in one’s self-
consistency needs (which will be discussed shortly), but rather, trauma forces one to 
make sense of their experiences (Abernathy, 2008; McAdams, 1993; Neimeyer, 2006) 
and as individuals engage in meaning-making to gain perspective on what happened 
they use the trauma to re-narrate their stories, finding not only new meaning but a 
new sense of themselves (Abernathy, 2008; Brennan, 2001). In this way, trauma can 
become central to this new sense of self and remain a pivotal and referential point in 
their life story. Thus the trauma may become what Pillemer (1998) refers to as an 
‘anchoring event’ for the attribution of meaning to other everyday experiences 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Further, based on previous research, it is proposed that if 
trauma does become central to one’s self-concept, it will lead to PTSD and post-
trauma maladjustment. This has been well evidenced in independent cultures, for 
example Sutherland and Bryant’s (2005) study found those with PTSD had greater 
trauma-centered self-definition, while Robinaugh and McNally (2011) found 
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increased trauma centrality to be associated with PTSD symptom severity in adult 
survivors of childhood sexual abuse. However, as yet, little work has been done with 
interdependent cultures, nonetheless, research does point to those from collectivistic 
cultures developing PTSD following trauma events, while self-concept is also 
implicated. The development of PTSD symptomatology has been evidenced in a 
study by Kato, Asukai, Miyake, Minakawa and Nishiyama (1996) on post-traumatic 
symptoms among younger and elderly evacuees in the early stages following the 1995 
Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan. They found both groups experienced sleep 
disturbances, depression, hypersensitivity and irritability in the first assessment. In a 
more recent study, Chen, Wang, Zhang & Shi (2012) used a structured equation 
modeling approach to the Wenchuan earthquake. They found the effect of trauma 
exposure was partially mediated by self-esteem (a measure of self-concept), which 
subsequently affected coping strategies and posttraumatic stress symptomatology. 
Again suggesting that if trauma becomes central to self-concept, negative affect and 
maladaptive psychological adjustment will occur.  
Next, the conceptual framework further proposes that there are culture specific 
differences in self-consistency needs, which as delineated by Suh (2000) in Chapter 3 
is culturally variable. Here it is proposed that self-consistency needs apply most 
especially following a trauma, as one is compelled to make sense of the conflicting 
information caused by the event. Further, cultural differences in self-consistency 
needs will impact differently on psychological well-being. This contention is based on 
the contradictory and changeable nature of the interdependent self-concept, and 
research on naïve dialecticism. In relation to well-being self-concept consistency is 
less central to psychological well-being among collectivistic cultures (Heine & 
Lehman, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009) while being a stronger predictor of 
subjective well-being among individualistic cultures (Church et al, 2008; Suh, 2002). 
Thus when it comes to PTSD, as research demonstrates, instead of leading to 
maladaptive adjustment, inconsistencies and ambivalence in self-concept could be 
adaptive in dialectical cultural contexts (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009), reflected in 
higher self-esteem (Paulhus & Martin, 1988) and subjective well-being (Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2010). Thus, it is imperative to explore the links among culture, self-
concept inconsistency (or flexibility) and psychological well-being. As Spencer-
Rogers et al. (2009) propose, self-coherence is regarded as a fundamental human 
motive in Western psychology and according to self-verification theory (Swann et al., 
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2003), people strive for internal consistency and temporal stability in their thoughts, 
feelings, and actions. While these qualities may be viewed as normative and desirable 
in independent cultures and are generally associated with psychological well-being 
(Suh, 2002), it need not necessarily be a fundamental motive for those from 
collectivistic culture. Instead coherence may be achieved in a strikingly different 
manner, whereby for those in dialectical cultures, individuals may be striving for 
equilibrium (see Kitayama & Markus, 1999). The conceptual framework therefore 
proposes there will be cultural differences in self-concept consistency posttrauma. 
Namely, those from individualistic cultures will be motivated to resolve inner 
conflicts resultant from the trauma, while those from collectivistic cultures will be 
more tolerant of inconsistencies and ambivalence resultant from the trauma. Therefore 
it is hypothesized that collectivistic cultures will have a more ambivalent self-concept 
while individualistic cultures will identity as having either a positive or negative self-
concept. Those who identity as having an ambivalent self-concept will have greater 
posttrauma maladjustment and will be associated with PTSD. However, this is not 
necessarily the case for those from collectivistic cultures. 
 
4.5 Linking Cultural Differences in Self-Construal, Appraisals and Self-Concept 
Lastly, the conceptual framework proposes that there is a relationship between 
appraisals and self-concept and these relationships differ across cultures due to 
cultural differences in self-construal. Referring back to Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
cognitive appraisal model it is illustrated that appraisals of the trauma experience 
and/or its sequelae function to maintain a sense of current threat. These appraisals fall 
broadly into two classes, those that concern the self and those that concern the world 
(Karl, Rabe, Zollner, Maercker & Stopa, 2009). Karl et al. (2009) illustrate that 
negative self-appraisals following a trauma can and do affect self-concept, as these 
negative appraisals focus on enduring negative changes to the self, for instance “I will 
never recover” or “I will never be the same person again”. This is also somewhat 
evocative of the trauma as central to identity model as these cognitive appraisals are 
reflective of a trauma-centered self-concept and serves as a salient feature from which 
to base future expectations concerning self and other experiences. Finally, it is 
proposed that negative self-appraisals will be related to distorted and or trauma-
centered self-concept and this will in turn be related to PTSD. In support of this, 
research has demonstrated that negative self-appraisals, negative world appraisals and 
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self-blame are highly related with, and predictive of, PTSD (Bryant & Guthrie, 2007, 
2005; Field, Norman, & Barton, 2008).  
However, to date, research has not examined the relationship between 
distortions and disruptions in self-concept (such as self-ambivalence, trauma-centered 
self-perceptions and discrepancies in self-concept) and trauma-associated appraisals 
in those with PTSD. It is predicted that the two will be related and that maladaptive 
appraisals may even mediate the associations between distorted self-concept and poor 
posttrauma psychological adjustment (as explained further in Chapter 5). Lastly, these 
relationships may differ due to cultural differences in self-construal’s influence on 
appraisals and self-concept. Specifically, cross-cultural research has indicated that 
those from collectivistic cultures have a greater tolerance of discrepant and 
contradictory self-relevant information (Spencer-Rodgers et al, 2009); whilst those 
from individualistic cultures value self-consistency and are not tolerant of negative 
self-relevant information (Spencer-Rodgers et al, 2009; Suh, 2000). Further, self-
discrepancy and inconsistency and negative self-evaluations have been linked to 
adverse psychological well-being for those from individualistic cultures but not for 
those from collectivistic cultures (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). Therefore, with such 
cultural differences in self-conceptions and evidence indicating trauma appraisals to 
be predictive of PTSD, it would be expected that maladaptive appraisals would be 
associated with, and mediate the relationship between, distortions in self-concept and 
PTSD for those from individualistic cultures but not necessarily for collectivistic 
cultures. 
  
4.6 Main Summary Points of the Conceptual Framework 
Cultural differences in how individuals create identities or forge new ones 
following trauma and how identity impacts on posttrauma psychological adjustment is 
not well researched. Despite this lack of research, its role is extremely important, as it 
is central to how individuals adapt to trauma. The conceptual framework draws 
together psychological theories from the trauma and cross-cultural literature. In sum, 
it is proposed that cultural differences will influence underlying processes (i.e. 
appraisals and self-concept) in PTSD development and maintenance. Specifically, 
these relate to the following three hypotheses that will be investigated throughout the 
course of this thesis:  
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Appraisals of trauma: 
1) It is predicted cultural differences in self-construal will influence trauma 
appraisals, particularly in regard to agency (i.e. perceived control and responsibility in 
relation to the trauma) appraisals. Specifically, it is hypothesized that those from 
individualistic cultures will value agency appraisals to a greater extent in the trauma 
memory than those from collectivistic cultures and will in turn influence posttrauma 
psychological adjustment. 
  
            Self-concept following trauma: 
2) It is predicted that trauma will impact one’s self-concept and that this will differ 
across cultures. 
  
Appraisals, Self-concept and Culture: 
3) It is predicted that appraisals and self-concept will be related, however, it is not yet 
known whether these relationships are culturally distinct due to cultural-specific 
appraisal tendencies and cultural differences in self-construal.  
 
4.7 Studies 
Following the thesis conceptualizations of how cultural differences in self-
construal influences appraisals and self-concept posttrauma, the following seven 
studies have been developed to empirically test the three hypotheses derived from the 
conceptual framework. Further, the framework is revisited and discussed more 
thoroughly in the introduction of each individual study, allowing for more precise 
hypotheses to be generated. In addition, it will be returned to in Chapter 8’s general 
discussion to consider whether the framework is appropriate regarding the role of 
culture in trauma appraisals, self-concept posttrauma and subsequent posttraumatic 
psychological adjustment. 
 Part 1 of the thesis (Studies 1 and 2) will focus on the trauma event in a non-
clinical sample. Specifically, the first study will explore how cultural differences in 
self influence appraisals of trauma and its subsequent impact on psychological 
adjustment. The second study will explore the impact of cultural differences in self on 
posttraumatic self-concept, self-definition and psychological adjustment. Part 2 of the 
thesis (Study 3) will focus on the interdependent perspective regarding trauma 
appraisals, the meaning and understanding placed on trauma, and trauma’s 
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consequences for affected individuals. This will be gained using a qualitative design 
and employing focus groups comprised of trauma survivors from collectivistic 
cultures recruited from the general population. In addition, key informant interviews 
with mental health practitioners who routinely work with trauma survivors from 
collectivistic cultures will be used. Lastly, a new measure will be derived from these 
focus groups and key informant interviews, to measure cognitive appraisals from a 
more interdependent perspective. Part 3 will focus on the trauma event in a sample of 
trauma survivors from individualistic and collectivistic cultures with and without 
PTSD to extend the ecological validity of Part 2 and 1. Specifically, Study 4 will 
explore how cultural differences in self influence appraisals of trauma and its 
subsequent impact on psychological adjustment. It will further consolidate findings 
from Study 1 and will pilot the new measure derived in Study 3. Study 5 is an 
extension of Study 2 and will explore the impact of cultural differences in self on 
posttraumatic self-concept and psychological adjustment. Study 6 will also focus on 
posttraumatic self-concept, however it will focus on cultural differences in self-
ambivalence and psychological adjustment. Lastly, Study 7 investigates how the new 
measure developed in Study 3 is associated with posttraumatic self-concept and 
posttraumatic psychological adjustment.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 The introduction addressed the three objectives stated in Chapter 1. First, 
Chapter 2 outlined the current prominent socio-cognitive models of PTSD. The 
importance of appraisals and the conceptual self in distinguishing between those with 
and without PTSD is undeniably central to most of these models. Additionally, 
another important process, namely, posttraumatic self-concept was identified as being 
central in understanding the etiology and maintenance of PTSD. Second, Chapter 3 
explored cultural distinctions in the self in terms of an independent and 
interdependent self. It was demonstrated that although individuals are motivated to 
achieve both aspects of the self, independence is emphasized in individualistic 
cultures, such as the United Kingdom, and interdependence is emphasized in 
collectivistic cultures, such as Asian cultures. This cultural distinction in self-
construal has been found to impact on appraisals and self-concept and it is in these 
cultural differences that the culturally emphasized self is reaffirmed. Therefore, given 
that this cultural distinction in self impacts on these two key processes in PTSD 
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development and maintenance, it became obvious that PTSD models need to consider 
cultural variations in self. This is already alluded to and appears to be underpinning 
many of the models; however, it has not been fully acknowledged as an integral and 
constituent part in these models or empirically investigated. In response to this, the 
third aim of the introduction was to develop a conceptual framework that accounted 
for cultural differences in appraisals and self-concept and their potential influence on 
the development and maintenance of PTSD. The studies developed in this thesis are 
designed to empirically test this conceptual framework and shed further light on the 
influence of culture on these component processes in PTSD development and 
maintenance. 
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Part 1 
 
Investigating Cultural Differences in Trauma Appraisals, Self-Concept and 
Autobiographical Remembering following Trauma and Implications for 
Posttraumatic Psychological Adjustment in a Non-Clinical Sample 
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Chapter 5 
Cultural Differences in Trauma Appraisals, Self-Concept and Autobiographical 
Remembering following Trauma and Implications for Posttraumatic 
Psychological Adjustment in a Non-Clinical Sample 
 
5.1. Overview 
 As outlined throughout the thesis, cognitive appraisals and self-concept are 
central to understanding the development, maintenance and treatment of PTSD. 
However, cross-cultural psychology research has demonstrated that cultural 
differences in self-construal influence how one appraises an event and how one 
perceives the self. The question remains, therefore, how do cultural differences in 
self-construal influence appraisals of trauma, posttrauma self-concept and what are 
the implications of this for PTSD? The conceptual framework contends these cultural 
distinctions impact on trauma appraisals and that trauma will influence self-concept, 
which will subsequently be linked to posttrauma maladjustment. The aim of this 
research is to explore these issues in a non-clinical sample. It is highlighted that while 
the same participants are used in this research, the findings have been separated into 
two studies to aid in the reporting of findings. Study 1’s aim is to investigate whether 
there are cultural differences in the appraisals of everyday and trauma events and the 
implications for posttraumatic psychological adjustment. The objective of Study 2 is 
to investigate the relationships between discrepancies in self-concept, self-appraisals 
and PTSD symptoms and to examine whether these relationships differ depending on 
one’s cultural background.  
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5.2. Study 1 
Appraisals of Everyday and Trauma Events and Implications for Posttraumatic 
Psychological Adjustment 
An impressive body of literature identifies several factors that impede post-
trauma recovery, maintain posttraumatic symptoms and predict the development of 
on-going PTSD (see Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & 
Weiss, 2003, for reviews). One such factor is negative cognitive appraisals (Kleim, 
Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007). Cognitive appraisals are of particular interest because 
they are central to influential clinical cognitive models of PTSD. Ehlers and Clark 
(2000) emphasize that self-relevant appraisals of the trauma experience and/or its 
sequelae function to maintain a sense of current threat in the survivor’s life and are 
instrumental in promoting the use of maladaptive strategies, which in turn, maintains 
current symptoms. Empirical evidence supports these theoretical assertions and 
suggests that cognitive factors are the most useful of a set of pre-trauma factors, 
trauma specific factors and other predictors for identifying chronic PTSD (Kleim et 
al., 2007). Moreover, appraisals are potentially modifiable and thus, provide 
important targets for treatment (Resick, 2001). However, the majority of our 
understanding regarding the role of appraisals in PTSD is informed by research using 
Western populations. Despite the increase in recognition that PTSD is observed in 
many different societies and cultures, little is known about the etiology, maintenance 
and treatment of PTSD in non-Western cultures (Foa et al., 2009). Given the central 
role of cognitive appraisals in PTSD, it is important to consider the influence of 
culture on the relationship between cognitive appraisals and PTSD and the use of 
culturally adequate and valid assessment of trauma-related appraisals in PTSD 
research and clinical practice (Su & Chen, 2008).  
The question of whether culture influences how a given everyday event is 
experienced has received some attention in cross-cultural psychology research where 
it has been found that culture influences appraisals (Mesquita & Walker, 2003). 
Research has demonstrated that Western/individualistic cultures report more 
appraisals of perceived control, responsibility and anticipated effort than Asian 
cultures (e.g., Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer, & Wallbott, 1988; Mauro et al., 1992; 
Mesquita & Markus, 2004; Scherer, 1997) as Western cultures attach more value to 
personal responsibility, agency and a personal sense of perceived control (Fiske, 
Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, 1998, Markus & Kitayama, 1991, Nisbett, Peng, Choi, 
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& Norenzayan, 2001). In contrast, personal agency and perceived control have less 
applicability in Asian cultures rather interdependence of an individual and their 
environment is stressed (Mesquita & Walker, 2003). Culture also influences how 
people react to different cognitive appraisals so that reactions generally correspond 
and reinforce cultural norms (e.g. Kim, 2002; Kitayama, Mesquita & Karasawa, 2006; 
Leu et al., 2010; Mesquita & Markus, 2004; Mesquita & Walker, 2003).  Appraisals 
of personal responsibility, autonomy and perceived control have been found to predict 
positive affect in Western cultural groups but less so for those from Asian cultures 
(Mesquita & Karasawa, 2002; Mesquita & Walker, 2003). Sato (2001) suggests that 
diminished levels of personal agency and perceived personal control can result in 
depression and/or anxiety in those holding a strong independent self-construal. In 
contrast, alienation and isolation may be more associated with depression and/or 
anxiety in those holding an interdependent self-construal (see Chapter 3 for further 
details regarding cultural differences in the appraisals of everyday events). Study 1 
aims to investigate whether the same cultural differences are evident in the appraisals 
of trauma and if so, what are the implications of these differences for PTSD.  
 The cross-cultural literature has investigated the influence of culture on ten 
cognitive appraisal dimensions in relation to everyday events. These ten cognitive 
appraisals include pleasantness (result of having what one desires), attentional activity 
(strong motivation to attend closely to an event), certainty (predictability, certainty 
and understandability of the situation), coping ability (ability to cope with situation), 
perceived control (level of personal perceived control in the event), responsibility 
(personal responsibility for the event), anticipated effort (anticipate needing to expend 
energy or effort in the event), goal-need conduciveness (level of importance and 
perceived obstacles in the event), legitimacy (perceived fairness of an outcome of an 
event) and norm/self compatibility (appropriateness of own behavior, feelings, 
thoughts and actions in the situation) (see Mauro et al., 1992). However, to date, 
research has not investigated these cognitive appraisal dimensions in relation to one’s 
trauma memory. The trauma memory potentially differs from other autobiographical 
memories as, by definition, it results from an extremely stressful or traumatic event 
and is generally associated with an increase in emotional arousal, intensity and 
schema violations (Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008). Moreover, this is of particular 
relevance for those with PTSD as certain dysfunctional appraisals are central to the 
understanding of PTSD (Brewin, 2011; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & 
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Clark, 2000). Therefore, the first aim of Study 1 was to explore these cognitive 
appraisal dimensions in relation to trauma and to examine the relationships between 
these appraisals and PTSD symptoms in British and Asian participants.  
The Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 1999) was 
developed as a 33-item self-report questionnaire that is now widely used to assess 
negative trauma-specific cognitive appraisals. It includes three factors: negative 
cognitive appraisals about the self, negative cognitive appraisals about the world and 
self-blame. While the PTCI is widely used, only one study has to date investigated the 
reliability and validity of the PTCI for use in Asian populations. Su and Chen (2008) 
reported the factor structure and psychometric properties of a Chinese version of the 
PTCI and its relationship with PTSD symptoms. They used a sample of 240 
traumatized Taiwanese university students. Their confirmatory factor analysis 
suggested adequate replication of the original three-factor (i.e. negative self, negative 
world and self-blame) structure of the PTCI after eliminating four cross-loaded items. 
Their 29-item PTCI was found to have good psychometric properties and had 
moderate to high correlations with PTSD symptoms. This initial study suggests that 
similar negative cognitions contribute to PTSD development in Asian samples. The 
second aim of Study 1, therefore, is to further investigate the influence of culture on 
trauma-specific negative cognitive appraisals. This will be achieved through 
examining whether there are cultural differences in these trauma-specific 
dysfunctional cognitive appraisals and the relationships between these trauma-specific 
cognitive appraisals and PTSD symptoms. 
 In light of the above and as reflected in the conceptual framework, it is 
hypothesized that there will be cultural differences in the appraisals dimensions 
related to the trauma event. Second, given Su and Chen’s (2008) findings that similar 
negative trauma-specific cognitions (as indexed on the PTCI) contribute to PTSD 
development in Asian samples, it is hypothesized that similar dysfunctional appraisals 
will be associated with PTSD symptoms in both British and Asian participants.   
 
5.2.1 Method 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Psychology Research Participation Panel 
at the University of East Anglia. An email was sent to those on the panel and those 
who were interested contacted the researcher. The inclusion criteria for the sample 
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included participants being 18 years and over, having experienced a traumatic or 
extremely stressful event, to have the language ability to complete the study in 
English and lastly to self identify as either British or Asian. Participants received £5 
for participation. An a priori power calculation revealed that a sample size of 92 was 
required for independent t-tests to have 80% power for detecting large size effect 
when employing the traditional .05 criterion for statistical significance. GPower 
software revealed that a sample size of 111 participants was needed for the study for 
conducting ANOVA and a sample size of 64 was required 80% power for detecting 
medium effect size when employing the traditional .05 criterion of statistical 
significance for correlation analyses. 
 
5.2.1.2 Measures 
5.2.1.2.1 Psychological adjustment. 
Impact of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997).  
Posttraumatic stress symptoms were assessed using the widely used self-report 
questionnaire, Impact of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997). The 
IES-R is a standard measure used to assess PTSD symptomatology. It consists of 
three subscales assessing avoidance, intrusions and hyperarousal symptoms relating to 
a specific event. The IES-R is a 22-item self-report measure designed to access 
current subjective distress for any specific life event. Respondents are asked to rate 
each item on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely) according to the past seven days. 
Participants received a score for each scale and a total score. In this case the specific 
event was the trauma memory disclosed prior to the Appraisal Inventory (see below). 
The rationale for using the IES-R was based on it being a prominently selected 
measure to assess trauma symptomatology, it parallels the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) 
criteria for PTSD and is hence comprised of avoidance, intrusions and hyperarousal 
subscales. Further it has adequate psychometric properties (Weiss & Marmar, 1997) 
and has been used in previous cross-cultural research (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 
2006). The clinical cut off score for the IES-R is 33 (Creamer, Bell & Failla, 2003). 
According to Amone-P’Olak (2005) the intrusion and avoidance subscales in the IES-
R can be categorised into four clinical levels according to the degree of symptoms and 
reactions: scores 0 – 8 (sub clinical range), 9 – 25 (mild range), 26 – 43 (moderate 
range), and 44 (severe range). In the current study the total scale and subscales 
demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α of .87). 
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Depression (HSCL-25; Derogatis, Lipman, Rickels, & Cori, 1974).  
Depression was measured using Part II of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist 
(HSCL-25), which has 15 items that assess depression symptoms (Derogatis, Lipman, 
Rickels, & Cori, 1974). Participants are required to indicate how much each symptom 
bothered or distressed them in the past week, including today from 1(not at all) to 4 
(extremely). The depression score is the average of the 15 depression items, the 
clinical cut-off score of 1.75 is used an indication of symptoms equivalent with an 
anxiety or depressive disorder (Sandanger, Moum, Ingebrigtsen, Dalgard, Sorensen, 
Bruusgaard, 1998). The rationale for using this measure is based on the high 
comorbidity between depression and PTSD (Brewin & Holmes, 2003) and depression 
has been found to impact on autobiographical memory retrieval. The HSCL-25 
depression score has been consistently shown in several populations to be correlated 
with major depression as defined by the DSM-IV (1994). Further, it has good 
psychometric properties and is regularly used in cross-cultural research (e.g., Jobson 
& O’Kearney, 2006). In the current study the depression subscale demonstrated good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α of .89). 
5.2.1.2.2 Appraisals 
  Appraisals Inventory (AI; Mauro et al., 1992). Participants were asked to 
recall a positive and a trauma memory. The trauma event was subjectively selected by 
the participant as the most traumatic event in their life and thus, not all events fulfilled 
PTSD criterion A (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). To encourage 
participants to think deeply about each memory, they were then asked to describe the 
event in detail.  Following each memory, participants completed the AI inventory. 
The AI inventory was originally developed by Mauro et al. (1992) to investigate 
cross-cultural differences in emotional responses. It consists of 28 questions around 
ten appraisal dimensions related to specified events (i.e. the pleasant and 
trauma/distressing event specified). The ten appraisals dimensions consisted of 
pleasantness (e.g. How certain were you that you would get what you wanted?), 
attentional activity (e.g. To what extent did you try to devote your attention to what 
was going on?), certainty (e.g. As the situation was beginning, how certain were you, 
in advance, about what was going to happen?), coping ability (How certain were you 
that you would be able to cope with what was happening?), perceived control (e.g. To 
what extent did you feel that anyone (either yourself or someone else) was controlling 
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what was happening?), responsibility (e.g. How responsible did you feel for having 
caused what was happening?), anticipated effort (e.g. To what extent did you feel a 
need to exert yourself (mentally or physically) in order to deal with this situation?), 
goal/need conduciveness (e.g. To what extent did you feel that there were obstacles 
standing in the path between you and getting what you wanted?), legitimacy (e.g. 
How fair did you feel this event was?) and norm/self-compatibility (e.g. How 
appropriate do you think it was for you to feel what you felt in this situation?).  
Participants scored responses on seven-point scales from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very 
much). The rationale for using this measure was based on this questionnaire being 
routinely (Mauro et al., 1992; Scherer, 1997) used in the cognition, emotion and cross 
cultural research to assess cultural differences in appraisals and has adequate 
psychometric properties (Mesquita & Walker, 2003). 
Post-traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 1999). The PTCI is a 
33-item inventory assessing appraisals related to trauma. The PTCI has three 
subscales; appraisals about negative self, negative world and perceived self-blame 
regarding the trauma and uses seven-point scales from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally 
agree). The rationale for using the PTCI was due to it being a well-established 
inventory (Beck et al., 2004; Foa et al., 1999; van Emmerik, Schoorl, Emmelkamp, & 
Kamphuis, 2006) and has been used cross-culturally (Su & Chen, 2008) to evaluate 
negative self-cognition. Further it has excellent psychometric properties and is 
routinely used in trauma research and has also been used on student samples (Foa et 
al., 1999). In addition, current accounts surrounding post-trauma recovery place 
prominence on the role of negative and dysfunctional cognitions in the development 
and maintenance of PTSD (Beck et al., 2004). The PTCI is a measure of such 
negative and dysfunctional thoughts and beliefs.  In the current study the total scale 
and subscales demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α of .80) 
 5.2.1.2.3. Demographics  
 Participants were also asked to provide their age, ethnicity, gender, time in the 
UK. Following this, participants were asked how hard they found the study on a 10-
point scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) and their English language skills on a 
10-point scale from 1 (not very good) to 10 (extremely good). 
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5.2.1.3 Procedure 
 Ethical approval was obtained from University of East Anglia, Faculty of Heath 
Research Office, Reference Number 2009/10-029 (see Appendix A). Data for the two 
studies was collected in the same experimental session. Each session took 
approximately 60 minutes. Participants met with the researcher and following written 
informed consent procedures, participants were asked to complete the AI in relation to 
the trauma memory and positive memory. The positive and trauma memories were 
counterbalanced so as to control for order effects that could potentially influence the 
results. The procedure used to counterbalance the memories were to ask half of the 
British and half of the Asian participants to first recall a negative memory followed 
by a positive memory. The remaining half of the British and Asian groups were asked 
to recall first a positive memory followed by a negative memory. Participants were 
asked to recall their positive memories as follows; “Please think about a positive 
event that has occurred in your life. Please write about this event in as much detail as 
you can. All your writing will be completely confidential. As you write do not worry 
about punctuation or grammar, just write as much as you can and include thoughts, 
feelings, reflections etc ”. Participants were asked to recall their negative memories as 
follows; “Please think about the most traumatic event that has occurred in your life. 
Please write about this event in as much detail as you can. All your writing will be 
completely confidential. As you write do not worry about punctuation or grammar, 
just write as much as you can and include thoughts, feelings, reflections etc”. 
Participants also completed the IES-R, PTCI and HSCL-25 followed by their 
demographic information. 
 
5.2.1.4. Results 
 Data achieved normality for all variables with the exception of the IES-R and 
the PTCI. Transformations did resolve issues of skewness and kurtosis for the PTCI 
but not for the IES-R. For analysis using the IES-R variable, non-parametric 
correlations were used to investigate associations between trauma appraisals with the 
IES-R for PTSD symptoms (see Table 4). 
  
5.2.1.4.1. Participant Characteristics 
 The British sample comprised of 6 males and 28 females. The Asian sample 
included 9 males and 32 females and comprised of Chinese (n = 27), South Asian (n = 
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9), and South-East Asian (n = 5) participants.  
 As Table 2 shows, the two groups did not differ in terms of age. Unsurprisingly, 
the British group had lived in the UK for a significantly longer time than the Asian 
participants and rated their English language skills as more proficient than the Asian 
group. However, there was no significant difference between groups in self-reported 
task difficulty. In regards to posttrauma adjustment, Asian participants reported 
significantly higher trauma appraisals (PTCI total), PTSD symptoms (IES-R total) 
and depression symptoms (HSCL) than the British. When PTSD scores were included 
as a covariate, the two groups did not differ on the PTCI and its subscales.  
 
Table 2 
Mean and (Standard Deviations) for Participant Characteristics and Group 
Comparisons 
 British Asian t p 
Age (years) 23.00 (6.27) 23.02 (4.18) .20 .98 
Time in UK (years) 20.56 (6.71) 1.39 (2.00) 16.08 < .001 
Self-rated English 
ability 
9.06 (1.15) 5.78 (1.90) 9.18 < .001 
Task difficulty 4.35 (2.19) 5.12 (1.85) 1.65 .10 
IES-R 16.65 (17.33) 30.44 (15.50) .36 .001 
HSCL 1.90 (.58) 1.60 (.47) 2.47 .02 
Years since trauma  7.88 (6.91) 6.49 (6.57) .86 .39 
Years since 
pleasant event  
3.45 (3.99) 3.63 (4.73) .16 .88 
Trauma type (n) Death/illness = 12; 
Accident = 3;  
Assault = 7;  
Life stressor = 12 
Death/illness = 9; 
Accident = 9; 
Assault = 5;  
Life stressor  = 18 
- - 
Positive type (n) Achievement = 20; 
Relationship= 12 
Achievement = 28; 
Relationship = 7 
- - 
Note: IES-R = Impact of Event Scale-Revised. HSCL = Hopkins Symptom Checklist. 
Life Stressor included academic stress, relationship stress or stress associated with 
moving. 
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The trauma narratives were classified into the following trauma type category; 
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criterion A trauma type (i.e. witness death, serious physical 
injury to self or to others, sexual assault) (British n = 22; Asian n = 23) and life 
stressor (included academic stress, relationship stress or stress associated with 
moving) (British n = 12; Asian n = 18). The positive narratives were classified as 
success/achievement (British n = 20; Asian n = 28) and family/relationship (British n 
= 12; Asian n = 7). The groups did not differ in type of trauma, χ2(3, N = 75) = 4.35, p 
= .23, or positive event, χ2(2, N = 75) = 5.51, p = .06, disclosed.   
 
5.2.1.4.2. Hypothesis 1: Cultural differences in the appraisal dimensions related 
to the trauma event  
Table 3 shows the means for each of the appraisal dimensions for both British 
and Asian groups. A 2 (between subjects; culture: British vs. Asian) x 2 (within 
subjects; memory: positive vs. trauma) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
used with each appraisal type as the dependent variable. The findings were similar 
when the IES-R and depression was included as a covariate suggesting that group 
differences in level of posttraumatic stress did not influence the findings. 
Pleasantness. There was a memory main effect, F(1, 73) = 17.26, p < .001, 
ƞp
2
 = 0.19; unsurprisingly, the pleasant memory was appraised as being more pleasant 
than the trauma memory. There was also a significant culture main effect, F(1, 73) = 
6.07, p = .02, ƞp
2
 = 0.08; the British group had lower levels of pleasantness appraisals 
than the Asian group. The interaction was not significant. 
 Coping ability. There was a memory main effect, F(1, 73) = 33.30, p < .001, 
ƞp
2
 = 0.31; the pleasant memory was rated as being associated with greater ability to 
cope than the trauma memory. The culture main effect and interaction were not 
significant. 
Anticipated effort. There was a memory main effect, F(1, 73) = 14.89, p < 
.001, ƞp
2
 = 0.17; the pleasant memory was rated as having less anticipated effort 
appraisals than the trauma memory. The culture main effect was significant, F(1, 73) 
= 5.26, p = .03, ƞp
2
 = 0.07; the British group reported greater anticipated effort 
appraisals than the Asian group. The interaction was not significant. 
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Table 3 
Mean and (Standard Deviation) for the Asian and British Group on Appraisals for 
Pleasant and Trauma Experiences 
 Asian British 
 Pleasant Trauma Pleasant Trauma 
Pleasantness 5.85 (2.19) 4.41 (2.11) 4.91 (2.57) 3.35 (2.55) 
Coping Ability 5.88 (1.91) 4.39 (2.41) 6.29 (2.25) 3.91 (2.27) 
Anticipated effort 11.85 (3.94) 13.49 (2.68) 12.85 (4.47) 15.26 (2.29) 
Legitimacy 15.00 (2.53) 8.66 (4.37) 15.21 (4.04) 5.94 (4.01) 
Norm/Self 12.49 (2.96) 11.34 (3.66) 16.65 (1.79) 14.21 (3.37) 
Goal/Need 19.27 (3.79) 19.44 (4.59) 19.29 (4.83) 19.94 (4.74) 
Attentional 
activity 
25.41 (4.14) 20.95 (4.25) 28.09 (4.82) 22.59 (6.54) 
Certainty 27.44 (7.68) 23.39 (7.77) 25.94 (10.07) 22.29 (10.26) 
Responsibility 22.32 (3.91) 21.39 (4.95) 26.21 (5.59) 21.85 (5.89) 
Perceived control 21.71 (3.95) 19.32 (4.29) 23.94 (5.92) 18.62 (6.40) 
PTCI-Total 
PTCI-Self 
PTCI-World 
PTCI-Self blame 
- 
- 
- 
- 
9.19 (1.73) 
6.66 (1.65) 
4.89 (1.15) 
3.80 (.81) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
8.07 (1.82) 
5.84 (1.39) 
4.22 (1.30) 
3.33 (1.10) 
Note: PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory 
 
Legitimacy. The interaction was significant, F(1, 73) = 5.07, p = .03, ƞp
2
 = 
0.07. As illustrated in Figure 6, post-hoc comparisons revealed that while the cultural 
groups did not differ in terms of legitimacy of the pleasant memory, t(73) = .27, p = 
.79, d = 0.06, the Asian group reported the trauma memory was more legitimate than 
the British group, t(73) = 2.78, p = .01, d = 0.65.  
Norm/self compatibility. There was a memory main effect, F(1, 73) = 17.83, 
p < .001, ƞp
2
 = 0.20; the pleasant memory was rated as having greater norm/self 
compatibility appraisals than the trauma memory. The culture main effect was also 
significant, F(1, 73) = 38.07, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = 0.34; the British group had higher levels 
of norm-self compatibility appraisals than the Asian group. The interaction was not 
significant. 
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Figure 6. Interaction effect between trauma and pleasant legitimacy appraisals and 
cultural group. 
 
Goal/Need Conduciveness. The main effects and interaction were not 
significant. 
 Attentional activity. There was a memory main effect, F (1, 73) = 39.89, p < 
.001, ƞp
2
 = 0.35, ƞp
2
 = 0.17; the pleasant memory was rated as having lower levels of 
attentional activity appraisals than the trauma memory. There was a culture main 
effect, F(1, 73) = 6.64, p = .01, ƞp
2
 = 0.08; the British group had higher levels of 
attentional activity appraisals than the Asian group. The interaction was not 
significant. 
Certainty. There was a memory main effect, F(1, 73) = 14.82, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = 
0.17; the pleasant memory was rated as being associated with greater certainty 
appraisals than the trauma memory. The culture main effect and interaction were not 
significant.  
Responsibility. The interaction was significant for appraisals of 
responsibility, F(1, 73) = 5.80, p = .02, ƞp
2
 = 0.07, and can be seen in Figure 7. The 
British group had significantly higher levels of appraisals of responsibility than the 
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Asian group for the pleasant memory, t(73) = 3.54, p = .001, d = 0.80. The cultural 
groups did not differ in terms of the trauma memory, t(73) = .37, p = .71, d = 0.08, 
and the British group reported lower levels of responsibility in the trauma memory 
when compared to the pleasant memory, t(33) = 3.86, p < .001, d = 0.76. The Asian 
group did not differ significantly in terms of levels of responsibility in the trauma 
memory when compared to the pleasant memory. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Interaction effect between trauma and pleasant responsibility appraisals and 
cultural group. 
 
Perceived control. There was a memory main effect, F(1, 73) = 24.56, p < 
.001, ƞp
2
 = 0.25; the pleasant memory was rated as having greater perceived control 
appraisals than the trauma memory. The culture main effect and interaction were not 
significant. 
 
PTCI. A MANOVA was carried out with the total PTCI and three subscales 
as dependent variables. The multivariate effect of Group was not significant, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .92, F(3, 71) = 2.16, p = .10, ƞp
2
 = .08.  
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5.2.1.4.3 Hypothesis 2: Associations between trauma appraisals and PTSD 
symptoms  
Given the IES-R was not normally distributed and transformations did not 
achieve normality, Spearman correlations were used. Table 4 shows a significant 
negative correlation was found between perceived control and PTSD symptoms for 
the British group. In contrast, the Asian group had a significant correlation between 
attentional activity and PTSD symptoms. Table 4 shows that all of the British and 
Asian correlation coefficients did not differ significantly. 
Table 4 also shows that for the British group, PTSD symptoms and PTCI total, 
PTCI negative self and PTCI world were all significantly correlated. Additionally, the 
PTCI significantly predicted PTSD symptoms, (R
2 
= .18, β = .42, SE = .09, t = 2.65, p 
= .01). In contrast, for the Asian group, even though this group had higher levels of 
PTSD symptoms, only PTCI negative self subscale was significantly correlated with 
PTSD symptoms and the PTCI did not significantly predict PTSD symptoms, (R
2 
= 
.06, β = .25, SE = .14, t = 1.62, p = .11). This result suggests that the PTCI may better 
account for PTSD symptoms in the British group than the Asian group.  
These correlations were again explored for the Asian group excluding the 
items (3 items from negative self-subscale and 1 item from the self-blame subscale) 
that were excluded from the Chinese version of the PTCI (Su & Chen, 2008). When 
this was the case PTSD symptoms were now just significantly correlated with PTCI 
total, rs(41) = .31, p = .02, and still significantly correlated with PTCI self, rs(41) = 
.38, p = .01. However, self-blame still did not significantly correlate with PTSD 
symptoms, rs(41) = .05, ns. The PTCI also now significantly predicted PTSD 
symptoms, (R
2 
= .10, β = .17, SE = .08, t = 2.09, p = .04).  
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Table 4 
Spearman Correlation Coefficents (two-tailed) between Trauma Appraisals and 
PTSD symptoms for the British and Asian Cultural Groups and Z scores Comparing 
Correlation Coefficients. 
 British Asian Z score 
Pleasantness .03 -.22 1.20 
Attentional Activity -.33 -.50** .97 
Certainty  .14 -.05 .90 
Coping Ability -.21 -.13 -.39 
Perceived Control -.35* -.17 -.91 
Responsibility -.10 -.17 .34 
Anticipated Effort .04 .13 -.43 
Goal/Need -.01 .12 -.57 
Legitimacy -.16 -.09 -.34 
Norm/Self .18 .12 .29 
PTCI Total .40* .29 .59 
PTCI Self .49** .38* .64 
PTCI World .39* .07 1.61 
PTCI Self-Blame .15 .01 .67 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
 
5.2.1.5. Discussion 
Study 1 found that unsurprisingly pleasant and trauma memories were 
appraised differently. Despite this, the British group, regardless of memory type, 
reported higher levels of anticipated effort, attentional activity and norm-self 
compatibility appraisals and lower levels of pleasantness appraisals than Asian 
participants. This aligns with previous cross-cultural research and supports the 
conceptual framework and its hypothesis pertaining to appraisals. This is reflected 
through British participants valuing agency in this first study, assuming their reactions 
are typical and being less concerned about discrepancies with the reactions of others 
(Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Mesquita & Walker, 2003). The trauma memory was 
only unique in terms of legitimacy and responsibility appraisals. The Asian group 
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reported the trauma memory was more legitimate than the British group. This may 
reflect Asian cultures having greater acceptance of situation outcomes and fate 
(Mesquita & Walker, 2003), again supportive of the first hypothesis derived in the 
conceptual framework. The British group, as in previous research, had significantly 
higher levels of appraisals of responsibility than the Asian group for the pleasant 
memory, once again reflective of research on agency appraisals. However, this did not 
continue to account for the trauma memory, as the British group did not differ from 
the Asian group. Instead the British group had reduced their appraisals of 
responsibility to a level equivalent to the Asian group. Whilst this was unexpected 
and not as hypothesized, it can be seen as an important appraisal dimension for 
purposes of coping and recovery following trauma. Given the importance of 
responsibility in Western cultures, participants from British cultures may not want to 
feel responsible for trauma events, which may challenge and threaten the independent 
self. 
Further, a significant negative correlation was found between lower levels of 
perceived control and PTSD symptoms for the British group. Appraisals of control are 
valued in Western cultures and the violation of expectations/cultural norms in 
appraisals can lead to distress (Mesquita & Walker, 2003). Therefore, for British 
participants less perceived control may be associated with posttraumatic distress. 
While for the British group, PTCI appraisals were significantly correlated with, and 
predicted, PTSD symptoms, for the Asian group, the PTCI did not significantly 
predict PTSD symptoms. This result suggests that the PTCI may better account for 
PTSD symptoms in the British group than the Asian group. One possibility for this 
may be the PTCI assesses individualistic-type appraisals (e.g. I am a weak person, I 
have permanently changed for the worse, I can’t rely on myself, I am inadequate) 
rather than interdependent, public (i.e. social roles and identities) and communal 
(relationships and interdependence) appraisals, which are emphasised in Asian 
cultures. However, when only the items on the Chinese version of the PTCI (Su & 
Chen, 2008) were used, the PTCI did significantly correlate with and predict PTSD 
symptoms. This suggests that the 29-item PTCI may be more appropriate in Asian 
samples.    
On the final two notes, it is also worth highlighting that the groups did 
significantly differ in HSCL-25 scores, reflecting a significant difference in mood 
between the two groups, with the Asians above the clinical cut-off for depression and 
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the British below the clinical cut-off point for depression. This difference in mood 
could very well influence responses made on the appraisal inventory as research 
denotes that mood affects ones self-appraisals; namely, negative mood influences 
one’s appraisal of the self during an event negatively (Abele & Hermer, 1993). Thus 
the significant difference in mood state between the British and Asian groups could 
have impacted on findings. For instance the lower levels of attentional activity 
appraisals and anticipated effort appraisals expressed by the Asian group compared to 
their British counterparts could have been influenced by their depressive mood state.  
Additionally, mood states could have also influenced memories that were 
recalled. For instance, while there were no group differences in trauma memory 
events, the positive memory events were almost culturally distinct. This could be 
understood as a reflection of cultural differences on what constitutes a positive event. 
For instance Wang and Ross (2005) propose that those from individualistic cultures 
hold more autonomous memories while those from collectivistic cultures place 
greater emphasis on memories of significant others, focusing on interpersonal 
relationships. Yet in this instance, the Asian group provided greater autonomous 
(success/achievement) related memories, and fewer interpersonal (family) memories 
compared to the British group (see Table 2). This could be attributed to differences in 
mood between the two groups. The Asian group had significantly greater depression 
symptoms, which could potentially have influenced the type of positive memories 
recalled. This would support Yuan, Peng, Liu and Zhou’s (2011) assertion that 
negative moods could potentially influence one’s attention and the type of memory 
one attends to. 
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5.3. Study 2 
Discrepancies in Self-Concept, Posttraumatic Appraisals and Posttraumatic 
Psychological Adjustment 
 
 Current cognitive models of PTSD posit that an individual’s self-appraisals 
post-trauma can be largely dominated by negative perceptions of the self (e.g. “I am 
weak”, “I will never be the same again”) that can maintain PTSD as they create a 
sense of current internal threat to self (Dunmore et al., 1997; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Ehlers et al., 1998; Karl et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009). This sense of continued 
current threat results in an individual engaging in cognitive and behavioral coping 
strategies to reduce perceived threat. While such strategies may reduce distress in the 
short term, in the longer term they function to maintain the disorder as they prevent 
cognitive change (Agar, Kennedy, & King, 2006; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). As 
previously noted, the important role negative appraisals play in the maintenance of 
PTSD is well substantiated by empirical work (e.g. Bryant & Guthrie, 2005; Ehlers & 
Steil, 1995; Foa & Riggs, 1993). However, while such maladaptive appraisals serve 
as a risk factor for the maintenance of PTSD, dysfunctional and negative appraisals 
have not as yet been thoroughly explored in relation to self-concept: which not only 
includes evaluative aspects (i.e. self-appraisals) but also descriptive content about the 
self (Leary & Tangney, 2005). 
As outlined in Chapter 2 and 3, self-concept is of great significance to one’s 
personhood and acts as the reference point from which all else draws meaning 
(Combs & Snygg, 1959; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). It is an active, continuous and 
changing array of accessible self-knowledge and a framework for the perception and 
organization of one’s life experiences (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Moreover, self-
concept is influenced by a range of contextual factors (Leary & Tangney, 2005); one 
such influential factor is culture (Abernathy, 2008; Stone, 2006).  Indeed research 
suggests that people in different cultures have strikingly different understandings of 
the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1994, 2010). Individualistic cultures (typically 
Western) tend to emphasize the independent side of the self (i.e. perceive the self to 
be unique, independent, autonomous and separate from others). In contrast, Asian 
cultures tend to emphasize the interdependent aspect of self (i.e. perceive the self to 
be interdependent with others and emphasize relatedness of group norms and group 
harmony) (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010 and see Chapter 3 for further details).  
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 In the context of trauma, self-concept is of significant importance to 
psychological well-being as the trauma acts as a catalyst for a re-defining or re-
evaluating one’s self-concept, as one is prompted to make sense of the experience. 
Finding meaning in an otherwise incomprehensible situation potentially leads to a 
possible schema change, and in so doing, one’s possible selves are subject to change 
and potentially result in a new or discrepant self-concept (Brennan, 2001; Brewin, 
2011; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). As outlined in Chapter 3, Western psychological 
theories purport such inconsistencies and discrepancies in self-concept (i.e. a 
fractured or incongruent self) have been linked with various forms of psychological 
maladjustment (Brewin, 2011; Higgins, 1996; Strauman & Higgins, 1987; Sutherland 
& Bryant, 2008). However, while self-consistency is valued in Western cultures, it 
has been found to be less valued in Eastern cultures (Heine, 2001; Heine & Lehman, 
1997, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Suh, 2002). Research suggests that Asians 
hold a more inconsistent self-concept than Westerners and self-discrepancies are not 
as problematic for Asian cultures in regards to self-concept and well-being (Church, 
Anderson-Harumi, et al., 2008; English & Chen, 2011; Suh, 2000).  
 As outlined in Chapter 3, self-concept, in Higgins’ (1987) influential self-
discrepancy theory, is divided into three domains, the ‘Actual’ (representation of the 
attributes that one believes they actually possess and is one’s basic self-concept), the 
‘Ideal’ (representation of the attributes that someone would like to possess) and 
‘Ought’ (representation of the attributes that someone believes they should or ought to 
possess such as duty, obligations and responsibilities). Higgins delineates that when 
these domains are discrepant from one another negative affect can occur (e.g. 
Strauman, 1990; Strauman & Higgins, 1987). Again it has been found that Asians 
have a more flexible self-concept than their Western counterparts and are more 
tolerant of apparent contradictions in self-concept (Choi & Choi, 2002). It is not 
surprising then that research has found that those from collectivistic cultures have 
higher self-discrepancy scores than those from an individualistic culture (Cukur, 
2002). Therefore, it is proposed that those from Asian cultures will have greater self-
discrepancy scores than those from individualistic cultures.  
 Research has now demonstrated that trauma can have a negative impact on self-
concept; specifically for some trauma survivors, self-concept and self-definition can 
become trauma-centered. These alterations or distortions in self-concept have been 
found to be associated with disrupted posttraumatic psychological adjustment (e.g. 
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Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007; Sutherland & Bryant, 2006) (see Chapter 2 and 3 for 
greater detail). Further, as the self-concept (or the perceived actual self) can become 
trauma-centered, it seems likely that this in turn will result in discrepancies between 
the perceived actual self and the ideal and ought selves and such self-discrepancies 
will be associated with distress. In support of this, Sutherland and Bryant (2008) 
found that PTSD participants reported that their actual self was more discrepant to 
their ideal and ought self, compared to non-PTSD participants. Additionally, as 
trauma becomes central to self-concept, it seems likely that this will result in a greater 
trauma themed self-definition. In support of this, Sutherland and Bryant (2005) found 
those with PTSD reported more trauma related and negatively valenced self-defining 
memories compared to those without PTSD and control participants.  
To date, while research has investigated self-appraisals and discrepancies in 
self-concept following trauma, the relationships between maladaptive appraisals and 
distortions in self-concept (i.e. trauma-centered and discrepancies in self-concept) 
have not been investigated. It is predicted that the two will be related and that self-
appraisals may even mediate the relationship between self-distortions and PTSD 
symptoms. That is, if the actual self becomes trauma-centered, resulting in self-
discrepancies, it is likely that this will result in negative appraisals of the self (e.g. ‘I 
am weak’, ‘I can’t cope’), which have been found to maintain PTSD symptoms. 
Therefore, Study 2 aims to investigate the relationships between self-discrepancy, 
self-appraisals and PTSD symptoms and to examine whether these relationships differ 
depending on one’s cultural background.  
In light of the above, it is hypothesized that those from Asian cultures will 
have greater self-discrepancy than those from individualistic cultures. Second and 
referring back to the conceptual framework, that trauma, regardless of one’s cultural 
background, will influence one’s self-concept and this will be related to PTSD 
symptoms. This hypothesis is based on literature, which proposes self-concept 
undergoes a continuous adaptation process based on experiences. Therefore, 
regardless of culture, individuals will try to process and make sense of their traumatic 
experience, which in turn has implications for one’s current or ‘actual’ self-concept. If 
the processing of the trauma experience influences one’s self-concept in a negative 
manner (e.g. distortions in self-concept) this will have a subsequent effect on 
posttrauma adjustment. Third, it is hypothesized that a trauma-centered actual self or 
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trauma-centered self-definition will be related to greater self-discrepancies for both 
cultural groups. Fourth and reflective of the conceptual framework, it is predicted that 
regardless of one’s cultural background, disruptions in self-concept (e.g. self-
discrepancy, trauma-themed self-concept and trauma-centered self-definition) will be 
related to negative trauma-related self-appraisals as negative appraisals will arise 
when the self is perceived to be in danger (greater self discrepancies). Finally, it is 
hypothesized that negative self-appraisals will mediate the relationship between 
disruptions in self-concept (e.g. self-discrepancy, trauma-themed self-concept and 
trauma-centered self-definition) and PTSD symptoms. 
5.3.1 Method 
 Participants were the same as those recruited from the Psychology Research 
Participation Panel at the University of East Anglia in Study 1. The same power 
analysis revealed a sample of 92 was required. In addition to the measures completed 
in Study 1, participants also completed the Selves Questionnaire (SQ; Higgins, 1987) 
and the self-defining memory task (Singer & Salovey, 1993).  
 
 5.3.1.1 Selves Questionnaire (SQ; Higgins, 1987). Higgins’ (1987) SQ was 
used to elicit self-discrepancies. Participants were instructed to make a list of one-
word attributes that ‘describe the type of person you think you Ideally would like to 
be’; that ‘describe the type of person you think you Actually are’; and that ‘describe 
the type of person you think you Ought to be’. The rationale for using the SQ is based 
on it having been used in several other studies that have investigated the influence of 
trauma on self-concept (e.g. Sutherland & Bryant, 2008), thereby providing a measure 
of one’s self-concept. The self-discrepancy scores were coded according to the 
instructions of Sutherland and Bryant (2008); attributes were coded as a synonym, 
antonym or non-relational according to Roget’s Thesaurus. To derive an ideal self-
discrepancy score the total number of matches was subtracted from the total number 
of mismatches between the list of actual and ideal self-attributes. Comparatively, for 
ought self-discrepancy score the total number of matches were subtracted from the 
total number of mismatches between the list of actual and ought self-attributes. 
 The Actual Self attributes were also used as index of trauma-centered self-
concept. Specifically, trauma-centered actual self was coded as participant’s actual 
self-descriptions that were clearly and directly trauma focused (e.g. trauma victim, 
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traumatized, afraid). The total number of trauma-themed actual self-descriptions was 
divided by the total actual self-descriptions provided, thereby calculating a trauma-
centered actual self-ratio. 
 
5.3.1.2 Self-defining memory task (Singer & Salovey, 1993). The self-
defining memory task is a method routinely used in autobiographical memory and 
trauma research (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008). The 
rationale for using this measure is to provide another means of eliciting one’s self-
concept in addition to acting as a measure of trauma-centered self-definition, as used 
in previous research (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005). 
Participants were instructed that, “ a self-defining memory is a memory from your life 
that you remember very clearly, is important to you and leads to strong positive or 
negative feelings. It is the kind of memory that helps you to understand who you are, 
and conveys powerfully how you have come to be the person you currently are”. 
Participants were asked to provide up to five self-defining memories. These memories 
were coded as being trauma themed if they were clearly and directly related to trauma 
(e.g., I was in a road traffic accident, someone close to me died, I am so depressed 
since the event happened, etc.). The total number of trauma-themed self-defining 
memories were tallied for each participant and then divided by the number of 
memories retrieved, to provide them with a trauma themed ratio. 
 
5.3.2. Procedure 
Ethical approval was obtained from University of East Anglia, Faculty of 
Heath Research Office, Reference Number 2009/10-029 (see Appendix A). Data for 
the two studies was collected in the same experimental session. Each session took 
approximately 60 minutes. Participants met with the researcher and following written 
informed consent procedures, participants were asked to complete the self-defining 
memory task, the measures outlined in Study 1 and lastly the SQ. 
Interrater-reliability procedure 
 Interrater reliability procedure was determined by the Principal Investigator 
going through all data booklets and coding all the self-discrepancy (SQ) responses 
and self-defining memory responses. An independent Asian rater (blind to hypotheses 
and group status) was given 20% of the data booklets and also coded the self-
discrepancy (SQ) responses and the self-defining memory responses. The kappa 
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coefficient of interrater reliability was 1.00 for ideal self-discrepancy, .92 for ought 
self-discrepancy, .82 for trauma-centered actual self, and .96 for trauma-themed self-
defining memories.  
 
5.3.3. Results 
 Data achieved normality for all variables with the exception of the trauma-
centered actual self and IES-R variables. Transformations did not resolve issues of 
skewness and kurtosis, therefore non-parametric analysis were employed to 
investigate associations between trauma-centered self with the IES-R (see Table 6) 
and with the PTCI (see Table 7).  
 
5.3.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Self-discrepancies 
Figure 8 shows that, as hypothesized, the Asian group had significantly greater 
ideal and ought self-discrepancies than the British group, F(1, 73) = 6.62, p = .01, ƞp
2
 
= .07. The results were also evident when PTSD symptoms and depression symptoms 
were included as covariates.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean Actual-Ideal and Actual-Ought self-discrepancy scores across British 
and Asian groups. 
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5.3.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Trauma-Centered Actual Self 
 As shown in Table 5 the two groups did not differ in trauma-centered actual 
self or trauma-centered self-definition.  
 
Table 5 
Mean Participant Self-Discrepancy Scores, Trauma-Centered Actual Self Scores and 
PTCI Scores 
 Asian  British    
 M         SD  M      SD t p d 
IES-R 30.44 15.50  16.65  17.33 3.64 .001 .84 
HSCL-25 1.90 .58  1.60  .47 2.47 .02 .57 
PTCI Total 9.19 1.73  8.07 1.82 2.73 .01 .63 
PTCI Self 6.66 1.65  5.84 1.40 2.32 .02 .54 
PTCI World 4.89 1.15  4.22  1.30 2.37 .02 .55 
PTCI Self-Blame 3.80 .81  3.44 1.10 1.61 .11 .37 
Trauma-Centered 
Actual-Self 
.08 .13  .06 .09 .69 .49 .18 
Trauma-Centered 
Self-Definition 
.12 .16  .08 .13 .98 .33 .27 
Ideal SD .52 .53  .23 .57 2.31 .02 .53 
Ought SD .65 .46  .39 .49 2.38 .02 .55 
Note: PTCI = Post-traumatic Cognitions Inventory, IES-R = Impact of Event Scale-
Revised, HSCL-25 = Hopkins Symptom Checklist – 25, Ideal SD = Ideal Self-
Discrepancy, Ought SD = Ought Self-Discrepancy 
 
Given trauma-centered actual self ratio was not normally distributed, 
Spearman correlations were used to examine the relationship between trauma-
centered actual self, posttrauma appraisals and PTSD symptoms. Figure 9 illustrates 
the relationship between trauma-centered actual self and PTSD symptoms. It was 
found that as predicted for the British group trauma-centered actual self ratio was 
significantly correlated with PTSD symptoms, rho(34) = .29, p = .02 (one-tailed). 
However, contrary to our hypothesis, for the Asian group there was no significant 
correlation between trauma-centered actual self and PTSD symptoms, rho(41) = .12, 
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ns. This consequently highlights a greater tolerance for negative information even 
trauma information without adverse psychological adjustment for this group. 
Specifically, for the Asian group, even with the inclusion of trauma related 
information being a part of the individual’s perception of their actual self-concept, 
they are potentially able to hold this information without it being detrimental to their 
psychological health, as their trauma-related actual self was not related to PTSD 
symptoms, thus potentially highlighting this group to have a greater tolerance of 
negative self-relevant information. This was not the case for the British group, their 
trauma-related actual self-perceptions were related to PTSD symptoms, thereby 
illustrating that the British group are not as tolerant of holding negative self-relevant 
information without it resulting an adverse manifestation (i.e. PTSD symptoms). 
However, it needs to be noted that 25 participants provided trauma-centered 
self-descriptions, thereby bringing to light the limited variance this variable has. 
Further, the limited variability in the data gathered on this one variable could very 
well reduce the power of statistics on the correlation analysis conducted between this 
variable and the variable measuring PTSD symptoms (IES-R), thus impacting on 
findings which need to therefore be viewed in a much more tentative light. 
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Figure 9. Trauma-centered self-descriptors associated with PTSD symptoms for 
British and Asian groups. 
 
Additionally, trauma-centered self-definition findings were contrary to 
hypothesis. For the British group trauma-centered self-definition was not significantly 
correlated with PTSD symptoms. Whilst for the Asian group, there was a negative 
association between trauma-themed self-definition and PTSD symptoms (see Table 
6). 
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Table 6 
Correlation Coefficients (one-tailed) for Trauma-Centered Actual-Self, Trauma-
Centered Self-Definition and PTSD symptoms 
 Trauma-centered actual self Trauma-centered self-definition 
 British Asian Zdiff P British Asian Zdiff P 
IES-R Total .29* .12 .74 .23 .13 -.29 1.77 .04 
IES-R 
Intrusion 
.20* .10 .42 .34 .19 -.21 1.68 .05 
IES-R 
Avoidance 
.30 .08 .95 .17 .15 -.33 2.04 .02 
IES-R 
Hyperarousal 
.32* .13 .83 .20 .03 -.23 1.09 .14 
Note: *p < .05. IES-R = Impact of Event Scale - Revised; Spearman correlations were 
used for all correlations. 
 
Further, Table 6 shows the Z difference scores (and associated p-values) 
between the two cultural groups for each correlation coefficient. Here we find the 
Zscores differ significantly for trauma-centered self-definition and IES-R total and 
avoidance and intrusion subscales. Thereby suggesting that self-concept posttrauma 
may have differing implications for adjustment for British and Asian cultures. 
 
5.3.3.3. Hypothesis 3: Relationship between Trauma-Centered Actual Self, 
Trauma-Centered Self-Definition and Self-Discrepancy  
Spearman correlations were used to investigate the correlations between 
trauma-centered actual self, trauma-centered self-definition and self-discrepancy in 
each cultural group separately. As hypothesized, for the British group, it was found 
that trauma-centered actual self-ratio was significantly correlated with ideal self-
discrepancy, rho(34) = .31, p = .04 (one-tailed), and ought self-discrepancy, rho(34) = 
.34, p = .02 (one-tailed). Similarly, for the Asian group, trauma-centered actual self 
ratio was significantly correlated with ideal self-discrepancy, rho(41) = .42, p = .01 
(one-tailed), and approaching significance for ought self-discrepancy, rho(41) = .21, p 
= .09 (one-tailed).  
  98 
Contrary to the hypothesis there were no significant associations between 
trauma-centered self-definition and ideal or ought self-discrepancy for the British 
group. Again for the Asian group, trauma-centered self-definition was not 
significantly associated with ought self-discrepancy but was approaching significance 
with ideal self-discrepancy, rho(41) = .23 , p = .07 (one-tailed) (see Table 6). 
 
5.3.3.4. Hypothesis 4: Relationship between disruptions in self-concept (e.g. self-
discrepancy and trauma-themed self-concept) and appraisals 
As shown in Table 7, for the British group, trauma-centered actual self was 
significantly correlated with PTCI Total, PTCI Self, and PTCI World. For the Asian 
group, trauma-centered actual self significantly correlated with PTCI Total and PTCI 
Self. Table 7 also shows that, as hypothesized, British participants’ ideal and ought 
self-discrepancy scores were significantly correlated with PTCI Total, PTCI Self and 
PTCI Self-Blame (i.e. negative self-appraisals). For the Asian group, ideal and ought 
self-discrepancy scores were also significantly correlated with PTCI Total and PTCI 
Self. Ought self-discrepancy scores were also found to be significantly correlated with 
PTCI World. Conversely, trauma-centered self-definition was not significantly 
associated with PTCI or any of its subscales for either British or Asian groups. 
Further, Table 7 details the Zscores (and associated p values) between cultural groups 
for each correlation coefficient. It was found that trauma-centered actual self differed 
on the world subscale, while ideal and ought self-discrepancy differ on the self-blame 
subscale. 
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Table 7 
Correlation Coefficients (one-tailed) for Trauma-Centered Actual-Self, Self-Discrepancies and PTCI Scores 
 PTCI-Total PTCI-Self PTCI-World PTCI-Self-blame 
 British Asian Zdiff P British Asian Zdiff P British Asian Zdiff P British Asian Zdiff P 
Trauma-
centered actual 
self 
.34* .50** -.18 .21 .33* .49** -.80 .21 .06 .47** -1.86 .03 .24 .21 .13 .45 
Ideal SD .38** .38* 0 .50 .45** .32* .63 .26 .16 .23 -.30 .38 .12 .49** -1.72 .04 
Ought SD .31* .43* -.58 .28 .24* .35* -.50 .31 .24* .29 -.22 .41 .08 .52** -2.05 .02 
Trauma-
centered self-
definition 
.09 .02 .29 .39 .10 .18 -.34 .37 -.03 .11 -.58 .28 -.04 -.20 .67 .25 
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. Ideal SD = Ideal Self-Discrepancy Score; Ought SD = Ought Self-Discrepancy Score; Spearman correlations were 
used for all correlations.
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5.3.3.5. Hypothesis 5: Do Appraisals Mediate the Relationship between 
disruptions in self-concept (e.g. self-discrepancy and trauma-themed self-
concept) and Posttraumatic Psychological Adjustment?  
Multiple mediation (see Table 8) analyses examined whether the relationship 
between disruptions in self-concept (e.g. self-discrepancy and trauma-themed self-
concept) and PTSD symptoms were mediated by appraisals using bootstrapping 
procedures for the British and Asian groups separately (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The 
rationale for using multiple mediation analysis was to identity and understand the 
relationship between disruptions in self-concept and posttraumatic psychological 
adjustment as a causal relationship was suspected between the factors of interest 
based on previous research. The mediation analysis was conducted using Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) paper introducing mediation analysis, which has been cited over 
9,000 times (Gelfand, Mensinger & Tenhave, 2009), and employs a regression-based 
method. Further, in the analyses 5,000 bootstrap resamples of the data with 
replacement was used. Statistical significance with alpha at .05 is indicated by the 
95% confidence intervals not crossing zero. It was found that for the British group, 
trauma-related appraisals mediated the relationship between ought self-discrepancy 
and PTSD symptoms with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of 0.92 to 15.63 and 
between ideal self-discrepancy and PTSD symptoms with a 95% bootstrap confidence 
interval of 1.25 to 13.27 (equivalent findings were found when self-appraisals were 
substituted as the mediator; ought self-discrepancy, 95% confidence interval of .01 to 
12.74; ideal self-discrepancy, 95% confidence interval of .33 to 11.65). It was found 
that for the Asian group, appraisals mediated the relationship between ought self-
discrepancy and PTSD symptoms with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of 0.44 to 
8.74, but not between ideal self-discrepancy and PTSD symptoms, 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval of -.67 to 7.74. However, self appraisals mediated the relationship 
between both ought self-discrepancy, 95% confidence interval of .66 to 9.57, and 
ideal self-discrepancy and PTSD symptoms, 95% confidence interval of 1.19 to 9.71. 
Finally, it was found that for neither the British nor the Asian group did trauma-
related appraisals mediate the relationship between trauma-centered actual self-
concept or trauma-centered self-definition and PTSD symptoms.
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Table 8 
Summary of Results of the Mediation Analyses where Self-concept (i.e. trauma centered self and self-discrepancy) is the Independent Variable, 
Trauma-Related Appraisal (PTCI Total) is the Mediator and PTSD symptom (IES-R) is the Dependent Variable. 
 Asian  British 
 B SE t p  B SE t p 
Trauma-Centered Self          
Trauma-Centered Self to Mediator (a path) 2.48 1.83 1.36 .18  10.57 2.84 3.72 .01 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD symptoms (b path) 2.59 1.43 1.81 .07  3.89 1.85 2.11 .01 
Total Effect of Trauma-Centered Self on PTSD symptoms (c path) 5.05 16.78 .30 .77  48.36 31.18 1.55 .13 
Direct Effect of Trauma-Centered Self on PTSD symptoms (c’ path) -1.36 16.69 -.08 .88  7.27 35.47 .21 .29 
Ideal SD          
Ideal SD to Mediator (a path) 1.17 .47 2.52 .02  1.26 .52 2.43 .02 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD symptoms (b path) 2.20 1.50 1.47 .15  4.11 1.68 2.45 .01 
Total Effect of Ideal SD on PTSD symptoms (c path) 5.59 4.42 1.27 .21  5.05 5.30 .95 .35 
Direct Effect of Ideal SD on PTSD symptoms (c’ path) 3.01 4.69 .64 .52  -.14 5.37 -.03 .98 
Ought SD          
Ought SD to Mediator (a path) 1.21 .56 2.14 .03  1.25 .62 2.03 .05 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD symptoms (b path) 3.03 1.46 2.08 .04  4.07 1.64 2.48 .02 
Total Effect of Ought SDon PTSD symptoms (c path) -1.71 5.35 -.32 .75  5.43 6.16 .88 .34 
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Direct Effect of Ought SD on PTSD symptoms (c’ path) 5.37 5.43 -.99 .33  .34 6.07 .06 .96 
Trauma-Centered Self-Definition          
Trauma-Centered Self-Definition(a path) .43 1.75 .25 .80  .87 2.42 .36 .72 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD symptoms (b path) 2.67 1.33 2.00 .05  4.09 1.55 2.65 .01 
Total Effect of Trauma-Centered Self-Definition on PTSD symptoms (c 
path) 
-27.54 15.09 -1.82 .06  3.95 23.03 .17 .86 
Direct Effect of Trauma-Centered Self-Definitionon PTSD symptoms 
(c’ path) 
-28.70 14.55 -1.97 .06  .40 21.17 .02 .99 
 Note: PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale-Revised; Ideal SD = Ideal Self-Discrepancy Score; Ought SD 
= Ought Self-Discrepancy Score 
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5.3.5. Discussion 
The aim of Study 2 was to investigate the relationships between disruptions in 
self-concept (e.g. self-discrepancy and trauma-themed self-concept), self-appraisals 
and PTSD symptoms and to examine whether these relationships differ depending on 
one’s cultural background. It was found, in line with previous research (Cukur, 2002), 
that Asian participants had greater discrepant self-concepts than British participants. 
Second, as expected, for the British group trauma-centered actual self-ratio was 
significantly correlated with PTSD symptoms. However, contrary to the hypothesis, 
for the Asian group trauma-centered actual self-ratio was not significantly correlated 
with PTSD symptoms. Third, it was found, as hypothesized, that trauma-centered 
actual self was significantly correlated with greater self-discrepancies for both 
cultural groups. Fourth, for the British group, self-discrepancy scores were 
significantly correlated with PTCI Total, PTCI Self and PTCI Self-Blame. Similarly, 
for the Asian group, self-discrepancy scores were significantly correlated with PTCI 
Total and PTCI Self. Finally, self-appraisals were found to mediate the relationship 
between self-discrepancies and PTSD symptoms in both cultural groups. 
The findings therefore support the notion that trauma can become central to 
self-concept which in turn has detrimental effects on post-traumatic psychological 
adjustment (i.e. PTSD symptoms and trauma-related appraisals). However, the results 
indicated that while this may be the case for British participants, for Asian 
participants trauma-centered self-concept was not significantly correlated with PTSD 
symptoms and in some instances had negative associations. Both Berntsen and Rubin 
(2006) and Conway (2005) suggest self-change following trauma is motivated by a 
need for self-consistency. Cross-cultural research suggests, however, that self-
consistency needs are culturally variable (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001; Suh, 
2000, 2002). An internally coherent and consistent self-identity is essential for mental 
health in Western independent cultures as this coincides with independent cultures’ 
emphasis on the individual as the anchor of behaviour, thoughts, and feelings (Suh, 
2000). Suh (2000) suggests that this is not the case in Asian cultures where the focus 
is the social context, rather than on the individual, and people are much more capable 
of flexibility between social roles and tolerant of differences in their self in these 
roles. Initial research (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2006, 2008) has found support for a 
cultural distinction in self-change following trauma; namely, while those with PTSD 
from individualistic cultures tend to have a greater trauma-defined self, this 
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relationship is less evident in those from collectivistic cultures. This study provides 
further support for a lack of correlation between trauma-themed self-concept and 
PTSD symptoms in those from Asian cultures. Further, negative associations between 
trauma-centered self-definition and PTSD symptoms were first brought to light by 
Jobson and O’Kearney (2006, 2008). This study provides further support that for 
Asian participants, a traumatised self-concept is not necessarily associated with 
psychological maladjustment. Significant Z scores further consolidated there to be 
cultural differences in self-concept posttrauma and associations with PTSD 
symptoms. However, these analyses’ results were preliminary due to the nature and 
size of the sample. 
 Despite some cultural differences in the relationship between trauma-centered 
self and PTSD symptoms, the findings also suggest many cultural similarities in 
trauma-centered actual self being related to greater self-discrepancies. Thus findings 
only partly support the hypotheses derived in the conceptual framework. Results 
suggest that if trauma becomes central to perceived self-concept, people are likely to 
perceive their self-concept as not being in line with the way they feel their self-
concept should and would ideally like to be. This, in turn results in negative self-
appraisals which over time has been found to be involved in the maintenance of 
PTSD symptoms (Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 1997; Ehlers & Clark, 2000); 
discrepancies in self-concept perpetuate negative self-appraisals which in turn 
perpetuates PTSD symptoms. It is worth noting that for only the British group, self-
discrepancies were associated with self-blame appraisals. This may be the result of 
those from individualistic cultures valuing responsibilities of personal control and 
responsibility more than those from collectivistic cultures (Mesquita & Walker, 
2003). Additionally, for the Asian group, ought self-discrepancy scores were also 
significantly correlated with negative world appraisals (e.g. feelings of alienation, not 
being able to rely on others, etc.). This may reflect ought self-discrepancy being not 
living up to others expectations, which may relate to appraisals of alienation (Jobson 
& O’Kearney, 2009).  
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5.4. General Discussion 
There is an urgent need to improve our understanding of the influence of 
culture on the onset and maintenance of PTSD. This is further emphasized by the 
substantial evidence, which indicates that appraisals and self-concept, central to the 
understanding and treatment of PTSD, are found to differ across cultures. Study 1 
therefore examined the role of culture on the cognitive appraisals of everyday and 
trauma events and associated implications for posttraumatic psychological 
adjustment. Study 2 investigated the relationship between perceptions of self and 
trauma-related appraisals and whether culture influences this relationship. 
Overall, the results of Study 1 tend to confirm the hypotheses derived from the 
conceptual framework. First, findings support the prediction that due to differences in 
self-construal there are cultural differences in appraisals dimensions related to 
everyday and trauma events. Specifically, there were cultural differences in how a 
person appraises an everyday and trauma event that seems to reflect an emphasis on 
agency, independence and achievement in the British group. The trauma event had 
further differences in appraisals of legitimacy and responsibility. Second, the 
prediction concerning adjustment post-trauma in relation to appraisals tended to not 
be supported, as there were cultural differences in the relationship between cognitive 
appraisals and PTSD symptoms. Specifically, the PTCI was associated with PTSD 
symptoms more strongly in the British group than in the Asian group, which suggests 
that the PTCI may not be culturally sensitive to collectivistic cultures unless 
adjustments are made. 
Fourth, the findings suggest that due to cultural differences in self-
appropriation and dialectic philosophies of thinking, there are differences in the 
manner in which groups perceive their actual self, ideal and ought self-domains. 
Findings supported this prediction, namely that those from Asian cultures had greater 
discrepancies in their self-concept than those from British participants. Fifth, findings 
partially supported the hypothesis that trauma would influence one’s actual/current 
self-concept and that this would be related to PTSD symptoms, trauma-related self-
appraisals and greater discrepancies in self-concept. Specifically, while this did occur 
for the British group (trauma-centered actual self was significantly correlated with 
PTSD symptoms, trauma-related appraisals and greater self-discrepancies), this was 
not found in the Asian group (trauma-centered self was not found to be significantly 
correlated with PTSD symptoms or trauma-related appraisals and trauma-centered 
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self-definition was negatively associated with PTSD symptoms). Such findings 
perhaps suggest, stronger self-definition centered on trauma does not necessarily 
predict poor post-traumatic psychological adjustment and maintenance of symptoms 
within Asian cultures. However, for the Asian group, their trauma-centered actual self 
was found to be significantly correlated with self-discrepancies, which were in turn 
related to trauma self-appraisals. Sixth, the prediction that negative self-appraisals 
would mediate the relationship between self-discrepancy and PTSD symptoms was 
supported. Thereby supporting the notion that discrepancies in self-concept can 
influence self-appraisals that are involved in the maintenance of PTSD.  
There are several theoretical and clinical implications that can be drawn from 
these findings. First, current findings support cognitive models of PTSD that posit 
that an individual’s self-appraisals post-trauma can be largely dominated by negative 
perceptions, which can maintain PTSD. Further, findings from the current study 
suggest discrepancies in self-concept can influence self-appraisals involved in the 
maintenance of PTSD and highlights the importance of considering self-concept in 
therapeutic interventions. Moreover, understanding cultural differences and 
sensitivities in self-concept can help facilitate a healthy self-concept through its aid in 
the alleviation of negative and dysfunctional cognitive self-appraisals.  
The limitations of the study are acknowledged. First, sample sizes were 
modest which potentially limits statistical power and generalizability of the results. 
Additionally, participants were university students and thus, while they were 
responding in relation to their most traumatic and distressing life experience, of which 
a significant number would classify as APA (1994) criterion A type trauma, future 
studies need to examine these relationships using trauma survivors and in particular 
trauma survivors with PTSD. Second, the study was cross-sectional which precludes 
causal explanations. Third, participants were asked to complete all tasks in English, 
which may have impacted on appraisals and identity for participants in the Asian 
group. Moreover the Asian international students were considered as a single, 
collectivistic population, with the British group on the extreme individualism side. 
Although there is support for this approach from previous literature (e.g. Hofstede & 
Hofstede, 2004), the inclusion of a measure for interdependent and/or independent 
orientation would have provided better support for conclusions. Further, the 
limitations of using multiple mediation analysis as outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) include a number of theoretical and empirical concerns about the application 
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of this method of assessing mediation, including association, temporal order and the 
confirmatory-exploratory distinction (Gelfand, Mensinger & Tenhave, 2009). In light 
of this findings need to be considered more tentatively. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the results of the study document salient and cross-cultural differences 
between appraisals of trauma and everyday events which could go on to influence the 
relationships between trauma–related appraisals and PTSD symptom. It is also one of 
the first investigations into the relationship between discrepant self-concepts and the 
PTCI, producing findings that warrant further investigation into how self-concept can 
influence PTSD recovery. To address the limitations and to extend external validity 
and clinical inferences of this study a second study examining appraisals and self-
concept measures in a general community sample comprised of trauma exposed adults 
with and without PTSD, from British and Asian cultures is needed. 
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Part 2 
 
Exploratory Analysis of Trauma-Associated Appraisals in Trauma Survivors 
from Collectivistic Cultures 
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Chapter 6 
6.1 Study 3:  Exploring Trauma Associated Appraisals in Trauma Survivors 
from Collectivistic Cultures: Examining Implications for the Posttraumatic 
Cognitive Inventory and the Development of the Public and Communal Self 
Appraisal Measure (PCSAM) 
 
As continuously stressed in this thesis, appraisals are a key feature in 
understanding an individual’s experience; this is especially important when the 
experience is a traumatic one. Appraisals enable an individual to derive or construct 
meaning from a traumatic event that is potentially meaningless and arbitrary. Thus the 
manner in which the trauma is appraised is of paramount importance as it allows for 
evaluation of how the individual navigates through a series of novel and unwanted 
experiences, thoughts, emotions and behaviors. Appraisals aid in the understanding of 
posttraumatic psychological adjustment and recovery, along with what impedes its 
progress (e.g. Kleim et al., 2007). 
PTSD has received substantial clinical and empirical focus in the last two 
decades. As highlighted in Chapter 2, much of the literature on trauma and 
posttraumatic stress is based on cognitive models of PTSD, which emphasize the 
effects of trauma on the primary victim (i.e. the individual directly experiencing the 
traumatic event) (Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). However, it can be 
argued that the culture in which the primary victim(s) are oriented in plays a crucial 
role in their experiencing and appraisals of the trauma event. Shaler (2005) supports 
this assertion and purports traumatic events to be perceived as traumatic when it is 
both emotionally and personally meaningful. Moreover, Shaler (2005) puts forth that 
a traumatic event should not be viewed as affecting individuals; instead it should be 
viewed as affecting humans in their context. One’s culture provides such a context, 
namely the context in which humans reside, from which they draw meaning, and 
determines whether particular explanations, appraisals and cognitions make sense. 
Thus following traumatic events, these cognitive understandings of the world are 
called into question and have the potential to have extremely detrimental effects on an 
individual; namely PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Also, and importantly, culture 
influences how others within one’s culture would appraise the traumatic event. This 
potentially affects an individual’s support system, either enabling or disenabling it at 
the group level. Thus, the relationship between trauma and culture is an important one 
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and warrants further investigation for several reasons; not least of which is to arrive at 
culturally informed and appropriate PTSD models and treatments for those who have 
experienced trauma from non-Western, collectivistic cultures (Jobson, 2009; Jobson 
& O’Kearney, 2006; Jobson & O’Kearney, 2009).  
The importance of considering culture’s influence on trauma-associated 
appraisals and the implications for PTSD was highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Additionally, Study 1’s findings support this assertion. Specifically, when the original 
PTCI was used it was not significantly associated with or predictive of PTSD 
symptoms in the Asian group but was significantly correlated with and predictive of 
PTSD symptoms for the British group. Thus Asian/collectivistic cultures potentially 
appraise situations differently or hold different appraisals to be important in the 
aftermath of trauma than that of trauma survivors from Western cultures, which in 
turn can go on to influence PTSD symptom severity and maintenance. Therefore, 
examining the responses and interpretations of trauma related thoughts and beliefs as 
put forth by the PTCI would be insightful. 
 Thus far both PTSD theories and treatments have been developed somewhat 
independently of cross-cultural research. This extends to PTSD assessment measures 
such as the PTCI. Furthermore, the PTCI has consistently been used in trauma 
research predominately using participants from Western, individualistic cultures. As it 
stands, many of the PTCI items appear to be focused on individualistic-type 
cognitions (e.g. I am a weak person, I am inadequate) (Foa et al., 1999); therefore a 
greater focus on interdependent and collectivistic cognitions may be required. To the 
author’s knowledge, the PTCI has only been explored in relation to cultural 
appropriateness in collectivistic cultures by Su and Chen (2007). Their study reported 
the factor structure and psychometric properties of the Chinese version of the PTCI 
(PTCI-C), as well as its relationship with PTSD symptoms with a traumatized college 
sample in Taiwan. They found the measure displayed good internal consistency, test–
retest stability, concurrent validity, and discriminative validity.  
 However, questions still remain as to the PTCI’s suitability for use in non-
Western and collectivistic populations. This study therefore endeavored to examine 
how a greater focus on interdependent and collectivistic cognitions may influence this 
measure. Accordingly, the inclusion of the PTCI as a measure examining whether or 
not the items are appropriate, how they are interpreted and responded to by those from 
collectivistic culture is potentially valuable. For instance the language used to form 
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each item may not coincide with how each item should be expressed outside of 
independent cultures. The PTCI could provide information and insights on an under-
researched area, namely, on non-Western populations evaluation of trauma appraisals 
and measures used to assess for PTSD. As stated above, the PTCI is routinely used in 
clinical and research work and has been found in Western cultures to be predictive of 
the onset and maintenance and treatment outcome of PTSD (Kleim et al., 2007). 
Consequently, it is imperative to improve our understanding on its applicability when 
used in non-Western cultures in order to improve culturally appropriate assessments 
and treatment plans. 
 There has been much quantitative and empirical research delving in to the 
impact trauma appraisals have on the development and maintenance of PTSD. 
However, the same cannot be said from a qualitative viewpoint. There are very few 
published studies addressing trauma appraisals using qualitative methodologies. 
Research is even more diminutive when looking at the interaction between trauma 
appraisals and culture in relation to PTSD. Therefore, the use of qualitative 
methodologies to understand the interplay of culture and trauma (i.e. trauma 
appraisals) is important as it could provide valuable information to improve standards 
of care and access to services for those from non-Western populations. Study 3 
therefore aims to help bridge this gap. To accomplish this, the study will focus on 
exploring the perceptions, understandings and interpretations of trauma of trauma 
survivors from different cultural groups through the use of focus groups and 
interviews, as these are particularly sensitive to cultural variables and should highlight 
the dynamic nature of people’s understandings (Kitzinger, 1994). Participant selection 
will be based on community members from collectivistic cultures who have 
experienced a trauma and mental health practitioners who specialize in working with 
trauma survivors from collectivistic cultures. This should provide multiple 
perspectives, which are essential if insights into questions exploring this topic are to 
be gained. 
Therefore, in order to gain further understanding of cultural differences in 
perceptions and appraisals of trauma, Study 3 aims to a) investigate what meaning(s) 
community members from collectivistic cultures attach to trauma (and in particular 
appraisals typically generated in such groups) and whether this is influenced by 
culture (i.e. do these appraisals differ to those associated with individualistic 
cultures); b) use key informant interviews to further elicit insights on the influence 
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culture has on trauma appraisals within interdependent/collectivistic cultures; and c) 
to investigate the appropriateness of the PTCI as a measure to assess trauma-related 
appraisals and cognitions within collectivistic cultures.  
 
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Design 
The study used a mixed design with three qualitative focus groups with 
community members from collectivistic cultures and three qualitative individual key 
informant interviews with mental health practitioners. The qualitative components 
explored and elicited perceptions, appraisals, understandings and opinions 
surrounding trauma, posttraumatic psychological adjustment, and the three sub-scales 
of the PTCI (i.e. negative cognitions about self, negative cognitions about the world 
and self-blame). The appropriateness of the PTCI and its subscales will be informed 
by the quantitative component of the study, whereby both the community sample and 
the mental health practitioners were asked to complete a modified version of the PTCI 
questionnaire which investigates PTCI item appropriateness. A power analysis was 
not performed; instead research denotes that between 3 or 4 participants per focus 
group (Morgan, 1997; Krueger, 1994) are sufficient when they have specialized 
knowledge and/or experiences to discuss in the group, as is the case here. Krueger 
(1994) has endorsed the use of very small focus groups, what he terms “mini-focus 
groups” for such instances. 
 
 To provide context for the research process, it is important to note that data 
analysis and reporting was conducted in a team based approach. The team consisted 
of the primary investigator (A.E./doctoral student) and secondary investigator 
(L.J./primary supervisor). 
 
6.2.2. Participants 
Research points to using samples that can discuss and comment on the 
research topic from personal experience (Powell et al., 1996) or to have had a specific 
experience of or opinion about the topic being investigated (Merton & Kendall, 
1946), because those who have had contact and experience with the subject being 
discussed can shed real light on the topic (Fern 2001). It is with this in mind that the 
study samples were chosen: 
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6.2.2.1. Community Members. All participants (N = 11; male n = 8, female n 
= 3) for the focus group were recruited from the general community in Norwich by 
using posters at Bridge Plus a non-profit charity based in Norwich and internal 
bulletins to its members and affiliates. Bridge Plus has a number of aims; these are 
predominantly centered on improving community cohesion through a social 
networking community center; in addition to empowering community members with 
knowledge and information to aid integration in to their new communities.  
Notices called for participants who were from collectivistic communities, were aged 
over 18 years and who could complete the study in English. Focus group participants 
were Chinese (n = 2), Vietnamese (n = 1), Indian (n = 2), Sri Lankan (n = 3), 
Ethiopian (n = 1), Jordanian (n = 1) and Slovakian (n = 1). All identified as being 
from non-Western cultures. According to Hofstede’s and Hofstede’s (2004) 
Individualistic/Collectivism continuum, all fell within the collectivistic range 20 to 
52. Focus group participants ranged in age from 20 – 29 years; all participants were 
unemployed and enrolled in higher education courses. Participants had been in the 
UK between 1 and 2 years. Further, participants had a range of trauma experiences 
(see Table 9). All participants identified as being trauma survivors, while no measures 
of PTSD or depression were included, participants had a range of trauma experiences, 
the majority having been a road traffic accident (RTA, n = 8) in addition to witnessing 
a death (n = 1), involved in an accident resulting in serious injury (n = 1) and being 
persecuted (n = 1). All incidences had been experienced in the participant’s country of 
origin and prior to them arriving in the UK to commence their academic courses. 
 
6.2.2.2. Key informant interviews. All participants (N=3) for the key 
informant interviews were mental health practitioners identified by the research team 
as having experience in this area (i.e. mental health practitioners working at the 
Refugee Council or Red Cross, psychologists working in the NHS and working for 
trauma organizations such as the Trauma Clinic and Medical Foundation) and were 
therefore routinely working with trauma survivors from collectivistic cultures. The 
mental health practitioners all identified as British which amounts to a score of 89 on 
Hofstede and Hofstede’s (2004) Individualistic/Collectivism continuum and ranged 
between 40 – 45 years. 
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6.3. Data Collection and Measures  
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were used based on a topic guide. The 
rationale for this was to enable a detailed exploration of trauma appraisals from a 
collectivistic sample’s views, perspectives and experiences. Table 9 details the focus 
group and interview protocol; the three guiding question topics and sub-questions are 
derived from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (2009) which classified 
them as being pertinent issues surrounding trauma appraisals. In addition, research 
demonstrates that following a trauma, appraisals or re-appraisals of the self, world 
and others (Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1999) are frequent and key influencing 
cognitive appraisals related to the development and maintenance of PTSD. 
Consequently these were included in the interview topic guide below forming specific 
but open-ended questions. All focus group sessions and key informant interviews 
were audio taped, transcribed verbatim and checked for accuracy. The moderator 
(A.E.) also took notes on interpersonal dynamics and nonverbal communication 
among participants that could not be captured by audio recording (Kitzinger 1995; 
Krueger & Casey 2000). The transcripts also revealed that the moderator sometimes 
asked follow up questions that were subsidy to the topic guide, however these 
questions were still not specific to the trauma event the participant experienced, rather 
it was to clarify a response or encourage participants to provide more information on 
the general topic questions put forth. 
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Table 9  
Interview topic guide 
Questions  
 
1. What does trauma mean in your culture? (Focus group) 
What does trauma mean in collectivistic/interdependent cultures? (Key informal 
interviews) 
2. What typical thoughts do people have after a trauma? 
2.1. About themselves?  
2.2. About the world in which they live?  
2.3. About their future?  
2.4. About their relationships with others?  
3. How do these thoughts influence adjustment? 
4. Please complete the modified PTCI questionnaire 
5. What are your thoughts about the PTCI items/questions? How appropriate did you 
find them? 
 
 
6.3.1. The Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 1999). 
The PTCI was modified in that instead of asking participants to rate how 
strongly they believe each cognition, participants were instructed, “The PTCI is 
designed to assess the thoughts and beliefs of people who have been through a 
stressful life event. It has compiled a number of items, which are listed below. Please 
read each item and then indicate how appropriate you think it is to ask these items. 
Please circle the appropriate response”. Participants will rate each item on its 
appropriateness from 1 (totally inappropriate) to 7(totally appropriate). At the end of 
the questionnaire participants are asked to, “Please add any items that you feel would 
be appropriate to ask someone who has experienced a stressful life event”. The 
rationale for using the modified PTCI was to keep focus on dysfunctional trauma-
related thoughts and beliefs but to find how appropriate these questions are for those 
from collectivistic cultures, considering its prominent use in trauma research (Foa et 
al., 1999). 
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6.4. Procedure  
Ethical approval for Study 3 was obtained from NRES Committee East of 
England – Hertfordshire REC, Reference Number 10/H0311/56 (see Appendix B).   
 
6.4.1. Focus Groups. Those who contacted the researcher were invited to the 
focus groups. Potential participants for the focus groups were randomly allocated to 
Focus Group 1 (n = 4), Focus Group 2 (n = 4), or Focus Group 3 (n = 3). Focus 
groups were run on separate days. Participants were informed about the study's 
purpose, limits of confidentiality and the right to withdraw. Following written 
informed consent procedures, those who agreed to take part then commenced the 
focus group sessions, which lasted approximately 1 hour. The focus groups took place 
in a pre-booked room at the University of East Anglia and were led by the primary 
investigator A.E (moderator). At the start of the focus groups and prior to audio 
recording, participants introduced themselves to each other, and disclosed 
demographic information pertaining to their ethnic identification, age, employment, 
education and time in the UK (see Table 10). The participants provided this 
information without prompting; they wanted to feel more at ease within their focus 
groups before starting. After introductions were made, the moderator called the focus 
group to a start and guided the sessions according to the open-ended questions 
delineated in Table 9, and the modified PTCI questionnaire that participants were 
encouraged to freely discuss once completed. At the end of the study participants 
spoke privately with the moderator and disclosed their trauma event of their own 
violation and any thoughts they had regarding the study. At the end of the focus group 
session participants were given £15 to compensate them for their time. 
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Table 10 
Focus Group Demographic Information 
Focus 
Group 
Participant 
Number 
Age Gender Ethnicity Trauma Event Education Employment Time in 
UK 
Collectivism (Hofstede & 
Hofstede, 2004) 
1 P1 25 Female Jordan RTA Masters Student < 1 year 38 
1 P2 29 Male Indian RTA Masters Student 1 year 48 
1 P3 28 Female Slovakian RTA Masters Student 2 years 52 
1 P4 20 Female Chinese RTA BSc Student 2 years 20 
2 P5 28 Male Indian RTA Masters Student < 1 year 48 
2 P6 26 Male Sri Lankan Witness Death Masters Student < 1 year ---1 
2 P7 26 Male Sri Lankan RTA Masters Student < 1 year ---  
2 P8 27 Male Sri Lankan RTA Masters Student < 1 year ---  
3 P9 22 Male Chinese Accident/Injury Masters Student 1 year 20 
3 P10 23 Male Vietnamese RTA Masters Student 1 year 20 
3 P11 29 Male Ethiopian Persecution A-Levels Student < 1 year 20 
Note: RTA = Road Traffic Accident.
                                                        
1
 Sri Lanka has not been given a collectivism score as Hofstede and Hofstede (2004) have done for the other countries. However, Sri Lanka is considered a collectivistic 
culture. 
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6.4.2. Key informant interviews. Those indentified were contacted directly 
by email and invited to take part; respondents were then given further information on 
the study, those who elected to take part met with the researcher (A.E). Demographic 
information pertaining to key informant interviewee’s are detailed in Table 11. 
Interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s offices. The interview commenced 
following the informed consent protocol. The interviews lasted approximately 1 hour 
and were guided by the same open-ended questions as those used in the focus group 
sessions, the modified PTCI questionnaire which participants were encouraged to 
freely discuss. 
All focus group and interview sessions were audio-recorded in order to 
transcribe verbatim and check for accuracy. Participants were notified of this from the 
start, prior to filling out consent forms. At the end of transcription, all recordings were 
destroyed. 
 
Table 11 
Key Informant Interviewee’s Demographic Information 
Key 
Informant 
Interview 
Participant 
Number 
Age Gender Ethnicity Occupation Work 
Experience 
1 P12 45 Male British Clinical 
Psychotherapist 
> 15 years 
2 P13 40 Female British Clinical 
Psychologist 
> 10 years 
3 P14 40 Male British Counseling 
Psychologist 
> 10 years 
 
6.5. Data Analysis 
Data analysis consisted of two separate yet related functions. The first section 
of the data analysis was undertaken using Template Analysis to code the focus groups 
and key informant interviews. This is a particularly apt method of analysis because it 
has been designed to analyze textual data including responses to open-ended 
questions as employed in this study (King, 2008). 
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Template Analysis allows for the narrowing of extensive information captured 
by the focus group and key informant interviews. It further allows for the 
development of a coding template, which goes on to summarize themes identified by 
the researcher as important in a data set, focuses on patterns formed by words, themes 
and perspectives that emerge throughout the sessions, along with being able to 
organize them in a meaningful and useful way (King 2008). The second data analysis 
function used SPSS version 18.0 for the analysis of the modified PTCI. 
 
6.6. Reliability 
For the research design and analysis stage there were two checks of reliability 
and validity. First, a topic guide was used to ensure a similar range of topics was 
discussed with each participant. Second, the formal analysis and development of 
taxonomy was completed by the primary researcher (A.E); additionally some of the 
transcripts were coded by a second rater to ensure trustworthiness (L.J). Discrepancies 
between raters were resolved through discussion before arriving at a final coding 
framework. Additionally, although there was only a small number of focus groups 
and key informant interviews data saturation (i.e. where no new themes were 
emerging) was achieved after the first 2 focus groups and 2 key informant interviews 
and confirmed with the final focus group and final key informant interview. 
 
6.7. Results 
6.7.1. Development of the Template 
Step 1. A priori themes were developed, these were based on the interview 
guide and prior research which delineates that negative changes to views of the self 
and others, world perception, future perceptions to be predictive of PTSD 
maintenance (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1999). The initial themes were a) 
traumatized self, b) altered perceptions to worldview, c) changes to future, and d) 
dysfunctional relationships. 
Step 2. Interviews and focus groups were then transcribed and read through 
for familiarization. 
Step 3. Initial coding was carried out on the first focus group. The parts of the 
data that were relevant to the research questions were identified when they fell within 
the scope of the a priori theme. A code was then designated to this section of the 
transcript. While reading the transcript if there was no relevant theme that fit the 
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section of textual data, a new theme was devised. Additional themes added at this 
point were: a) trauma perceptions b) trauma symptoms, c) cultural and social roles, 
and d) external attributions. 
Step 4. Initial coding was then carried out on all transcripts. During this 
process, identified themes were grouped in to a smaller number of higher order codes, 
which described the broader theme in the data. This led to the initial template (see 
Table 12, Appendix D). 
Step 5. The template was developed by applying it to the full data set. 
Whenever a relevant piece of text did not fit with the existing themes comfortably a 
change to the template was needed. This was achieved through a) emergent themes in 
the data that were not anticipated, b) adding new codes to reflect these themes, c) 
restructuring how the different codes fit together, and d) deleting a theme because it 
was better covered by another (see Figure 10). 
Figure 10 demonstrates that the initial themes 1 (trauma perceptions) and 2 
(trauma symptoms) were amalgamated and became established as the first theme in 
the final template (trauma and adjustment). Subsequently, the initial third theme 
(cultural and social roles) became the final second theme with a couple of added 
subthemes. Following on from this, the initial fourth theme (traumatized self) became 
theme 3 in the final template and had subthemes added. Further, initial themes 5 
(world) and 6 (external attribution) were amalgamated and became the final fourth 
theme (external attribution) with further subthemes added. Lastly, the initial themes 7 
(future) and 8 (relationship) subsequently became final themes 5 and 6. The final 
themes 7 (education) and 8 (language) were additions, as they did not fit any other 
theme. The Figure 10 also presents the new code and sub-codes added to the final 
template.  
Step 6. Final template is used on the full data set to interpret findings (see 
Appendices E - J for transcripts with annotation and coding). 
Step 7. At stages 4 and 5 a quality check was taken to ensure analysis was not 
being distorted by preconceptions and assumptions. This was achieved through 
independent scrutiny of the analysis by another member of the research team (L.J) as 
detailed above to ensure reliability and trustworthiness. 
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Figure 10. Development of the Final Template
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6.7.2. Qualitative Interview Results 
The final Template identified eight emergent themes within the qualitative 
data sets. To provide an understanding of our coding and interpretation of data, the 
findings are presented according to analytical typologies. Verbatim quotes from the 
study are from the focus groups or key informant interviews identified by participant 
number (e.g. P1). 
 
6.7.2.1. Trauma and Adjustment. Throughout the focus group sessions, 
trauma was predominantly thought of in terms of physical health while mental health 
or psychological health was not appraised to be of equal importance. 
 
“I think in my culture, the trauma mostly means the physical injury like when 
people have an accident or something, erm, now its increasing about trauma 
meaning, many people also aware that the trauma can be the mental problem, 
… but mainly, most people in my country think its trauma just physical erm 
problem” (P10). 
 
“normally we never mention this word [trauma]… its not concerned with the 
mental, its from the outside … the body … Yes the physical not the mental, I 
think that’s all” (P4). 
 
However, when participants predominantly talked about the physical 
manifestation of trauma, they brought to light somatic symptoms following the 
trauma event (e.g. cannot eat, cannot sleep) “they can’t have a good sleep and they 
can’t eat anything” (P2).  
 
A small portion of participants did report trauma to be a mental imbalance 
caused by a negative event, “according to my understanding trauma means the state 
of mind after some disastrous event” (P9), however this stance was not widespread.  
 
Subsequently, key informant interviews put great importance on meanings of 
trauma in collectivistic cultures as affecting the group and relationships within that 
group. Key informant interviewees denoted that trauma is experienced in an 
interdependent manner, as the rupturing of social and interpersonal bonds: 
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“if you’re from a collectivistic culture then bonds are everything, so it’s 
[trauma] something which break the family, breaks relationships, breaks your bond to 
society” [P13]. Additionally, it is “experienced at the group level” (P14) trauma is 
explained as a collective trauma “what’s important is what happened to the group 
and how the group responded, the family, the party, the village, the town, or whatever 
it is, the [group] as a whole” (P14). 
 
In regards to adjustment there did appear to be an emphasis on group support. 
 
“the community, erm if one exists … are extraordinary in how they look after 
each other … the group, which is the community and feeling it can go to help 
very quickly. And so once you get your head around the way it works, you 
have to put something in and you get an awful lot back, lot of support” (P14). 
 
“people draw strength from getting support from other, feeling that they 
belong within a group, erm, feeling that they’re being helped and supported, 
and that gives them the motivation to put things right and to start you know 
trying to rebuild, er, it also helps them with the grieving process if they’re lost 
friends close family, erm, and again you could maybe draw strength by seeing 
that other people have been through a very similar situation, so you can sort 
of go through it together, erm, so, yeah I think the sort of beliefs I’m talking 
about are positive ones, because I feel that these beliefs have been formed 
with close knit societies that their cultures have been formed in adversity over 
a long period of time so its there for a purpose, you know, it’s a tried and 
tested way of existing and its evolved in relation to adversity as a way of 
supporting people and getting them through these crises” (P12). 
 
However, when the group does not help for whatever the reason then 
“adjustment is coming from outside … from different ideas, that’s what I see because 
that’s where I’m located, outside” (P13). In addition to group support participants 
talked about posttraumatic adjustment in terms of relying on personal strength, 
reflecting on the event and drawing life lesions, whereby “adversity activated 
developments such as ideas of posttraumatic growth, resilience, and whereby people 
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eventually grow when they come to realize and perceive themselves as survivors” 
(P14).  
 
6.7.2.2. Social and cultural roles. Participants emphasized societal and 
cultural impact factors and endorsed the importance of social and cultural 
expectations and roles. For instance, following a trauma, “its not only your own 
expectations but it what other people expect from you” (P1) that is important 
especially when trying to promote adjustment posttrauma. 
From the narratives it seemed that it was important for participants to meet 
and adhere to cultural and societal expectations, values and norms and to act in 
accordance to cultural dictums.  As one participant denotes “[there are] expectations 
from society on you … you are expected to behave in some way and you sometimes 
are afraid of doing something different from what your parents want you to do” (P3). 
When these expectations are not met, the individual feels traumatized because they 
are in direct conflict with these expectations. 
Cultural values and norms are important to an individual because they guide 
members of a given group or culture. This seems to hold further significance in terms 
of healing and recovery, as participants bring to light that some cultural values, 
expectations and norms should not be violated, and such violation results in a 
traumatized self.  
“I think in my culture, you can’t, you start to feel traumatized when you feel 
like the value that you gain in your home, from your family, is really conflicted in 
some way, its kind of like if you brought up with certain values and then you broke 
[them] … then you start to feel traumatized …[because] this is not the right way that I 
was brought up to be. So I think when your value, the thing that conflicts with the 
situation, you start to feel traumatized” (P1). 
Moreover, from the responses it seemed that one’s culture assigns roles to its 
members; when individuals experience a trauma these social and cultural roles (e.g. I 
am a father/provider/caregiver) undergo change that can result in loss or damage to 
the self. For instance, individuals “don’t say I’ve lost my role but men … typically … 
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are … are rather saying or one way or another you’re led to a thought that this is 
somebody who had a place in the family, a place in society, erm, had a role who now 
doesn’t. So you know, going from provider and head of the family to being the one 
who is looked after because he’s … you know, he’s traumatized” (P13). 
 
When the self is thought of in terms of failure, or rather failing in its role, it 
can have very negative connotations, individuals “think of themselves as very weak 
and not very strong to face these problems [resultant from the trauma event]” (P6). 
While the culture in which they reside can also place greater strain on the individual 
“I work with people here, who talk about being blamed and judged by members of 
their community because of their misfortune” (P14).  
 
Conversely, if individuals feel they have adhered to cultural and societal 
expectations and acted appropriately, yet still experience a trauma, they may see 
themselves as “being cruelly marked out … why me? … I’ve done everything right, … 
I’ve been a good citizen, I’ve followed my religion, I’ve fitted in, I’ve been a good 
citizen, why has this happened?” (P12). The protective features of one’s culture has 
not shielded the individual from suffering or pain, it has failed them, and subsequently 
challenged their beliefs, rendering previously held schemas for safety, trust and 
dependency as redundant and/or contested. 
 
6.7.2.3. Self  
6.7.2.3.1. In relation to others. Study participants found it very difficult to 
talk about themselves following a trauma. Instead they continually brought the 
conversation back to others and their relationship to others, in addition to the 
challenges and changes a trauma could play in their relationships to their family and 
community at large. 
 
“Its very common in my culture that family tie is very, very, very high” (P9). 
 
Those from collectivistic cultures would be concerned about others over and 
above themselves, whereby the family or the group is their raison d’être. They would 
sacrifice the self for the group, “because if you have … a sense of a bigger group, 
then the bigger group can survive even without you” (P13). Whereby, the individual 
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is no longer the focus, they are not thinking of themselves, their individual future is 
over but their family’s future won’t be if they sacrifice their needs: “I don’t care for 
myself but I’ve got children now” (P13). 
 
6.7.2.3.2. Self-blame. All study participants mentioned being highly emotive 
with appraisals centering around self-blame: 
 
“The Kosovan women I’ve worked with totally self-blame” (P13).  
 
Many accounts highlighted feelings of guilt: 
 
“they have guilty feelings … that you feel responsible … if someone else is 
suffering because of you then you will be extremely guilty about what 
happened” (P6). 
 
“Yeah the guilty ones at the end, the event happened because of the way I 
acted, you hear that a lot, unrealistic guilt. We had a client who had been 
beaten unconscious by a group of soldiers who attacked his family and then 
his mother was killed, so he was actually unconscious at the time she was 
killed, so there was nothing he could have done and he was wracked by guilt” 
(P14).  
 
Other accounts highlighted pertinacious sense of shame: 
 
“I’m thinking about young Tamil women who I’ve worked with over the years, 
who have been raped … shame coming into this at quite a communal level as 
an example … [abduction of women community assumes] you would have 
been raped. And so what we discovered was happening, was that then because 
you had been raped shame falls on you and your family erm and women would 
talk to us about feelings that they were impure, they were never able to get 
married erm and as we got into it more and more we discovered that actually 
what would often happening is that they would have to flee for their own 
safety and their family would have to entirely relocate because of the sense of 
shame” (P14). 
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6.7.2.4. Future. Participants talked about the future in terms of: 
 
6.7.2.4.1. Uncertainty. Uncertainty appraisals appear to have a impact 
on adjustment, it appears that one is not simply uncertain as to what is happen 
or why an event is happening. The trauma event perpetuates this uncertainty 
and potentially influences appraisals of future events. 
 
“I think this is one of the reasons why they are traumatized, because 
they are worried about their future. So after the trauma they are 
worried about what could happen to me, but they do not have answer, 
normally, they are worried because of the future, but still they won’t 
plan anything. They’ll be too much worried about the world for some 
time” (P2). 
 
6.7.2.4.2. Attitude changes. Trauma can cause a revision of attitude 
concerning life choices and how one pursues their future, for instance:   
 
“If the trauma is a hard experience it may change their attitude 
towards life, so think, er, I must take time to enjoy my life, not spend or 
waste my time out walking or something, so maybe they will change 
their attitude, I think it depends on the extent of their experience, how 
bad they had to face” (P4). 
 
6.7.2.5. Relationships/Others. As mentioned through the study, participants 
placed emphasis on others/ the group they felt they belonged to, and focusing on the 
importance of their relationships with them. The group protects, motivates, supports 
and helps: 
 
“To recovery, I think the help from the family is very important … the family 
have the sole responsibility to the people who have the problem” (P11). 
 
Conversely, the groups can also exacerbate problems the individuals face by 
judging and pressurizing them: 
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“I’m no longer a believer in one’s lovely culture is a lovely place to be, 
there’s a lot of crap in one’s cultural pressures” (P13). 
 
“I work with people here, who talk about being blamed and judged by 
members of their community because of their misfortune, they’ve been 
tortured, or somebody’s been killed, or whatever, they’ve been blamed for it, 
because of what they did in a previous life” (P14). 
 
Additionally, following a trauma relationships undergo change, they can be 
strengthened or broken down and filled with mistrust: 
 
“No if anything they [relationships] could be strengthened I’d have thought, 
you know in adversity people draw closer together, to gather strength from 
each other, erm, that’s my sort of observation of the recent events in Japan, 
that people seem to pool together and look after each other” (P12). 
 
6.7.2.6. External Causes. Participants cited several perceived external causes 
as precipitous to the trauma incidents occurrence. All focus group participants 
brought this forward, it was alluded to in one key informant interview. 
 
6.7.2.6.1. Fate. Fate attribution came up in all focus group session, with a 
number of respondents believing trauma events to be arbitrary and random, not 
necessarily brought on by anything the individual may have done. For instance, P4, 
and P10 both highlight that in their cultural groups, individuals base causality of 
events as a result of fate: 
 
“fate … sometimes we think fate [must have caused the event to happen], and 
there was a reason so … it must be something you had to experience” (P4). 
 
“Yes because of fate it’s happened, some people blame themselves but some 
other people think it’s because of fate” (P10). 
 
Further, it would appear that such attributions have a bearing on perceived 
agency at the time of the event and subsequent links to self-blaming. For some, they 
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do not necessarily feel they are to blame or are responsible for the trauma, perhaps 
this external attribution alleviates self-blame: 
 
“yes [they think] it’s the signs that’s responsible [for what happened]” (P8). 
“they blame fate” (P7).  
 “Yes it’s a cultural thing … if someone blames fate” (P6).  
 
6.7.2.6.2. Religion. Religion was another subtheme and looked at external 
attribution from a slightly different point of view. Again, some participants place 
causality on an external source, however it appears the implications are somewhat 
different, and again have implications to self-blame appraisals that can occur 
following a trauma. For instance P1 asserts, “in my culture, my religion says that 
everything has happened is a plan from god and its kind of a test”. However, what 
needs to be borne in mind is how one perceived they may have done on such a test? If 
they feel they have failed this can have detrimental future effects for the self. Further, 
one places their faith and trust in their religion, would they feel alienated from their 
religion and their beliefs in their god after having experienced a traumatic?  
Other views pertaining to beliefs, attributes causality to karma, believing 
positive or negative events occur as a result past behaviors. Again this appears to have 
implications for self-blaming. 
 
“we’ve had cultures who have a belief in karma, the Hindu’s they believe in 
karma and reincarnation, hence the idea that if something horrible happens to 
you in this life its because you did something terrible in the previous life” 
(P14).  
 
Further, individuals revert to cultural beliefs on rituals and ceremonies to aid 
in recovery. For instance, P4 brings to light that Chinese undergo a cleansing ritual 
every year, namely Chinese New Year. This is a time when they clean their homes 
and sweep away not just bad luck but any bad experiences they had over the year. 
 
“for example, in New Year it’s very serious in China. Yeah erm we try to 
create a cleaning environment so for anything bad, when this is finished, all is 
returned to normal, everything changed … so its, how to say, closure” (P4). 
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Additionally, others highlight the solace they take from their religion in aiding 
recovery.  
 
“in the Hindu religion they try to er, do certain curses, ceremonies … which is 
to bring hope, those kind of things are very common after a traumatic 
situation … these kind of what you call puja’s are religious ceremonies, they 
are very common, which take place after this traumatic event … they believe 
that something really happened from us, and we are really sorry, maybe we 
are accepting it, we’re praying god to give more strength to us, that really 
happens, and after this cleans your spirit, we could see there is a change in 
their mental belief … that’s very common, in our religion”. (P5) 
 
6.7.2.7. Education. Although not widely talked about, education did come up 
as a theme for Focus groups 1 and 2, whereby they thought it was important for a 
person to think about what happened to them in order to make sense of it and if they 
were going to move on from the trauma.  
 
“like how much their exposure is to education, because if someone is really 
educated, he is aware of the world and things happening around” (P2) 
“[if educated] they can think what went wrong” (P6) 
 
Additionally, participants thought adjusting from the trauma would be harder 
if education was lacking. For instance, “I think it [trauma appraisal] would depend 
on the person and also if they are educated … [because if not educated] the mind 
would be weak” (P5). This is also reflective of the research on PTSD susceptibility 
and trauma recovery (Ahmed, 2007). 
 
6.7.2.8. Language. Language was brought up by all key informant interviews. 
For instance K1 states “the “we” is more important than the “I” and if; I speak 
Turkish and Kurdish and certainly the Kurdish people are speaking to each other in 
either of those languages, the words they use are “we”, “us” and “our” … you very 
rarely hear anyone say “I”, “me”, … it can be quite unusual to hear somebody 
talking very directly about themselves or me as an individual” (P14). Subtle 
differences in languages, or use of colloquialisms could result in changing the 
  131 
interpretation of how the questions are understood and therefore how they are 
responded to; which could subsequently impact on assessment interpretations. 
 
In addition, this inter-relationship between self and other depicted by language 
as mentioned above holds true throughout the focus group sessions, where 
participants found questions in relation to trauma affecting the self as a difficult 
concept to conceive, and participants in the focus group sessions found it very 
difficult to talk about themselves. Instead it was married to how trauma affected them 
in relation to their significant other, family and society. Subsequently this is why one 
of the themes mentioned above is ‘self in relation to others’. 
 
6.8. PTCI item appropriateness 
 Data achieved normality for all variables. PTCI item appropriateness (for Total 
and all subscales) was rated as ‘very appropriate’ by the key informant interviewees. 
PTCI Total and Self-subscale item appropriateness was rated as ‘neutral’ by the focus 
group participants, while they rated the World and Self-Blame subscales as ‘very 
appropriate’ (see Table 13).  This indicated a good consensus on PTCI item 
appropriateness. 
 
Table 13 
Mean PTCI Scores 
 Focus Groups Key Informant Interviews 
 M SD M SD 
PTCI Total 3.99 1.49 5.91 .91 
PTCI Self 3.55 1.78 5.87 1.07 
PTCI World 4.95 1.45 5.81 1.09 
PTCI Self-
Blame 
4.49 1.07 6.20 .72 
Note: PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory 
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6.9 Discussion 
This qualitative study aimed to explore the influence of culture on appraisals 
of trauma within interdependent/collectivistic cultures, and to investigate the 
appropriateness of the PTCI as a measure to assess trauma related appraisals and 
cognitions within collectivistic cultures. In reverse order, the PTCI can be deemed 
suitable to use on individuals from collectivistic background, all participants rated the 
PTCI and its subscales as being ‘neutral’ or ‘very appropriate’. Additionally, over the 
course of the focus groups and key informant interviews a strong number of emergent 
themes arose (in addition to those covered on the PTCI) that also had significant 
consequences for post-trauma psychological adjustment and recovery. In general, 
members from collectivistic cultures appraised trauma as a predominantly physical 
stressor, while some did acknowledge psychological distress. This is reflective of 
previous research conducted with refugees from non-Western cultures, which has 
shown them to commonly somatize their symptoms. Indeed, several PTSD criteria, 
such as somatization, are relatively common among Southeast Asian cultures 
(Eisenhruch, 1991). 
Further, those in the focus groups felt that admitting to suffering from any 
adverse psychological maladjustment would lead to stigmatization by the community 
they belonged to. Considering how important the group is to the individual and the 
desire to belong and live in commune and harmony with the group, revealing 
psychological stress as a result of trauma can be a cause of consternation and 
apprehension. Subsequently, this could potentially hamper posttrauma recovery, as 
support systems would not necessarily lend support to those in need. Indeed, a lack of 
support and negative attitude towards the trauma victim could potentially impede 
recovery due to the trauma victims feeling isolated, separate from their group and a 
general sense of not belonging.  Further, and worryingly, research has found these 
factors to obstruct access to health services for ethnic minority groups (Street et al, 
2005). Consequently, in sum, for collectivistic cultures, it can be surmised that 
support is available from the community for physical trauma but not as widely for 
psychological trauma, even when acknowledged that this type of trauma is worrying 
and potent. This theme therefore bears weight on understanding how the trauma is 
appraised, dealt with and its potential consequences for recovery. 
Another theme that resonated and warrants further scrutiny was the impact of 
trauma on the group; specifically, its impact on family members. Also, very notable, 
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the community members found it increasing difficult to talk about the trauma in terms 
of themselves and how it had impacted on them. Their immediate concerns after the 
trauma tended to be centered around important others, such as the impact on children, 
spouses, parents and so forth. Thus, as one of the mental health practitioners asserted, 
‘trauma broke social bonds and therefore impacted on relationships, which was of 
paramount concern. What is more, the individual derives its strength and support from 
the group, from the family and even community, however, with the trauma impacting 
at the group level, support systems are also now at risk and in need of support 
themselves’. 
The group and one’s interconnectedness with the group was very much 
emphasized with the self (or traumatized self) as a secondary feature of trauma 
consequences. If considered in terms of the self, one’s social role was called into 
question, in particular whether the individual could function as part of the group and 
retain their role within it, or if the trauma had caused a loss or damage to this role; 
thereby de-valuing the individual as a member of the group. This displacement and 
feelings of being outside the group, potentially results in extremely poignant feelings 
of dejection, as the group or family is the individual’s reason for being in many 
instances. Thus if one is not an active and reciprocal member of the group, the self is 
devalued on both an individual and collective level, making the trauma’s impact 
twofold. 
The self is a major component for Western clinical practices in alleviating 
negative appraisals and restoring a healthy self-concept. However, here it is found 
that in order to help restore a healthy self-conception, relatedness needs to be taken in 
to account. Namely, relatedness with one’s groups, at either the family or community 
level is the overarching factor is self-redefinition and reducing self-blame. To address 
and redress dysfunctional trauma appraisals of the self, focus may need to be given to 
alleviating distortions concerning how the self impacted on the needs of others. 
Thus it appears that there is a public appraisal of the self (i.e. viewing the self 
as a proponent part of the whole and in relation to one’s roles within that whole), 
where the self has not only been privately damaged, but also viewed as publically 
humiliated. These public manifestations of self-failure weigh heavily on the 
individual, because potentially they can no longer see how they fit in to the larger 
world/community or group, creating a sense of isolation and separateness. As falling 
away from family and society is one of the most profound facets of PTSD. 
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Again, there are potential practical applications that can be drawn from the 
data presented. For instance, to aid in trauma recovery, group therapies may be more 
effective for those form collectivistic cultures. Indeed, group therapies have been 
widely used in posttraumatic psychotherapy in Western clinical practices due to its 
ability to reduce psychological shame and to decrease the sense of alienation and 
isolation that it brings (Adshead, 2000). Additionally, the development of self-help 
groups has been effective in reducing shame and increasing a sense of self-
empowerment, challenging passivity and helplessness (Adshead, 2000). Thus group 
therapy appears to be tapping into both the supportive and prejudiced attitudes the 
group places on the individual while either encouraging or circumventing them to aid 
in posttrauma adjustment.  
In addition to relationships and social roles being potentially damaged or 
changed by the trauma, another prominent theme that emerges was that of cultural 
appropriateness, expectations, values and norms. For many, trauma appraisals are 
judged and evaluated according to these cultural standards and one is expected to act 
within one’s cultural remit, even when dealing with the trauma and its aftermath. 
Thus culture appears to color one’s interpretations of the events and thus trauma and 
what constitutes a trauma is based on a particular community’s traditions, mores and 
values. Moreover, these cultural predilections are expected to be adhered to and act as 
a base from which an individual is judged. Thus when cultural or societal norms and 
values are violated by the trauma, it appears individuals either revert to self-blame 
(e.g. they could have done something to avert it such as being a better citizen). 
Alternatively, in other instances, these acts are seen as random and predestined by fate 
or God or some other external cause. This then brings to light another theme that also 
appears to be a cultural mechanism for coping with the traumatic event, namely, 
reverting to religion, prayer and cleansing rituals. These could be in keeping with 
cultural practices following a trauma, for instance, in some collectivistic cultures up-
keeping these customs is part of what it means to be a good citizen. Thereby, by 
restoring these beliefs, it may help individuals align views of the self with cultural 
mores on appropriate behaviors and reaffirming that one did not act outside of them to 
incur the trauma, this could aid in recovery.  Further, in terms of beliefs, religion, 
ceremonies and rituals, there is a rich literature, especially on fate attribution by 
ethnographers and cultural observers (Norenzayan & Lee, 2010). However, this 
domain remains largely overlooked in the psychological literature. Taking a social 
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cognitive approach to examining fate beliefs in an attribution framework, the 
implications of rituals, ceremonies and religion in trauma recovery models would be 
advantageous to understanding the cognitive underpinnings of such beliefs and their 
implications for posttrauma recovery.  
Some themes were similar to that emphasized currently in the literature, for 
instance causal attribution came to light. Here results reflected literature on 
collectivistic cultures making more external attributions, for instance chance factors 
(Kawanishi, 1995) due to common beliefs in luck and fate as a type of external locus 
of control (Bond & Tornatzky 1973), while those from individualistic cultures are 
more likely to exercise primary control and therefore try to control or change their 
external environment (Chun, Moos & Cronkite, 2006). Here it appears that 
participants accepted the situational outcomes, for the better or worse. Other themes 
were similar to research found in Western populations, such as particular emotions 
(e.g. guilt, shame) and the notion of self-blaming. Much research into PTSD has 
found anger, guilt, shame, and sadness to be high posttrauma, when appraisals of 
blame, responsibility, and loss become paramount (Amstadter & Vernon, 2009).  
On reviewing key informant interviews, similar themes were found, with 
prominent emphasis on: the value of the group to the individual and trauma and 
recovery being perceived to be experienced at the group/community level. However, 
what did emerge in one interview was that outside help or influences can only be 
introduced from the outside. Specifically, new ideas, thoughts, values and states of 
being allow for the discovery of new appraisal processes. This could potentially help 
individuals from sacrificing themselves for the group and in so doing release them 
from an enduring and continuous cycle of self-blame, guilt and shame. Thus while the 
group can be seen as a supportive, motivating and protective, it can also be self-
harming, as it does not allow the individual to break free of the psychological and 
emotional distress they are in due to social and cultural conventions. 
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6.10.  
Development of the Public and Communal Self Appraisal Measure (PSCAM) 
 
Following the eight emergent themes outlined above, three warranted further 
investigation. These three themes were ‘external attribution’, ‘social and cultural 
roles’ and ‘relationships’ amalgamated with ‘self-in-relation to significant others’. 
These themes were chosen, as the concepts have not been used in any other measure 
to assess for dysfunctional appraisals that may be linked to PTSD. Further, the themes 
appeared to be important to participants and were consistently highlighted by the 
mental health practitioners. As a result, the next step is to examine what these 
concepts are potentially tapping into and whether they can be developed into a new 
measure, which can work alongside established measures when investigating the role 
of dysfunctional appraisals in PTSD. Subsequently, findings from the qualitative 
research were used to develop a new measure, the Public and Communal Self 
Appraisal Measure (PCSAM). The items on the PCSAM (Table 14) represent 
potential dysfunctional cognitions as a result of a) trauma leading to disintegration in 
one’s cultural/social roles (i.e. public self), b) dysfunctional appraisals about 
communal aspects of self and relationships (i.e. communal self), and c) dysfunctional 
appraisals of one’s belief systems following trauma. 
The 21-item measure was established via the textual data from the focus 
groups and key informant interviews, in addition to comments participants left on the 
modified PTCI measure. The first subscale’s (public self) items (15 – 21) were 
derived from the theme ‘social and cultural roles’ and its implications for recovery. 
The rationale for the choice of wording that made up the items on the PCSAM was 
based on previous research, the information ascertained from the focus groups, key 
informant interviews and the need for the measure to determine the individual’s 
appraisals of their traumatic experience. It is for this reason that the words “I” and 
“me” have been used in the items sentence structure, because while it may appear to 
be autonomous and individualistic in nature due to the focus on oneself, the context in 
which it is framed (e.g. family, society, social role) alludes to a more collectivistic 
and interpersonal approach on which to base ones appraisals. 
 
The subsequent quotes were used as a foundation for the construction of the 
subscale: 
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1. ‘For them the world hasn’t changed, they failed’ (P13). 
2. ‘people would be more likely to define that [failings] in terms of their role, so 
erm I’m not a good father anymore’ (P13) 
3. ‘the event happened because of the way I acted, you hear that a lot, unrealistic 
guilt’ (P14) 
4. ‘you feel bad about, or traumatized … when these values are [in] conflict’ 
(P1) 
The second subscale (communal self) followed on from the themes 
‘relationships’ amalgamated with ‘self-in-relation to significant others’. The 
following quotes prompted the constructions of items 7 – 14: 
 
1. P3 writes that the ‘relationship with others and society after the trauma [needs 
to be looked at]’.  
2. ‘they’re unable to play their part in the group any longer and this is the thing 
about collectivistic cultures, the group is everything’ (P14) 
3. ‘in adversity people draw closer together, a gather strength from each other’ 
(P12) 
4. ‘in our culture we have very strong feeling for … all people, the family 
members’ (P3) 
 
In regards to the third subscale (beliefs), items 1 – 6 were put together as a 
result of the following quotes from the focus groups and comments on the modified 
PTCI forms. 
 
1. ‘fate makes these things [trauma event] happen’ as a comment on other items 
the PTCI could include. This along with the following quotes inspired the 
items: 
2. ‘because of fate it’s happened’ (P4)  
3. ‘everything [that] has happened is a plan from god and its kind of a test’ (P1) 
4. ‘we’ve had cultures who have a belief in karma, the Hindu’s they believe in 
karma and reincarnation, hence the idea that if something horrible happens to 
you in this life its because you did something terrible in the previous life, and 
this is quite an active belief’ (P14) 
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Table 14 
Public and Communal Self Appraisal Measure (PSCAM) 
1. Fate or God or Bad Luck caused the event to happen 
2. Since the event I have a pessimistic view of life 
3. My Faith or Religion or Beliefs have been challenged by the event 
4. Since the event I feel let down by the world 
5. Since the event I feel let down by Fate or my Beliefs or God or my Faith 
6. Since the event I do not feel like I have a place in the world 
7. Since the event I have sacrificed my needs for the needs of significant others 
8. Since the event I feel like I am a burden (e.g. a problem/trouble/worry) to others 
9. I do not want anyone to know about the event 
10. Since the event I no longer feel close to others 
11. Since the event other people have become a priority 
12. Since the event my relationships have been damaged or challenged 
13. Since the event I find it hard to have relationships with others 
14. Since the event others have made the problem worse 
15. Since the event I have lost my social role/identity (e.g. as a parent, husband, wife, 
at work) 
16. Since the event I have failed in my role(s) 
17. Since the event my values have changed 
18. Since the event I try harder to meet social or cultural expectations 
19. Since the event I have not lived up to social or cultural expectations 
20. Since the event I try hard to act appropriately 
21. Since the event I do not feel I am a significant member of my culture or society or 
community or Group 
 
 
6.11. Discussion 
The aim of this section was to extend and extrapolate findings from the first 
part of the study to derive a new appraisal measure founded in collectivistic type 
cognitions. Further, while the appropriateness of the PTCI’s items, as a measure of 
trauma related appraisals within collectivistic cultures was found to be suitable; the 
responses by both trauma survivors from the focus groups and interviews 
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demonstrated that there are important areas not yet covered and in need of further 
investigation. Three emergent themes were focused on due to their uniqueness in the 
trauma and cross-cultural literature thus far. Those themes comprised the three 
subscales of the PCSAM and pertained to the self, specifically the public and 
communal aspects of self in addition to belief systems and aimed measure both 
internal and external threat to the self, reminiscent of Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
cognitive appraisal model.  
These aspects of self (i.e. public and communal) were used to derive the 
PCSAM, as the focus groups and interviews found the self to be interdependent with 
the group, one cannot make sense of the self without recognising this relatedness (i.e. 
communal aspects of self). Individuals from collectivistic cultures appear to have a 
collective self (i.e. made up of communal aspects of self). Therefore, in order to arrive 
at a healthy self-concept, appraisals drawing on the group dynamics, relationships and 
their connection with the self may need to be focused on to aid in adjustment and 
recovery posttrauma. Additionally, there is not a large body of research investigating 
the disparities between the self with social and cultural roles (i.e. the public aspect of 
self). However, it would appear that this is an important component process in trying 
to attain a healthy self-concept following trauma. For example, one lives within and 
amongst their culture, when their sense of belonging to this culture is taken away, or 
beliefs in it are challenged, much malcontent is a result, potentially impeding 
recovery. It’s consequent clinical implication is to restore the public aspect of the self. 
Finally, belief systems were focused on including self-beliefs and ideological beliefs. 
Thus beliefs can be either internal (e.g. self as incapable/self as failure) or external 
(e.g. fate, karma) and may help or impede recovery. Ideological beliefs such as 
attributing the trauma event to have occurred due to fate or luck, or the events were 
predestined or in god’s plan, are very hard to change or alter. If one truly believes that 
their karma was bad and caused the event to happen and in so doing blame 
themselves, shifting this paradigm would be very challenging. Additionally, while 
religion, rituals and ceremonies also arose under the external attribution theme in 
Study 3, it was not focused on as it was outside the remit of the thesis. This thesis’ 
primary focus is on cultural differences in self and is subsequent influence on 
appraisals and self-concept. The PCSAM is reflective of this. It is for this reason that 
religion, while acknowledged as an important factor was not further developed or 
investigated. In addition, private aspects of self were also discussed in focus groups 
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and key informant interviews. However, work in this area is already underway and 
well established (e.g. PTCI, private self-appraisals detailed in Ehlers & Clarks, 2000, 
appraisal model). It is with the above in mind that the current three themes were 
chosen and developed. Now, work on establishing the validity and reliability of the 
PSCAM as a prospective measure to assess for dysfunctional trauma appraisals is 
needed and will be addressed in Study 4. 
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6.12. General Discussion 
This third study serves to highlight the relationship between trauma and 
culture, supporting the assertion that it is an important union that warrants further 
investigation to arrive at culturally informed and appropriate assessment and 
treatment for those who have experienced trauma (Jobson, 2008; Jobson & 
O’Kearney, 2006; 2009). Further the study provides much needed work on research 
conducted with non-Western populations (Jobson & O’Kearney 2009; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), providing valuable information and insights regarding trauma 
appraisals. Indeed the study underscores the many challenges collectivistic cultures 
face when having undergone a trauma. The findings provide a better understanding 
about the health-information needs and concerns of collectivistic cultures, and the 
ways that trauma survivors from these cultures may appraise traumatic events. 
Therefore, Study 3 aimed to address how individuals from collectivistic cultures 
appraise trauma events, reasons for its occurrence and its causation and how one can 
derive coping mechanisms to resolve its impact on the self and the group. At the same 
time, the study helps illuminate the roles for practitioners and health care settings in 
better serving the needs of those from collectivistic cultures. For instance, it would 
appear that meanings attached to trauma from community members from 
collectivistic cultures are centered round their interconnectedness with their group and 
are interpreted by their cultural values, expectations and social norms. What is more, 
these culturally shaped beliefs impact an individual’s and even family’s recovery. 
Further, the development of the PCSAM addresses issues that arose in the first part of 
the study. It therefore constructed items to measure violations to social and cultural 
roles (i.e. public self) and violations to relationships and interconnectedness with the 
group (i.e. communal self), as this appears to be part of the collectivistic self-identity. 
Along with items measuring violations of ideological beliefs as to why the trauma 
event occurred. Additionally, ideologies and beliefs are potentially intrinsic to one’s 
sense of self as they are informed by one’s cultural and society. Consequently, it is 
proposed that violations and disparities in these aspects of self will cause negative 
affect and contribute to maladjustment posttrauma.  
 The limitations of the study are acknowledged, the sample size was small. 
However, data saturation was achieved after the first two focus groups and first 2 key 
informant interviews. Further, all participants were relatively young and unemployed 
students, which could have impacted on findings. Additionally, no individualistic 
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focus groups were used; therefore, direct comparisons concerning the themes that 
emerged cannot be made. Furthermore, while all focus group members acknowledged 
having experienced a trauma, neither PTSD symptoms nor depression was assessed 
amongst the focus group participants, which may have impacted on findings. 
Nevertheless, this is one of the first qualitative studies investigating the interaction 
between trauma appraisals and culture. It is also one of the few studies investigating 
the appropriateness of measures such as the PTCI, which are consistently used in 
clinical and trauma research, where its cultural applicability may not be as highly 
sensitive to cultural nuances as needed. The study also resulted in the development of 
the PCSAM. However, further work on the PSCAM is needed to find if it is a valid 
and reliable measure, and if it has the potential to act as a supplement to other 
established measures in the field when assessing those from collectivistic cultures 
who have experienced a trauma event. Finally, it would also be interesting to find 
what results it would attain when assessing those from individualistic cultures, given 
those from individualistic cultures also hold public and communal aspects of self 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sato, 2001). These questions will be addressed in Part 3 
of the thesis, using a sample of trauma survivors with and without PTSD from 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures. 
 
6.13. Overall Chapter Summary 
Study 3 explored the meanings and understandings attached to trauma by 
those from collectivistic cultures and how they subsequently appraise trauma events. 
From this, eight emergent themes arose; some reflective of current literature on 
cultural distinctions is self-construal, others demonstrating an overlap with 
individualistic type cognitions, while some themes appeared to be unique. Further, 
while a number of themes (e.g. relatedness to group, beliefs and external attribution of 
failure) have been highlighted in the literature they have not as yet been explored in 
detail in relation to PTSD and posttrauma maladjustment. The study further examined 
the appropriateness of the PTCI within these collectivistic cultures and found it to be 
suitable, as assessed by both community members and mental health practitioners. 
Following this, the next section extrapolated findings by expanding on three emergent 
themes, which were used to develop a measure to assess trauma related thoughts, 
beliefs and appraisals that are geared toward collectivistic cultural sensitivities. It is 
believed the PCSAM could potentially be used as a supplementary measure of 
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posttraumatic psychological adjustment and used as an adjunct to other established 
measures. Therefore going forward, a pilot of this measure is needed, preferably with 
a sample of trauma survivors with and without PTSD, to find if it is reliable, valid and 
able to discriminate between those with and without PTSD.  
Finally, in relation to the conceptual framework, some of the results supported 
the assertion for cultural distinctions in trauma appraisals. For instance public and 
communal aspects of self are supported by the cross-cultural literature on self-
construal, which this study proposed has important implications for appraisal 
tendencies and on posttrauma adjustment. Further, findings on private aspects of self 
which is also supported by previous literature and demonstrated overlap with 
Western, individualistic cultures, thereby not supporting cultural distinctions in self-
construal when it comes to this component of self and its role in psychological 
maladjustment. However, it needs to be borne in mind that only collectivistic cultures 
were included in Study 3, therefore to make more specific and direct comparisons, 
individualistic cultures should also have been approached to take part in the study. 
Additionally, while participants were all trauma survivors, the small sample size 
makes all findings tentative and exploratory. 
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Part 3 
Cultural Differences in Trauma Appraisals and Self-Identity in Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder: Extending the Ecological Validity and Theoretical and Clinical 
Implications of Part 1 in a Clinically Relevant Sample 
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Chapter 7 
Study 4 - 7: Cultural Differences in Cognitive Appraisals of Trauma and Self-
Concept Following Trauma in those with and without PTSD  
 
The ecological validity and clinical implications that could be drawn from 
Study 1 were limited as participants were students and several of the trauma events 
disclosed would not meet DSM-IV criterion for PTSD (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2004). Further, the validity of inferences about cultural differences was 
unclear due to cultural groupings being based solely on ethnicity without a validating 
measure of independence/interdependence. Studies 4-7 are an extension of Studies 1 
and 2 and examine whether PTSD and culture interact to influence cognitive 
appraisals of trauma and trauma-focused self-concept. To extend ecological validity 
and clinical implications, these studies tests similar predictions to that of Studies 1 
and 2 in a sample of trauma survivors with and without PTSD from individualistic 
and collectivistic cultures. Specifically, Study 4 aims to investigate whether cultural 
differences in self influences trauma-related appraisals using British and Asian trauma 
survivors with and without PTSD. Second, Study 4 aims to examine whether the 
PCSAM, developed in Study 3, is a valid and reliable measure that is appropriate to 
use in collectivistic.  Studies 5 and 6 examine differing aspects of self-concept (Study 
5 – self-discrepancy and trauma-centered self-concept; Study 6 - ambivalent self-
concept) in the aftermath of trauma, how they may be culturally specified and how 
they are related to PTSD. Lastly Study 7 examines how the PCSAM is related to 
one’s self-concept following trauma. 
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7.1. Study 4 
An Investigation of Trauma-Associated Appraisals and Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder in British and Asian Trauma Survivors: The Development of the Public 
and Communal Self Appraisals Measure (PCSAM) 
 
As highlighted throughout the thesis, there is an impressive body of literature, 
which identifies the central role negative cognitive appraisals play in the 
development, maintenance, and treatment of PTSD (e.g., Kleim et al., 2007).  
However, as also previously outlined, a significant body of research has demonstrated 
cultural differences in the appraisals of everyday events (see Mesquita & Walker, 
2003). Thus an obvious question is how does culture influence the appraisals of 
trauma and what are implications of these differences for PTSD? Study 1 commenced 
an investigation into this area. It was found that culture might influence the 
relationships between trauma–specific appraisals and PTSD symptoms. It was found 
that the PTCI was significantly associated with and predicted PTSD symptoms in the 
British group. However this was not found to be the case in the Asian group. Thus, 
the PTCI may not fully assess trauma-specific appraisals associated with PTSD in 
those from Asian cultures. The thesis suggests that this may be the result of the PTCI 
typically tapping into individualistic-type appraisals rather than more interdependent, 
public and communal appraisals.  
Therefore, following Study 1 a qualitative study exploring cognitive appraisals 
that were associated with trauma and disrupted psychological adjustment following 
trauma in trauma survivors from collectivistic cultures (Study 3) was conducted. Key 
informant interviews with mental health practitioners who work with trauma 
survivors from Asian cultures and three focus groups comprised of trauma survivors 
from Asian cultures were selected to generate a greater understanding of culturally 
appropriate appraisals. Open-ended interviews were used to collect data. In addition 
participants were asked to rate the appropriateness of the PTCI items for use in 
collectivistic cultures. Using template analysis several strong emergent themes were 
elicited that focused on a) social and cultural roles following a trauma, b) 
relationships to others following trauma, and c) appraisals of one’s belief systems 
following the traumatic incident. These themes seemed to align with cross-cultural 
research on self-construal (i.e. public and communal aspects of self) and the influence 
of these differences on appraisal tendencies. Further, the beliefs theme reflects cross-
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cultural research on self-control and external attribution of failure (see Ji, Peng, & 
Nisbett, 2000; Sastry & Ross, 1998; Tweed, White, & Lehman, 2004). The findings 
of this qualitative research were used to develop a new measure in Study 3; the Public 
and Communal Self Appraisal Measure (PCSAM). The items on the PCSAM were 
developed to represent potential dysfunctional cognitions as a result of a) trauma 
leading to disintegration in one’s cultural/social roles, b) dysfunctional appraisals 
about communal aspects of self and relationships, and c) disintegration in one’s belief 
system.  
Therefore, the current study aimed to extend this work. The overall objective 
of Study 4 was to investigate whether PTSD and culture interact to influence 
cognitive appraisals and trauma-specific appraisals (as indexed by scores on the PTCI 
and PCSAM). Specifically, Study 4 investigated the a) aims of Study 1 using British 
and Asian trauma survivors with and without PTSD and, b) reliability and validity of 
the PCSAM and its appropriateness for use in Asian trauma survivor populations. 
In light of the above, it is hypothesized that there will be cultural differences 
in the appraisals dimensions related to the trauma event. Second, there will be PTSD 
condition differences in the appraisal dimensions related to the trauma event. Third 
given Su and Chen’s (2008) findings that similar negative trauma-specific cognitions 
(as indexed on the PTCI) contribute to PTSD development in Asian samples, it is 
hypothesized that similar dysfunctional appraisals will be associated with PTSD 
symptoms in both British and Asian participants.  Lastly, the PCSAM will be a good 
measure of dysfunctional appraisals for Asians. 
 
7.1.2 Method 
7.1.2.1 Participants 
All participants (N = 95) were recruited using from the general community in 
the UK by posters in public places, Adult Migrant English Programs, advertisements 
in local and ethnic newspapers, contacts with ethnic organizations and communities 
and organizations that provide treatment for trauma survivors. Notices called for those 
who had experienced a traumatic event and identified the study as researching trauma, 
appraisals and culture. The Asian group was comprised of Chinese (n = 12), Japanese 
(n = 18), Korean (n = 2), and South Asian (n = 15) participants. An a priori power 
analysis using GPower software and to have 80% power for detecting large effect size 
when employing the traditional .05 criterion of statistical significance, revealed that a 
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sample size of 111 participants was needed for the study for conducting ANOVA, 128 
for independent t-tests (two-tailed) and a sample size of 64 was required for 
correlation analyses to have 80% power for detecting medium effect size when 
employing the traditional .05 criterion of statistical significance. 
The inclusion criteria for the clinical sample were to be over 18 years of age, 
to have experienced a traumatic incident which meets APA (2000) criterion A, to be 
able to complete the interview and questionnaires in English and to self-identify as 
being either Asian or British. Lastly in the British group some ex-veterans 
participated, this was not part of the inclusion criteria nor had it been assigned part of 
any exclusion criteria. There were no ex-veterans in the Asian group, although one 
participant had experienced a combat situation as a civilian. All participants were 
trauma survivors; they had experienced a range of traumas, which included road 
traffic accidents (RTA), natural disasters, combat, assault and witnessing a death (see 
Table 15). Participants were then recruited from Norwich and London, with the main 
body of participants being recruited from London.  
Lastly, all traumas were experienced in participants’ country of origin; the 
combat related traumas were all experienced in Afghanistan (for both Asian and 
British participants). The time since the traumas were experienced was a mean of 7.02 
years (SD = 1.12) for the British and 5.37 years (SD = .61) for the Asians. 
 
7.1.2.2 Measures  
7.1.2.2.1 Psychological adjustment. 
Depression (HSCL -25; Derogatis et al., 1974). See Study 1, Chapter 5. 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR AXIS-I Disorders (research 
Version) (SCID; First et al, 2002). PTSD diagnosis was identified using the 
Overview and PTSD module from the SCID-I for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders (First 
et al., 2002). The rationale for using the SCID-I which is a semi-structured interview, 
was to gain a more through identification of PTSD presentation amongst participants 
and not focus solely on self-reports and because it is a routinely used diagnostic 
instrument. Interviews were audio-recorded to account for inter-rater agreement and 
reliability of the coding of the data. Inter-rater reliability was found to be good 
(Kappa coefficient of .88) and all discrepancies were resolved between raters.  
PTSD checklist (PCL; Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993). The 
PCL is a 17-item self-report measure of the DSM-IV symptoms of PTSD (APA, 
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2000). Participants rate each item from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) to indicate the 
degree to which they have been bothered by that particular symptom over the past 
month. The rationale for using the PCL-C was to further consolidate the results from 
the SCID-I as to PTSD diagnosis and identification for participants. Further, the PCL 
is used to screen individuals for PTSD, diagnosing PTSD and monitoring symptom 
change during and after treatment. Of the three versions of the PCL, the PCL-C 
(civilian) was used and asked about symptoms in relation to the traumatic experience 
the participant’s referred to in Task 1 of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV-TR Axis I Disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 2002). In addition, since its introduction 
the PCL-C has been widely used in research and clinical settings. The PCL is scored 
as a total symptom severity score (range = 17-85) and has good psychometric 
properties (Keen, Kutter, Niles, & Krinsley, 2008). The clinical cut off score on the 
PCL for PTSD is a score of 50 (Blanchard, Jones Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 
1996). 
7.1.2.2.2 Appraisals. 
Appraisals Inventory (AI; Mauro et al., 1992). See Study 1, Chapter 5. 
PTCI (Foa et al., 1999). See Study 1, Chapter 5. 
PCSAM. The items for the PCSAM were developed from the findings of the 
qualitative study. The original PCSAM consisted of 21 items that were thought to 
relate to three sub-scales; 1/ potential dysfunctional cognitions as a result of 
world/external causes 2/ communal and 3/ disintegration from cultural/social roles 
(see Table 14). Participants were asked to rate these items in relation to the trauma 
disclosed on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2004) Axis I 
Disorders (SCID-I; First, Gibbon, Spitzer & Williams, 2002). Participants were 
instructed ‘Please read each item and then indicate how much you agree with each 
statement in regards to the past seven days’. Items were rated on Likert-type rating 
scales ranging from 1(totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The rationale for using the 
PCSAM was to examine if it was a good measure to assess for collectivistic type 
cognitions in relation to dysfunctional trauma-related thoughts and beliefs. 
 7.1.2.2.3 Independence/ interdependence. 
 “I Am” Test (Khun & McPartland, 1954). Cultural independence/ 
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interdependence was measured using a shortened version of the frequently used 
measure of the construct of self; the twenty statement test (TST). As in previous 
research instead of twenty statements, participants were asked to provide ten 
statements (Bochner, 1994). The rationale for using the TST was based on it being a 
simple and commonly used technique to assess one’s sense of self or self-
identification (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Further, the TST is a qualitative measure 
of the self that makes explicit how individuals mediate their social environment in 
different ways by indexing how self-related information is differentially organised 
across individuals (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). The TST simply asks respondents to 
provide statements in response to the question “Who Am I?” Researchers have 
frequently used the TST to examine and control for cultural differences in the 
individual’s sense of self (e.g., Wang et al., 1998; Watkins & Gerong, 1999). The 
responses are coded into comparable categories of the independent-interdependent 
dichotomy. The instrument allows researchers to observe individuals’ own self-
conceptualization (in a free response format) of their social relationships, role 
identities and personal qualifiers. The TST has been found to have high interrater 
reliability, criterion validity tests have generally supported the TST and researchers 
have shown the TST to have a fair degree of test-retest reliability (Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954; Spitzer, Couch & Stratton, 1973), content validity (Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954) and concurrent validity (Spitzer et al, 1973). 
  
 7.1.2.3 Demographics. Participants provided highest educational qualification, 
their employment status, marital status and religion during the SCID interview. The 
questionnaire booklet, prompted participants to provided their age, ethnicity, gender, 
time in the UK. Following this, participants were asked how hard they found the 
study on a 10-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) and their English 
language skills on a 10-point scale from 1 (not very good) to 10 (extremely good). 
 
7.1.3 Procedure 
 Ethical approval was obtained from NRES Committee East of England – Essex 
REC, Reference Number 12/EE/0194 (see Appendix C). Data for the four studies 
were collected in the same experimental session. Each session took approximately 60 
- 90 minutes. Participants met with the researcher and following written informed 
consent procedures, participants first completed the SCID, which was audio-recorded 
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to account for inter-rater agreement and reliability of the coding of the data. Once this 
was accomplished, participants were asked to complete the questionnaire booklet in 
the following order; trauma memory and appraisals, negative memory and appraisals 
(counterbalanced) (a negative memory was selected as a comparison memory given it 
should be closer in valence to a trauma memory than a positive memory. Participants 
also completed the PCL-C, PTCI, HSCL-25 and TST, followed by their demographic 
information. Two weeks later the PCSAM was re-administered to examine test-retest 
reliability. 
 
7.1.4 Trustworthiness and Reliability 
 Trustworthiness was determined by the Principal Investigator entering all scores 
from the questionnaire booklet and an independent Asian rater (blind to hypotheses 
and group status) entering 20% of the data from the questionnaire booklets.  
Interrater reliability was determined by the principle investigator coding all 
TST and an independent Asian rater (blind to hypotheses and group status) coding 
20% of the TST. The kappa coefficient of inter-rater reliability was .99 for 
independence and .93 for interdependence. 
 
7.1.5 Results 
 Data achieved normality for all variables therefore transformations were not 
needed. Parametric methods of analyses were employed in this study. 
 
7.1.5.1 Participant Characteristics 
Participant characteristics are presented in Table 15. 2 (Culture: Asian vs. 
British) x 2 (PTSD condition: PTSD vs. non-PTSD) ANOVAs were used with each 
demographic variable as the dependent variable. The cultural groups did not differ 
significantly in terms of education or task difficulty but did differ significantly in age 
F(1, 91) = 9.71, p = .01, ƞp
2 
 = .10, gender; χ2 (1, N = 95) = 4.88, p = .02, length of 
time in the UK, F(1, 91) = 145.07, p < .001, ƞp
2 
 = .61, and self-rated English ability, 
F(1, 91) = 34.10, p < .001, ƞp
2 
 < .01. There was a cultural difference in trauma type χ2 
(4, N = 95) = 10.36, p = .04. The was a cultural difference in trauma type, with the 
Asian group experiencing more natural disasters to the British group, potentially due 
to geographical location and climate. While the British group experienced more 
combat related traumas, potentially due to the ex-veterans in this group compared to 
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the Asians. The traumas experienced however can be viewed as being comparable in 
severity as they all met PTSD criterion A (APA, 2000), in addition, there was no 
significant differences for the British and Asian PTSD groups as the PTSD main 
effect and interaction effect were not significant. Independence/interdependence was 
measured using the TST, as expected the Asian group (M = .37, SD = .30) had a 
significantly greater interdependent ratio than the British group (M = .27, SD = .28), 
t(94) = 1.74,  p = .04, d = .38.  
 
Table 15 
Means and (Standard Deviations) for Participant Characteristics 
 British  Asian  
 PTSD 
(n = 15) 
No PTSD 
(n = 33) 
PTSD  
(n = 19) 
No PTSD 
(n = 28) 
Gender (n) Male = 7 Male = 18 Male = 4 Male = 10 
Age (in years)  41.60 (12.40) 34.21 (8.30) 33.11 (10.06) 28.21 (8.83) 
Years spent in UK  40.93 (12.44) 30.17 (8.45) 7.13 (10.99) 7.31 (10.01) 
Task Difficulty 5.80 (2.17) 4.39 (2.21) 4.45 (1.72) 4.57 (2.39) 
English Ability 9.00 (1.00) 8.58 (1.37) 6.47 (1.90) 6.96 (1.93) 
Education (n)  Secondary = 7, 
Degree = 6, 
Postgrad = 2 
Secondary = 10, 
Degree = 14 
Postgrad = 9 
Secondary = 
10, Degree = 2, 
Postgrad = 7 
Secondary = 7 
Degree = 8 
Postgrad = 13 
PCL 42.47 (6.99) 22.50 (4.85) 47.70 (12.35) 23.89 (8.23) 
HSCL 35.33 (8.25) 20.73 (4.98) 32.74 (9.24) 23.45 (7.69) 
Trauma Type (n)  Accident = 6 
Disaster = 1 
Combat = 2 
Assault = 4 
Death = 1 
Accident = 18 
Disaster = 3 
Combat = 6 
Assault = 5 
Death = 1 
Accident = 6 
Disaster = 6 
Assault = 5 
Death = 2 
Accident = 13 
Disaster = 6 
Combat = 1 
Assault = 6 
Death = 2 
Note: Secondary = Completed secondary school. Postgrad = Completed postgraduate 
degree. PCL = Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Checklist. HSCL = Hopkins Symptom 
Checklist. Disaster = Natural Disaster. Assault includes sexual and non-sexual. Death 
= witness sudden death. 
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Posttrauma severity was measured using 2 (Culture: Asian vs. British) x 2 
(PTSD condition: PTSD vs. non-PTSD) ANOVAs with PCL and PTCI and 
depression (HSCL-25) as the dependent variable. As expected, those with PTSD 
scored significantly higher on the PCL than those without PTSD, F(1, 91) = 154.17, p 
< .001, ƞp
2 
 = .63. The cultural main effect was significant with Asians scoring higher 
than the British, F(1, 91) = 136.36, p < .001, p
2 
 = .60. The interaction was not 
significant.  Those with PTSD scored significantly higher on the PTCI than those 
without PTSD, F(1, 91) = 60.35, p = .01, p
2 
 = .40. The culture main effect was 
significant, Asians scored higher on the PTCI than the British, F(1, 91) = 5.10, p = 
.01, p
2 
 = .53; the interaction effect was not significant. Finally, in regards to 
depression, those with PTSD also had significantly higher symptoms of depression 
than those without PTSD, F(1, 91) = 59.52, p < .001, ƞp
2 
 = .40. The culture main 
effect and interaction were not significant. 
 
7.1.5.2 Hypotheses 1 and 2: Cultural differences and PTSD condition differences 
in appraisal dimensions 
Appraisals. Table 16 shows the means for the appraisal measures. 2 (Culture: 
Asian vs. British) x 2 (PTSD condition: PTSD vs. non-PTSD) x 2 (Memory: Negative 
vs. Trauma) mixed ANOVAs were used with each appraisal type as the dependent 
variable.  
Pleasantness. The memory main effect was significant, F(1, 91) = 6.24, p = 
.01, ƞp
2
 = .06. As in Study 1, the traumatic memory was rated as being less pleasant 
than the negative memory. The cultural main effect was significant, F(1, 91) = 4.98, p 
= .03, ƞp
2
 = .05. As in Study 1, the Asian group rated the memories to be more 
pleasant than the British group. The PTSD main effect was also significant, F(1, 91) = 
10.85, p = .001, ƞp
2
 = .11; the PTSD group found the memories to be less pleasant 
than the non-PTSD group. None of the interactions were significant. 
Coping ability. Only the memory x PTSD interaction was significant, F(1, 91) 
= 9.36, p = .003, ƞp
2
 = .93. Post-hoc comparisons revealed no difference between the 
groups for appraisals associated with the negative memory. However, in terms of the 
trauma memory those without PTSD had significantly higher appraisals of coping 
than those with PTSD, t(93) = 4.81, p < .001, d = 1.00. Paired comparisons found that 
while those without PTSD reported similar levels of coping appraisals in both the 
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trauma and negative memories, those with PTSD reported lower levels of coping 
appraisals in the trauma memory compared to the negative memory, t(33) = 4.65, p < 
.001, d = 1.62 . 
 
Table 16 
Mean and (Standard Deviation) for the British and Asian Trauma Survivors with and 
without PTSD on Appraisals Associated with Negative and Trauma Memories 
 British Asian 
 PTSD 
(n = 15) 
No PTSD 
(n = 33) 
PTSD 
(n = 19) 
No PTSD 
(n = 28) 
Pleasantness 
     Negative 
     Trauma 
 
2.73 (1.94) 
2.07 (1.39) 
 
4.03 (1.85) 
3.81 (2.34) 
 
4.15 (2.52) 
2.84 (2.48) 
 
4.82 (2.54) 
4.39 (2.23) 
Coping Ability 
     Negative 
    Trauma 
 
4.67 (2.50) 
2.80 (1.86) 
 
6.21 (2.00) 
5.33 (2.82) 
 
5.53 (2.39) 
2.79 (1.65) 
 
5.07 (1.56) 
5.04 (2.38) 
Anticipated effort 
     Negative 
    Trauma 
 
13.20 (3.55) 
15.73 (2.15) 
 
12.79 (3.14) 
14.85 (3.24) 
 
13.11 (3.77) 
15.11 (2.71) 
 
12.25 (3.22) 
12.14 (4.34) 
Legitimacy 
    Negative 
    Trauma 
 
7.27 (5.13) 
5.07 (3.90) 
 
6.39 (3.29) 
4.97 (3.62) 
 
7.47 (4.29) 
5.16 (3.64) 
 
8.82 (4.76) 
6.79 (4.32) 
Norm/Self 
    Negative 
    Trauma 
 
12.80 (4.13) 
13.26 (3.39) 
 
14.18 (2.97) 
14.70 (4.10) 
 
13.32 (3.81) 
12.74 (4.33) 
 
12.82 (3.27) 
13.61 (2.99) 
Goal/Need 
    Negative 
    Trauma 
 
21.00 (4.74) 
21.60 (3.70) 
 
20.61 (3.71) 
21.82 (4.23) 
 
19.47 (4.69) 
19.37 (5.84) 
 
18.82 (4.41) 
18.64 (5.13) 
Attentional Activity 
    Negative 
    Trauma 
 
24.07 (4.56) 
24.67 (4.10) 
 
23.06 (3.68) 
25.52 (5.11) 
 
23.00 (5.40) 
20.05 (5.67) 
 
23.54 (5.36) 
24.29 (5.28) 
Certainty 
     Negative 
 
25.67 (6.68) 
 
23.91 (8.38) 
 
23.95 (7.58) 
 
23.00 (7.99) 
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    Trauma 16.47 (9.19) 25.30 (7.54) 17.21 (8.59) 20.68 (8.59) 
Responsibility 
     Negative 
    Trauma 
 
20.47 (5.50) 
19.53 (7.41) 
 
24.09 (6.16) 
20.21 (7.61) 
 
19.95 (7.14) 
20.79 (5.69) 
 
21.32 (8.18) 
18.36 (6.86) 
Perceived control 
    Negative 
    Trauma 
 
21.73 (6.15) 
15.60 (6.94) 
 
23.33 (6.36) 
19.48 (5.38) 
 
19.26 (7.58) 
19.58 (6.53) 
 
20.14 (6.55) 
16.00 (7.78) 
PTCI-Total 109.00 
(40.82) 
59.82 (22.91) 129.15 
(33.54) 
73.04 (28.46) 
PTCI-Self 
PTCI-World 
PTCI-Self Blame 
64.47 (25.22) 
30.13 (13.01) 
14.40 (7.43) 
30.27 (10.80) 
20.52 (12.28) 
9.03 (4.93) 
76.10 (23.47) 
35.55 (10.37) 
17.50 (6.97) 
37.78 (18.09) 
24.56 (11.65) 
10.70 (6.47) 
PCSAM-Total 50.00 (17.23) 24.79 (10.34) 50.95 (10.05) 29.68 (11.98) 
PCSAM-Public 16.87 (6.44) 5.64 (2.93) 14.32 (5.87) 7.64 (4.77) 
PCSAM-Communal 22.13 (6.52) 12.64 (6.73) 21.58 (4.14 14.26 (7.45) 
PCSAM-Beliefs 11.00 (6.81) 6.52 (3.32) 15.05 (5.95) 7.75 (3.91) 
Note: PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory, PCSAM = Public and Communal 
Self Appraisal Measure. 
 
Anticipated effort. There was a significant memory main effect, F(1, 91) = 
12.60, p = .001, ƞp
2
 = .12. As in Study 1, greater anticipated effort was appraised in 
the trauma memory than the negative memory. The culture main effort was 
approaching significance, F(1, 91) = 3.09, p = .08, ƞp
2
 = .03. The direction of the 
culture main effect reflected cross-cultural and Study 1’s findings, with British 
participants reporting greater appraisals of anticipated effort than their Asian 
counterparts. There was a PTSD main effect, F(1,91) = 5.14, p = .03, ƞp
2
 = .05; the 
PTSD group reported greater appraisals of anticipated effort than the no PTSD group. 
None of the interactions were significant.  
Legitimacy. There was a significant memory main effect, F(1,91) = 11.72, p = 
.001, ƞp
2
 = .114; participants felt the negative memory to be fairer than the trauma 
memory. There was also a culture main effect, F(1, 91) = 8.11, p = .01, ƞp
2
 = .08; 
Asian participants perceived the memories to be fairer than the British group. There 
was no PTSD main effect and none of the interactions were significant.  
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Norm/Self compatibility. None of the main effects or interactions were 
significant.  
Goal/Need conduciveness. There was only a significant culture main effect, 
F(1, 91) = 7.00, p = .01, ƞp
2
 = .01; the British group had significantly greater 
goal/need conduciveness than their Asian counterparts.  
Attentional activity. The memory x PTSD interaction was significant, F(1, 91) 
= 4.70, p = .03, ƞp
2
 = .05. Post-hoc follow-up comparisons revealed those with PTSD 
reported significantly less attentional activity appraisals in the trauma memory than 
those without PTSD, t(93) = 2.53, p = .01, d = .52. However, for the negative memory 
there was no significant difference between groups. Paired comparisons found that 
those without PTSD had significantly greater appraisals of attentional activity in the 
trauma memory than the negative memory, t(60) = 2.35, p = .02, d = .61. However for 
those with PTSD there was no significant difference between the memories. 
The memory x culture interaction was also significant, F(1, 91) = 4.20, p = 
.04, ƞp
2
 = .04. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that while the British group had 
significantly greater attentional activity for trauma memory than their Asian 
counterparts, t(93) = 2.46, p = .02, d = .51, no such differences were found for the 
negative memory. Paired comparisons found that the British group had significantly 
greater appraisals of attentional activity in the trauma memory when compared to the 
negative memory, t(47) = 2.61, p = .01, d = .76. However Asian participants did not 
significantly differ between memories. The PTSD x culture and three-way 
interactions were not significant. 
Certainty. Only the memory x PTSD interaction was significant, F(1, 91) = 
12.08, p = .001, ƞp
2
 = .12. Post-hoc comparisons found that those with PTSD reported 
less certainty in the trauma memory than the no PTSD participants, t(93) = 3.48, p = 
.001, d = .72. However, the groups did not differ significantly in terms of the negative 
memory. Paired comparisons found that for those with PTSD there was significantly 
lower levels of certainty appraisals in the trauma than the negative memory, t(33) = 
3.80, p < .001, d = 1.32. However for those without PTSD there was no significant 
difference between the trauma and negative memories.  
Responsibility. Only the memory x PTSD interaction was approaching 
significance, F(1, 91) = 3.63, p = .06, ƞp
2
 = .04. Post-hoc follow-up paired-
comparisons revealed those without PTSD reported significantly greater personal 
responsibility for the negative event than trauma event, t(60) = -3.14, p = .01, d = .81. 
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However, those with PTSD reported similar levels of responsibility appraisals in both 
the trauma and negative memory. 
Control.  There was a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 91) = 4.17, p = 
.04, ƞp
2
 = .04. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that appraisals of control did not differ 
for Asian trauma survivors with and without PTSD for the negative or trauma 
memories. For British trauma survivors, while appraisals of control did not differ 
between those with and without PTSD for the negative memory, for the trauma 
memory British trauma survivors with PTSD had lower levels of control appraisals in 
the trauma memory than those without PTSD, t(46) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .63.  
 
7.1.5.3 Hypothesis 3: Trauma Specific Appraisals 
A 2 (Culture; Asian vs. British) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD vs. no PTSD) 
ANOVA was used with PTCI total as the dependent variable. The PTSD main effect 
was significant, F(1, 91) = 66.42, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = .42; those with PTSD scored higher 
on the PTCI than those without PTSD. The culture main effect was also significant, 
F(1, 91) = 6.67, p = .01, ƞp
2
 = .07; the Asian group scored significantly higher than 
the British group. Contrary to Study 1, the interaction was not significant (F < 1); 
suggesting that the PTCI differentiated between those with and without PTSD 
regardless of trauma survivors’ cultural background.  
A 2 (Culture; Asian vs. British) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD vs. no PTSD) 
MANOVA was used with PTCI sub-scales as the dependent variables. The 
multivariate effect of Group was not significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .95, F(3, 89) = 
1.69, ns, ƞp
2
 = .05. The multivariate effect of PTSD was significant, Wilks’ Lambda = 
.53, F(3, 89) = 26.06, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = .46. Follow-up analyses found that the PTSD 
group scored significantly higher on all subscales than those without PTSD (negative 
self, F(1, 91) = 74.04, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = .45, negative world, F(1, 91) = 14.40, p < .001, 
ƞp
2
 = .14, self-blame, F(1, 91) = 21.56, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = .19). The multivariate effect of 
the interaction was not significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F(3, 89) = .28, ns, ƞp
2
 = 
.009. Additionally, unlike in Study 1, the PTCI correlated significantly with PTSD 
symptoms (PCL) in both cultural groups; Asian PTCI, r(47) = .72, p < .001, Negative 
self, r(47) = .68, p < .001, Negative world, r(47) = .53 p < .001, Self-blame, r(47) = 
.54, p <.001; British PTCI, r(48) = .65, p < .001, Negative self, r(48) = .69, p < .001, 
Negative world, r(48) = .43 p = .01, Self-blame, r(48) = .41, p = .01. 
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7.1.5.4 Hypothesis 4: PCSAM   
 Principal component analyses and item retention. In order to ensure that all 
questions on the PCSAM were measuring the same scale, the degree to which scores 
on each question correlated with scores on all other questions was evaluated. For an 
item to be retained at this stage, it had to correlate greater than r = .30 with at least 
two other items. The only item that did not meet this criterion was item number 1. 
Hence, this item was removed. The other 20 items were then submitted to a principal-
component analysis with oblim rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified 
the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = .88 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999), 
and all KMO values for individual items were > .79 and thus were well above the 
acceptable level (Field, 2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (190) = 1462.52, p < 
.001, indicated that correlations between items was sufficiently large for principal 
components analysis (Field, 2009). An initial analysis was conducted to obtain 
eigenvalues for each component in the data. Four components had eigenvalues over 
Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 71.55% of the variance2. 
However, items 8, 13, 14 and 18 did not load above .40 on any of the factors and 
items 2 and 20 loaded equally onto two factors. Therefore, these items were removed. 
Subsequently, the 14-item PCSAM was submitted to a principal-component 
analysis with oblim rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling 
adequacy for the analysis, KMO = .85 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999), and all KMO 
values for individual items were > .75. Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (91) = 912.50, p 
< .001, indicated that correlations between items was sufficiently large for principal 
components analysis. Three components had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 
and in combination explained 70.86% of the variance. The first factor explained 
49.96% of the variance and the second and third factors, an additional 11.71% and 
9.19%, respectively. Visual examination of the scree plot also suggested a three-factor 
solution. Given the convergence of the scree plot and Kaiser’s criterion on three 
components, this was the number of components that were retained in the final 
analysis. Table 17 shows the factor loadings. The items that cluster on the same 
components suggest that component 1 represents challenge to beliefs and belonging 
(5 items), component 2 represents communal aspects of self (5 items) and component 
3 represents public roles and identity (4 items). Thus, the final inventory contained 
                                                        
2
 The first factor explained 50.54% of the variance and the second, third and fourth factors, an 
additional 8.78%, 7.15%, and 5.08%, respectively. 
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14-items and the components were similar to that derived from the qualitative study. 
The three PCSAM scales correlated moderately to strongly with each other (all ps < 
.001); Beliefs and Belonging and Communal, r(93) = .49, Beliefs and Belonging and 
Public, r(93) = .60, Communal and Public, r(93) = .56. The correlations with the 
Total Score were r(93) = .80, .85, .85, for Beliefs and Belonging, Communal, and 
Public, respectively. 
 
7.1.6 Internal consistency. Cronbach’s alphas for the three PCSAM scales 
and total score were as follows; total score α = .92; Beliefs and Belonging α = .90, 
Communal α = .81, and Public α = .92.  
 
7.1.7  Test-retest reliability. The length of time between the test-retest 
reliability of the PCSAM was 2 weeks. Pearson correlations were calculated to 
examine temporal stability of the PCSAM. The test-retest reliability was found to be 
excellent overall, r(68) = .89, p < .001 and for each subscale; Beliefs and Belonging, 
r(68) = .85, p < .001; Communal, r(68) = .87, p < .001; and Public, r(68) = .85, p < 
.001
3
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3
For each cultural group, test-retest reliability was found to be excellent overall, British r(34) = .94, p < 
.001; Asian r(32) = .83, p < .001, and for each subscale; Beliefs and Belonging, British r(35) = .81, p < 
.001; Asian r(32) = .84, p < .001; Communal, British r(35) = .90, p < .001; Asian r(32) = .82, p < .001; 
and Public, British r(35) = .95, p < .001; Asian r(32) = .78, p < .001.  
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Table 17 
Pattern Matrix for Public and Communal Self Appraisal Measure  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Since the event I feel let down by fate/my 
beliefs/God/ my faith 
.92 -.04 -.004 
My faith/religion/beliefs have been challenged 
by the event 
.86 -.07 .06 
Since the event I feel let down by the world .79 .17 .04 
Since the event I feel I do not have a place in the 
world 
.75 -.01 -.20 
Since the event I no longer feel close to others .62 .08 -.30 
Since the event people have become a priority -.12 .86 .11 
I do not want anyone to know about the event -.02 .68 -.08 
Since the event I have sacrificed my needs for 
the needs of significant others 
.30 .66 .08 
Since the event my values have changed .08 .60 -.33 
Since the event my relationships have been 
damaged or challenged 
.11 .54 -.33 
Since the event I have failed in my roles -.001 .01 -.92 
Since the event I have lost my social 
role/identity  
-.05 .09 -.90 
Since the event I have not lived up to social or 
cultural expectations 
.01 -.01 -.87 
Since the event I do not feel I am a significant 
member of my culture/society/community/group 
.21 -.06 -.78 
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7.1.8 Convergent validity. To examine the convergent validity of the 
PCSAM the correlations between PCSAM scores and the PTCI was examined. There 
were significant correlations between the PCSAM and PTCI (Table 18). To examine 
the relationships between cognitions and posttraumatic symptoms, Pearson 
correlations were conducted between the PCSAM and PCL. Table 18 shows that the 
PCSAM was found to significantly correlate with PTSD symptoms.   
 
Table 18 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between PCSAM, PTCI and PCL for Total 
Sample/British/Asian 
 PCSAM 
 Beliefs Communal Public Total 
PTCI 
 Self  
 
.74**/.76**/.69** 
 
.61**/.70**/.55** 
 
.73**/.87**/.61** 
 
.82**/.88**/.77** 
World .61**/.70**/.50** .52**/.46**/.57** .49**/.52**/.44** .63**/.61**/.63** 
 Self-Blame .37**/.53**/.20 .42**/.47**/.36* .50**/.61**/.37** .52**/.61**/.40** 
 Total .74**/.80**/.65** .64**/.67**/.60** .72**/.82**/.61** .82**/.86**/.78** 
 PCL
 
.52**/.49**/.50** .53**/.60**/.48* .72**/.79**/.70** .71**/.73**/.70** 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01; PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory; PCSAM = 
Public and Communal Self Appraisal Measure; PCL = Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Checklist 
 
7.1.9 Discriminative validity: differences between groups. To examine 
whether the PCSAM could discriminate between those with and without PTSD a 2 
(Culture; Asian vs. British) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD vs. no PTSD) ANOVA was used 
with PSCAM total as the dependent variable. For the total score, the PTSD main 
effect was significant, F(1, 91) = 79.91, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = .47; those with PTSD scored 
higher on the PCSAM than those without PTSD. The culture main effect and 
interaction were not significant.  
2 (Culture; Asian vs. British) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD vs. no PTSD) 
ANOVAs were used with PCSAM subscales as the dependent variables. For the 
Beliefs and Belonging subscale, the PTSD main effect was significant, F(1, 91) = 
33.24, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = .27; those with PTSD scored significantly higher than those 
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without PTSD. The culture main effect was significant, F(1, 91) = 6.69, p = .01, ƞp
2
 = 
.07; the Asian group scored significantly higher than the British group. The 
interaction was not significant. For the Communal subscale, the PTSD main effect 
was significant, F(1, 91) = 35.92, p < .001, ƞp
2
 = .28; those with PTSD scored 
significantly higher than those without PTSD. The culture main effect and interaction 
were not significant. For the Public subscale, there was a significant interaction 
between PTSD and culture, F(1, 91) = 4.88, p = .03, ƞp
2
 = .05. Post-hoc follow-up 
comparisons found that the British PSTD, t(46) = 8.36, p < .001, d = 2.24, and the 
Asian PTSD groups, t(45) = 4.29, p < .001, d = 1.25, scored significantly higher than 
their non-PTSD comparison groups. It was found that the Asian PSTD and British 
PTSD groups did not significantly differ. However, the Asian no PTSD group scored 
significantly higher than the British no PTSD group, t(59) = 2.01, p = .77, d = .51. 
Lastly, a discriminant function analysis was conducted to examine the 
specificity and sensitivity of the PSCAM subscales in identifying individuals with and 
without PTSD. The three obtained PSCAM factors loaded on one function which 
classified 80% of the sample correctly into those with and without PTSD, Wilks’ λ = 
.53, χ2 (3, N = 95) = 58.55, p < .001. Sensitivity was .77 and specificity was .81. The 
discriminant function analyses were also conducted for the British and Asian groups 
separately. For the British group, the three obtained PSCAM factors loaded on one 
function which classified 83% of the sample correctly into those with and without 
PTSD, Wilks’ λ = .54, χ2 (3, N = 48) = 28.35, p < .001. Sensitivity was .73 and 
specificity was .88. For the Asian group, the three obtained PSCAM factors loaded on 
one function which classified 79% of the sample correctly into those with and without 
PTSD, Wilks’ λ = .53, χ2 (3, N = 47) = 28.54, p < .001. Sensitivity was .74 and 
specificity was .82. 
 
7.1.10 Discussion 
 Study 4 again found that the cultural influences on appraisals tended to extend 
to trauma memories. Specifically, Asian trauma survivors reported higher levels of 
pleasantness and legitimacy appraisals and lower levels of anticipated effort, 
goal/need conduciveness and attentional activity than the British group. This supports 
previous research that suggests Western cultures generally emphasize appraisals of 
anticipated effort and Asian cultures tend to appraise situations to be more legitimate 
when compared to Western cultures (Mauro et al., 1992; Mesquita & Walker, 2003). 
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Given the role of appraisals in PTSD, Study 4 was also interested in appraisals that 
differentiated between those with and without PTSD. Those with and without PTSD 
did not differ in their appraisals of attentional activity, certainty and coping associated 
with the negative memory. However, for the trauma memory those with PTSD 
reported fewer appraisals of attentional activity, certainty and coping than those 
without PTSD. Furthermore, those without PTSD appraised less personal 
responsibility for the trauma event. These differences between those with and without 
PTSD were evident regardless of one’s cultural background suggesting cultural 
similarities in the dysfunction appraisals of those with PTSD. The only appraisal type 
that differed cross-culturally was control; appraisals of control only differentiated 
between British trauma survivors with and without PTSD for the trauma memory. 
This aligns with Western cultures valuing control and violations of cultural 
expectations resulting in psychological distress (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2009; 
Mesquita & Walker, 2003). 
Second, trauma-specific appraisals were examined. It was found that, unlike 
Study 1, those with PTSD, regardless of cultural background, scored significantly 
higher on the PTCI than those without PTSD. Therefore, the PTCI seems appropriate 
for use with Asian trauma survivors with PTSD. Those with PTSD may hold 
culturally similar dysfunctional negative appraisals about the self, world and self-
blame. Third, the usefulness of a new measure developed to investigate trauma-
associated appraisals in terms of more public and communal aspects of self was 
examined. The 14-item questionnaire loaded onto three factors (challenges to beliefs 
and belonging, communal, public and social roles). Internal consistency, convergent 
validity and test-retest reliability were good. The PCSAM was able to discriminate 
between those with and without PTSD.  
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7.2. Study 5: Self-Concept, Posttraumatic Appraisals and Posttraumatic 
Psychological Adjustment: what are the relationships? 
 
 As outlined in Study 2 and throughout the thesis, cognitive models of 
posttraumatic psychological adjustment have implicated both self-appraisals and self-
concept in the development and maintenance of symptoms of PTSD (Brewin, 2011; 
Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Further as outlined in 
Study 2 in the context of trauma, self-concept is of significant importance to one’s 
psychological well-being. In order to make sense of the experience, the trauma event 
acts as a catalyst for re-defining and re-evaluating one’s self-concept. However, such 
a change can potentially result in a fractured, conflicting or discrepant self-concept. 
Research demonstrates such distortions in self-concept have been linked with various 
forms of psychological maladjustment, including PTSD (Brewin, 2011; Higgins, 
1996; Strauman & Higgins, 1987; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008) as least for those from 
Western cultures. Research suggests that Asians hold a more inconsistent self-concept 
than Westerners and self-discrepancies are not as problematic for Asian cultures in 
regards to self-concept and well-being (Church, Anderson-Harumi, et al., 2008; 
English & Chen, 2011). Study 2 examined distortions in self-concept (i.e. trauma-
centered self-concept and discrepant self-concept) using British and Asians students 
who had professed to experiencing an extremely stressful situation. The overarching 
aim was to investigate the relationship between these distortions in self-concept 
(trauma-centered, ideal and ought self-discrepancies), self-appraisals and PTSD 
symptoms and to examine whether these relationships differ depending on one’s 
cultural background. The study found trauma-centered self-concept to be associated 
with PTSD symptoms for the British, while distortions in self-concept were 
significantly associated with trauma-related appraisals for both groups. Finally, 
trauma-related appraisals mediated the relationships between ideal self-concept 
discrepancies with PTSD symptoms for both groups in addition to ought self-concept 
discrepancies relation to PTSD symptoms for the British. 
 The objective of Study 5 was to investigate the same aims as that outlined in 
Study 2 using a group of Asian and British trauma survivors with and without PTSD. 
It was hypothesized that those from Asian cultures will have greater self-discrepancy 
than those from individualistic cultures. Second, that trauma, regardless of one’s 
cultural background, will influence the actual self and this will be related to PTSD 
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symptoms. Third, that a trauma-centered actual self will be related to greater self-
discrepancies for both cultural groups. Fourth, regardless of one’s cultural 
background, disruptions in self-concept (e.g. self-discrepancy and trauma-themed 
self-concept) will be related to negative trauma-related self-appraisals as negative 
appraisals will arise when the self is perceived to be in danger (greater self 
discrepancies). Lastly, that negative self-appraisals will mediate the relationship 
between disruptions in self-concept (e.g. self-discrepancy and trauma-themed self-
concept) and PTSD symptoms. 
 
7.2.1 Method 
 In addition to the measures completed in Study 5, participants also completed 
the Selves Questionnaire (SQ; Higgins, 1987) described in Study 2. Interrater 
reliability was determined by the principle investigator coding all self-discrepancy 
scores and an independent Asian rater (blind to hypotheses and group status) coding 
20% of self-discrepancy scores. The kappa coefficient of inter-rater reliability was .90 
for ideal self-discrepancy, 1 for ought self-discrepancy and .97 for trauma-centered 
actual self. 
7.2.2 Results 
Data achieved normality for all variables with the exception of the trauma-
centered actual self. Transformations did not resolve issues of skewness and kurtosis 
for this variable. Therefore, Spearman correlations (one-tailed) were used to 
investigate associations between trauma-centered self and self-discrepancy with the 
PTCI (see Table 20). 
 
7.2.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Self-discrepancies 
Mean self-discrepancy scores, trauma-centered actual self scores and PTCI 
scores are detailed in Table 19. 2 (culture; Asian vs. British) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD 
vs. no PTSD) ANOVAs were used with actual and ought self-discrepancy scores as 
the dependent variables. Unlike Study 2, there was no difference in ideal self-
discrepancy or ought self-discrepancy between British and Asian cultural groups. The 
PTSD main effect and interaction were also not significant
4
. However, when 
                                                        
4
 Equivalent results were reached when demographic data (English ability, Age, Gender) were included 
as covariates. 
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interdependent self-construal and length of time in the UK were included as 
covariates, there was a significant difference in self-discrepancy scores between 
British and Asian groups, with Asians having significantly greater ideal self-
discrepancy, F(1, 94) = 5.87, p = .02, p
2 
= .06, and ought self-discrepancy, F(1, 94) = 
9.01, p = .01, p
2 = 
.09. The PTSD main effect and interaction effect were still not 
significant. 
 
Table 19 
Mean Self-Discrepancy Scores, Trauma-Centered Actual Self Scores and PTCI 
Scores 
 Asian British 
 PTSD  
(n = 19) 
No PTSD  
(n = 28) 
PTSD  
(n = 15) 
No PTSD 
 (n = 33) 
Ought Self-
Discrepancy 
-1.11 (.73) -1.00 (1.15 -.79 (.38) -.77 (.93) 
Ideal Self-Discrepancy -.78 (.63) -.62 (1.05) -.65 (.46) -.54 (.73) 
Trauma-Centered Self .14 (.25) .02 (.06) .17 (.15) .03 (.08) 
PTCI 129.15 
(33.54) 
73.04 (28.46) 109.00 
(40.82) 
59.82 (22.91) 
Note: PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory. 
 
7.2.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Trauma-centered actual self 
 A 2 (culture; Asian vs. British) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD vs. no PTSD) 
ANOVA was used. The two cultural groups did not differ in trauma-centered actual 
self. However, the PTSD group did provide a greater trauma-centered actual self than 
the no-PTSD group, F(1, 92 ) = 17.33, p < .001, p
2 
 = .16. The interaction was not 
significant. Therefore, unlike Study 2, for both Asian and British trauma survivors, 
those with PTSD had a significantly greater trauma-centered self-concept than those 
without PTSD. 
 
7.2.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Relationship between trauma-centered actual self and self-
discrepancy 
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Given there were no cultural differences in self-discrepancy or trauma-themed 
self-concept, for these two variables data was collapsed across groups. Unlike Study 
2, for both the PTSD and no PTSD groups, there were no significant relationships 
between trauma-centred actual self and self-discrepancy (all rs < .17). 
 
7.2.2.4 Hypothesis 4: Relationship between distortions in self-concept and 
appraisals 
To address this hypothesis the thesis investigated the relationships between 
trauma-centered self and self-discrepancies and trauma-related appraisals in those 
with PTSD.  Correlation analyses found that, as in Study 2, for the British PTSD 
group trauma-centered actual self was significantly correlated with PTCI (and 
subscales). For the Asian PTSD group, trauma-centered actual self significantly 
correlated with PTCI Self (see Table 20). Table 20 also shows that the Asian PTSD 
group’s ideal self-discrepancies scores were significantly correlated with the PTCI 
total and its subscales and ought self-discrepancies scores were significantly 
correlated with the PTCI Self-Blame. However, the British PTSD groups’ self-
discrepancies scores were not significantly correlated with the PTCI.  
 
Table 20 
Correlation Coefficients (one-tailed) for Trauma-Centered Actual-Self, Self-
Discrepancies and PTCI Scores for the British PTSD and Asian PTSD groups 
 PTCI-Total PTCI-Self PTCI-World PTCI-Self-blame 
 Asian British Asian British Asian British Asian British 
Trauma-
centered self 
.22 .63** .37* .66** -.10 .45* -.10 .44
*
 
Ideal SD .53* -.16 .41* -.30 .50* -.10 .45* .30 
Ought SD .33 -.13 .25 -.27 .21 .02 .41* .16 
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. Ideal SD = Ideal Self-Discrepancy Score; Ought SD = 
Ought Self-Discrepancy Score.  
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7.2.2.5 Hypothesis 5: Do appraisals mediate the relationship between distortions 
in self-concept (i.e. self-discrepancies and trauma-centered self) and PTSD? 
The rationale for using mediation analysis was to identity whether the 
appraisals mediated the relationship between distortions in self-concept (i.e. ought 
and ideal self-discrepancies and trauma-centered self) and PTSD diagnosis, as 
mediation was suspected based on previous research. To strengthen analysis 
bootstrapping procedures were used for the British and Asian groups separately 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In the analyses 5,000 bootstrap resamples of the data with 
replacement were used. Statistical significance with alpha at .05 is indicated by the 
95% confidence intervals not crossing zero. It was found that for the British and 
Asian groups, trauma-related appraisals did not mediate the relationship between ideal 
and ought self-discrepancy and PTSD diagnosis. However, for the British and Asian 
groups it was found that trauma-related appraisals did mediate the relationship 
between trauma-centered self-concept and PTSD diagnosis, with a 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval of 1.93 to 21.92 for the British group and .90 to 17.87 for the 
Asian group.  
 
7.2.3 Discussion 
Firstly, when interdependent self-construal and length of time in the UK were 
included as covariates, the British and Asian groups differed significantly in terms of 
self-discrepancy scores, whereby the Asian group had greater ideal and ought self-
discrepancy scores than their British counterparts. This supports previous research 
and suggests that interdependent sense of self and time in a Western culture may 
influence self-discrepancy scores. Furthermore, PTSD status did not influence self-
discrepancy.  However, those with PTSD, regardless of cultural background, did have 
a significantly greater trauma-centered actual self-concept compared to trauma 
survivors without PTSD. Unlike Study 2, no evidence was found to suggest 
significant relationships between trauma-centred self-concept and self-discrepancy. 
However, the findings suggested that, as in Study 2, distortions in self-concept (i.e. 
trauma-centered self-concept and self-discrepancies [Asian group only]) were 
significantly correlated with negative self-related appraisals. Lastly, while negative 
trauma-related appraisals did not mediate the relationships between self-discrepancies 
and PTSD status, they did mediate the relationship between current trauma-centered 
self-concept and PTSD for both British and Asian cultural groups. Study 6’s findings 
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suggest post-trauma survivors who hold a more trauma defined self-concept have 
more negative self appraisals, which in turn negatively effects post-trauma 
psychological adjustment. A limitation of study is the use of mediation analysis which 
was based on the procedure outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). This method of 
mediation has a number of theoretical and empirical concerns, including association, 
temporal order and the confirmatory-exploratory distinction (Gelfand, Mensinger & 
Tenhave, 2009), thus findings need to be considered somewhat tentatively. 
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7.3. Study 6: Investigating Cultural Differences in Self-Ambivalence and 
Implications for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 
Self-concept has been implicated in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD (Brewin, 2011; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This thesis espouses its import and consequence in trauma 
studies and calls for further research into this domain. In the context of trauma, self-
concept is of significant importance to one’s psychological well-being. The trauma 
potentially acts as a catalyst for re-defining and re-evaluating one’s self-concept, as 
one is prompted to make sense of their experience. Finding meaning, in an otherwise 
incomprehensible situation, potentially leads to change in one’s self-concept 
(Brennan, 2001; Brewin, 2011; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Further, changes in self-
concept have the potential to affect self-esteem. Self-esteem is considered to be an 
attitude towards the self as a whole (Baumeister, 1998). Most research on self-esteem 
has focused on the valence (i.e. positive and negative aspects) of this attitude towards 
self. Research has examined the importance of high self-esteem (i.e. positive attitudes 
towards self) in maintaining psychological well-being and the role of low self-esteem 
(i.e. negative attitudes towards self) in depression and anxiety (Sowislo & Orth, 2013; 
Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007).  
However, experiencing a trauma can raise complex attitudes and beliefs in a 
trauma survivor that are not necessarily seen in black and white or simply as positive 
or negative in valence as previous and current experiences, knowledge, beliefs and 
values are fighting for dominance or even co-existence. Thus, self-esteem has another 
dimension, namely self-ambivalence (Riketta & Ziegler, 2006). Self-ambivalence is 
the co-presence of both positive and negative, and thus conflicting, self-evaluations. 
The thesis argues that self-ambivalence may be a useful construct in trying to 
ascertain the state of one’s self-concept following a trauma and its subsequent 
influence on posttrauma psychological adjustment. 
Research has demonstrated that a clear, coherent and stable self-concept is 
emphasized in Western cultures and is thus, largely associated with psychological 
well-being (e.g., Campbell, 1990; Suh, 2000, 2002). Those from Western cultures 
have little tolerance for self-ambivalence and discrepancies in their self-concept.  
Specifically, inconsistencies in self-concept have been found to be related to greater 
anxiety, depression and lower self-esteem and life satisfaction (Campbell et al., 1996; 
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Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 
1997). While a significant body of research has investigated the effects of self-
ambivalence on psychological well-being, the role of self-ambivalence in trauma 
survivors, and especially those with PTSD, has not yet been investigated. Recently, 
however, Jerg-Bretzke, Walter, Limbrecht-Ecklundt and Traue (2013) conducted a 
related study investigating the emotional ambivalence (i.e. feeling both positive and 
negative emotions towards a situation, person or experience) experienced by German 
soldiers after deployment with PTSD. They found emotional ambivalence did indeed 
affect the severity of PTSD symptoms after soldiers returned from military operations 
and demonstrated it to be predictive of psychological burden. These findings 
demonstrate that there is potentially a need for further work examining the role of 
ambivalence in trauma survivors with PTSD.   
Self-concept has a significant influence on the way in which one cognitively 
appraises events, the self, others and the world (Dunmore et al., 2001; Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). Therefore, as self-ambivalence is seen somewhat negatively in Western 
cultures (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010), those with greater self-ambivalence may 
consequently have greater threat to their self-concept resulting in negative ways in 
which they appraise events, the self, others and the world (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 
2009). There has been much research on the role of cognitive appraisals in the 
development and maintenance of PTSD (see Ehlers & Clark, 2000). However, to date, 
research has not examined the relationships between self-ambivalence and trauma-
associated appraisals in those with PTSD.  
Finally, while the literature is relatively consistent in terms of the role of self-
coherence in maintaining psychological health in Western cultures; it is also 
consistent in demonstrating that Asian cultures hold a more dialectic worldview than 
those from Western cultures (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). This manner of thinking 
emphasizes change, contradiction, and co-variation, whereby the world is viewed as 
inherently contradictory (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). Many studies have found this 
world-view philosophy forms a template to judge and evaluate the self. That is, 
dialecticism has been found to lead to greater self-ambivalence and dialectical self-
esteem (Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang & Hun, 2004). Research has indicated that 
members from Asian cultures have greater self-ambivalence and self-discrepancy than 
those from Western cultures (e.g. Boucher, Peng, Shi, & Wang, 2009; Hamamura, 
Heine & Paulhus, 2008; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Kim, Peng, & 
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Chiu, 2008). Additionally, Westerners, and those low in dialecticism, have been 
found to strongly endorse polarized self-responses (i.e. accepting or providing 
positively keyed items and rejecting negatively keyed ones) and thus, tend to make 
internally consistent responses when evaluating the self (see Spencer- Rodgers et al., 
2004). In contrast, in Asian cultures an inconsistent and discrepant self is considered 
normative and therefore these qualities of self tend not to be associated with 
psychological distress (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). For instance, a study by 
Spencer-Rodgers et al. (2010) found self-ambivalence was unrelated to life 
satisfaction, anxiety, and depression among their Chinese sample but it was 
significantly related among their European American sample. Thus, research points to 
a dialectical inclination to tolerate contradiction and change amongst Asian samples 
(Cheng, 2009), which leads to the conclusion that Asians may readily acknowledge 
inconsistency within their self-concept and not suffer adverse consequences as a result 
(Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). 
 The aim of this research, therefore, is to investigate whether self-ambivalence is 
implicated in PTSD and whether this differs across cultures.  This will be investigated 
in a sample of British and Asian trauma survivors with and without PTSD. Firstly, it 
is hypothesized that due to Western cultures valuing a coherent and stable self, 
positive and negative judgments will be more polarized for the British group than the 
Asian group (i.e. British participants will have more negative or positive self-
statements than Asian participants and Asian participants will have more neutral self-
statements than British participants). Second, due to Asian cultures being more 
comfortable with psychological contradiction, including evaluative contradiction 
regarding the self, it is expected that the Asian group will provide similar numbers of 
co-occurring positive and negative self-statements and therefore have a more 
ambivalent (or equally-valenced) self-orientation than the British group (Heine & 
Hamamura, 2007, Falk, Heine, Yuki & Takemura, 2009). Third, given previous 
research using Western samples has demonstrated a relationship between self-
ambivalence and poorer psychological adjustment, the British PTSD group was 
expected to have greater self-ambivalence than the British non-PTSD group. 
However, given Asian cultures have been found to have greater acceptance of self-
ambivalence, it was hypothesized that self-ambivalence may not differentiate between 
Asian trauma survivors with and without PTSD. Fourthly, due to theoretical links 
between cognitive appraisals and self-concept, it was hypothesized that self-
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ambivalence will be correlated with negative, dysfunctional trauma appraisals for the 
British group. However this relationship may not be evident in the Asian sample. 
Finally, given self-ambivalence is proposed to have a negative effect on trauma-
related appraisals, at least in the British group, and trauma-related appraisals have 
been found to play a major role in PTSD, it was hypothesized that trauma-related 
appraisals will mediate the relationship between self-ambivalence and PTSD for the 
British group. However, given Asian cultures have greater acceptance of self-
ambivalence and self-ambivalence is typically not associated with psychological 
maladjustment, these relationships may not be evident in the Asian sample. 
 
7.3.1 Method 
 In addition to the TST being used as a measure of independence/ 
interdependence as denoted in Study 4.  The TST was also was used in Study 6 as a 
measure of self-ambivalence. Dialectical tendencies toward tolerance of contradiction 
influence the manner in which Asians respond to Likert-type scales about the self and 
other attitude objects (Hamamura et al., 2008). Therefore, a free-response measure of 
self is used in this study. The TST has been used to examine differences in self-
concept and cultural effects on an individual’s self-concept (e.g., Bond and Cheung 
1983; Watkins et al. 1998). Participants were instructed “Below, are 10 fill-in the 
blank areas for you to answer the basic question, “Who am I?” Simply write an 
answer next to each “I am” and make each answer different.” Responses to this 
generic question provided subjective definitions of the self (Kuhn & McPartland, 
1954). Thus the ‘I am’ is a qualitative measure of the self (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) 
which simply asks respondents to provide statements in response to the question 
“Who Am I?” However, research has shown the TST may be more effective with as 
few as 10 responses (Bochner, 1994). Therefore, as in previous research, participants 
were asked to provide ten self-statements (Bochner, 1994). The rational for using the 
“I Am” test was due to participants being able to spontaneously list thoughts about 
themselves, which is a relatively unobtrusive assessment of the frequency with which 
cultures use positive and negative self-statements when describing the self was 
obtained, thereby providing a more naturalistically and less culturally-biased 
assessment of self-evaluative ambivalence (Spencer-Rodger et al, 2004). Further, the 
TST is especially useful for cross-cultural comparisons, as the format is more easily 
understood across a variety of cultures when compared to other types of measures. As 
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a result of these advantages, the TST provides a powerful tool for cross-cultural 
researchers to explore self-concept. However, it also needs to be borne in mind that 
one’s mood state, as measured by the HSCL, may influence participant’s self-
statements. Research suggests depression is associated with greater negative self-
statements, therefore participants’ responses to the TST could be influenced by their 
mood, and thus interpretation of findings need to keep this in mind. 
 Responses to the ‘I am’ were coded according to valence; negative (-1), neutral 
(0), and positive (1). The proportion of positive, neutral and negative self-statements 
were divided by participants’ total number of responses to develop a negative, neutral 
and positive ratio, respectively. Self-ambivalence was coded as the ratio of positive to 
negative self-responses. Inter-rater reliability was found to be excellent (Kappa 
coefficient of 1). 
7.3.2 Results 
 Data achieved normality for all variables without transformations needing to be 
made in this study. Therefore parametric methods of analyses were used. 
 
7.3.2.1 Hypothesis 1 and 2: Self-Evaluation 
Table 21 shows the means for each self-evaluation variable for each group. A 
2 (culture; British vs. Asian) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD vs. no PTSD) ANOVA was 
used to investigate the number of self-statements provided. There was no cultural or 
PTSD main effect and the interaction was not significant. 
A 2 (culture; British vs. Asian) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD vs. no PTSD) 
MANOVA was used to investigate self-evaluation with ratio of negative, positive and 
neutral self-statements as the dependent variables. The multivariate effect of the 
interaction was approaching significance, Ʌ = .93, F(3, 88) = 2.33, p = .08, ƞp
2
 = .07. 
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed that the interaction was only significant for 
ratio of negative self-statements provided, F(1, 90) = 4.18, p = .04, ƞp
2
 = .04. As 
predicted, British participants with PTSD had a significantly higher ratio of negative 
self-statements than Asian trauma survivors with PTSD, t(32) = 1.93, p = .05, d = 0. 
However, contrary to our hypotheses, Asian and British participants without PTSD 
did not differ significantly in terms of ratio of negative self-statements. Furthermore, 
ratio of negative self-statements did not differentiate between Asian trauma survivors 
with and without PTSD but British trauma survivors with PTSD had a significantly 
greater ratio of negative self-statements than those without PTSD, t(46) = 2.75, p = 
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.001, d =  .97. The multivariate effect of culture was approaching significance, Ʌ = 
.93, F(3, 88) = 2.28, p = .09, ƞp
2
 = .07. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed that, 
as expected, Asian participants provided a greater ratio of neutral self-statements than 
British participants, F(1, 90) = 4.55, p = .04, ƞp
2
 = .05. There was no evidence 
however to support the notion that British participants would provide more positive 
self-judgements than Asian participants. The multivariate effect of PTSD was 
significant, Ʌ = .83, F(3, 88) = 6.08, p = .001, ƞp
2
 = .17. Follow-up univariate 
ANOVAs revealed that those with PTSD had a significantly lower ratio of positive 
self-statements than those without PTSD, F(1, 90) = 9.43, p = .002, ƞp
2
 = .10. 
 
7.3.2.2 Hypothesis 3: Self-Ambivalence 
 A 2 (culture; British vs. Asian) x 2 (PTSD status; PTSD vs. no PTSD) ANOVA 
was used to investigate self-ambivalence. The interaction was approaching 
significance, F(3, 88) = 3.21, p = .07, ƞp
2
 = .08. There was no support for our third 
hypothesis; Asian participants with and without PTSD did not differ significantly in 
levels of self-ambivalence when compared to British trauma survivors with and 
without PTSD. However, as predicted, self-ambivalence did differentiate between 
British trauma survivors with and without PTSD; those with PTSD had significantly 
greater self-ambivalence than those without PTSD, t(46) = 4.02, p < .001, d = 1.22, 
self-ambivalence did not differentiate significantly between Asian trauma survivors 
with and without PTSD.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  176 
Table 21 
Means (SD) Self-Evaluation Scores, and Posttrauma Adjustment Scores for British 
and Asian PTSD and No-PTSD groups.  
 Asian British 
 PTSD  
(n = 19) 
No PTSD  
(n = 27) 
PTSD  
(n = 15) 
No PTSD  
(n = 33) 
Total self-statements 8.37 (2.75) 8.41 (2.17) 8.60 (2.29) 8.58 (2.03) 
Positive SE .17 (.24) .30 (.28) .17 (.21) .41 (.33) 
Neutral SE .69 (.29) .62 (.35) .52 (.31) .48 (.34) 
Negative NE .14 (.19) .09 (.18) .30 (.28) .09 (.12) 
Self-Ambivalence -.03 (.33) -.21 (.32) .12 (.37) -.32 (.35) 
PTCI 129.15 (33.54) 73.04 (28.46) 109.00 (40.82) 59.82 (22.91) 
Note: SE = Self Evaluation. PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory.  
 
7.3.2.3 Hypothesis 4: Associations between self-evaluation and trauma appraisals 
Data were normally distributed after transformations were made. Therefore, 
Pearson’s correlations were used to investigate associations between self-ambivalence 
and trauma-specific appraisals for both the British and Asian groups. Table 22 
illustrates that regardless of cultural group, self-ambivalence was positively 
associated with trauma appraisals, supporting our fourth hypothesis on ambivalent 
self-cognitions being directly related to trauma appraisals.  
Additionally, Table 22 highlights positive self-evaluations were associated 
with fewer trauma appraisals for both cultural groups and negative self-evaluations 
were associated with greater trauma appraisals for both cultural groups. All 
correlations were reviewed partialling out PTSD symptoms to ensure that all these 
relationships are not just a feature of having PTSD symptoms. Partial correlation 
revealed the same relationships between self-ambivalence, negative and neutral self-
evaluations and PTCI for both British and Asians. Positive self, however was 
approaching significant associations in the same negative direction for both groups, 
r(45) = -.22, p = 07 (British) and r(43) = -.22, p = .08 (Asians). 
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Table 22 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Self-Evaluation Scores and Trauma 
Appraisals for the British and Asian Cultural Groups. 
 PTCI 
     Asian                British 
Self-Ambivalence  .42** 
-.30* 
.31* 
.04 
 .53**  
Positive Self-Evaluation   -.40**  
Negative Self-Evaluation   .35*  
Neutral Self-Evaluation   .09  
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory 
 
7.3.2.4 Hypothesis 5: Trauma appraisals will mediate the relationship between 
self-ambivalence and PTSD 
Two mediation analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) examined whether the 
relationship between self-ambivalence and PTSD diagnosis was mediated by negative 
trauma-related appraisals (PTCI) in both the British and Asian samples. The rationale 
for mediation analysis was based on previous research, which led to the supposition 
that trauma appraisals would mediate the relationship between self-ambivalence and 
PTSD; thus mediation analysis allows for the identification of this relationship. These 
analyses were conducted using the bootstrapping procedures recommended for 
smaller samples (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004, 2008) and operationalized in an SPSS macro by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004). Additionally, 5,000 bootstrap resamples of the data with replacement was 
used. Statistical significance with alpha at .05 is indicated by the 95% confidence 
intervals not crossing zero. For the British group, it was found that PTCI mediated the 
relationship between self-ambivalence and PTSD diagnosis, Sobel statistic = 2.15, p = 
.03, 95% confidence intervals = -5.51, -.52. For the Asian group, it was found that 
PTCI also mediated the relationship between self-ambivalence and PTSD diagnosis, 
Sobel statistic = 2.40, p = .02, 95% confidence intervals = -13.58, -1.20. Therefore, 
while self-ambivalence was not directly related to PTSD diagnosis, it indirectly 
affected PTSD through negative trauma-related appraisals. Further details about the 
mediation analyses are presented in Table 23.Table 23 
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Summary of Results of the Mediation Analyses where Self-Ambivalence is the 
Independent Variable, Trauma-Related Appraisals the Mediator and PTSD diagnosis 
the Dependent Variable. 
 B SE t P 
British Sample     
Self-Ambivalence to Mediator (a path) 48.27 11.41 4.23 <.001 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD diagnosis (b 
path) 
-.05 .02 2.57 .01 
Total Effect of Self-Ambivalence on PTSD 
diagnosis (c path) 
-4.16 1.45 2.87 .004 
Direct Effect of Self-Ambivalence on PTSD 
diagnosis (c’ path) 
3.66 1.94 1.89 .06 
Asian Sample     
Self-Ambivalence to Mediator (a path) 55.08 16.67 3.30 .002 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD diagnosis (b 
path) 
-.07 .02 3.36 .001 
Total Effect of Self-Ambivalence on PTSD 
diagnosis (c path) 
1.82 1.06 1.72 .09 
Direct Effect of Self-Ambivalence on PTSD 
diagnosis (c’ path) 
1.59 1.43 1.11 .27 
  
 
7.3.3 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of self-ambivalence in PTSD 
amongst Asian and British trauma survivors. First, there was some evidence to 
suggest that self-evaluations were more polarized for the British group than the Asian 
group. British participants with PTSD had more polarized negative self-evaluations 
than their Asian PTSD counterparts and Asian participants were found to provide a 
significantly greater ratio of neutral self-statements than British participants. Second, 
there was no evidence to support the prediction that Asian participants would have a 
more ambivalent self-orientation than the British group. This finding contradicts 
previous research that has found that Asians tend to evaluate themselves in a more 
contradictory manner than their American and Euro-American counterparts (Spencer-
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Rodgers, Williams & Peng, 2010; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Kanagawa, Cross & 
Markus, 2001; Bond & Cheung, 1983). However, it is worth noting, that none of the 
studies referred to above use trauma survivors, therefore, findings here may 
demonstrate trauma’s over-riding influence on self-concept and self-evaluation. 
Namely, the way in which one evaluates their self-concept posttrauma may be 
somewhat conflicting and contradictory regardless of cultural identification.  
Despite the cultural groups not differing significantly in terms of self-
ambivalence, culture did influence the manner in which self-ambivalence impacted on 
psychological well-being. It was found that self-ambivalence differentiated between 
British trauma survivors with and without PTSD; those with PTSD had significantly 
greater self-ambivalence than those without PTSD. However, self-ambivalence did 
not differentiate significantly between Asian trauma survivors with and without 
PTSD. These findings support the notion that in Western samples, there is a 
relationship between self-ambivalence and poorer psychological adjustment. 
However, Asian cultures have been found to have greater acceptance of self-
ambivalence and are more comfortable with psychological contradiction (Falk, Heine, 
Yuki & Takemura, 2009; Heine & Hamamura, 2007). Additionally, it was found that 
negative self-statements differentiated between British participants with and without 
PTSD but did not differentiate between Asian participants with and without PTSD. 
This is potentially indicative of Asians being tolerant of negative aspects of self 
(Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Choi & Nisbett, 2000) 
and dialectical emotions prevalent in Asia being characterized by a ‘‘middle way’’ 
rather than by emotional extremes (Miyamoto & Ryff, 2011). Furthermore, Asian 
samples have been found to have less of a need for positive self-regard when 
compared to Western samples (Kim, Peng & Chiu, 2008). 
Finally, self-concept has a significant influence on the way in which one 
cognitively appraises events, the self, others and the world (Dunmore et al., 2001; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000). However, to date, research has not examined the relationship 
between an ambivalent self-concept and trauma appraisals. For both cultural groups 
self-ambivalence was significantly associated with dysfunctional trauma appraisals. 
Findings highlight that in the aftermath of trauma those displaying greater 
ambivalence in their self-concept may consequently perceive the self to be under 
threat and therefore appraise events, the self, others and the world negatively. This is 
analogous with Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD, which proposes 
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that the conceptualization of internal/external threat is instrumental in promoting the 
use of maladaptive appraisals and coping strategies, which in turn, maintains current 
PTSD symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). The findings also align with more recent 
empirical findings such as Chen, Benet-Martinez, Wu, Lam and Bond’s (2013) study. 
They investigated the role of the dialectical self and psychological adjustment on East 
Asians subjects and found a tolerance for contradiction had a deleterious effect on 
well-being. Consequently, it would appear that a dialectic and/or ambivalent self are 
not necessarily associated with less psychological distress; instead, it is 
psychologically taxing, which thereby results in maladjustment. 
Finally, as hypothesized trauma-related appraisals mediated the relationship 
between self-ambivalence and PTSD diagnosis for British trauma survivors. 
However, given that it was not believed self-ambivalence would have a direct 
influence on PTSD in the Asian group but may indirectly influence PTSD via 
negative trauma-related appraisals, mediation analysis using bootstrapping was 
employed. This was based on the argument that testing for the X → Y (self-
ambivalence → PTSD) association for statistical significance was not required nor 
was it suitable to use if inconsistent or indirect mediation was suspected (Kenny, 
2013; MacKinnon et al, 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) as was the case here. Results 
concluded that mediation also occurred for the Asian group, self-ambivalence 
influenced PTSD via the indirect effect (i.e. via trauma appraisals). Thereby 
demonstrating self-ambivalence to have a detrimental link with PTSD for both 
cultural groups, albeit through alternative expressions. However one of the limitation 
of this study would be using mediation analysis, which did not account for 
association, temporal order and the confirmatory-exploratory distinction (Gelfand, 
Mensinger & Tenhave, 2009), thus findings need to be considered somewhat 
tentatively. Notwithstanding this however, it can be put forward that pan-culturally in 
the aftermath of trauma, self-ambivalence may have a negative impact on trauma-
related appraisals, which in turn may result in PTSD, given trauma-related appraisals 
playing a major role in PTSD. 
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7.4. Study 7: Preliminary Findings for Cultural Differences in Self-Concept as 
assessed by the Public and Communal Self Appraisals Measure (PCSAM) in 
those with and without PTSD 
 
The PCSAM, developed in chapter 6, was designed to assess public and 
communal self cognitive appraisals hypothesized to be associated with poor recovery 
from traumatic experiences and maintaining PTSD. The validity and reliability of the 
PCSAM received good support as described in Study 4. Additionally, while it was 
predictive of PTSD for both Asian and British groups, it has not been used to assess 
any other factors involved in the development and maintenance of PTSD. The 
PCSAM is a brief questionnaire investigating the perceptions of public and communal 
aspects of self-appraisals, making it somewhat context specific is the type of 
appraisals it is measuring. With this in mind, the main aim of this study was to use the 
PCSAM and its subscales, utilizing the context it encapsulates, namely the 
disintegration of public and communal focused self-cognitions to assess one’s self-
concept posttrauma.  
Further, self-concept has been found to be a significant factor in PTSD 
development and/or maintenance throughout the thesis. First, Studies 2 and 5 assessed 
self-concept in terms of distorted self-conceptions. These studies found that pan-
culturally both a discrepant and/or trauma-centered self-concept was significantly 
associated with PTSD. Second, Study 6 investigated self-concept in regards to 
ambivalent self-conceptions posttrauma. This study found that while there were no 
cultural differences in self-ambivalence for British and Asian trauma survivors, those 
with PTSD in the British group had a more ambivalent self-concept than British 
trauma survivors without PTSD. However, self-ambivalence did not differentiate 
between Asian trauma survivors with and without PTSD. Moreover, Study 6 also 
found that pan-culturally self-ambivalence had a role in PTSD via being associated 
with negative cognitive appraisals which in turn were associated with PTSD. All 
studies thereby demonstrated self-concept and appraisals to be key features in PTSD 
pan-culturally. Further, studies 2, 5 and 6 investigated posttrauma self-concept (i.e. 
trauma-centered self, discrepant self, ambivalent self) in relation to trauma self-
appraisals as measured by the PTCI. Collectively they found distortions in posttrauma 
self-concept to be related to negative self-appraisals; in addition these appraisals 
mediated the relationship between self-concept and PTSD diagnoses for both the 
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groups. Therefore, Study 7 extends these findings by focusing on trauma self-
appraisals as measured by the PCSAM (i.e. public and communal self-appraisals), to 
find if the same relationships are evident. Consequently, it was hypothesized that the 
PCSAM will be significantly related to self-concept (i.e. trauma-centered self, self-
discrepancy and self-ambivalence) for both the British and Asian PTSD groups in the 
same manner as the PTCI. Second, the PCSAM will mediate the relationship between 
maladaptive post-trauma perceptions of self-concept and PTSD symptoms for both 
British and Asian trauma survivors. 
 
7.4.1 Method 
In addition to the measures used in study 5 and 6, the results from the 14-item 
PCSAM described in Study 4 was also used. The scores from the PCSAM in Study 4 
were used; trauma-centered self and self-discrepancy scored from Study 5 and self-
ambivalence scores from Study 6 were used. 
 
7.4.2 Results 
Data was not normally distributed after transformations were made. Therefore, 
Spearman correlations (one-tailed) were used to investigate associations between 
trauma-centered self, self-discrepancy and self-ambivalence with the PCSAM (see 
Table 24). 
 
7.4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Associations between Self-concept and PCSAM 
Trauma-centered self. Findings supported hypothesis 1, for those with PTSD 
in both cultural groups, trauma-centered self was significantly correlated with 
PCSAM. In addition the Asian PTSD group’s trauma self-concept was significantly 
associated with the beliefs and belonging subscale, while the British PTSD group’s 
trauma self-concept was also significantly related to the public and communal 
subscale.   
 
Self-discrepancy. Correlational analyses did not support hypothesis 1 for this 
feature of self-concept, ideal and ought self-discrepancy scores were not significantly 
related to the PCSAM.  
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Self-ambivalence. Regardless of cultural group, self-ambivalence was 
significantly and positively associated with PCSAM, providing further support for 
hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 24 
Correlation Coefficients (one-tailed) for Trauma-Centered Actual-Self, Self-
Discrepancies, Self-Ambivalence and PCSAM Scores for the PTSD British and PTSD 
Asian groups 
 PCSAM-Total PCSAM-
Beliefs and 
Belonging 
PCSAM-
Public 
PCSAM-
Communal 
 Asian British Asian British Asian British Asian British 
Trauma-
centered self 
.54** .71** .39* .33 .28 .81** .34 .69** 
Ideal SD -.00 -.27 19 -.36 .27 -.33 -.36 -.12 
Ought SD .04 -.16 .17 -.20 .16 -.22 -.22 -.06 
Self-
ambivalence 
.27* .51** .24 .27* .16 .12 .0 .28* 
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. Ideal SD = Ideal Self-Discrepancy Score; Ought SD = 
Ought Self-Discrepancy Score 
 
7.4.2.2  Hypothesis 2: Do appraisals on the PCSAM mediate the relationship 
between distortions in self-concept (i.e. trauma-centered self, self ambivalence 
and self-goals) and PTSD? 
Three mediation analyses based on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) method 
examined whether the appraisals as measured by the PCSAM Total mediated the 
relationship between distortions in self-concept (i.e. trauma-centered self, self-
discrepancy and self-ambivalence) and PTSD diagnoses using bootstrapping 
procedures (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The rationale for using this type of mediation 
analyses was based on the need to identify whether collectivistic type appraisals (i.e. 
PCSAM) also mediated the relationship between distortions in self-concept and 
PTSD, as was suspected based on previous research and previous findings reported 
throughout the thesis. In the analyses, 5,000 bootstrap resamples of the data with 
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replacement was used. Statistical significance with alpha at .05 is indicated by the 
95% confidence intervals not crossing zero. It was found that the PCSAM did mediate 
the relationship between trauma-centered self and PTSD diagnosis, with a 95% 
bootstrap confidence interval of 1.46 to 21.97 for the British trauma survivors only, 
the same relationship was not found for the Asians trauma survivors, this partially 
supports hypothesis two. The PCSAM also mediated the relationship between self-
ambivalence and PTSD diagnosis, with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of .46 to 
5.45 again for the British trauma survivors only, again only partially supporting 
hypothesis two. The PCSAM did not mediate the relationship between ideal or ought 
self-discrepancies and PTSD diagnosis for either group of trauma survivors (see Table 
25 for summary of results). 
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Table 25 
Summary of Results of the Mediation Analyses where Self-concept (i.e. trauma centered self, self-discrepancy and self-ambivalence) is the 
Independent Variable, PCSAM Total is the Mediator and PTSD diagnosis is the Dependent Variable. 
 Asian  British 
 B SE t p  B SE t P 
Trauma-Centered Self          
Trauma-Centered Self to Mediator (a path) 44.05 12.34 3.57 .001  81.21 18.33 4.43 <.001 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD diagnosis (b path) .12 .04 3.32 .001  .11 .04 2.90 .004 
Total Effect of Trauma-Centered Self on PTSD diagnosis (c 
path) 
6.88 3.52 1.95 .05  10.71 3.63 2.95 .003 
Direct Effect of Trauma-Centered Self on PTSD diagnosis (c’ 
path) 
1.81 4.10 .44 .66  7.02 4.38 1.60 .11 
Ideal SD          
Ideal SD to Mediator (a path) .06 2.80 .02 .98  -2.29 4.11 -1.28 .21 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD diagnosis (b path) .13 .04 3.47 .001  .12 .04 3.14 .001 
Total Effect of Ideal SD on PTSD diagnosis (c path) -.26 .34 -.75 .45  -.25 .47 -.52 .06 
Direct Effect of Ideal SD on PTSD diagnosis (c’ path) -.60 .48 -1.27 .21  .18 .65 .27 .78 
Ought SD          
Ought SD to Mediator (a path) -1.04 2.54 -.41 .68  -2.63 3.43 -.77 .45 
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Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD diagnosis (b path) .12 .03 3.61 <.001  .12 .04 3.43 .01 
Total Effect of Ought SDon PTSD diagnosis (c path) -.11 .30 -.37 .71  -.02 .40 -.06 .95 
Direct Effect of Ought SD on PTSD diagnosis (c’ path) -.06 .44 -.13 .90  .25 .66 .38 .70 
Self-Ambivalence          
Self-Ambivalence to Mediator (a path) 9.52 7.43 1.28 .21  25.91 5.52 4.69 <.001 
Direct Effect of Mediator on PTSD diagnosis (b path) .14 .04 3.55 <.001  .10 .04 2.72 .01 
Total Effect of Self-Ambivalence on PTSD diagnosis (c path) 1.82 1.06 1.72 .09  4.16 1.45 2.87 .004 
Direct Effect of Self-Ambivalence on PTSD diagnosis (c’ path) 1.52 1.30 1.17 .24  2.85 2.02 1.41 .16 
 Note: Ideal SD = Ideal Self-Discrepancy Score; Ought SD = Ought Self-Discrepancy Score
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7.4.3 Discussion 
 The overall aim of Study 7 was to provide preliminary findings as to the 
PCSAM’s ability to highlight the deleterious relationship between self-appraisals and 
self-concept. The importance of the conceptual self’s role in PTSD has been drawn 
upon throughout the thesis, as has the influence of maladaptive private self-appraisals 
on PTSD development and maintenance. However, the PCSAM utilized different 
contexts of self-appraisals, namely, the public and communal aspects of self, 
demonstrating that the conceptual self is comprised of more than our private self-
appraisals. These other facets of the self have not yet been researched, although their 
importance has been alluded to in cross-cultural research (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). Consequently, this study provides a good starting point from which to draw 
potential conclusions as to the influence of maladjusted public and communal self-
appraisals on the conceptual self and in the development and maintenance of PTSD. 
Findings support previous research on the impact self-appraisals have on 
PTSD (e.g. Ehlers & Clark, 2000). For instance, hypothesis one was supported, the 
PTSD group had greater dysfunctional self-appraisals than the no PTSD group. 
Second, the PCSAM was significantly related to self-concept; whereby greater 
dysfunctional public and communal self-appraisals were associated with a more 
trauma-centered and ambivalent self-concept. Finally, the PCSAM also mediated the 
relationship between maladaptive post-trauma perceptions of self-concept and PTSD 
symptoms for the British but not for the Asian trauma survivors, it is not clear why 
this occurred. Consequently, it appears worthwhile investigating these other 
dimensions of self-appraisals, because they too appear to have a role in psychological 
well-being and in particular PTSD diagnoses, at least for the British trauma survivors. 
Further work is needed, as these findings are preliminary, however, one of the 
strengths of the study was its use of trauma survivors with and without PTSD as an 
initial sample. Subsequently, findings do have theoretical implications. Ehlers and 
Clark’s (2000) cognitive models of PTSD highlighted cognitive appraisals as a root 
element in the disorders perpetuation. Here too, cognitive appraisals pertaining to 
public and communal aspects of self are also associated with the disorder’s 
continuation. Thus results support the appraisal models, as the result of negative self-
appraisals within a public and communal context lead individuals to process their past 
threat as an ongoing threat to these aspects of the self. Ehlers and Clark (2000) 
theorized that PTSD is the result of an individual processing “the traumatic event 
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and/or its sequelae in a way that which produces a sense of serious current threat” 
(p.320). They propose that this perceived current threat is “either external (e.g., the 
world is a more dangerous place) or, very commonly, internal (e.g., a threat to one’s 
view of oneself as a capable/acceptable person who will be able to achieve important 
life goals)” (p.320). Further, once this threat is activated it is accompanied by PTSD 
symptoms. The PCSAM taps into threats that are analogous to Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) conceptualization of internal threat. However, these appraisals are based on 
interdependent type cognitions (e.g. I have failed in my social role). Thus the view of 
oneself as a capable and acceptable person is perceived using relatedness reasoning. 
The appraisals utilized by the PCSAM illustrate the influence and impact of 
significant others and the wider community on the self and the manner in which they 
relate to an individual’s appraisal process following a trauma. Thus the PCSAM 
proposes that the threat to the conceptual self results in the processing of the traumatic 
experience and/or its sequelae in a way, which produces a sense of current and serious 
threat to public and communal aspects of self. Once these perceptions of current 
threat to self are activated, it is accompanied by PTSD symptoms. Further, as Sato 
(2001) proposes, the conceptual self is essential in maintaining mental health. 
However, it needs to be borne in mind that one’s conceptual self is made of 
multifaceted aspects. In order to restore order and semblance to the whole, each area 
needs to be looked at in greater detail. Thus just as research points to each individuals 
holding both interdependent and independent aspects of their self-construal, it needs 
to be recognized that both these aspects of self-construal need to be addressed and 
redressed to arrive at a healthy self-conception. Thus measures assessing PTSD and 
other forms of psychological distress needs to be more incorporate of this to arrive at 
a fuller understanding as to the disorders development and maintenance. 
 The findings also have clinical implications. Cognitive therapy targets the 
dysfunctional private aspects of self-appraisals as outlined in the PTCI. However, due 
to PCSAM’s direct and indirect associations with PTSD, it would make sense to also 
be inclusive of targeting public and communal aspects of one’s self-appraisals as 
these too are held as important to an individuals subjective well-being. 
 A limitation of this study was the small sample size of British and Asian trauma 
survivors, therefore this was used as an exploratory dataset. In addition, the choice of 
mediation analysis as mentioned previously, did not account for association, temporal 
order and the confirmatory-exploratory distinction (Gelfand, Mensinger & Tenhave, 
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2009) which would have strengthening findings, thus results need to be considered 
somewhat more tentatively. Notwithstanding this however, these preliminary findings 
suggest that the PCSAM is a useful measure of self-appraisals, as they capture aspects 
of the self important to an individual’s recovery following trauma. 
 
7.5 General Discussion 
Cognitive appraisals and self-concept have been found to be a central tenet to 
PTSD development and maintenance, moreover, as highlighted throughout the thesis, 
these two factors are found to have differing cultural implications The cumulative 
objective of Part 3 (Studies 4 – 7) was to extend the ecological validity of Part 1 
(Studies 1 – 2) and Part 2 (Study 3) in it’s investigation of cultural differences in 
trauma appraisals and self-identity following trauma in those with and without PTSD. 
This was achieved through the four studies detailed above, the first centered around 
trauma appraisals (Study 4) and associated implications for posttraumatic 
psychological adjustment; in addition to assessing the reliability and validity of the 
PCSAM and its appropriateness for use in Asian trauma survivor populations. The 
examination of the role of self-concept was undertaken in the following two sub-
studies; investigating the relationship between distorted self-conceptions (Study 5) 
and ambivalent self-concept (Study 6) with trauma-related appraisals and PTSD 
diagnoses; and the impact of PCSAM and its influence on self-concept and post-
trauma psychological adjustment (Study 7). The objective of this discussion is to 
briefly summarize the main findings and focus primarily on the theoretic and clinical 
implications of Studies 4-7. 
 
7.6 Summary of findings 
Overall, the results of Study 4 tend to confirm the hypotheses derived from the 
conceptual framework. There were cultural differences in appraisals of everyday and 
trauma experiences. However, there also appeared to be cultural similarities in the 
dysfunctional appraisals of those with PTSD. The PSCAM had good internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, convergent validity, and discriminative validity. 
Additionally, unlike Study 1, the PTCI was predictive of PTSD for both the British 
and Asians.   
Study 5 found that trauma-centered distortions in one’s self-concept were 
found to correlate significantly with trauma-related appraisals, while those with 
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PTSD, regardless of cultural background, did have a significantly greater trauma-
centered actual self-concept compared to trauma survivors without PTSD. Moreover, 
negative trauma-related appraisals mediated the relationship between distortions in 
self-concept and posttraumatic psychological adjustment (i.e. PTSD) for both British 
and Asian trauma survivors. As this study extended the results from Study 2, when 
findings are taken together, they relay the importance of the role of appraisals in 
identity formation and psychological adjustment posttrauma.  
Study 6 showed that self-ambivalence differentiated between British trauma 
survivors with and without PTSD but did not differentiate between Asian trauma 
survivors with and without PTSD. Significant positive associations were found 
between self-ambivalence and trauma appraisals for both cultural groups.  Finally, in 
both Asian and British trauma survivors, self-ambivalence was found to indirectly 
influence PTSD through trauma-related appraisals.  Thus findings demonstrate self-
ambivalence to have a negative effect on psychological adjustment for trauma 
survivors pan-culturally and further implicates self-concept in posttrauma 
psychological adjustment. 
Finally Study 7 demonstrated that the PCSAM could make a useful measure 
of self-appraisals, as it captures public and communal aspects of the self, which are 
also important to an individual’s recovery following trauma. Additionally, while 
study 7 supports previous research on the impact self-appraisals on PTSD 
development and maintenance, the PCSAM only mediated the relationship between 
maladaptive post-trauma perceptions of self-concept and PTSD symptoms for the 
British but not for the Asian trauma survivors, it is not clear why this occurred and 
further exploration would be needed. However, it is appears worthwhile investigating 
the dimensions put forth by the PCSAM, because they do appear to have a role in 
psychological well-being and in particular PTSD diagnoses, at least for the British 
trauma survivors. 
 
7.7 Theoretical and Clinical Implications 
7.7.1 Appraisals. There are several theoretical and clinical implications that 
can be drawn from these findings. First, this study supports PTSD models emphasis 
on the role of cognitive appraisals in PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and the focus on 
appraisals in the treatment of PTSD (Resick, 2001). The results extend findings 
conducted with Western populations to indicate that appraisals also play an important 
  191 
role in PTSD in Asian cultures, which is expected given the emphasis theories of 
emotion give to the role of cognition in emotion (e.g. see Mauro et al., 1992). The 
results indicate that the cultural differences in cognitive appraisals of everyday events, 
which are in line with cross-cultural theories (Mesquita & Walker, 2003), tend to 
extend to trauma cognitive appraisals. Nonetheless, despite these cultural differences 
in trauma cognitive appraisals, the findings suggest that the types of cognitive 
appraisals that relate to PTSD symptoms may be culturally similar. However, 
appraisals of personal control seemed to be somewhat unique. While appraisals of 
personal control were found, as in previous research (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 
2009), to differentiate between British trauma survivors with and without PTSD, 
appraisals of control had little relevance in discriminating between Asian trauma 
survivors with and without PTSD. This suggests that in some instances the influence 
of cultural differences in self-construal on cognitive appraisals influences PTSD 
outcome (see Jobson, 2009). The success of the PCSAM in differentiating between 
those with and without PTSD demonstrates the importance of also considering public 
and communal aspects of self in those with PTSD.  
Effective treatment for PTSD targets appraisals of trauma (Resick, 2001). The 
effectiveness of these interventions has been demonstrated in Western cultures (e.g. 
Basoglu Salcioglu, & Liyanou, 2007; Duffy, Gillespie, & Clark, 2007). However our 
understanding of interventions for non-Western groups is exceptionally limited. 
Therefore, research improving our understanding of the processes involved in PTSD 
for those from different cultural groups is imperative for generalizing current 
interventions. Given the focus of effective treatments on appraisals, it is important 
that clinical practice and research consider the cross-cultural research highlighting the 
influence of culture on appraisals and associated emotional responses. The findings 
suggesting many appraisals associated with PTSD are culturally similar indicate that 
many of the treatment targets may be generalizable. However, it remains important 
that clinicians consider how trauma appraisals may challenge cultural norms and 
culturally influenced self (including self in relation to others) of a client. Thus, 
cognitive restructuring in therapy may need to focus on realigning sufferers’ beliefs 
with their culturally determined conceptual self. It may be important to include more 
social role, group and interpersonal appraisals (and less focus on control) as potential 
moderators of PTSD within Asian cultures and thus, target these appraisals in 
treatment. Furthermore, current measures assessing trauma-related appraisals may 
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benefit from including greater focus on appraisals associated with interdependence. 
Finally, the recent changes to the PTSD criteria in DSM-V (APA, 2013) includes 
negative alterations in cognitions and persistent and distorted blame of self or others 
which seems to be appropriate cross-culturally as those with PTSD, regardless of 
cultural background, had negative cognitions about self (private, public and 
communal), world, and self-blame. 
 
7.7.2 Self-Concept. Further, findings from the current study suggest discrepancies 
in self-concept (i.e. a trauma-centered self) can influence self-appraisals involved in 
the maintenance of PTSD and highlights the importance of considering self-concept 
in therapeutic interventions. The findings suggest that if trauma becomes central to 
self-concept, people are likely to perceive their self-concept as not being in line with a 
healthy self. This distortion in self-concept or ambivalent self-concept, in turn, may 
result in negative self-appraisals which over time has been found to be involved in the 
maintenance of PTSD (Dunmore et al., 1997; Ehlers & Clark, 2000); 
distortions/conflictions in self-concept perpetuate negative self-appraisals which in 
turn perpetuate PTSD. Thus, the results highlight and emphasize the role of the self 
(i.e. trauma-identified self, self-discrepancies, negative self appraisals) in PTSD and 
the importance of considering self-concept in therapeutic interventions. For instance, 
self-schema work could address trauma-caused ‘vulnerable identities’ (Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003), integrating current views of the self (e.g. I am a victim) into existing 
self-knowledge and the life story, and make sense of the trauma in respect to existing 
aspects of their self-concept and goals (Hembree & Foa, 2004) and targeting the 
relationship between appraisals and self-concept.  
 
7.8 Limitations 
The limitations of the study are acknowledged; sample sizes were modest which 
potentially limits statistical power and generalizability. Second, the study was cross-
sectional which precludes causal explanations. Third, participants were asked to 
complete all tasks in English, this may have impacted on appraisals and identity for 
participants in the Asian group. Fourth, future research would benefit from 
investigating the influence of culture on appraisals associated with particular traumas 
as trauma type (e.g. interpersonal) may have had an influence on findings. Fifth, it 
was difficult to estimate selection bias. Sixth, this research, as in most other cross-
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cultural research (Mesquita & Walker, 2003), focuses on attribution to a specific 
agent (self or other). Agency and agency appraisals can also be associated with magic 
spells, spirits, fate, and so forth. Such appraisals need further exploration in relation to 
culture and appraisals of trauma. This especially needs to be considered in terms of 
cultural differences in religious beliefs. Seventh, due to dialectical tendencies toward 
tolerance of contradiction and its influence on the manner in which East Asians 
respond to Likert-type scales about the self and other attitude objects (Hamamura et 
al., 2008) a free-response measure of self was used in this study, however because of 
this self-ambivalence was only measured using the ratio of positive to negative self-
statements. In future, other forms of self-ambivalence measures need to be used, 
which have been tried, tested and validated. Additionally, the Asian and British 
participants differed on various demographic factors, which may have influenced 
finings. However, when these demographic variables were included as covariates a 
similar pattern of results remained, demonstrating that age, English language ability 
and gender had no significant bearing on reporting of self-discrepancies within one’s 
self-concept. Conversely, when length of time spent in the UK and interdependence 
scores were included as covariates in analysis, results did present themselves in a 
culturally dynamic manner. Namely, results reflected prior research highlighting 
interdependent cultures (reflected by the Asian group in this study) as having greater 
tolerance and acceptance of self-discrepancies within their self-concept. Future 
research should consider conducting a cross-country study in an attempt to reduce the 
influence of the new culture on self-concept. Also, future research would benefit from 
examining trauma survivors from similar trauma types as different trauma types (e.g. 
interpersonal) may influence the self-concept differently. Finally, as mentioned earlier 
in the participant description, some ex-veterans participated in the study in the British 
group only. This could have potentially impacted on findings as ex-veterans may not 
share similar characteristics to their civilian counterparts, indeed some research 
denotes military personnel to be more robust, less likely to worry, less neurotic and 
less agreeable (Jackson, Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Ludtke & Trautwein, 2012). 
Additionally, the PTSD measures have been adapted for serving personnel as they 
take these characteristics into account. Additionally, there were no ex-veterans in the 
Asian group to provide equifinality between the two groups; therefore findings may 
need to be understood more cautiously. 
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7.9 Conclusions 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings suggest negative appraisals 
mediate the relationship between distortions in self-concept and PTSD. Specifically, 
if a trauma survivor, regardless of their cultural background, has challenges to their 
self-concept (e.g. I am a victim), on-going appraisals about the self will be both 
negative and distorted (I cannot cope, I am permanently damaged) and such negative 
appraisals have been found to have an important role in the maintenance of PTSD as 
they create a sense of current internal threat to self (Dunmore et al., 1997; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 1998; Karl et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009). Such 
findings warrant further investigation into how self-concept can influence PTSD 
recovery. Further, the results of the study document one of the first investigations into 
the relationship between an ambivalent self-concept across different cultural groups 
of trauma survivors with PTSD symptoms and maladaptive appraisals, producing 
findings that warrant further investigation into how self-concept can influence PTSD 
recovery. Finally, as far as the author is aware, this study is one of the first to 
investigate the role of culture in trauma appraisals and associated posttraumatic 
psychological adjustment. The findings suggest that while there are cultural 
differences in appraisals of trauma experiences, those with PTSD, regardless of 
cultural background, may have similar dysfunctional appraisals, which may play a 
role in the development and maintenance of PTSD. This is initial research in this area 
and thus, further research is required to further investigate this important area. 
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
 
“It is more important to know what kind of patient has a disease than what 
kind of disease a patient has.” 
(Winston Churchill) 
 
In this final chapter a review of the main aims of the thesis will first be 
provided, followed by a summary of the main findings, which are discussed in the 
context of the research questions defined in the introduction and in reference to the 
conceptual framework. Specifically, Chapter 8 aims to synthesize results from each 
study with current theoretical understandings about the etiology and maintenance of 
PTSD and understandings relating to cultural variation in self-construal. Third clinical 
implications of the findings are discussed. Lastly, limitations and future directions are 
reviewed. 
 
8.1 Review 
 Trauma has been perceived by many to be a localized issue (Leppaniemi, 
2004). However trauma and its consequent manifestations (i.e. the development of 
PTSD) has been gaining increasing attention as a global problem. Leppaniemi (2004) 
asserts urgent, co-ordinated and well organized measures need to be put in place to 
combat anticipated increases in all categories of trauma injury across the globe, which 
are all predicted to rise by the year 2020. Therefore, now more than ever it is 
important to understand disorders such as PTSD for prevention and treatment 
outcomes. However, what needs to be borne in mind is that a trauma does not simply 
affect a single person or group of people, a trauma “is never an isolated event 
unrelated to the surrounding world” (Leppaniemi, 2004: 193-194). Additionally, the 
quote above by Winston Churchill captures the thesis’ reason d’être. First, it 
impresses the importance of truly understanding the individual trauma survivor: 
where they come from and therefore how they will potentially interpret what has 
occurred to them and how they will subsequently cope with what has happened. 
Second, it relates back to the conceptual framework, highlighting that cultural 
differences in our self-construal can in turn influence the “kind of person” one is, 
which in turn influences one’s self-concept and appraisals: two key processes 
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involved in PTSD development and maintenance and therefore central to one’s 
posttraumatic health, treatment and recovery. 
 In order to arrive at effective treatments, the thesis has proposed culture needs 
to be incorporated into cognitive models of PTSD to advance theoretical and clinical 
propositions for subsequent ‘real world’ practical application (i.e. treatments). 
However, this dimension needs to gain clarity in its associations to PTSD as research 
in this area has been implemented but is still significantly lacking. However, culture’s 
theoretical implications and associations with cognitive models have yet been 
established. As detailed in the conceptual framework, the cause of PTSD may very 
well be related to the manner in which the individual interprets and subsequently 
appraises the event and meanings of the event, these interpretations potentially are 
steeped in and informed by one’s cultural and socialization practices. In light of this, 
the overall objective of this thesis was to investigate the influence of culture on the 
posttraumatic appraisals and self-concept and its relationship to PTSD. Specifically, 
Part 1 was comprised of two studies that investigated cultural differences in trauma 
associated appraisals (Study 1) and posttraumatic self-concept (i.e. trauma-centered 
self and self-discrepancies) (Study 2) and implications for posttraumatic adjustment in 
a non-clinical sample. Part 2 (Study 3) was a qualitative study investigating 
interdependent type appraisals associated with trauma. Part 3 extended the ecological 
validity of Part 1 and 2 by investigating cultural differences in trauma associated 
appraisals (i.e. general appraisals, PTCI and PCSAM) (Study 4) and posttraumatic 
self-concept (trauma-centered self, self-discrepancies and self-ambivalence) (Studies 
5-6) and the relationships between appraisals and self-concept (Studies 4 and 7) in 
British and Asian trauma survivors with and without PTSD. A summary of the 
findings are reported and discussed below.  
 
8.2 Overview of Main Findings 
8.2.1 Trauma Appraisals  
The aim of Studies 1 and 4 was to investigate the influence of culture on 
cognitive appraisals associated with trauma experiences and the influence of these 
appraisals on posttraumatic psychological adjustment in a non-clinical sample (Study 
1) and in a sample of trauma survivors with and without PTSD (Study 4). Both 
studies were discussed separately in their respective chapters, however, it would seem 
apt to discuss the main findings by combining the pilot first study with Study 4, as the 
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subsequent study extended the ecological validity of its precursor. Overall the 
findings demonstrated cultural differences in the way in which experiences are 
appraised. British participants were found to appraise significantly less pleasantness 
(Study 1 and 4) and legitimacy (Study 4) and significantly greater anticipated effort 
(Study 1), goal-need conduciveness (Study 4), norm-self compatibility (Study 1), and 
attentional activity (Study 1) than Asian participants in the positive (Study 1) and 
negative (Study 4) autobiographical memories they provided. These differences 
reflect what has been found in previous research. Moreover, the findings 
demonstrated that such differences also extended to the trauma autobiographical 
memory. Such cultural differences reflect British participants valuing agency, 
independence, assuming their reactions are typical and being less concerned about 
discrepancies with the reactions of others (Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Mauro et al., 
1992; Mesquita & Walker, 2003). Additionally, Asian cultures tend to have greater 
acceptance of situation outcomes and fate (Mesquita & Walker, 2003). Therefore, 
appraisals, including those associated with trauma experiences, are in line with what 
is culturally emphasized and expected and thus, appear to function to develop, express 
and maintain the culturally-expected self (Mesquita & Walker, 2003).  
Despite these cultural differences in appraisals of positive, negative and 
trauma autobiographical memories, the findings overall also suggest that the 
relationships between cognitive appraisals and PTSD symptoms are predominately 
culturally similar, which consequently disputes the first hypothesis in the conceptual 
framework. As those with and without PTSD, regardless of their cultural background, 
were found to appraise events differently; those with PTSD appraised their memories 
to be less pleasant with greater anticipated effort than those without PTSD. 
Additionally, those with PTSD were found to appraise the trauma memory uniquely. 
While those with and without PTSD tended to appraise the negative event similarly, 
those with PTSD appraised that they could not cope as well in the trauma event, 
perceived the trauma event to be less predictable, certain and understandable, and 
appraised that they had less motivation to attend closely to the event than trauma 
survivors who did not develop PTSD. Furthermore, those with PTSD felt they were 
personally responsible for the trauma event.  
Substantial research has demonstrated the role of control appraisals in 
maintaining PTSD. However, cross-cultural research has demonstrated that control is 
one particular cognitive appraisal that is valued to a greater extent in Western cultures 
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than Asian cultures (e.g. Mesquita & Walker, 2003). This cultural difference was 
found to influence the relationship between control and PTSD supporting hypothesis 
one in the conceptual framework. In Study 1 while a significant negative correlation 
was found between lower levels of perceived control and PTSD symptoms, this was 
only found to be the case for the British group. In Study 4, while British trauma 
survivors with and without PTSD did not differ significantly in their appraisals of 
control associated with the negative memory; for the trauma memory British trauma 
survivors with PTSD reported lower levels of control appraisals in the trauma 
memory than those without PTSD. In contrast, Asian trauma survivors with and 
without PTSD did not differ significantly for either the negative or trauma memories. 
Thus, as perceived personal control and agency are valued in Western cultures, 
appraisals associated with situations, such as the trauma event, that violate culturally 
expected cognitive appraisals are potentially distressing (Mesquita & Walker, 2003). 
Therefore, perceived control differentiates between those with and without PTSD in 
British cultures but not Asian cultures.  
In terms of trauma-specific appraisals, hypothesis one was supported by Study 
1, which found that for the British group, the PTCI was significantly correlated, and 
predicted, PTSD symptoms. In contrast, for the Asian group the PTCI did not 
significantly predict PTSD symptoms. Based on this finding and the findings of a 
related qualitative study (Study 3), it was proposed that the PTCI may be tapping into 
individualistic type appraisals (e.g. I am a weak person, I can’t rely on myself, I am 
inadequate) rather than interdependent, public (i.e. social roles) and communal 
(relationships and interdependence) appraisals, which are emphasized in Asian 
cultures, thereby demonstrating cultures to interpret trauma appraisals differently. 
However, in Study 4 the PTCI was found to differentiate between those with and 
without PTSD, regardless of cultural background, thereby not providing support for 
cultural differences in trauma appraisals. Therefore, in clinical samples the PTCI may 
be appropriate for use with Asian trauma survivors as those with PTSD may hold 
culturally similar dysfunctional negative appraisals about the self, world and self-
blame.  
The final aim of Study 4 was to investigate the reliability and validity of the 
PCSAM and its appropriateness for use in Asian trauma survivor populations. The 
PCSAM was a newly developed measure aimed to assess the influence of trauma on 
more public and communal aspects of self-appraisals. The final PCSAM inventory 
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consisted of 14-items that loaded onto three components; 1) beliefs and belonging, 2) 
communal aspects of self, and 3) public and social roles. The PSCAM was found to 
have good internal consistency, test-retest reliability and convergent validity. In 
regards to discriminate validity, the PCSAM (and its sub-scales) could discriminate 
between those with and without PTSD. A discriminant function analysis found that 
the specificity and sensitivity of the PSCAM subscales in identifying individuals with 
and without PTSD was good.  
Study 3 was a qualitative study investigating the meanings and interpretations of 
trauma and trauma appraisals using trauma survivors from collectivistic cultures and 
mental health practitioners who routinely work with trauma survivors from 
collectivistic cultures, as the vast majority of research on this topic has been 
conducted with Western/individualistic cultures.  Eight themes emerged as a result of 
the focus groups and key informant interviews, these were; Trauma Perceptions, 
Traumatized Self, Cultural and Social roles, Future, Relationships, External/World, 
Education and Language. Some themes were evocative of current work in the trauma 
literature as having direct or indirect implications for poor posttraumatic adjustment 
and as indicative of PTSD development. In addition these themes also had overlaps 
with literature on individualistic type cognitions. This included ‘trauma perceptions’, 
‘traumatized self; and some subthemes (e.g. the world is a dangerous place) from 
‘external/world’. Others themes, for instance ‘cultural and social roles, ‘relationships’ 
and ‘beliefs’ subtheme from ‘external/world’ appear to be unique as they have not 
been explored in relation to trauma appraisals for any cultural group. Further, they 
also appear to be reminiscent of what research construes as an interdependent self 
(e.g. group relatedness, achieving group harmony, importance of significant others). 
Therefore, it was these three themes (cultural and social role, i.e. public self-
cognitions; relationships, i.e. communal self-cognitions, and beliefs) that were further 
developed to create the PCSAM as an additional measure to assess for dysfunctional 
appraisals. The findings of the PCSAM are outlined above in Study 4. 
Finally, Study 7 provided preliminary results from the PCSAM and potentially 
demonstrates that interdependent self-cognitions also have implications for trauma 
survivors, as it impacts on self-concept and PTSD. These influences appear to be 
culturally similar, for instance both the British and Asians negative dysfunctional 
appraisals as measured by the PCSAM were significantly related to distorted self-
concept (i.e. trauma-centered self and self-ambivalence). Additionally, the PCSAM 
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mediated the relationship between self-concept and PTSD symptoms, but only for the 
British group. It is not clear why this did not occur for both groups. 
 
8.2.2 Posttrauma Self-Concept 
Studies 2, 5 and 6 all focused on different aspects of a posttraumatic self-concept. 
The aim of Studies 2 and 5 were to investigate the relationship between distortions in 
self-concept (i.e. trauma-centered and self-discrepancies) and PTSD symptoms. Again 
Studies 2 and 5, which are discussed separately in their respective chapters, are 
brought together here. Overall it was found that those with PTSD, regardless of 
cultural background, were significantly more likely to have a trauma-centered self-
concept than those without PTSD. This is in line with previous research (e.g. Berntsen 
& Rubin, 2006, 2007; McNally et al., 1995; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005). Secondly, it 
was found that those with a more trauma-centered self-concept had significantly 
greater discrepancies in their self-concept (Study 2). This suggests that particular 
distortions in self-concept may be related to other distortions in self-concept. Thirdly, 
the findings taken together suggest that distortions in self-concept (i.e. trauma-
centered self-concept and self-discrepancies) are significantly correlated with 
negative trauma-related appraisals pan-culturally. These findings support hypothesis 
two of the conceptual framework, which proposed that self-concept would be 
impacted by trauma. Here we find that when a trauma becomes central to self-
concept, this results in it becoming damaged and distorted and subsequently leads to 
poor posttrauma adjustment, for both British and Asians.  
 Study 6 investigated self-consistency needs by focusing on the manner in 
which individuals deal with contradicting and inconsistent self-relevant information 
following trauma (i.e. ambivalent self-concept). The study found British trauma 
survivors held more polarized self-statements than Asian trauma survivors while 
Asians held more neutral self-statements. This suggests the British are trying to avoid 
ambivalence while Asians may not and may be comfortable with negligent self-
information. Additionally, findings do appear to provide some support for hypothesis 
two from the conceptual framework, as an ambivalence posttrauma self-concept had 
cultural distinct implications for posttrauma adjustment. Specifically, it was found 
that for the British group those with PTSD had significantly greater ambivalence than 
those without PTSD; however, this was not the case for the Asians. This again 
suggests that an inconsistent, ambivalent self-concept is indicative of maladjustment 
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for those from individualistic cultures, while collectivistic cultures are more tolerant 
of such contradictions and inconsistencies and does not necessarily result in 
maladjustment or PTSD. This supports hypothesis two, as the trauma does appear to 
impact self-concept and fosters self-ambivalence. However, ambivalence appears to 
directly impacts on poor adjustment for the British, but not for the Asians.  
 
8.2.3 Trauma Appraisals and Posttrauma Self-Concept 
The aim of Studies 2 and 5 was also to investigate the relationships between 
distortions in posttrauma self-concept (i.e. trauma-centered and self-discrepancies) 
and trauma-related self-appraisals and PTSD symptoms. In addition to examining 
whether these relationships differ depending on one’s cultural background. It was 
found that negative trauma-related appraisals mediated the relationship between 
distortions in self-concept (self-discrepancies in Study 2 and trauma-centered self-
concept in Study 5) and PTSD. This difference between Study 2 and 5 (i.e. appraisals 
did not mediate the relationship between self-discrepancies and PTSD in Study 5) 
may be because self-discrepancies did not differentiate between those with and 
without PTSD in Study 5. This is contrary to previous research (e.g. Sutherland & 
Bryant, 2008) and it is uncertain why this was the case. However, findings do provide 
some support to hypothesis three of the conceptual framework, namely, regardless of 
cultural group, trauma appraisals and posttrauma self-concept were related, in 
addition, appraisals mediated the relationship between posttrauma self-concept and 
PTSD, regardless of one’s cultural background. 
Study 6 also investigated the relationship between posttrauma self-concept 
using self-ambivalence and trauma appraisals as measured by the PTCI. It was found 
that self-ambivalence was related to trauma appraisals again supporting hypothesis 
three. In addition trauma appraisals mediated the relationship between self-
ambivalence and PTSD for the British but not for the Asian group, demonstrating a 
cultural distinction in how ambivalence influences self-concept’s relationship with 
appraisals and PTSD. In a similar vein, Study 7’s exploratory analysis of the PCSAM 
and how these alternative self-appraisals impacted on posttrauma self-concept found 
similar results. Specifically trauma-centered self-concept and an ambivalent self-
concept were related to the PCSAM, supporting hypothesis three. In addition the 
PCSAM appraisals mediated the relationship between self-ambivalence and PTSD for 
the British but not for the Asians. This is further supportive of hypothesis three of the 
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conceptual framework; in addition to cross-cultural literature denoting self-
consistency needs are different across cultures. This is seen here as they had differing 
implications on posttrauma psychological adjustment.  
The overall findings from studies 2, 5, 6 and 7 support trauma appraisals being 
related to posttrauma self-concept for both the British and Asians in relation to private 
self-cognitions as measured by the PTCI, however, this was only partially the case for 
collective self-cognitions (as measured by the PCSAM). For instance, while these 
collective self-cognitions were associated with posttrauma self-concept for both the 
British and Asians, they only mediated the relationship between self-concept and 
PTSD for the British; it is uncertain as to why this did not occur for the Asians other 
than to highlight differences in how self-cognitions generated by differing self-
construal impact on adjustment across cultures. Therefore further work is needed to 
unpack these processes and understand how they are utilized.  
 
8.3 Theoretical Implications  
Throughout the thesis it has been questioned as to whether current cultural 
models of PTSD are flexible enough to accommodate cultural variation in self. Based 
on the overall findings outlined throughout this thesis, the short answer is yes. This 
said, while many cultural similarities were found in the appraisals and self-concept of 
those with PTSD (discussed further below), the findings overall also highlight that 
these models would benefit from further considering the influence culture plays on 
the cognitive processes involved in the disorder’s development and maintenance. 
Below are more specific examples for this assertion, which draw together findings 
from each study with the socio-cognitive models of PTSD and conceptualize the 
findings with the framework outlined in Chapter 4. 
 
8.3.1 Appraisals 
8.3.1.1 Trauma appraisals in relation to everyday appraisals. Based on 
Studies 1 and 4, the findings supported the PTSD models’ emphasis on the role of 
cognitive appraisals in PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and the focus on appraisals in 
the treatment of PTSD (Resick, 2001). Namely, the results extended previous findings 
that have been conducted with Western populations to indicate that appraisals also 
play an important role in PTSD in Asian cultures. This is expected given the emphasis 
theories of emotion give to the role of cognition in emotion (e.g. see Mauro et al., 
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1992). However, cultural differences in the appraisals of trauma were found 
indicating that the cultural differences previously found in relation to the cognitive 
appraisals of everyday events tend extend to the trauma experience. This supports 
cross-cultural theories’ notion that the independent self tends to appraise events in 
terms of personal agency, control and responsibility while such appraisals are less 
emphasized by the interdependent self, as generally emphasized in Asian cultures. 
Thereby, such appraisals function to differentiate the self and reaffirm the self as an 
autonomous entity (Mesquita & Walker, 2003).  Nonetheless, despite these cultural 
differences in trauma cognitive appraisals, the findings suggest that the types of 
cognitive appraisals that relate to PTSD may be culturally similar. This indicates that 
those with PTSD, regardless of their cultural background, have similar negative, 
distorted and dysfunctional appraisals of the self (private, public and communal 
aspects), world and self-blame which consequently result in a sense of on-going 
continual threat proposed to maintain PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
 
8.3.1.2 Appraisals of personal control. Appraisals of personal control seemed 
to be somewhat unique. While appraisals of personal control were found, as in 
previous research (e.g. Jobson & O’Kearney, 2009), to differentiate between British 
trauma survivors with and without PTSD, appraisals of control had little relevance in 
discriminating between Asian trauma survivors with and without PTSD. This suggests 
that in some instances the influence of cultural differences in self-construal on 
cognitive appraisals does influence PTSD outcome (see Jobson, 2009). This has 
important theoretical implications. For instance Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model of 
PTSD emphasizes the role of self-relevant appraisals of the trauma experience and/or 
its sequelae in the maintenance of PTSD. The model suggests that appraisals function 
to maintain a sense of current threat in the survivor’s life and are instrumental in 
promoting the use of maladaptive strategies intended to control this threat and the 
current symptoms. Therefore, it is theoretically important to understand how trauma 
exposed individuals, in particular those with PTSD, utilize agency appraisals, 
especially in relation to regulating self-relevant appraisals of or following the trauma 
event and how these subsequently influence coping strategies. It could be surmised 
that control appraisals are perceived as appraisals of internal threat for those from 
Western cultures, as this appraisal dimension in Studies 1 and 4 was measuring the 
individual’s perceived internal control (i.e. attributing the environmental event, in this 
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instance the trauma event, to themselves, as opposed to external attributions outside 
one’s power, such as luck or fate or other people). When the British trauma survivors 
had diminished perceived control appraisals, it could be supposed these control 
appraisals were evaluated as threat appraisals, assessing the transaction between 
themselves and the environment as a potential source of harm or loss (Folkman, 
1984). Further, such threat appraisals have been found in previous research to be 
followed by the arousal of negative emotions (e.g. anger, fear, anxiety, depression) in 
those from Western cultures, which must be regulated to preserve a tolerable internal 
state. Additionally, the cross-cultural literature (Mesquita & Karasawa, 2002; 
Mesquita & Walker, 2003) has found appraisals of personal responsibility, autonomy 
and control to be associated with positive affect in independent cultures but not in 
interdependent cultures. Thus following from a trauma event, diminished person 
responsibility, autonomy and control are more likely to be associated with negative 
affect in independent cultures. Subsequently, these negative emotions may prevent the 
use of effective problem-focused coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Hence, control 
appraisals in regards to a traumatic or stressful transaction are potentially viewed as a 
threat to one’s well-being which in turn contribute to pathology because it directs 
coping towards excessive emotional regulation and diverts it from problem solving 
(Olff, Langeland, Berthold & Gersons, 2005). In contrast, for those from Asian 
cultures, given control and personal agency have less emphasis such appraisals may 
be less related to internal threat to self and thus less accompanied by PTSD 
symptoms. 
Finally, the appraisals of control could have further ramifications within 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model of PTSD, specifically, pertaining to cognitive 
appraisal domains of control strategies, alienation, mental defeat and permanent 
change. These four theoretical appraisal domains refer to the trauma exposed 
individuals’ appraisal of their cognitive, emotional and behavioral responses during 
the traumatic event and appraisals of themselves and of their relationship to others 
subsequent to the trauma (Jobson, 2009). There is some evidence that these four 
appraisals operate in PTSD consistently with the appraisal model and it is proposed 
that one’s appraisals of perceived internal control over the event could influence 
control strategies employed by the individual. For instance, failure to effectively gain 
control over the intrusions of the trauma memory would confirm the individual’s 
beliefs that these trauma related thoughts or images are indeed a threat to personal 
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well-being that will lead to long term negative consequences (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
Thus maladaptive control strategies contribute to the maintenance of PTSD by 
directly producing symptoms and preventing change in the negative appraisals of the 
trauma and in preventing change in the trauma memory (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). 
Moreover, lack of personal control could further engender mental defeat due to 
diminished autonomy, while if lack of personal control leads to inferiority this has 
associations with an overall feeling of alienation or permanent change following the 
trauma (Ehlers et al, 1998). However, again these claims may be culturally specific. 
Jobson and O’Keraney (2009) found that while appraisals of control, mental defeat, 
permanent change and alienation differentiated between those with and without PTSD 
from individualistic cultures, the only appraisal differentiating between those with and 
without PTSD from collectivistic cultures was alienation. Hence, again in this study 
appraisals of a lack of control and agency did not seem to play a role in PTSD for 
those from collectivistic cultures, stressing the importance of control for 
psychological adjustment in Western cultures and highlighting the lessened relevance 
of control for adjustment for trauma survivors from collectivistic cultures.   
Theoretically, these findings also extend Mesquita and Walker’s (2003) 
argument that cultural differences in self-construal moderate the relationship between 
the way in which individuals appraise situations, events and life encounters and their 
affective responses to the trauma experience and PTSD. Further, as Sato (2001) 
proposed, for those with an independent self-construal, poor mental health may result 
when personal control over their environment is perceived to have diminished and 
subsequently the self is under threat, which in turn impacts on self-relevant appraisals 
and its impact of coping strategies, which could turn maladaptive. This in turn support 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) appraisal model, namely, trauma appraisals that threaten 
the self (i.e. by negative autonomous appraisals) may produce a sense of current threat 
that is accompanied by PTSD symptoms. However, for those with an interdependent 
self-construal poor mental health does not appear to be related to the perceived level 
of personal control over the environment. The findings therefore suggest the appraisal 
model may need to consider and make explicit how cultural differences in self impact 
on the way in which appraisals may be implicated in the etiology and maintenance of 
PTSD. 
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8.3.1.3 Appraisals relating to private, public and communal aspects of self. 
In terms of the PTCI, it is a measure of trauma-related self-relevant appraisals 
pertaining to the world, self and self-blame. Findings demonstrated that such 
appraisals captured in this measure could be applied to both independent and 
interdependent cultural groups, thus, suggesting that trauma has universal effects on 
these post-trauma conceptions. Specifically, regardless of cultural orientation, a 
trauma impacts on cognitions of one’s worldviews, self-views and self-blame. These 
cognitions can become trauma centered and dysfunctional, leading to an internal (self, 
self-blame) and external (world) sense of current and continued threat experienced by 
the trauma exposed individual. This sense of current threat in turn causes maladaptive 
coping strategies and provokes PTSD symptoms. Thus further demonstrating that 
appraisals are a key feature of PTSD and supporting Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) PTSD 
model from a cross-cultural perspective. Finally, while some studies have found the 
self-blame subscale to be lacking in discriminant validity for determining those with 
PTSD (e.g. Beck et al, 2004), in this thesis support was provided for all subscales of 
the PTCI for both the British and Asians. This in turn supports the theoretical 
supposition that these posttraumatic cognitions play a significant role in PTSD for 
those from individualistic and collectivistic cultures; supporting previous studies that 
have found negative appraisals and PTSD severity to be highly associated (Beck et al, 
2004; Daie-Gabai et al, 2011; Foa et al, 1999).  
Additionally, while the PTCI pertains to private self-cognitions following a 
trauma, the PCSAM, which was also successful in differentiating between those with 
and without PTSD, captures collective self-cognitions (i.e. public and communal) 
following a trauma. The PCSAM has a number of theoretical contributions; first, as 
previously stated it was able to discriminate for both British and Asian trauma 
survivors those with and without PTSD. This is important theoretically, because it 
demonstrates the importance of considering public and communal aspects of self and 
the role these self-appraisals play in PTSD development and maintenance. The 
PCSAM captures communal self-cognitions based on group membership (e.g. I am a 
father, mother, husband) and public self-cognitions that pertained to cognitions about 
how individuals perceive others to view them (e.g. people think I am weak) in relation 
to the trauma experience (e.g. Communal – Since the event I feel like I am a burden to 
others, i.e. perceive others to think of them as burdens, refers to family, social, 
community groups; Public - Since the event I have lost my social role/identity (e.g. as 
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a parent, husband, wife, at work) again refers to group memberships). From a 
theoretical standpoint, these self-features are potentially as important to one’s 
psychological adjustment as private aspects of the self (i.e. I am weak, I am a failure) 
as they too can come under threat following a trauma.  Consequently, this again is 
synonymous with Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model of PTSD, as these 
communal and public aspects of self represent internal threats to self (i.e. negative 
beliefs about self) and illustrate overgeneralized appraisals of danger to the collective 
self, which in turn represents an ongoing anxiety response to the trauma event after its 
occurrence. The PCSAM also captures external threat appraisals in its ‘beliefs and 
belonging’ subscale, and again this is analogous with Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) 
model denoting external threat to self. Specifically, external threat appraisals here 
concern the individual’s perception of safety and agency (i.e. control and 
responsibility) and are directed to external factors (i.e. fate, luck) as the causal 
attributor for the trauma event. However, these external attributors are random, 
arbitrary and unpredictable, thereby threatening the safety of the self. To conclude, 
the PCSAM presents alternative appraisals concerning the competence of oneself to 
be part of the cognitive model put forward by Ehlers and Clark (2000). Specifically, 
these appraisals are responsible for perceptions of on-going threat experienced by the 
individual posttrauma. 
Cross-cultural theories on the role of the self have proposed that the private 
self is emphasized more in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures 
(Hofstede, 1980; Hsy, 1981; 1985) and therefore these individuals have more private 
self-cognitions and fewer collective self-cognitions. In contrast those from 
collectivistic cultures would have more collective self-cognitions and fewer private 
self-cognitions due to the emphasis on the collective self (Trafimow, Triandis & 
Goto, 1991). PTSD research has focused primarily on private self-cognitions and has 
demonstrated how they are impacted following a trauma and their subsequent 
influence on PTSD. The results from Studies 3, 4 and 7 expand on these current 
theoretical suppositions concerning private and collective aspect of self and on trauma 
appraisals, as they demonstrate that negative self-appraisals focusing on 
interdependent type cognitions are as important, as they too play a role in PTSD for 
both British and Asian cultures. Here we find that collective self-cognitions 
surrounding communal and public aspects of self are just as vulnerable. Therefore, the 
dominant self-construal and dominant self-cognitions are no more important than the 
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secondary self-construal and secondary self-cognitions following a trauma regardless 
of cultural orientation. Thus both collective and independent self-construal and self-
cognitions are just as vulnerable following trauma and have just as much of a 
detrimental effect for independent cultural groups as they do for collectivistic cultural 
groups. This in turn is reflective of literature highlighting that individuals have both 
independent and interdependent self-construal and require both aspects of self to 
maintain psychological well-being (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sato, 2001), and 
whist culture may determine which self-construal is emphasized, the other should not 
be relegated to the sidelines, as it too has a significant bearing on posttauma 
psychological adjustment. Specifically, following a trauma, both self-construal are 
potentially impacted and damaged, which in turn have negative and detrimental 
effects for adjustment. 
 
8.3.2 Posttrauma Self-Concept 
 8.3.2.1 Trauma-centered self-concept. Brewin (2003) asserts individuals with 
PTSD often have common negative identities that perceive the self as powerless, 
inferior and futureless; in other words, their self-concept is vulnerable following a 
trauma. In a similar vein, Berntsen and Rubin (2006; 2007) focus on this vulnerability 
in self-concept and propose that a trauma can become central to one’s self-concept. 
Here we find that the findings in this thesis support these two suppositions; the self is 
vulnerable following a trauma and can become trauma-centered regardless of cultural 
influences. Further, this trauma-centered self has significant associations with 
negative cognitive appraisals which are evoked due to difficulties in retrieving 
positive self-identities or negative self-identities being readily reactivated due to the 
trauma experience, thereby delineating the competition in self-concept retrieval. 
Therefore, the trauma event can be seen to have power over one’s cognitions (views 
of self and world) and more worryingly, threatening one’s sense of self (Brewin, 
2003). 
Thus there is a universality in the aftermath of trauma, the trauma memory of 
those with PTSD seems not to align with the desired goals of the self-concept and 
thus is hard to integrate with previously held assumptions about the self and world. 
Consequently, the trauma becomes central to people’s mental life as they struggle to 
resolve these discrepancies resulting in a significant amount of time being spent 
recalling these events and ruminating about them (Brewin, 2011; Horowitz, 1976, 
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Janoff-Bulman, 1992). As a result, the trauma becomes highly associated with self-
concept (Brewin, 2011) and the traumatic event forms a turning point in people’s 
construction of their own identity and a cognitive reference point for the organization 
of autobiographical knowledge (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Therefore, it seems that 
pan-culturally those with PTSD have more trauma-defined self-concepts than those 
without PTSD. 
 
8.3.2.2 Self-consistency. Research denotes that there are culture specific 
differences in self-consistency needs (Suh, 2000). The thesis proposes that self-
consistency needs play a central function following a trauma, as one is compelled to 
make sense of the conflicting self information caused by the event and integrate it 
with exiting self-concept content.  However, cultural differences in self-consistency 
needs are proposed to impact differently on psychological well-being. This contention 
was based on the contradictory and changeable nature of the interdependent self-
concept (see Chapter 3), and research on naïve dialecticism (see Chapter 3). 
Therefore, theoretical positions regarding self-discrepancy and self-ambivalence, and 
the role of culture in these arguments need to be taken into account when considering 
the influence of trauma on self-concept and its subsequent effect on PTSD. 
Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, 1999) predicts that ideal and ought 
discrepancies will cause negative affect in those from Western cultures. Findings 
were conflicting, as self-discrepancy was related to negative appraisals and PTSD 
symptoms via appraisals in Study 2 in both Western and Asian trauma survivors, but 
this however, did not occur in Study 5’s nor Study 7’s trauma sample of PTSD and 
no-PTSD trauma survivors. This potentially suggests that in a clinical sample of 
trauma survivors with PTSD and without PTSD, self-discrepancy theory does not 
provide a unique variance with the disorder nor does it share variance with appraisals, 
perhaps implying self-discrepancy variables to be latent when it comes to 
understanding PTSD etiology. However, Sutherland and Bryant did find it plays a 
role in PTSD development and/ or maintenance. Their findings supported cognitive 
models of PTSD, demonstrating an individuals self-appraisals to be largely dominated 
by negative perceptions (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and that the trauma is intrinsic to 
identity (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003).   
 
  210 
8.3.2.3 Self-ambivalence. Self-ambivalence theory brings to the forefront the 
conflicting and simultaneous existence of oppositional data (i.e. positive and negative 
evaluations) of an attitude object and like cognitive dissonance, illustrates dissonance 
that could arise due to inconsistencies in the content of one’s self-concept 
(Mylvaganam, 2009). Attitudes have been identified to encompass evaluations of 
other people, places, ideas, beliefs and feelings. In this thesis, attitudes pertained to 
the self in an effort to add to the theoretical literature on how self-ambivalence in 
regards to one’s self-concept can impact on posttrauma adjustment and pathological 
disorders such as PTSD. An essential component of ambivalence is the idea that 
people hold evaluations, which are inconsistent. Self-ambivalence theories illustrate 
these inconsistencies can relate to the self and can be both negative and positive and 
can be experienced concurrently, thereby giving rise to self-ambivalence. What is 
more, attitudes towards self-ambivalence differ across cultures. In Asian cultures, 
self-ambivalence tends to be tolerated; individuals hold paradoxical information 
concurrently and are comfortable with such shifting characteristics and 
inconsistencies (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). Whilst in Western, independent 
cultures, self-ambivalence is problematic, as the self tries to attain stability and 
boundaries from which to determine current and future self-evaluations and from 
which to interpret experiences. Self-ambivalence theory espouses that the more 
ambivalent one’s self-concept, the more dissonance, unpleasantness and discomfort 
one experiences. However, due to differing self-consistency needs and dialectic 
traditions of those from Asian cultures, this may not necessarily hold true for trauma 
survivors from these cultures following a trauma. Therefore, this thesis investigated 
whether such a tolerance for contradiction and conflicting self-relevant information 
was also in effect following a trauma. What was found extends the theoretical 
literature, as British individuals with PTSD had greater ambivalence in their self-
concept than trauma survivors without PTSD. However, self-ambivalence did not 
differentiate between Asian trauma survivors with and without PTSD. This reflects 
cultural differences in self-consistency needs; those from Asian cultures are more 
tolerant of ambivalence in their self-concept and consequently ambivalence seems not 
to be associated with poor psychological adjustment. For those from Western, 
independent cultures ambivalence potentially negatively impacts one’s self-worth 
following the trauma. It is therefore surmised that those individuals perceive their 
self-concept/self-representations as internal failings. Moreover, negative/ambivalent 
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self-concept was found to be related to negative appraisals for both British and 
Asians, this potentially demonstrates that ambivalence constitutes a predisposition 
towards maladaptive posttauma appraisals pan-culturally and therefore, ambivalent 
self-perceptions act as components of the cognitive mechanism related to the disorder 
(PTSD). 
Therefore, findings support self-ambivalence theory’s contention that 
posttrauma ambivalence in self-concept causes dissonance and conflict, which has a 
detrimental effect on adjustment posttrauma for those from independent cultures as it 
was found to have overt associations with PTSD. This is not necessarily the case for 
those from Asian cultures. For those from Asian cultures, as appraisals mediated the 
relationship between self-ambivalence and PTSD, an indirect effect for the role of 
self-ambivalence in having an influence on PTSD symptoms is suggested for this 
cultural group. Thus when it comes to PTSD, ambivalence is not necessarily adaptive 
in dialectical cultural contexts (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009), instead they too reflect 
the deleterious effect between a conflicted and ambivalent self-concept resulting in 
negative self appraisals which in turn results in PTSD. 
Spencer-Rogers et al. (2009) propose, self-coherence is regarded as a 
fundamental human motive in Western psychology and according to self-verification 
theory (Swann et al., 2003); people strive for internal consistency and temporal 
stability in their thoughts, feelings, and actions. While these qualities may be viewed 
as normative and desirable in independent cultures and are generally associated with 
psychological well-being (Suh, 2002), they too appear to play a similar roles albeit 
indirectly for those from Asian culture. Thus those from Asian cultures were just as 
motivated to resolve inner conflicts resultant from the trauma as those from 
individualistic cultures; suggesting those from collectivistic cultures are not more 
tolerant of inconsistencies and ambivalence resultant from the trauma given their 
negative influence on the way in which the self and world is appraised posttrauma. 
 
8.3.3 Summary  
To conclude, trauma’s impact on self-concept is reflective of research, which 
posits that trauma can become central to one’s self-concept, threatens one’s self-
concept and leads to an increase in PTSD symptom severity. Namely, as Brewin 
(2003) postulates the trauma event damages the self and affects self-knowledge 
through the violation of an individual’s schemata (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007) 
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concerning self assumptions and beliefs. This can cause the self to become trauma-
centered and/or self-ambivalent. This in turn, acts as highly accessible self-relevant 
information and a cognitive reference points for the organization of other 
autobiographical memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007) that reinforce a 
traumatized or ambivalent self and subsequent negative self-appraisals. Consequently, 
this can effect future expectations of the self (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007; Smeets et al., 
2010) as traumatized, inconsistent, conflicted and ambivalent. Thus the trauma event 
becomes highly salient to the individual’s life script and acts as a major causal event 
on which to base future interpretations, thereby subverting self-concept and 
maintaining a traumatized or ambivalent self-concept (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007). To 
summarize, trauma can become central to self-concept (trauma-centered and self-
ambivalent) and inform one’s self-concept, in turn this has been found to be positively 
correlated with negative appraisals and PTSD symptoms for both individualistic and 
collectivistic cultural groups in either an overt or indirect fashion.  
 
8.3.4 Overall Summary of Theoretical Implications 
Overall the findings point to some important cultural considerations both in 
the etiology of PTSD and in its maintenance, which are not part of current models of 
PTSD. The results also point to cultural similarities in trauma appraisals for those 
with PTSD and trauma’s impact on self-concept. Thus findings from this thesis both 
challenge certain aspects of these models to articulate more explicitly how the cultural 
self aligns with their accounts, in addition to providing support for certain universal 
features of PTSD outlined in the clinical models of PTSD. However, due to cultural 
differences that have arisen in this thesis, it is proposed these differences need to be 
considered in PTSD models and alterations to structural aspects of PTSD models and 
in aspects and processes that are through to be implicated in the maintenance of PTSD 
symptoms are needed. Therefore while certain universal features are acknowledged, 
the thesis proposes that PTSD models need to explicitly consider cultures impact on 
the self and the cultural self’s subsequent impact on processes involved in the 
development and maintenance of PTSD. 
The thesis has now reached a point a point in which it is appropriate to 
synthesize the findings with current theoretical knowledge about the etiology and 
maintenance of PTSD, knowledge of cultural differences in self-construal and the 
conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 4 to produce a working model that offers a 
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method of making sense of the findings and accounts for the relationship between 
trauma and culture’s impact on the etiology and maintenance of PTSD focusing on 
appraisals and self-concept. This model is depicted in Figure 11.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Conceptual Model of the Thesis investigating Cultural Differences in 
Trauma Appraisals and Implications for the development of PTSD 
 
Figure 11 extends Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive appraisal model by 
further highlighting the role of appraisals in PTSD, in addition to integrating self-
concept as another key feature based on Brewin’s (2003) threat to self model and 
Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006, 2007) trauma as central to identity model. At a broad 
level, it can be seen that the trauma event influences one’s cognitive processing, in 
this instance, one’s appraisals of the trauma, which occur both at the time of the 
trauma event and in its aftermath, and one cognitions relating to the self. Firstly, these 
trauma appraisals can become negative which subsequently leads to negative private 
and collective self-appraisals. The model then delineates that both the independent 
and interdependent self-construal potentially come under attack by the trauma. The 
resultant dysfunctional private and collective self-appraisals correspond to the 
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individual perceiving their self to be under threat both internally (e.g. I am weak, I 
have failed in my role as a father, husband etc) or externally (e.g. the world is a 
dangerous place, the event happened because of fate, bad luck), demonstrating both 
internally self-relevant appraisals and externally self-relevant appraisals to be 
dangerous to the individual regardless of these appraisals arising from their 
independent or interdependent self-construal. Thus the self is perceived to be under 
current threat which can lead to negative affect, intrusions of the trauma event and of 
the self perceived as a failure, in addition to arousal and avoidance symptoms, all of 
which are features of PTSD. Therefore if the self is perceived to be under threat, this 
leads to the development of PTSD and if the self is perceived to be under on-going 
threat it leads to the maintenance of PTSD due to the continued expression of the 
disorder’s symptoms. It is proposed that this occurs regardless of one’s cultural 
orientations. However, an added component, which is not included in Ehlers and 
Clark’s (2000) original model, is the inclusion of the collective self-appraisals 
reflecting and being influenced by the interdependent self-construal. Thus 
incorporating the cross-cultural literatures which points to individuals holding both 
aspects of self and proposing trauma has the potential to disrupt both self-systems and 
therefore both need to be addressed following trauma.  
Secondly, control or agency appraisals are added as an adjunct of the appraisal 
process. The cross-cultural literature and the thesis’ findings highlight agency 
appraisals and the importance given to them being culturally variable. Therefore it is 
important to consider this dimension in cognitive models of PTSD, as the evaluation 
between the self and one’s interaction with the environment could be highly salient to 
the individual, especially those from independent cultures. Thus the agency appraisal 
pertaining to one’s control and potentially one’s assumed responsibility for the trauma 
event can imply the self to be useless and powerless (Brewin, 2003). Thereby again 
demonstrating the self to be under threat as it has lost its autonomy and is perceived 
as too weak to have stopped bad things from happening in the present and in the 
prospective future. Once more this causes negative affect and PTSD symptomatology 
leading to the development of PTSD and if on-going dysfunctional control appraisals 
are made, these symptoms will be maintained. However, this seems to have more 
influence on the independent aspect of self that the interdependent aspect of self, 
which gives less emphasis and is less psychologically influenced by perceived levels 
of control in events. 
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Third, Figure 11 also denotes the symptoms protracted when the ‘self is under 
current threat’ to have a reciprocal relationship with collective and private appraisals. 
Specifically, the more the self feels it is under duress the more dysfunctional its 
appraisals, which serve to perpetuate the disorder, as the self is appraised and 
reappraised as powerless, inferior, futureless, vulnerable to further negative events, 
failing in its social roles, not living up to social and cultural obligations, letting others 
down and failing in relationships, without the means to defend against such 
appraisals. 
Fourth, the trauma event also influences one’s self-concept. Our self-concept 
is already comprised of information pertaining to past experiences, beliefs and state of 
the individuals. However, the trauma impacts on this information and on one’s coping 
potential. Thus when the self tries to assimilate and integrate the trauma information, 
this can be done at the expense of previously held beliefs and assumptions of the self; 
thereby relegating the self-concept to become negative, trauma-centered or self-
ambivalent. In an effort to attain self-consistency, the model illustrates a number of 
cultural differences and similarities. For instance if one’s self-concept becomes 
trauma-centered due to the catastrophic damage wrought by the trauma, the self is 
perceived to be under current threat regardless of cultural affiliation, which then leads 
to experiencing PTSD symptoms. Another aspect of self-concept is that of self-
ambivalence, the co-presence of positive and negative self-information. This co-
presence of oppositional self-data and attitudes concerning the self does not give rise 
to self-consistency and its presence is enough for the self to come under direct threat 
for those form independent cultures and to the subsequent development of PTSD and 
maintenance if ambivalence is not redressed. However, as the cross-cultural literature 
denotes, collectivistic groups are more tolerant of contradictions and inconsistencies. 
This appears to be the case here too; its own self-ambivalence does not appear to be 
detrimental to those from collectivistic cultures. However, a different picture emerges 
when self-ambivalence is coupled with appraisals, which the model delineates self-
concept to have a reciprocal relationship with. Here we then find that both a trauma-
centered self-concept and an ambivalent self-concept are indirectly associated with 
PTSD development and maintenance regardless of cultural identification. However, 
this appears to only be the case in regards to private self-cognitions pan-culturally, 
collective self-cognitions mediates the relationship between distorted self-concept and 
PTSD only for those from independent cultures. It is not understood why this may be 
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the case and thus, further research is needed to extrapolate findings and gain clearer 
understandings as to this occurrence.  
Overall, the work does extend theoretical models of PTSD by combining 
literature on socio-cognitive models of PTSD with the theoretical construct of self-
construal and cultures impact on this. While further work is needed, the thesis does 
point to the usefulness of explicitly integrating the cultural self in PTSD models. 
 
8.4 Clinical Implications  
  Following on from the results of Studies 1 and 4, it can be asserted that 
effective treatment for PTSD target the appraisals of trauma (Resick, 2001). The 
effectiveness of these interventions has been demonstrated in Western cultures (e.g. 
Basoglu Salcioglu, & Liyanou, 2007; Duffy, Gillespie, & Clark, 2007). However our 
understanding of interventions for non-Western groups is relatively limited. 
Therefore, research improving our understanding of the processes involved in PTSD 
for those from different cultural groups is imperative for generalizing current 
interventions. Given the focus of effective treatments on appraisals, it is important 
that clinical practice and research consider the cross-cultural research highlighting the 
influence of culture on appraisals and associated emotional responses. The findings 
suggesting many appraisals associated with PTSD are culturally similar and thus, 
indicate that many of the treatment targets may be generalizable. However, it remains 
important that clinicians consider how trauma appraisals may challenge cultural 
norms and the culturally influenced self (including self in relation to others) of a 
client. Thus, cognitive restructuring in therapy may need to focus on realigning 
sufferers’ beliefs with their culturally determined conceptual self. It may be important 
to include more social role, group and interpersonal appraisals (and less focus on 
control) as potential moderators of PTSD within Asian cultures and thus, target these 
appraisals in treatment. Furthermore, current measures assessing trauma-related 
appraisals may benefit from including greater focus on appraisals associated with 
interdependence. The PCSAM could therefore act as a much needed accompaniment 
measure, due to its focus on interdependent type cognitions and in so doing contribute 
to a more rounded assessment of dysfunctional trauma appraisals. Finally, the recent 
changes to the PTSD criteria in DSM-V (APA, 2013) includes negative alterations in 
cognitions and persistent and distorted blame of self or others which seems to be 
appropriate cross-culturally as those with PTSD, regardless of cultural background, 
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had negative cognitions about self (private, public and communal), world, and self-
blame. 
 Further, control appraisals were found to be important, especially for those 
who had developed PTSD. However, trauma events are, in most instances, random 
and the individual perceives them to be uncontrollable. This then engenders feelings 
of hopeless and helplessness. If one is to overcome such feelings, restoring one’s 
sense of control and autonomy is required. This can potentially alleviate PTSD 
symptomatology. For instance, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Dansky, Saunders, and Best 
(1993) found that completely uncontrollable events such as natural disasters were less 
likely to lead to PTSD than traumas inflicted by other people, for instance rape and 
physical assault. Therefore, it is important to relinquish negative appraisals and 
reacquire or strengthen other appraisals (i.e. control) if one is to disconfirm their 
trauma centered beliefs, as this not only has implications for the individual’s “here 
and now” experiences but also their future experiences (i.e. perceived current / on-
going threat). However, this only appeared to be important for the British participants 
and not the Asians, as control did not differentiate between those with and without 
PTSD in the Asian groups. This is an important finding, as it would appear to be 
critical to focus on agency appraisals for those from independent cultures due to its 
strong associations with PTSD and well-being. Lack of control and unpredictability 
are associated with high levels of fear responses (Foa, Zinbarg & Rothbaum, 1992; 
O’Donnell et al., 2007) and this is potentially what is happening during the trauma 
event for the British group, resulting in perceptions of diminished control. 
Conversely, for those from interdependent cultures, this is potentially not problematic 
because they have an external locus of control and therefore control appraisals or lack 
thereof are not perceived to threaten the self. However, for those from collectivistic 
cultures, relatedness appraisals are important as mentioned above and as highlighted 
by the PCSAM. Thus a clinical emphasis on relatedness and interpersonal 
relationships in treatment of maladaption following trauma is needed for those from 
collectivistic cultures; while emphasis on increasing autonomy in trauma survivors 
from individualistic cultures is stressed. 
Clinical implications that can be drawn from Studies 2 and 5 highlight and 
emphasize the role of the self (i.e. trauma-identified self, self-discrepancies, negative 
self appraisals) in PTSD and the importance of considering self-concept in therapeutic 
interventions. For instance, self-schema work could address trauma-caused 
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‘vulnerable identities’ (Brewin & Holmes, 2003), integrating current views of the self 
(e.g. I am a victim) into existing self-knowledge and the life story, and make sense of 
the trauma in respect to existing aspects of their self-concept and goals (Hembree & 
Foa, 2004) and targeting the relationship between appraisals and self-concept.  It is 
worth noting that for only the British group, self-discrepancies were associated with 
self-blame appraisals. This may be the result of those from individualistic cultures 
valuing responsibilities of personal control and responsibility more than those from 
collectivistic cultures (Mesquita & Walker, 2003). Additionally, for the Asian group, 
ought self-discrepancy scores were also significantly correlated with negative world 
appraisals (e.g. feelings of alienation, not being able to rely on others, etc.). This may 
reflect ought self-discrepancy being not living up to others expectations, which may 
relate to appraisals of alienation (Jobson & O’Kearney, 2009).   
Study 3 also brings to light that challenges or perceived threats to one’s moral 
and value beliefs can lead to negative cognitions that can be extremely detrimental to 
an individual’s well-being. For instance believing that one did not act within the 
cultural mores and values of one’s culture could lead to social alienation (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 1998; Jobson, 2009). Therefore, it is important to address 
and redress these beliefs, as they could potentially alleviate maladaptive symptoms; as 
research has found the feelings this construct engenders (e.g. helplessness, 
hopelessness, alienation) are all linked with PTSD. Those from collectivistic type 
cultures could be more vulnerable to developing feelings of alienation due to the 
weight put on the importance of the group and significant others. The group 
potentially acts as a protective feature and offers an important and accessible support 
system, however, if they feel separate from and outside of their group, not only do 
they lose this support, but they could lose their sense of self, as their culture, group 
and social standing within it make up a part of their self-concept and identity. 
Therefore perceived threats to and perceived attacks on their morals and values could 
lead to disintegration of their self-concept, leaving them feeling alienated, disaffected 
and isolated, in addition to perpetuating negative appraisals, all of which are 
associated with maintaining PTSD.  
 All the studies point to trauma acting as a catalyst for individuals to think 
about and question meanings, values and beliefs pertaining to their personal, public 
and collective selves and their self-functioning following the trauma. The trauma 
unsurprisingly challenges these core values and beliefs and impacts on their self-
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work, safety and meanings associated with life (Orr et al., 2004). As Janoff-Bulman 
(1992) assert, trauma and subsequent development of PTSD is a result of “the 
shattering of basic assumptions” concerning the individual and the world. It is an 
“information shock” which impacts on our self-concept and cognitions pertaining to 
beliefs, cognitive schemas and attributions. Therefore, the clinical implications that 
can be derived from these studies demonstrate that these negative and catastrophic 
self-appraisals render one’s self-concept to be traumatized and distorted, to be self-
limiting and self-defeating. Subsequently, correcting such negative and dysfunctional 
appraisals is fundamental to restoring a healthy self-concept. Ager et al (2006) 
proposes posttraumatic cognitive reframing is necessary as it could correct these key 
processes and allow for the individual to move forward. Further clinical implications 
pertaining to Studies 3, 4 and 7, all in reference to the PCSAM and the appraisals as 
detailed in the PTCI demonstrate that belief rigidity in private, public and communal 
aspects of self also constitute cognitive risk for PTSD.  Therefore, all these self-
aspects need to be assessed and addressed therapeutically to arrive at a healthy self-
concept through the redressing of these self-appraisals. 
 
8.5 Limitations 
 The limitations of this thesis will be discussed briefly, as they have already 
been addressed in length in the studies. The first set of limitations concern the 
possibility of trauma type moderating the impact of cultural differences on trauma 
responses. Specifically, future research should clearly match trauma-type across 
culture. Furthermore, whether a trauma is of individualistic (i.e. car accident) or 
collectivistic (i.e. tsunami) nature may have influenced findings. Finally, whether the 
trauma type was interpersonal or not may have influenced findings. 
 The second set of limitations pertain to PTSD diagnoses affecting 
relationships between appraisals, self-concept and maladjustment, as all these 
relationships could just be a feature of having PTSD symptoms. However, partially 
out PTSD symptoms did bring about similar results. 
 The third set of limitations pertained to cultural variables. This included, 
language, as the tasks and SCID-I interviews were all conducted in English. This 
could have potentially affected task understanding and impacted on findings. 
Additionally, a significant factor was that all participants were residing in the UK and 
future work should consider a cross-country study. Further, in regards to the samples 
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was group heterogeneity (i.e. the Asian group was comprised of several cultural 
groups). This is keeping with previous studies (Hall et al., 2004; Jobson & 
O’Kearney, 2009; Wang & Ross, 2005) and while, this approach was selected, as this 
is the first study to explore these issues, the next step is to use more homogeneous 
groups  
Moreover, while a measure of self-construal was added in Part 3 to strengthen 
group allocation of participants as being either from individualistic or collectivistic 
culture, it is also acknowledged that the independent/interdependent construct is only 
one cultural dimension. Therefore, the cultures comprising these groups (i.e. 
participants in Studies 4 -7) could vary on other cultural dimensions. 
Fourth, the qualitative study could have used participants from individualistic 
cultures to investigate if findings were comparable.  Additionally, the PCSAM is an 
exploratory measure, confirmatory analyses and further statistical analyses with larger 
sample sizes (e.g. factor analysis) will need to be conducted to derive more solid basis 
for interpretation of analyses. 
Fifth, future work could use other established measures of self-ambivalence. 
However, the TST did allow for a free response measure of self-evaluation, thereby 
circumventing dialectic tendencies of those from collectivistic cultures impact on 
responses as it may do for standardized measures of investigating self-concept. 
Another set of issues pertains to the study being cross-sectional which 
precludes causal explanations, in addition to sample sizes being modest. Finally, in 
relation to methodological issues, the hypotheses derived in this thesis were tested 
using very similar methodology throughout. Thus, findings could also have been 
reflective of the methodology used, as opposed to cultural differences. However, 
findings did emerge consistently across tasks suggesting some convergence of 
findings. Second, the thesis adopted a universalistic approach to cross-cultural 
research in that it tested the universality of existing psychological theories of trauma.  
 
8.6 Conclusions 
To conclude, the research project detailed in this thesis aimed to investigate 
cultural differences in trauma appraisals and posttrauma self-concept and its 
implication for the development and maintenance of PTSD. Consequently, based on 
observations that current socio-cognitive models of PTSD seem to have largely 
ignored cultural models of self-construal and its associated implications to the 
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disorder, this thesis synthesized these two separate realms and developed a conceptual 
framework that transported PTSD models in to the cultural sphere via their existing 
connections with the self. This conceptual framework was then tested using the seven 
studies detailed above. The overall results can be concluded as supportive of the 
conceptual framework. As taken as a whole, the findings relay that there were cultural 
differences in trauma appraisals, including a significant cultural difference in 
perceived personal control for those with PTSD compared to trauma survivors 
without PTSD. The remaining appraisals of those with PTSD, across both cultural 
groups, tended to be similar. Second, collective self-cognitions also play a significant 
role in PTSD development and/or maintenance, suggesting both independent and 
interdependent self-construal are impacted and damaged by trauma. Therefore both 
independent and interdependent type cognitions need to be taken in to account when 
assessing maladaptive responses to trauma, specifically PTSD. Third, posttrauma self-
concept can become traumatized and trauma-centered. When this occurs there is a 
pan-cultural relationship to PTSD. Specifically, a trauma-centered self-concept 
regardless of cultural background is significantly associated with negative cognitive 
appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae. Subsequently these negative cognitions 
mediate the relationship between a trauma-centered self-concept and PTSD. Fourth, 
posttrauma self-concept can also become ambiguous and ambivalent. Self-
ambivalence appears to be culturally variant. Specifically those from independent 
cultures with PTSD had greater self-ambivalence than those from independent 
cultures without PTSD, however this was not the case for those from collectivistic 
cultures, suggesting a greater tolerance of ambiguity and contradiction. However, it is 
also important to examine the indirect relationships self-concept may have to PTSD, 
in this case, there was an indirect relationship between self-ambivalence and PTSD 
mediated by appraisals. This is an interesting finding, as previous research points to 
ambivalence not being a pertinent to maladjustment or damaging well-being in Asian 
and collectivistic groups, however, when looking at it from an indirect standpoint, it 
does pose as deleterious for both British and Asians, suggesting ambivalence has an 
impact on posttrauma self-concept and consequent PTSD symptomatology pan-
culturally. 
 In light of these findings current models of PTSD were critiqued in terms of 
their cultural flexibility in accounting for cultural variation in self-construal. 
Additionally, while overall the PTSD models can, and do, account for much of the 
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phenomena observed in PTSD, and while cultural similarities were found in the thesis 
pertaining to both trauma appraisals and self-concept, there were a number of 
significant cultural variations for both these processes, which in turn has an influence 
on both in the etiology and maintenance of the disorder. Consequently, findings 
challenge these models to incorporate the manner in which the cultural self aligns 
with their accounts. As foundations with the cultural self had already been set allowed 
the conceptual framework to be established as a starting point for further study. 
Findings from these further studies serve to realize these links with the cultural self to 
be resolute and in need of articulation in PTSD models. Specifically, they need to be 
more explicit on the impact of the cultural self on the processes involved in the 
development and maintenance of PTSD. Further, the thesis also offers guidelines for 
clinical practice. It was suggested that current elements of cognitive behavioral 
therapy for PTSD to focus on interdependent and relatedness aspects of self. 
Consequently expanding its approach to include public and communal aspects of self. 
The human response to traumatic stress and PTSD is an important public 
health concern. It impacts on both the individual and society. This thesis aimed to 
attend to one of the multi-dimensional domains (i.e. culture) pertaining to PTSD, its 
concluding point being that while trauma impacts on the affected in varying ways, 
culture should be included in cognitive models and treatment practices as this will 
allow for a fuller and richer understanding as to its consequences and how to address 
them. Cultural similarities were found in the thesis’ studies, but so too were cultural 
distinctions. Hereafter it is advocated that a cultural element should be included into 
theoretical frameworks as this could allow for a more precise characterization of the 
nature and range of responses of trauma survivors that could significantly improve 
treatments directed to them. The thesis provides some light on this area, however, 
continuation of research is in this domain is required. 
 
8.7 Future Directions 
This thesis initiated an exploration into cultural differences in trauma 
appraisals and posttraumatic self-concept. It is believed to be one of the very few 
studies exploring trauma appraisals and one of the first studies exploring posttrauma 
self-concept from a cultural perspective concerning trauma consequences. Its findings 
therefore are some of the first to break ground in this research area. However, being 
such a new venture, although clear theoretical and clinical implication emerged, so 
  223 
too did questions and areas requiring further research. These areas included belief 
systems and religion, the PCSAM and posttraumatic growth. 
Specifically, Study 3 found that cultural variations in self potentially also 
impact on belief systems and religion. The PCSAM’s beliefs and belonging subscale 
has links with spirituality and a transcendental perspective. However the remaining 
studies in the thesis did not focus on this aspect, as this was not its focus nor did it 
have the time or resources to pursue this avenue of inquiry. There has been a renewed 
interest in this area with calls for mental health practitioners to focus on spiritual 
issues. However, research in this area has continued to be neglected. It is for that 
reason the relationship between spirituality and PTSD is not known and should be 
further researched, especially from a cross-cultural perspective, as this has not 
previously been done. Study 7 does point toward this being a factor in PTSD 
development and maintenance as those with PTSD had a significantly greater number 
of dysfunctional appraisals on this subscale. This area therefore needs further 
research, perhaps looking into spiritual alienation and its nascent implications for 
PTSD. In relation to religion, the PCSAM did also touch upon this area (item 
inclusion concerning karma and fate attribution) however not in any great detail due 
to time and project constraints. Yet work has found trauma-affected individuals have 
trouble reconciling their religious beliefs with the trauma event and in instances 
abandon them (Foy, Drescher, & Watson, 2011). Therefore future work on this area 
would be beneficial to further understandings on religion and PTSD. Furthermore, the 
PCSAM needs further expansion and exploration as only exploratory analyses were 
conducted in this thesis. The results were promising as to the measures validity and 
reliability; however, further research using this measure would be beneficial as to its 
applicability to assess for PTSD in traumatized populations.  
As a final point, posttraumatic growth was another area that came to attention 
but was not investigated. It focuses on positive posttraumatic effects, while this thesis 
focused on the negative posttraumatic consequences. This area also influences 
treatment plans for individuals with PTSD, as treatment plans could include 
alterations to perceptions of trauma appraisals, specifically to help individuals 
perceive the trauma and subsequent appraisals as challenges, turning points or 
opportunities for growth. It is not proposed that dysfunctional difficulties should be 
ignored, but that careful consideration should also be given to this area of the trauma 
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literature due to its potential implications for PTSD. Additionally, to the author’s 
knowledge, no substantial work has been done cross-culturally in this area. 
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Appendix D 
Table 12 
Initial Template 
Code Themes  Sub-themes Level 1 Sub-themes Level 2 
1 Trauma perceptions    
1.1.  Psychological Trauma  
1.2.  Physical Trauma  
1.3.  Reflections of Trauma  
2 Trauma Symptoms   
2.1  Somatic  
2.1.1   Eating 
2.1.2   Sleeping 
2.2  Emotional  
2.3  Psychological  
2.3.1   Avoidance 
2.3.2   Psychological 
Distress 
2.4  Trauma Memory  
2.4.1   Wanting to 
forget/Avoidance 
2.4.2   Intrusive memory 
2.5  Adjustment  
2.5.1   Group support 
2.5.2   Personal strength 
2.5.3   Education 
2.5.4   Religion 
3 Cultural and social roles   
3.1  Expectations  
3.2  Values/norms  
3.3  Social roles  
3.3.1   Loss of role 
3.3.2   Self has failed 
4 Traumatized self   
  lix 
4.1  Attitude change  
4.2  Behavioral change  
4.3  Self-blame  
4.3.1   Anger 
4.3.2   Shame 
4.3.3   Guilt 
4.4  Sacrifice self for group  
5 World   
  Negative world  
  World perceptions stay 
same 
 
  External world event 
causes trauma 
 
6.  External attribution   
6.1  Fate/luck cause event  
6.2  God’s plan/religion  
6.3  Recovery   
7 Future    
7.1  Uncertainty/Changes  
7.1.1   Positive/Negative 
7.2  No future  
7.3  Same future  
7.4  Immediate/long term 
future 
 
8 Relationships   
8.1  Community/Group  
8.1.1   Protects/Exacerbates 
problems 
8.2  Changes  
8.2.1   Breakdown 
8.2.2   Strengthened 
8.2.2   Traumatized others 
8.3  Stays the same  
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Appendix E 
Focus Group 1 
 
Interview Key:   M = Moderator   P1, P2, P3, P4 = Participant Numbers 
… = Pauses     [Actions] 
 
M: What does trauma mean in your culture? 
P2: in Indian culture trauma would be someone’s death or some accident, some theft, loss of 
property, erm, it is a personal one to ask with their views. 
 
P3: Erm, I agree with this, trauma for me is everything that happens which is not happy 
experience, it could be something really small, it could be mild, or a very severe trauma,  it 
could be really bad like a horrible truck accident or I don’t know, abuse, and that would 
obviously be a serious trauma. 
 
P1: I think, erm, I second what they say, that it’s a bad event, so you become traumatized in 
some way. I think my culture, you can’t … you start to feel traumatized when you feel like 
the value you gain in your home, from your family is really conflicted in some way, it seems 
like not right or not true, its kind of like if you were brought up with certain values and then 
you broke it, then you start to feel traumatized. So I think when your value, the thing that 
conflicts with the situation, you start to feel traumatized. 
 
So what I mean like, in Arabic culture, in my culture, I think we have this kind of, its kind of 
like the whole, so the whole culture has kind of values, religious values and cultural values, 
so its kind of erm you feel bad about, or traumatized from things when these values are like 
kind of conflict. 
 
P2: Can I make one more point? 
 
M: Yes 
P2: It’s, in our culture its more family bond, we, we take everyone in our home to be some 
way, you know we expect them to be good or something, but anyone of those persons who 
are going away from our expectations, then we start to feel for that and the whole family will 
worry about it, you know, they’ll have no direction to go kind of, so even when they try 
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something and can’t solve it people will worry and will be going through really bad situation 
and, and that I also think should be considered strongly. Because its more culture, in our 
culture we have very strong feeling for the, you know all people, the family members, my 
sister. 
 
P1: I think it depends on expectation, what I mean is you have expectation to live up to, to 
love and erm like to see your parent die before you, so it’s a real trauma if for some reason 
the parent dies, or if you have children, to like see them grow up, get married and it could be 
trauma if your children die or so its kind of expectations, so you expect to er study certain 
degree but once you cannot do it, you choose that but you cannot do it, it is your expectation 
that you have in certain context. 
 
P2: Yes lets say for example that my brother is going the wrong way, he’s trying to do 
something that’s just wrong, and you try to correct him and he’s arrogant enough to not 
listen, and you don’t know what to do, and you can probably hit him very badly so he may 
die, you get so angry, because its not that I want to hit him but you really feel that, you really 
want him to be on the right track or something like that. 
 
P1: And I think going back to the expectations, its not only your own expectations but it what 
other people expect from you. 
 
P2 & P3: Yes, that is true. 
 
P3: What I mean erm, in pregnancy, there is that this depression the woman has after giving 
birth, I don’t think its kind of recognized or kind of common in my country cause its kind of 
you’re expected to have kind of, you get married, er, you start to get pregnant and have 
children and then its, you start to have the cycle of taking care of them, so its kind of you’re 
expected to be erm, so erm, so other people’s expectations, like if someone lose, like if you 
find that there was a birth that you lose, the father is expected to strong so its kind of if he 
gets traumatized its not recognized in our culture, I think the expectations are from the usual 
kind of the people around you. 
 
M: Ok and do you have anything to add? (Directed to P4) 
P4: Really, in my culture we not count trauma.  
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M: Ok is it not talked about much? 
P4: It’s not much about the mental hurt, it is about the physical hurt, so it’s a little confusing, 
I can’t, I mean, it’s not a trauma it’s just … 
 
M: So in your culture trauma is a physical injury? 
P4: Yes 
 
M: And it’s not a mental injury? 
P4: Yes yes, and the hurt, well we call the, mental trauma is a kind of trauma, just something 
you have to hold. 
 
M: Ok, so the mental trauma from an event is something the individuals have to deal 
with on their own? 
P4: Yes, yes, it’s not how to say, it’s not, not a kind of hurt, it’s just erm it’s not a kind of 
hurt I think in my opinion 
 
M: Ok, and how about in your culture (directed towards P3) 
P3: I never thought of these things but when I heard the others talking about the family 
pressure sometimes and I, the expectations from the society on you, on the individual, I think 
it is to some extent in my country as well, which is like, but erm, I don’t think its that strong. 
I didn’t really expect these kinds of pressures but erm I think it is there, erm you are expected 
to behave in some way and you sometimes are afraid of doing something different from what 
your parents want you to do. Its like, its just, trauma seems like something that conflicts your 
opinion as opposed to your parents opinions. Does this make sense? 
 
M: Yes 
P2: If I can … in our case it could so happen in such a situation where knowing the family 
relationship its happening bad, in terms of family thinking, it may be er that bad also for the 
family, their expectations are not met and its really going out of the way then it could so 
happen that the family will do anything to help about it, you know, like maybe the parents 
will realize they can’t do anything, but thinking about it, they’re not sleeping, they have 
increase in worrying about the situation. Those things also happens lots, it happens very 
much in our culture. I’ve seen it many times, yes, this is very true. 
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P1: I think with bad and good, this is where culture because it depend totally in culture, I 
mean how you define your losses or your gain based on your value or how much you value 
something, so good and bad depend on the value of the culture or the context, so, erm, so it 
could be, what I mean, for some family, her son to smoke or do drugs or to run with someone 
and get married, for some countries or other families, they have a different standard or value 
it would be kind of devastating for the family and the whole foundation of the family, so yes, 
good and bad these definition of things really affect how much an event can be seen as good 
and bad and how much of the good affects the person. 
 
M: Ok, so would it be fair to say that even if you as an individual had a trauma, it 
wouldn’t just stay with you, it would also affect your families, because they feel very 
much a part of the entire process? 
P2 & P1: Yes yes yes 
 
P1: Yes because in my culture its kind of believed its related to all the family, in kind of, in 
not kind of involved in our life, but based on the culture we don’t like, if you have problem 
its normal to go and share with your family, and they can support you financially or with 
advice, so its kind of if you have problem I think somehow its good but if you are taking this 
problem with you and reflecting it on other people. 
 
M: Do you find it helpful that you can share this experience? 
P1: Its good and bad in the same way. It’s good because erm you are supported in some way 
and sometimes you are never alone, but its bad because as I like, some, like … yes its bad 
because its kind of like, having a lot of people in the problem could complicate it, it in some 
way, especially like, there is some family in my country where, in my family, my parents, but 
there is other family that have uncles and cousins and things so instead of having problem 
that is kind of small, you talk about it and have a really big problem with everyone. 
 
M: Ok, so the trauma is sort of exacerbates and spreads? 
P2: Yes exactly 
P4: I would say in my culture, we don’t say this to parents, because I would share it with my 
friends or keep it with myself and because we think erm if we work in other country or other 
city they may not tell the things to their parents, they always put on smile, happy face, 
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especially now China has very strict, every family has only one child, so actually they will 
not say that to their parents. 
 
M: Ok so you would not tell your family? 
P4: Yes for two reasons, first of all its er don’t want the parents to worry about and the 
second is that you think the parent cannot understand why we are unhappy, then you think I 
ignore that or you can do better, but actually we don’t think they can understand that. 
 
M: Ok so you are saying that you would share a traumatic experience with friends, so 
there is a different support system in place? 
P4: Yes, because they can understand why we are unhappy, our parents always think it’s our 
problem, other’s problem. 
 
P1: Which is different, because in my culture you parents, still very, even if you married and 
have your own family, still very kind of, you’re … they are there for you and its even still 
their business, any problem you would have and like this is something like they do to us and I 
would do to my children because this is the way you do things. 
 
P2: This is the same in my culture 
 
P3: When I think about it I remember the older generations which is my grandma which was 
at the time when socialism was still there, my grandparents tend to care more for what their 
children do, which is my parents, so they tend to be more involved and even try to erm try to 
make decisions almost on their children’s behalf, they children can be 40 50 years old but 
still want to be really involved and want to just be controlled sometimes, not always but 
sometimes, its definitely similar but erm in younger generations it is somehow changing, 
although for some people its still there, but not as strong as in other countries but there is a 
kind of will to control to some extent, but its not too strong. 
 
M: OK, if I could move on to the next question, what typical thoughts do you think 
somebody in your particular cultures would have after having been through a 
traumatic experience? 
P2: It depends on the outcome of the trauma, most of the time. Sometime if the trauma is bad 
or sometime then it takes some time for them to really come back, it really can go on for 
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many months, it takes some months but it depends on the individual’s strength to come to 
turns with their pain and the significance of the trauma again. Sometimes, for example, a loss 
of something, such as a child, then the loss won’t take that long because they know they can 
have another child. But if its their son or daughter has run away with someone then that stays 
forever, where just thinking about it they can get suicidal, because something has really 
happened that has humiliated the family and they don’t want to face society, there are cases 
like that.  
 
M: Ok so the trauma can stay with a person as a life long 
P2: yes but there are some people that can accept that and start anew, but it’s very bad, most 
will have it difficult. 
 
M: Ok so if the individual had eloped or run off this affects the family strongly? 
P2: Yes yes, it will affect a lot but if the girl that has run off comes back some families will 
accept it, because they want their kid to be good, you know, but some families go to the 
extent where they will kill both of them. 
 
M: ok so it can be very extreme 
P2: yes, but I can say that its in 60-40% in villages, India has more villages than cities, in 
villages this is think of more, in cities its considered more normal, people do accept, they 
accept that it is fine. 
 
M: So even within a country and culture it also depends on your location? 
P2: Yes, like how much their exposure is to education, because if someone is really educated, 
he is aware of the world and things happening around and what is really good and bad, and 
they can really think well, ok, I mean I am going more towards the trauma of the family, but 
if it is an accident er those things I mean someone’s death, within a week they come back 
because they know they cant get them back and they’re seen to know these kind of trauma 
can happen, but if its unexpected then it can prolong it for us. 
 
M: Does anyone have anything else to add? 
P1: I think someone’s thoughts after trauma, depending on er how tense, feeling of loss you 
have after trauma, depend maybe how this event er is from the culture values and your family 
values so erm, its kind of like divorce in some families is er its accepted in some way but in 
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other families its kind of a really standing challenge for the whole family, and for some 
family erm if someone left with another guy or something its somehow accepted but in the 
family it would mean all the girls would not have so much scope for them. So if the trauma 
falls on you it still affects your family. 
 
M: What are your thoughts? 
P4: Yes its almost the same but one more point is that we really focus on what we gain from 
the trauma, maybe people find they, find something they did not know before, some valuable 
thing they did not know before, like with their family relationship, so … actually people find 
they gain more out of the trauma. 
 
M: ok so you are looking for the positive that happened? 
P4: Yes. The trauma is finished, I mean the whole thing is done, finished, then you think 
well, what good I learn from that, like that, yes. 
 
M: ok and what about yourself? (Directed at P3) 
P3: It depends, er, it’s kind of opposite it’s on individuals and also where they grow up, like 
the others said, in my country there is erm, it depends, in the capital it is quite westernized 
many things don’t matter, you can do what you want, in the more traditional parts of 
Slovakia, it does matter, the people in the village would talk about it, take it in a bad way. It 
depends on the family a lot and also whether they are Christian or not. 
 
M: Can you expand on that? 
P3: Being Christian can make you think about it differently from others and because 
Christianity is really common in Slovakia now.  
 
M: Ok, so we’re talked quite a lot about how the family would react to a traumatic 
event. What typically thoughts do you think a person who’s had the trauma, be it 
pregnancy, divorce, accident or whatever is considered traumatic within the culture, 
what do you think their typical thoughts would be? 
P2: But you must tell your family, its like you’re not really caring for your family like they 
are caring for you, for example if I do not share any traumatic experience with my family, 
they would be really mad that I didn’t do it, I’m expected to do that, because of something 
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good happened and then something bad, they would have felt like they could have helped me, 
mentally they would have supported me. 
 
M: So you would be alienating your family if you didn’t share this with them? 
P2: yes, yes, they share your experiences, if I am happy they are happy, if I am sad they also 
feel sad, so that’s how you usually handle it, not alone. 
 
M: OK so would your thoughts include how this is going to affect your family? 
P2: Yes  
 
M: What typical thoughts would you have? (Directed to P4) 
P4: … … … 
 
M: So if you were going through a physical or mental trauma, what typical thoughts do 
you think somebody would have about it? 
P4: Erm if fate … 
 
M: Fate? 
P4: yeah, sometimes we think fate, and there was a reason so … it must be something you 
had to experience/ 
 
P1: I think how personally er I think after the trauma you feel, sometimes, it not like … with 
religion, at the end in my culture my religion says that everything has happened is a plan 
from god and its kind of a test, god might think it’s a test. How much you loss and the trauma 
is kind of depend how you move forward after this trauma, and how much like … how much 
you can remind this fact or these things, maybe like praying, or giving, when you want 
something you give money to poor people, its kind of charity, so you know, like, this depend 
on person, that some people could like er could have this on their mind and this is where they 
move forward from their loss, but some people will then have this on their mind, of this is 
fate, god take my son for some reason, like it didn’t make, I think really my cultures 
religious, religion is kind of er, erm a factor in how people deal or sort or accept erm trauma 
things. 
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M: ok and do you think this helps them deal with things and move forward from the 
trauma? 
P1: Yes I do, like in my religion and country, you give money and ask god for forgiveness or 
mercy and its like this is test, this is a test, god tests us to see how we will do this, so it, if you 
have this thought, you would, you would act differently from certain person who think that 
this happened, I have a bad life, in Islam there is no life, everything it has a plan. If you in 
this kind of trauma do not have this thought I think you will react differently. 
 
P2: I just have one more point to make, in our culture sometimes when a trauma happens, 
when socially people are recognizing you and what this person has gone through, its very 
obvious the person wants to leave that place. If the person is in one place the trauma happens, 
it’s quite common that people move to a different place, so that you can lead a quiet life, 
because the people surrounding them doesn’t know, they also can have some time to get the 
thing out of their mind. That’s very, very often. In any kind of trauma situation. They would 
like to get away from that place and see if they kind of calm down with the family, they want 
to lead a normal life, they may not come out for some time, to mingle with anybody outside. 
Maybe any situation in our culture they try to stay away from general society, even who they 
know very well, so that can work on it. 
 
P1: I think this is the main difference between our culture, because there is really wide 
recognition of everybody around you, what I mean, you have something to say about your 
neighbour, about your friend, about your family, when you hear, like you can hear what ever 
you want, do anything in your home, but on our culture, the, this kind of being by yourself or 
not matter other people’s business is not the case; and that can sometimes make trauma, this 
could make the trauma bigger and go longer and longer, because in our culture, you have a 
retribution for everything, we don’t have this mentality of don’t matter anything is not of 
your business, its kind of like you recognize everyone around you. 
 
M: So you’re saying you are very connected with those around you? 
P2:  I think it is so strong, and if something goes really bad, they start in the same way, 
talking about you. 
 
P1: And this would help as well as making you depressed even more. 
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P2: Yes 
 
P3: It’s not the same, in my culture its not the same, if something happened, if you live in a 
village then er its really, they may gossip about it, talk about it, but they wont come and help 
you. They might offer but it depends on relationships, talk about it and other things, erm if a 
trauma happens to a person that person often ruminate about it and amount of problems 
because they might not want to talk about it with their family and friends. But it’s not so 
much in my culture and if they do it might not help as much because it’s not so connected. 
But different things happen to different people and they can take it well, it was meant to 
happen, I will try to live with it.  
 
P2: In our culture I think to add on, I’ve known a person who was very silent and he had a lot 
of debts, which he couldn’t pay, and one person, I mean the one who had given him money, 
told this in front of everyone and he got suicidal and I think he died. So yeah because he 
couldn’t live with it, he couldn’t face the people he told in front of so many people about his 
loss. It is so strong. 
 
M: So it has a very high mental impact? 
P2: Yes, yes this is it 
 
P1: There is all the gossip, sometimes if there is a big issue we will hide it even from close 
family, if you have kind of a mental illness, say child, you would take care of the child but 
you wouldn’t tell anyone about it, the same if you had someone who had depression, things 
you have you would not tell. 
 
M: Ok so a mental illness would be treated differently to someone who suffered a 
physical trauma. 
P1 & P2 & P3: Yes 
 
P3: Yes I just wanted to say that mental illness in my country is still stigmatized, and seeing a 
psychologist or psychiatrist for example depression is ok over here in England but its still 
stigmatized in my country. 
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P1: And these things you wouldn’t talk about it in public, or if you have an appointment you 
just lie and say that you are going somewhere. You wouldn’t talk about, even for very close, 
like you would maybe discuss it with you kind of very close family like parents, sister, those 
kind, because you are in the same house with them, but with your uncle or cousin you 
wouldn’t share it. The family tends to really hide it and never share it, you never talk about it. 
 
M: And is this similar in your culture? (Directed towards P4) 
P4: Yes, er we do not share with other people I think other people cannot give the answer you 
want and er only yourself can put yourself forward other people cannot understand your 
condition. We deal with it ourselves. Just … when it happen a long time the impact is 
reduced but just deal with ourselves will not burden, sometimes we will share this with old 
people not our parents but our grandparents, but it’s not very normal. 
 
M: ok so its something you deal with very much yourself? 
P4: Yeah 
 
M: What typical thoughts do you think people will have after a trauma about 
themselves? 
P2: I think they will just stick to how they are, how they should be, just stick to it 
 
P1: You never stop think about it, it’s not recognized I think, like you would sometimes ask 
god, like erm, I’m not feeling ready, like I cannot see, like you would think about any health 
issue part, you wouldn’t sit and think since this is happened I’m not thinking really, I’m not 
spending time with my family, I’m just grieving most of the time, I’m just avoiding, just 
feeling, you never stop to say all these things to recognize that these are the symptoms an you 
should see someone. 
 
P2: It’s very rare I think to see a physician I think, in this situation really, I think if they have 
a good family it helps them a lot, for a person to come and talk about things like 
posttraumatic situation, they’re very sensible about it, they’ve had this experience and they 
will take their son or daughter, or if the husband is in a bad situation then the wife would help 
him come back from the bad situation. Those kinds of things do happen, very rarely going to 
see a psychiatrist or something. 
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P1: I’m thinking about your question, when everything, when something happen that seems 
trauma, the first thing would be self-blame, like I brought this to myself, er, erm, this is not 
right, this happened because I wasn’t good enough, and I think maybe its kind of confident, 
like when someone, again it depend on your values and how you deal with your loss and your 
religion and your perception on how to deal. I think in some way people think this happened 
in some way because I didn’t do things, I haven’t done things as it should have been done; 
and I don’t think someone who is feeling like this would talk about it or seek for help, 
because this is my fault and I am dealing with the consequence. 
 
M: Ok, and would you say the same? (Directed toward P4) 
P4: It depends, I mean if the trauma is an accident, or cancer or illness, I mean if the people 
who hurt you did not mean to hurt you then you admit that, nothing you will do it will not 
influence others, but if a terrible breakup with girlfriend or boyfriend then I think, I mean its 
… at this time, you may blame yourself, you may erm show some other kind of guise, so it 
depends on the condition. 
 
P2: I think er, the person will also think er, as she said [acknowledges P3 & P4], gods, you 
know something like fate, most often in our culture, in the Hindu religion they try to er, do 
certain curses, ceremonies for gods, they go on for some time and very regularly, and they 
carry pictures which is to bring hope, those kind of things are very common after a traumatic 
situation. They want to, you cannot, in our culture, our religion, they very much, these kind of 
what you call puja’s are religious ceremonies, they are very common, which take place after 
this traumatic event, to kind of, they believe that something really happened from us, and we 
are really sorry, maybe we are accepting it, we’re praying god to give more strength to us, 
that really happens, and after this cleans your spirit, we could see there is a change in their 
mental belief that something is really, there’s some peace that will come to us because we 
prayed to god, that belief comes to people, and they kind of come to normal situation after 
that ceremony, that’s very common, in our religion. 
 
M: Ok and you’re saying this has a positive impact? 
P2: Yes, yes, often it is the thing that happens. Often we go to religious places, Hindu’s 
especially, and they try to visit that place and come back, things that I’m praying god, he will 
do something good for me because if something really bad happened and the things that is I 
did something wrong and the effect of this they try to change. 
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M: Ok, so the way they think afterwards changes, so they may have blamed themselves 
for the event that happened but after they go through a religious ceremony like puja, 
the way they feel and think about what happened and their perceptions about 
themselves change? 
P2: [nodding agreement] 
 
P1: Yes because I think in, which is similar to my culture, people tend to look for support, 
like, this situation is not people who will help you, they will look for support, so for like a 
child you will pray and it will come through pray, so after this traumatic experience they will 
pray to god. 
 
M: So this is where they draw their strength from to deal with the situation? 
P2 & P1: Yes, yes 
 
P3: It always depends; our culture is changing, and has been changing for 20 years now. But 
er, different people, like I said in our culture also, people will go to religious places to pray if 
something happened to them, or if some, or if nothing happened they will still go and pray for 
someone else or their family in general; but after a trauma I would say they go either to this 
places or to church or maybe talk to the priest but I would also say they would go to the 
doctor, er, I don’t know how common this is but erm as I said before it is stigmatized but if 
people don’t see other options they do go to a doctor. 
 
M: Ok if we could move on to the next question, what typical thoughts do you think 
people have about the world in which they live after a trauma? 
P3: I think they might feel more threatened. 
 
P1: After a trauma I think you start to look back at everything you took as advantage, as part 
of your culture or bond. 
 
P2: I think the community after an event, do you mean to say right after it all or after some 
time?  
 
M: Both if you could; their immediate reaction and after a certain amount of time? 
1.5.4 
1.5.5 
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6.1 
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P2: Yes, I would say immediately its about the community, it’s the first, everybody I have 
seen they bare all to the community in the first place, then gradually, they went away with the 
people and they always have the feeling that someone could come for them and they’ll get 
away with that. But most often they get over it and start over again and get back to normal. 
During a bad period they may think the same stuff is happening and the trauma, things like 
that but gradually that reduces and people come back to normal and people treat them as 
normal. 
 
P4: I don’t see the question? 
 
M: What thoughts would people have after the trauma about the world? 
P4: Like change? 
 
M: Yes it could be about change; would you think the individual’s view of the world 
would change after the trauma? 
P4: Yes, for example, in New Year it’s very serious in China. Yeah erm we try to create a 
cleaning environment so for anything bad, when this is finished, all is returned to normal, 
everything changed. 
 
M: So it’s a cleansing ritual? 
P4: Yes so its, how to say, closure, so I think Chinese people cannot remember something 
that’s its past things. 
 
M: Ok so they leave the traumatic events in the past? 
P4: Yes  
 
M: And what typical thoughts do you think people have about their future after a 
trauma? 
P1: I think when something happened, when something makes your paralyzed and you face 
things like experience these bad feelings, then you, you try to move forward but at the time, I 
think someone is just paralyzed trying to deal with this feeling. I don’t think you start to think 
about the future. Maybe to think about the solution to what’s next after what has happened, 
but not what’s the future as the future. 
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M: So they would be thinking about the immediate next step? Would the person be seen 
as living very much in the present? 
P1 & P2: Yes 
 
P2: They just want to get through the trauma; in Indian culture they want to really think of 
anything except that moment. Erm, just to get over that moment, they don’t go around really 
thinking about the future. They think about karma and how this came to happen. 
 
P4: If the trauma is a hard experience it may change their attitude towards life, so think, er, I 
must take time to enjoy my life, not spend or waste my time out walking or something, so 
maybe they will change their attitude, I think it depends on their extent of the experience, 
how bad they had to face. 
 
P2: And I think this is one of the reasons why they are traumatized, because they are worried 
about their future. So after the trauma they are worried about what could happen to me, but 
they do not have answer, normally, they are worried because of the future, but still they won’t 
plan anything. They’ll be too much worried about the world for some time. 
 
M: Ok so there isn’t very much of an attitude change toward their future? 
P2: It depends very much on the family support, for example most of the cases I see for the 
family, if there is support, they will come back to normal life, and if for example one person 
feels completely differently after the trauma, obviously that person changes, but if there’s a 
lot of support for the person people understand why that happened and they want them to 
come back. So the family help in how the person changes or not changes after the trauma, the 
traumatic event. 
 
P1: After trauma I think you change your attitude, like to be closer to your family, to be good, 
and normally being good by being more religious, good by enjoying your life, its kind of this 
things that we are to be good thing and you hold life and maybe you strive to change your 
attitude to this way of life to maybe bring peace to yourself, you would change your attitude 
in a way that brings you closer to what you think is right. 
 
M: So the cultural values you mentioned earlier come in to inform how you should 
behave? 
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P1: Maybe more of a social norm, its your self norms and values, maybe somehow you feel 
this thing has happened to me because I am bad and has happened to me for some reason, this 
kind of attitude to your self blame, and this kind of attitude to the trauma to be good, because 
it kind of resulted because you did something wrong. I think you would feel some peace if 
you did the right thing. 
 
P3: I agree with that people change after trauma, they change their view on the world after 
trauma, but I don’t think they are immediately, but after some time and it depends on the type 
of trauma, and really personal or er … accident … er something really different, it has a 
different impact on the person, I don’t know how early after the trauma they think about the 
future, because obviously immediately after they think how to deal with it now and the future 
comes to mind later. 
… … … 
 
M: Ok, so we’ve talked about the family and friends, I now want to ask you what typical 
thoughts do you think people have about their relationships with others after a trauma? 
P2: It depends on the trauma I think, it’s something which the whole family it may change, 
some trauma is very personal for example and lasts, maybe some physical accident, so yes 
the relations, so they way the person acts can change and they can go more into themselves 
and can be very different. If there’s a chance for them to come back then their attitude don’t 
change because people accept them, but if its something really personal then it can have 
strong impact, I think they will change. 
 
P1: I think with the dynamic you would include yourself and limit your relations with just 
close people at this stage, and maybe your best friend, and even with your best friend, how 
much you can let them be involved can depend on how much its accepted by your family to 
let this issue out of your family. So yes the dynamic can change, because if it’s very personal 
for the family, even if you had a best friend you would not share. 
 
P3: For us its not about sharing with people, I think that every person climbs into himself or 
herself and they are more likely to feel they don’t want to talk to other and feel detached from 
people even those who are close. But maybe they meet people who are close that they may 
share some things with, even if they are afraid, when I think about it they still need someone 
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to share it with, maybe not whole family or all close friends but just one. But er, I think it 
definitively changes things. 
 
P4: Yes, er it changes, er, in China people tend to erm, help some people who experience the 
trauma, but after those people have, I mean, gave up, er tell of their condition. 
 
M: OK and lastly, how do you think these thoughts influence adjustment? 
P2: I think family plays a very big role in Indian culture for any person that has experienced a 
trauma and how sensible people are, how educated they are, how experience they are, for 
example how experienced people are with these things can help with supporting them better 
than if they are alone or with someone who is not so experienced with dealing with this 
situations. Some people who are very experienced with these things, they can help them come 
back to normal life. Especially in cities if they are living, I don’t think there will be a lot of 
support for them to come back to normal life, in cities it’s most like they live by themselves, 
people around don’t care. But if they live in medium or small places people tend to have 
more interactions, they relationships with people are also good to come back and the 
community can help sometimes. More often you see in Indian people they help people come 
out of it. 
 
P1: I think relations and social expectations is the most things that could affect you and how 
you will deal with the trauma or proceed after the trauma. 
 
M: Does anyone else have anything else to add? 
[All shake heads] 
 
M: Ok, if I could ask you to please complete this questionnaire, please read through the 
instructions and complete in your own time, if anything is unclear please ask me. Thank 
you. 
[Everyone completes questionnaires] 
 
M: Could I just ask if anyone has any initial thoughts on the items, did you think they 
were appropriate? 
P2: I think it depends on how long after the trauma you ask these; and I think these are all 
very negative, I mean would you really ask these to someone who has just had a trauma? I 
6.2 
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think it would remind them and build more a bad feeling in them instead of a sense of help 
because they have come here searching for help, so you should not ask questions that will 
bring back the bad feeling, that is what I think. If they share their sad sorrow with someone it 
should reduce their bad feelings, it would be more understanding to positively tackle it, 
instead of making them feel you are really a bad person, because if you read some of the 
questions you will really feel like you are bad. 
 
P1: I think it should include items for what you have learned from this experience, for your 
personality after the trauma and … items on what is their thought and what’s next for future 
plans or something.  
 
P4: I think the first one or two pages are a little negative, I think more positive questions are 
needed. 
 
P3: I think the first 2 pages were quite harsh and in my culture they might be like taken aback 
– why are you asking me – you might think these things but everybody will be surprised to be 
asked them. I understand you need to ask questions to see if something is PTSD or not, but 
maybe the wording can be different. 
 
M: Ok so to sum up then, not all the questions were as appropriate as you would like, 
perhaps they shouldn’t be so confronting and so should be worded in a way that people 
would respond to better. 
P2 & P3: Yes yes [P1 and P4 nod]. 
 
M: Thank you very much for taking part. 
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Appendix F 
Focus Group 2 
 
Interview Key:   M = Moderator   P5, P6, P7, P8 = Participant Numbers 
… = Pauses     [Actions] 
 
M: What does trauma mean in your culture? 
P5: Trauma specifically, well, trauma can be caused by anything, you know, that alleges 
distress. Like monsters or something, you know, like tragic things that happen to your family 
or friends, like that. Yeah, you know, kind of like a minor matter, or a mental imbalance, I 
believe it is trauma. 
 
P6: Yes something which gives you a strong feeling like sadness or anger, strong feelings like 
that. 
 
M: So are you saying it is only a trauma if it elicits a great deal of emotion? 
P6: Yes and you need to feel and remember hat for a long period of time. 
 
P7: Yes it can also be like an injury or something like, you know, like you met with some 
kind of accident, you would be scared for some months or some years. Like when I met with 
an accident I was scared to travel in a car or something you know, an experience like that. It 
stays with you. It effects how you think about things afterwards. 
 
[All participants nodding] 
 
P8: Yes on how you move forward. 
 
P5: Yes, yeah, on how you move forward. 
 
P8: Erm, what I think about trauma, it’s like some accident that happens to you, some kind of 
physical accident, it can also relate to the stress you feel in your job. I had the former 
experience, when I was younger I had a bike accident and now I have a fear of driving a bike. 
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P5: There are also things that happen in your childhood that may affect you later, even if it’s 
minor. I was really afraid of dogs for a long time, because I was attacked by a dog when I 
was a child. I think recently when I came to this country, all the dogs were well trained, 
unlike in India and I am kind of ok with it now. 
 
M: So to summarize then, the trauma event that happens, whether in adulthood or 
childhood stays with the person and has a long-term impact on them and possibly how 
they behave because of that event or experience? 
P5: Yes I believe that is something happens in childhood that may last a long time, I think. 
 
P6: But I think if you can change the mind-set of someone, so if someone helps you get out of 
it, there will be some kind of shift in your mind, yes, so you need mental support. [Twists his 
hands] I had a, me and my sister, it was an accident, she passed away when I was 6 years old, 
it was an accidental death like we were playing near a water tank and erm in the evening erm 
err our parents come and we, erm, err, we were playing with our cousins and me and my 
sister and err in the evening my mum called us for snacks so we all went but we didn’t check 
whether everyone came or not with us and when we went back she fell in the water tank and 
erm we couldn’t save her life, like she died on the way to the hospital.  
 
M: You don’t have to [P6 speaks over moderator] 
P6: And after I have very guilty feelings, like if we were em like if I was erm a bit more 
careful it would have been avoided and after that since I saw that she was in the water tank I 
was scared to enter the water like whenever you go to the beach or swimming pools. I won’t 
enter into the water. It was during my college days, my friends took me to the beach and it 
was, I mean it was for that long period of time, I was not ready to go to the beach or enter 
some place where there is water. Now at college, I mean my friends, they made me, I mean 
they supported me and gave me confidence, that it won’t happen, they gave me mental 
support. Then I started to begin to feel comfortable. 
 
M: So a support system is need to move forward from a traumatic experience? 
P6: Yes [All others nod agreement] 
 
M: Is trauma talked about in your culture? 
All participants: No, no. 
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P5: Because of what other people will think 
 
M: Whom do you go to for support? 
P7: Maybe close friends. 
 
P6: Parents. [Others nod]. 
 
M: Ok, my next question is what typical thoughts do people have after the traumatic 
event? 
P7: What kind of thoughts? I think like scary feelings will be there, like during the trauma 
and how do you overcome that? Some people come to doctor or like check up for that 
because erm the parents will be erm err can’t help. Like one of my cousins is very scared of 
cockroaches and spiders and whenever she sees this creature she feel itchy. We tried to help 
her overcome this, we tried a lot to help her recover but she did not recover from that. Then 
we told the doctor and that doctor was telling us it is difficult to get rid of these feelings. She 
sees a doctors and now, 5 or 6 years, now she is somewhat ok, not so serious but she didn’t 
take any medication for that. 
 
M: Do you think a visit to the doctors helped? 
P7: He just gave some advice, so just some advice. 
 
M: Advice on how to cope? 
P7. Yes yes advice on how to cope with the scared feelings. 
 
M: [Directed to P5, P6 and P8] What typical thoughts do you think people have? 
P5: Depends on the situation but erm normally I think err like it is a physical err will 
probably try to avoid that kind of situation. 
 
P6: I don’t know … I mean like, because scary sometimes they have guilty feelings like I told 
you earlier, that you are responsible for something. 
 
P8: I think it depends on the situations like say an accident, I had an accident, I was driving 
the car, I slept and hit another car and I had a small wound and my sister hurt her leg and my 
brother-in-law got a cut on his head. For nearly the next year when I think of these things I 
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feel like … before this accident I slept for 3 hours a day, I feel like maybe if I had a good 
sleep this wouldn’t have happened, I wouldn’t have committed that accident. After that 
accident I have a good sleep when I travel in the car whether I’m driving or not. Also I was 
feeling a little bit guilty because of that and so now I sleep before a long journey, before I 
drive a car.  
 
M: Do you think other people in your cultures would have similar thoughts? 
P7: I think it depends on the situation. 
 
P5: I think it depends on the person. 
 
P6: I think if they are educated it helps. 
 
M: How would that play a part? 
P5: Well typically when a person is not much educated, they will not have a broad mind, that 
will affect their decisions. The mind would be weak and an educated person is supposed to 
have a strong mind, this will help them. 
 
P6: Yeah because they can think what went wrong. 
 
P7: Think rationally. 
 
P8: Yes think rationally about what happened. 
 
M: Do you think it’s important for the person to think about what happened? 
P5: Yes to get past that. 
 
All participants: Yes 
 
M: What typical thoughts do you think people have about themselves after the 
traumatic event? 
P6: I think it is something … if you are the sufferer of what happened, then it’s easy for you 
but if someone else is suffering because of you then you will be extremely guilty about what 
happened. 
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P5: I think after a trauma, it’s quite hard to convince me that there’s not a fault, the person 
becomes aware of the facts and gets away from the situation. 
 
P8: They blame themselves. 
 
M: What typical thoughts do you think people have about the world after the traumatic 
event? 
P7: The world? 
 
M: Yes about the world they live in. 
P6: I think they have a feeling, will focus on what others will feel because of me. 
 
P5: Yes, if we go back to the accident again, I’ll drive more carefully because it might hurt 
people if I don’t, just thinking about other people, I will be more concerned about other 
people. 
 
P8: Some people will tell you ‘my time is not good’. Like you cannot always blame, like he is 
not always careless, so we cannot blame him or the other person. So they will say ‘my time is 
not good’ I cannot do anything about it. 
 
P7: They blame fate.  
 
All participants: Yes, yes fate. 
 
M: So people think fate is the cause of what happened?  
Yeah some people think in that way, but mainly our religious people. 
 
P8: Yes. 
 
P7: I agree. 
 
P6: Or those who believe in signs, astrology, they say this time or week is not good for you, it 
is the signs that’s responsible. 
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P7: Yes that’s what happens. 
 
P8: Yes it is a cultural thing. 
 
P5: So if someone blames fate, I don’t think it will change how they think of the world. [All 
other participants agree]. 
 
M: What typical thoughts do you think people have about their relationships with 
others after the traumatic event? 
P8: It doesn’t change my relationships, but with the car accident, I will not go in the car with 
him again. It’s just that particular person, he’s still my friend, I don’t thinks it’s changed our 
relationship. 
 
P6: Maybe he would think about his life more, be more friendly with his friends.  
 
P7: I think relationships can change. I feel relationships matter.  
 
P6: I’m not sure if this is trauma, but my friend’s sister, she is from a village and goes to the 
city to an international school. She had very strong bullying and teasing, the situation was 
really bad and on one day she tried to commit suicide and after that she always has this 
feeling that someone is trying to kill here. When she goes back to her family she feels like her 
brother is trying to kill her, it’s changed her relationship with her brother. In this case all her 
relationships have changed, with her brother and many other people, parents, friends. 
 
M: Does anyone else have anything else to add? 
No answer. 
 
M: So to sum up then people’s relationships can change, even with close family 
members. 
[All nod assent]. 
 
M: What typical thoughts do you think people have about their future others after the 
traumatic event? 
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P5: To be honest I don’t think they think much about their future after a traumatic event, they 
will think about their immediate future, they will think what will I do now … 
 
P6: They will try to avoid the same situations. 
 
P7 & P8: Yes, yes. 
 
P5: They will think about what happened and erm try to make it not happen again. 
 
P7: They will think about the future, in my case when I was 6 something happened and it was 
in my memory for like 10 – 12 years. Whenever this picture comes to mind, like it actually 
stopped me from doing some things so we have to think of future. 
 
P5: It would be about immediate future. 
 
P8: I agree it would be about immediate future. For me when an accident happened I felt like 
I might get terminated from the company, I had a fear of that thing for the immediate future, I 
didn’t think of all the things for a long term future, just the immediate future. 
 
P7: I think it is like that for any accident, but I also think it stays with you for a long time and 
you have to stay careful. 
 
M: How do you think all these thoughts we’re been discussing influences a person’s 
adjustment after a trauma? 
… 
 
P5: How do you mean? 
 
M: How do you think these thoughts influence how you recover or get better after a 
trauma? 
P7: I don’t know. 
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P5: Some people are very good at getting on with things after an incident and maybe if its 
minor traumatic incident they will get over it soon. The relationship with other people and 
family members won’t change what happened in the situation. 
 
P8: Maybe for some months you feel bad things, maybe that incident will haunt you, but after 
that, after some time you will be free. 
 
P6: I agree. 
 
M: Would people seek help? 
P5: In India people are not that comfortable with psychiatrists, I mean not many people are. 
 
P7: I think they will go to a psychologist if the case is extreme. 
 
P8: Yes if they had kind of depression. 
 
P5: But I don’t think many will go see a psychiatrist. It is like, if I go to a psychiatrist other 
people will talk. 
 
P6: Yes. 
 
P5: They talk a lot. 
 
P8: Yes. 
 
P7: They think you are insane. 
 
[All agree]. 
 
P7: They can exaggerate what is wrong. 
 
P6: If one of the family members goes to the psychiatrist it can affect the whole family. 
 
M: How does it affect the whole family? 
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P6: Yes the whole culture in India is very different, there are a lot of arranged marriages, so if 
my sister is taken to a psychiatrist it will be difficult for a marriage to happen later.   
 
[All agree]. 
 
P6: You know people say things. 
 
P5: When I was young my parents took me to a speech therapist so I went and my parents 
were understanding so it wasn’t too big a deal. But if the family is not understanding I don’t 
think they will be ready to take their son to a psychiatrist. And if they do they will take him 
somewhere far away. 
 
[All agree]. 
 
P8: In my cousin’s case they took her to Bangalore, which is 300 kilometers away from 
where they are living. 
 
M: Because they didn’t want anyone to know? 
P6: Yes but this only comes with mental problems. 
 
P7: Yes these types of issues. 
 
M: Ok so a physical problem is treated differently to a psychological problem? 
P5: Yes, very differently. 
 
[P6 & P8 nodding] 
 
P7: The community as a whole is not understanding. 
 
[All agree]. 
 
M: So to help people adjust after a trauma what do they do? 
P5: Keep it to themselves and support themselves. Sometimes family. 
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P7: They will tell certain family members, father or mother. 
 
P5: But sometimes that doesn’t happen, they keep it to themselves. 
 
M: Would it be fair to say that people’s thoughts are concerned with how others see 
them and this influences their adjustment posttrauma? 
[All agree]. 
 
P8: How others see you matters. 
 
P5: Yes because you don’t want others to find out if it is a serious issue. 
 
M: Ok, now if you could complete the questionnaire. Please read the instructions and 
complete in your own time. If anything is unclear please ask me. 
[Everyone completes questionnaires in silence] 
 
M: Did anyone have any thoughts regarding the questions? Did you think they were 
appropriate? 
P5: I think most were not appropriate. 
 
P7: I don’t think so either. 
 
P5: I didn’t like the self-blaming questions, I think it should have a positive outlook. 
 
P8: Yes I think that would be better. 
 
P6: Because a lot of people blame themselves, they commit suicide. 
 
M: Any other comments? 
… 
 
M: Ok thank you for your time today. 
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Appendix G 
Focus Group 3 
 
Interview Key:   M = Moderator   P9, P10, P11 = Participant Numbers 
… = Pauses     [Actions] 
 
M: What does trauma mean in your culture? 
P9: O trauma, yes yes, er there is some bad thing, some accident, erm memorable in the past, 
normally we never mention this word, we have a relation with the good things, I say that the 
accident, the earthquake, I think that’s fine, its not concerned with the mental, it’s from the 
outside, the for the body. 
 
M: So you’re saying it physical? 
P9: Yes the physical not the mental, I think that’s all. 
 
M: Is mental strain recognized? 
P9: maybe. Yeah yeah, maybe include, but depends on erm … … … 
 
M: Is it more emotional distress than mental distress, or is it then mostly physical? 
P9: Its mostly physical but maybe its 60% concerned with physical and 30% concerned with 
mental, I think that proportionately that’s ok. 
 
P10:I think in my culture, the trauma mostly means the physical injury like when people have 
an accident or something, erm, now its increasing about trauma meaning, many people also 
aware that the trauma can be the mental problem, like if you live in the family with the parent 
and not have a good relationship, it can effect to the children or something, it can also be a 
trauma, but now its increasing, but mainly, most people in my country think its trauma just 
physical erm problem. 
 
M: OK but you’re also saying that culture is slowly changing and accepting 
psychological or mental problem as well? 
P10: Yes yes. 
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P11: According to my understanding trauma means the state of mind after some disastrous 
event or something shocking happened, this is what I think trauma is. 
 
M: What would be considered a disastrous event or a shocking event? 
P11: For example if you lose somebody you love or if you are in the circumstance that is out 
of your control. 
 
M: You also said trauma is a state of mind, do you think it is also physical? 
P11: I think it’s very mental. 
 
M: What typical thoughts do you think someone in your culture would have after a 
trauma? 
P9: Sorry that doesn’t make sense. 
 
M: After someone has had a traumatic event, what sort of things do they think about? 
P9: Oo I think maybe it depends on the level of the traumatic things happened, if it is very 
bad I don’t think everyone want to have a memory, but they just want to forget it as soon as 
possible. Maybe in the future, they face some ordeal they can’t remember that is horrible, 
sometimes they can’t have a good sleep and they can’t eat anything. But for me I think that’s 
fine its I don’t know I think I have accepted you know it’s a bad memory, its past and I need 
to learn something from that and if the traumatic is slightly, I think that’s fine, it’s for the 
very bad memory I don’t want to remember it. 
 
P10: I think people will be kind of disappointed and sad after this and they have a kind of 
pessimistic view of life and something and, and the life and the future. 
 
M: Sorry did you say a pessimistic view of their life and their future? 
P10: Yes yes, I think so. 
 
P11: In my culture when somebody is in a traumatic situation, people they feel some 
sympathy, but that’s very visible to the person or to the victim, and he cannot forget that 
traumatic event, that the people maybe there to be sympathetic but they are there and you 
cannot calm down in a very short period of time, they are reminding you. 
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M: Ok, so you’re saying that although they are trying to be helpful, they are reminding 
the person about the trauma? 
P11: Yeah, yeah. 
 
M: And would this be the family or the community or both? 
P11: Both, especially community. 
 
M: And what would the individual’s thoughts be about the trauma? 
P11: I mean, he thinks about that event over again, and it may take a long time to get relief 
from that state of mind. Even for example if a person is dead from the family, the community 
come to give you some kind of comfort or something but they keep talking about the dead 
person and how he’s dead and that makes people cry and I think that’s not good, because I 
prefer it to be people came in to talk of other things. 
 
M: OK, what typical thoughts do you think they would have about themselves after 
experiencing a trauma? 
P10: I cannot say many or most people, but I think some of them maybe think that the 
problem comes from just himself or herself like he or she is the reason for the accident or 
problem, and they felt it’s a particular problem about themselves. But some people anything 
is erm a small number is a kind of fate and comes randomly and like they just reason some 
kind of fate and erm the reason is not come from themselves. 
 
M: OK so you’re saying that this other group of people blame fate for what happens? 
P10: Yes because of fate it’s happened, some people blame themselves but some other people 
think it’s because of fate. 
 
M: Ok so you’re saying there are two groups of people and they think differently and 
one group blames themselves and the other group blames it on fate? 
P10: Yes there are two groups of people and I cannot say which group has much people, 
because I think actually we have two kinds of people and so two groups, I cannot measure the 
numbers in which one. 
 
P9: Maybe they think of themselves as very weak and not very strong to face these problems, 
not even the traumatic event and er I think again it depends on the level of the traumatic, for 
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example if someone was faced with a car accident maybe they can’t travel by car after that, I 
have friends, my friend was in the same situation, he is very sensitive and just as he left the 
home and crossed the road a car ran the red lights, he pays very much attention to the 
situation of the road. Every time when he crosses the road there must be nothing in the road. 
Even some cars stop there, he can’t go across. It’s a very bad memory. 
 
M: Do you think the view of themselves changes after trauma? 
P9: Yeah, yeah, sometimes maybe they think they are different but I think its acceptable for 
themselves, I mean that bad thing they face not other people have face, so maybe other 
people can’t consider the situation, they never face it, so yeah they think they are different 
and that’s fine I think, so they just concern the life, themselves, even they face the very very 
horrid problems, so they take care, I think that’s fine. I mean some days it’s very dangerous 
everywhere, you know in China sometimes even you drive a car, not you hit others, you drive 
normal, but other rookies, they just learn the car, maybe several months they drive in public, 
and they hit you, you can’t avoid it, so its random if you face it, maybe you will lose your 
life. 
 
P11: Typical thoughts, for example? 
 
M: Thoughts they would have after a trauma about themselves? 
P11: Its very common in my culture that family tie is very very very high and especially 
when I mean the family who has a small income someone is lost, the people get shocked and 
this is very common, and people keep reminding them again and again, and sometimes, when 
people see for example, a youngster or child, people “tss” kind of “tss” this sound is to 
express sympathy that they give comfort to the victim. 
 
M: Ok I see, and after a traumatic event, do you think the individual’s thoughts about 
themselves would change to what they thought before? 
P11: Through time yes I think it could change, through time, it depends on the person and the 
type of person, and you know some people naturally have a better way of understanding the 
situation. 
 
M: Ok, so you’re saying it’s easier for the people who have a better understanding of 
the situation, of why the trauma happened? 
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P11: Yes yes. 
 
M: Ok, what thoughts do you think they have about the world after experiencing a 
trauma? 
P11: The world, I don’t understand. 
 
M: So how an individual thinks about themselves in the world they live in? What is 
their world view? 
P11: Ahh ok, yes … … …  
 
M: Do you think this could change? 
P11: I think so. 
 
M: How do you think it would change? 
P11: Because when this kind of feeling happens in very small communities, if the people can 
think of that there is other opportunity in the world there are other lifestyles the feelings of 
that victim would be better. 
 
M: So you think their worldview could change and it would be for the better, but they 
need to find a different way of coping, one that is outside a small community? 
P11: Yes. 
 
M: And what do you think? (Directs question to P9) 
P9: Sorry? 
 
M: After a trauma what would people think of the world? 
P9: Maybe a little sad a little blue, yeh I think its not normal, either you face this problem, 
this is your memory and you confront it, even you try to cut it sometimes I remember, I 
believe everyone can recover this memory, so its in your life, directly and maybe when you 
say the sky is very different colour now, its grey not very blue, its not the same sky. From 
emotion of themselves they think they are very weak, not as happy as before, just concerned 
everything you know. Maybe after I am very sensitive, I think after the bad memory I think 
that’s fine, but my family don’t think so, they are sensitive of everything, they never lose the 
hope of the future, but they are more careful than before.  
O
u
ts
id
e 
in
fl
u
en
ce
s 
- 
ad
ju
st
m
en
t 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
em
o
ti
o
n
s 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
se
lf
 v
ie
w
s 
1.5.5 
1.4.3 
3.1 
  xciii 
M: So you’re saying the perception of the world then does change slightly? 
P9: Yeh yeh absolutely, I mean maybe if we have 10 people and 4 of them faces a bad thing, 
maybe after that I think almost 50% of them will change their attitude forward. 
 
P10: Normally people will think the world is going to be worse, like erm after the trauma I 
guess the kind of injury can be both mental and physical so they will lose confidence about 
themselves so they think thoughts that the initial they are not have enough tough enough to 
adapt, so maybe they are having trouble and difficulty. 
 
M: Ok so then does their view of the world change? 
P10: Yes 
 
M: What thoughts would they have about their future after a trauma? 
P9: Just sometimes they worry about that. What about if they don’t have the power, they 
don’t have ability to do this to do that, when they face a problem how do they deal with it. 
Just concerning, very sensitive. 
 
M: So their thoughts on the future potentially change as well? 
P9: yeh yeh yeh I think must be changed, or potentially. 
 
M: Do you think their life goals would change? 
P9: Yeh I think that will be changed, when I was a little child I just have a good dream maybe 
several dream, you can think maybe in the future you are doing this you are doing that, but 
after you’re faced some things you need to change your thoughts, you must be maybe after 
they are adults you can realize even 30% of our dreams is fine, 30 – 50 I think that’s very 
great. 
 
P10: Thoughts about their future, they have bad thoughts, negative yes. 
 
P11: Their future, it depends actually, but most people especially from very small 
communities they think that the future is dark and maybe some people very very rarely they 
will try a suicidal attempt, very rarely, but yeh it depends on the people, some are very 
strong, even if they feel inside they won’t show it on the outside. 
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M: Do you think their plans would change? So if they had future goals, do you think 
this would change? 
P11: Ok, sometimes, sometimes, if someone, I’m just thinking what if that person dies from 
the family, but there are many different kinds of traumas, but in that case er people will you 
know going to school will have another plan, they want to stop going to school and find a job 
as kind of a help … … Yes, some who have a traumatic experience, they would change their 
place and want to live a new life. 
 
M: Ok so they would want to get away from where the experience happened? 
P11: Yes 
 
M: What thoughts do they have about their relationships with others? 
P10: What you mean relationships? With parents, family or the friend? 
 
M: Yes any or all of these relationships. 
P10: Erm, yes I think, in my country because some, after the trauma the family will take care 
more about the people, that’s their habit, because of this trauma the relationship with people 
in the family is much more stronger than before. But sometime, in another relationship in a 
couple of friend or something maybe it changes negatively, because some people have a kind 
of real problem, its personal, have a problem with their physical appearance, and maybe they 
lose a hair or maybe their face is something ugly, so its they lose ability to walk around and 
do other things, the future is not a future so effects to them and the couple or the relationship, 
like they some people they don’t feel their partner is good enough. Like so its affects their 
relationships, actually I see some husband, they change their thinking about their wife after 
the wife got accident or even after the wife got children, so think they of not leaving but 
having a relationship with another. 
 
M: Ok, so if somebody were to have a traumatic event, they would share this with their 
family? 
10: Yes yes, I think so, most people would share with the family. 
 
M: So would the family be an important support for them to help them get over the 
trauma? 
P10: Yes especially the parents. 
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M: You mentioned that family is very important and community ties, so after a 
traumatic event do you think a person’s relationship with others changes at all? 
(Directed at P11) 
P11: No, it’s not changed. 
 
M: So it stays the same? 
P11: Yes and very rarely, the victim is trying to avoid the people’s sympathy. 
 
M: Ok, but you say that’s rare? 
P11: Yes that is rare. 
 
M: Would somebody in your culture then be thinking about others after the traumatic 
event? 
P11: Yes, very much. 
 
P9: Also it depends on the level, if they face very big problem, for example, if they have a 
relationship with his friend maybe the relation is totally changes, they don’t trust each other 
and they sometimes they just make a complaint to each other, they are not friends after that, 
one was the relationship must change. Sometimes when the friend faces the same problems, 
the attitude that they saw their friend do is different than when they are normal, after that it is 
very strange between the two people. Sometimes even in the couple, for my girlfriend and me 
if something happened I mean the relation is different.  
 
M: So it changes? 
P9: Yeah it must change. 
 
M: So if somebody had a traumatic experience or stressful life event, whom would they 
go to for support? 
P9: For my point of view I think I would support by myself, I would do it, not just consider to 
ask someone else to heal me, it’s not reliable I think, er, but for my friend, I think both, he 
just tried to finish himself but also asked my friend and his friend to help him, and I had this 
though, I had this though, he want someone else to help him, because after that car accident 
this is sometimes, not sometimes, if no one pull him out he would lose his life, I mean from 
this point of view his view of the world is positive not negative. 1.5.8 
1.5.2 
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M: Ok, so he took something from that event? 
P9: Yeah yeah, maybe I think 3 or 4 people pull him out, it’s very important I think and they 
saw him to the hospital. 
 
M: So what thoughts do you think influence recovery? 
P10: To recovery, I think the help from the family is very important, because it is the most 
important people to help this problem, and they have, there is a significance and it come 
naturally. They have, the people in the family have the sole responsibility to the people who 
have the problem, so they have people like by themselves, they don’t think about any kind of 
benefit or something, they have to encourage people, so I think this help is very important 
and it has a chance to help people. 
 
M: what thoughts would be needed for recovery from the trauma? (Directed to P9) 
P9: maybe sometimes just avoid same situations, another one may be find some good, for my 
case, just try your best to make you happy. Sometimes I just blame myself. 
 
M: How would the thoughts we talked about help someone recovery? (Directs to P11) 
P11: I think that to, I mean its, for a death it’s a normal thing, it’s a natural thing, that they 
can live their life, just to think to give the company and to help them see what other 
opportunities there are.  
 
M: And how would they see what other opportunities there are? 
P11: The individual especially, friends, but the community is not like that, even sometimes in 
my community, when somebody was in a traumatic condition the topic is always that it 
should end, they associate everything with the traumatic event, and they are worsening it to 
be honest. 
 
M: So you’re saying the community can make it worse? 
P11: Yes. 
 
M: How can the individuals help themselves recover? 
P11: If they have a good friend they should let them know, keep some kind of company and 
get advice. 
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M: Do people seek professional advice? 
P11: Professionally, it’s not very common in my country. 
 
M: What do people do to get advice? 
P11: They go to church. Church is the only thing that you can do, go and pray and get 
strength and advice from the priest. Because they associate with their luck, especially because 
of them and luck, because God is angry, they are not a good person. 
 
M: So their strength comes from going to church, talking to the priest and unburdening 
themselves, is that what you’re saying? 
P11: Yes. 
 
M: Ok, thank you, if I could now ask you to read through and fill in the questionnaire. 
[Participants read through and fill in questionnaire] 
 
M: What were your initial thoughts?  
P11: Actually it’s related to my experience, it’s inappropriate to ask. 
 
M: Why do you think it’s inappropriate? 
P11: Because I am hopeful and I have a bright future. 
 
M: Ok so you want to concentrate on the positive? 
P11: Yes, not to be reminded about that. 
 
M: Ok is there anything else you would like to add? (Directs to P9 andP10) 
P9: I think your questions is too negative, I mean you can add some question for the positive. 
 
M: And your thoughts? (Directed at P10) 
P10: Yes I agree with some of what the others said that some may be inappropriate, but I also 
think there are some questions that are ok to ask, that is how you will find out how to help 
them. 
 
M: Ok, thank you all for taking part. 
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Appendix H 
P12 Key Informant Interview 
 
Interview Key:     M = Moderator     I = Interviewee      [Actions]     … Pauses 
 
M: If I could start with the first question, what does trauma mean for individuals in 
collectivistic cultures, which are typically non-western? 
I: For me trauma is both physical and psychological … so … I think in those cultures it 
maybe more … its more physical than psychological that would be my belief. But it would 
cover both but it may relate more to horrible events and how that impacts on your health and 
well-being. Primarily it would be in terms of their ability to survive, you know, eating and 
drinking, illness and then there would be how they would feel afterwards I think. 
 
M: So are you saying the psychological injury would be secondary and not hold as much 
precedence as the former injury? 
I: Yeah yeah 
 
M: Following on from there, what typical thoughts do you think people from 
collectivistic culture would have after experiencing a traumatic event? 
I: To some extent I think there might be fatalism that erm they are probably more accustomed 
than us to the effects of seasons and weather and natural disasters, so they may actually take 
it, they may have a more sort of fatalistic, more sort of accepting view than we would. 
 
M: OK and what typical thoughts do you think they would have about themselves 
following a traumatic event? 
I: They might sometimes personalize it and think its because of something I’ve done, so self-
blame rather than seeing it as er a sort of random event, I suspect they may personalize it 
more than seeing it as a random event something that’s just happened and there’s nothing 
much you can do about it and you are in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
 
M: And what typical thoughts do you think they would have about the world in which 
they live in following a traumatic incident? 
I: This is quite difficult because erm they may feel let down by the world and their 
worldview, I mean they might have, they might have quite a strong view of the world and 
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how it works and how they fit in to it, and its possible that a big disaster then disturbs that, 
you know, has an impact. 
 
M: So are you saying that potentially, there is a shift in their view of the world? 
I: Yeah … maybe … yeah 
 
M: Do you think the same for the previous question, that there may be a shift in their 
perception of themselves after a traumatic event? 
I: I think that some people erm they may be themselves as being victimized or being cruelly 
marked out, you know why me, you know I’ve done everything right, erm, you know I’ve 
been a good citizen, I’ve followed my religion, I’ve fitted in, I’ve been a good citizen, why 
has this happened? Erm so they might be some change. 
 
M: And do you think this links in to the self-blame mentioned earlier? 
I: Yeah, yeah … or its some other, you haven’t recognized them or that they’ve been cruelly 
treated, that their contribution and their place has, hasn’t been recognized by whatever has 
caused the problem and there’s been some failure of communication or something. 
 
M: And what typical thoughts do you think they would have about their future? 
I: It’s a difficult one, erm, is it ok to think? 
 
M: Of course it is, yes. 
I: Because I don’t want to give you a glib answer, and I’m trying to think back to when I been 
abroad and visited these sort of cultures, erm, I’ve never been involved in a, in a horrific 
disaster, so I’m going partly on what I’ve seen on the television, erm, and what I’ve read by 
people like Derek Summerfield, erm, see if they have a very strong collective belief, erm, it 
may not change their views about the future, erm, and you know, if they, if they’ve got a very 
resilient, sort of engaged culture then they’ll probably belief the futures going to be ok, that 
they’ve got you know some internal strengths that will enable them to overcome things, erm, 
things can be alright, that this is just a temporary thing that they’ll get over. 
 
M: So you’re saying that future goals are not impaired by this traumatic event? 
I: I think so, yeah I think so, yeah. 
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M: OK, what you are saying then is that they are concentrating more on the immediate 
future? 
I: Yeah I think they’d be immediate concerns but there would be a more positive view about 
the longer future. 
 
M: OK and lastly what typical thoughts do you think they would have about their 
relationships with others following a traumatic event? And do you think that would 
alter at all? 
I: No if anything they could be strengthened I’d have thought, you know in adversity people 
draw closer together, gather strength from each other, erm, that’s my sort of observation of 
the recent events in Japan, that people seem to pool together and look after each other. 
 
M: Do you think this is just within the family or within the community? 
I: No, I think it’s within community, yeah yeah. 
 
M: And how do you think these thoughts about themselves, the world, the future, about 
other would influence adjustment? Do you think it would have an impact? 
I: Erm, yeah I think it would help them manage and help them get through the initial crisis, 
yeah I do. 
 
M: Ok, could you expand on that please? 
I: Erm, I think people draw strength from getting support from other, feeling that they belong 
within a group, erm, feeling that they’re being helped and supported, and that gives them the 
motivation to put things right and to start you know trying to rebuild, er, it also helps them 
with the grieving process if they’re lost friends close family, erm, and again you could maybe 
draw strength by seeing that other people have been through a very similar situation, so you 
can sort of go through it together, erm, so, yeah I think the sort of beliefs I’m talking about 
are positive ones, because I feel that these beliefs have been formed with close knit societies 
that their cultures have been formed in adversity over a long period of time so its there for a 
purpose, you know, it’s a tried and tested way of existing and its evolved in relation to 
adversity as a way of supporting people and getting them through these crises. 
 
M: You mentioned earlier that trauma within collectivistic cultures was more 
contingent on physical trauma. 
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I: Yes. 
 
M: Regarding psychological trauma, do you think people within these cultures would 
come forward to see somebody or would it be something they would keep to themselves 
and try to cope with it themselves? 
I: I think they would come forward and engage, but they probably wouldn’t use the world 
psychological. You know it would be more to do with help, or friendship or erm, maybe just 
telling people how they feel, rather than psychologicalising it, it would be on a more sort of 
erm emotional level of saying you know I’m really fed up with this how do you feel. But 
there would also be some cultural, some cultural framework as well, because there would be 
certain emotions and certain sets of behavior that are valued and considered appropriate and 
others that are taboo, so there would be put through some sort of cultural framework. 
 
M: Thank you, if I could now ask you to read through the questionnaire, these are the 
items used in the Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory, they assess the thoughts and 
beliefs of people who have been through stressful life events. If you could read through 
each item and indicate how appropriate you think they are to ask people from 
collectivistic cultures. 
I: So what do I do, just say what I think? 
 
M: Yes, if you could just circle how appropriate you think the item is on the scale, it 
ranges from 1 totally inappropriate to 7 totally appropriate, and at the end if you can 
add any items that you feel would be appropriate to ask someone within a collectivistic 
culture that has been through a stressful life event that would be great. Thank you. 
I: [reads] Nothing good can happen to me anymore … erm … yeh it seems appropriate, erms, 
I’m sort of between the two, slightly and very, yeah, I’d say very. 
My life has been totally destroyed by the trauma, yeah it seem ok. I have no future … futures 
a cultural concept … but then I suppose trauma is as well, yeah future I think is a tricky one, 
because it is culturally determined what you think it is, erm … I’m going to say that’s slightly 
inappropriate. I’m a weak person … again weak I think erm, my idea of what weak is not 
going to be shared necessarily, erm, cause even in, you know, erm, I’m doing a study of 
Britain, hopefully I’m doing a study of Britain and how we coped with trauma in 1950s and a 
weak person would be somebody who wept openly whereas nowadays that would be 
considered a sign of strength, whereas in those days it had to be stiff upper lip, don’t cry. 
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M: So even within cultures, over times? 
I: it changes, yeah, a lot. Erm, so I think weak is slightly inappropriate.  
I can’t stop bad things happening to me. Yeah that seems ok. I’ve permanently changed for 
the worse. Erm, this is not easy to do actually. [reads] Cause with this I’d struggle over 
‘permanently’ again that’s erm … it doesn’t seem that erm I think that’s probably ok, I’ve 
permanently changed, I’d say neutral. [reads] My actions since the event show I am a lousy 
coper. That seems really … slightly inappropriate, cause the word lousy erm coping, they 
seem to me both culturally determined. Erm to me, I would say its more neutral if it says I 
don’t do well or something like that. 
 
M: so are you saying it’s the word? 
I: Yeah its the word, the meanings ok, but … [stops talking and reads again] 
 
M: Are you referring to lousy?  
I: Yes it comes from the first world war, because soldiers in the trenches got lice and you had 
to burn them off with a candle. So lousy meant feeling, it came from the trenches and feeling 
just uncomfortable and dirty 
 
M: I see. 
I: Yes it comes from lice. 
 
M: Would you say that’s a Western colloquialism?  
I: Yes definitely. [reads] If I think about the event I will not be able to handle it.  Yes, I 
suppose that’s ok, although handle it is erm a colloquialism isn’t it? [reads] I’ll never be able 
to feel normal emotions again … I feel like an object not a person … er, cause, a person can 
be an object [laughs]. Yeah, it depends on your culture, because I’m the object of this survey 
aren’t I? [reads] ‘My reactions since the event means I am going crazy’ … my problem with 
that one … is that actually all mental illnesses are culturally determined isn’t it? In terms of 
symptoms and interpretations, so my view of crazy behavior is not someone else’s, erm, and 
even something that looks crazy could be perfectly understandable in a particular context, 
erm, so Derek Summerfield view, so I’d say sort of neutral, but I don’t know …  
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M: So potentially that item can be explored further? 
I: Yeah. They all strike me as being perfectly reasonable questions, erm … by neutral I don’t 
mean that’s bad, I’m just you know neutral in some ways is sort of quite good for me, 
because its, a neutral question to me is quite a good question because its not loaded, but I 
know you want me to say whether its appropriate or not. I suppose, yeah, what I’m thinking 
is that they’re all appropriate questions, its sometimes words that sort of catch me out. 
 
M: So what you’re saying is that potentially changing the wording of the questions for 
these particular cultures then you could have very different results? 
I: Yes, I’d say that’s very appropriate [reads questions silently]‘ People cant be trusted’ that’s 
quite loaded isn’t it? That’s a loaded question. Rather than saying can you trust people? 
[reads] ‘I feel dead inside’ that to me may be quite a strong cultural thing; there may be some 
cultures where that doesn’t apply at all, that’s what I’m thinking. Cause I have a feeling I 
know what that means but in a different culture it may mean something completely different. 
[reads] ‘I feel like I don’t know myself anymore’, that’s quite complicated; yeah that’s quite a 
difficult one. There’s two here which are quite similar, ‘there’s something about me that 
made the event happen’ and also ‘the event happened to me because of the type of person I 
am’ the second ones more complicated [reads]. 
 
M: Having gone through the questionnaire? 
I: it does seem skewed about to the self with only 7 on the world view, I would have thought 
that is a bit biased. I mean if I’m putting myself in the situation and something horrific 
happened er I would be putting much more many more proportion of my beliefs would be in 
my view of the world, rather than, you know if there was an earthquake here I wouldn’t be 
thinking ‘oo I’ve caused this’ or it’s because or I mean I would have views about, I would 
have probably have negative views about, cause I know when I’ve been in crises afterwards I 
always think ‘oo I could have done better, why didn’t I do this? Why didn’t I do that?’ I 
certainly think that’s right. But I think I would have erm, yeah I would probably go more to 
having a larger section of views about the world. 
 
M: Do you think this would apply to collectivistic cultures? 
I:  Yes to these groups, I don’t see why not, I mean, erm I’m conscious that when I answered 
your questions at the beginning I certainly thought ‘o my god I’ve gone into some awful 
stereotype, erm about people in other cultures, thinking they’re less sophisticated than I am, 
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erm and their worldviews may be far more er well worked out and elaborate than mine. You 
know they may be much more appropriate. Because they’re evolved over a long period of 
time, and they’ve probably as a culture, as cultures, they’re got much more in their recent 
history of disasters, you know cause we’re had industrialization for a long time which is 
controlling the environment, whereas they’re will have seen many more sort of starvations, 
they’re much more at the influence of climate, and to some extent until recently their medical 
services are much poorer so they will have seen much more of death, so it may be that they 
actually erm have evolved much more sophisticated views of how the world operates and 
their place within it. 
 
M: So potentially then more world questions need to be asked? 
I: And subtle ones maybe, erm because my hypothesis would be that their world views are 
there to enable them to interpret and cope so they might have to be very subtle and 
sophisticated, you know capable of tuning, you know and applied to slightly different 
circumstances and different group of people. 
 
M: Yes that makes sense; culturally sensitive questions need to be asked. 
I: Yeh yeh which would certainly be Derek Summerfield views, that you know we go out 
there with our western questionnaires and the answers you get are largely irrelevant because 
they’re not understood or the persons being polite, they’re trying to work out what they think 
you want them to say and just providing that information. 
 
M: Ok, so you undermine those mechanisms by almost forcing labels onto them? 
I: Yeah yeah, which either they don’t understand or they’re not appropriate erm, and he 
thinks it quite dangerous, he’s a really erm, a very sort of extreme holders of that belief, you 
know, so he’s used a lot in debates, because he’s very powerful on that. 
 
M: OK, well that comes to the end of the questions so thank you very much for your 
time today. 
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Appendix I 
P13 Key Informant Interview 
 
Interview Key:     M = Moderator     I = Interviewee      [Actions]     … Pauses 
 
M: What does trauma mean in collectivistic cultures? 
I: Gosh ... what do I think it means because I’m not from a collectivistic culture? 
 
M: Yes, what would your thoughts be on what trauma means for people in collectivistic 
cultures? 
I: What are my thoughts on what it means to people from collectivistic cultures? Okay ... erm 
I’m thinking in terms of rupture, rupture of bonds ... I guess ... if you’re from a collectivistic 
culture then bonds are everything, so it’s something which breaks families, breaks 
relationships, breaks your bond to the society, so torture for example, within a group could be 
seen to break the bonds of trust between individuals and that society. Are you with me or 
would you like me to unpack that a bit? 
 
M: If you could, I am with you, but if you could also unpack that and go through 
exactly what you mean, it will be easier for me when I’m going through all the data 
later. 
I: Yeah yes okay, what I mean by that bit is that thoughts on the purpose of torture is to break 
down the ability of the group to act together to be powerful, so the group. So these are 
thoughts that I’ve got through someone else’s reading of, erm Martin Burrows work in El 
Salvador. 
 
M: Yes I’ve heard of him but have not yet read through his work. 
I: You should read some of his work, its storming [laughs]. Erm, he’s a really interesting guy, 
there’s one book, erm, that’s great, I’ve got it up there. But the idea is if you take a group, a 
village or whatever of fifty people, that’s quite small isn’t it, but you only need to torture one 
person and make them ... and let everybody believe that that one person revealed all the 
names of their contacts, for everybody else to then realise that if you have contacts you’re 
going to betray them and they’re going to betray you.  
 
M: Okay so it has this knock on effect? 
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I: Exactly. So then you have a broken up group. You make sure no one talks to each other. 
 
M: Ok, so it’s very psychological then, to break up the group? 
I: Emm totally. Erm ... so coming back to the question, it’s very much to do with social 
bonds, so breaking; so together people are more powerful than they are separated. So that’s 
what I mean by torture and breaking social bonds. Erm ... but also ... erm ... if you’re from a 
... not just collectivistic, but a much more family ... if that’s your raison d’etre, your family, 
you know you think of a ... women who’s only ... you know you say, I’m going to kill myself. 
Why don’t you? Because of my kids. So family is all, so if something happens that means 
you can’t ... talk with your family or be with your family in the same way, you can’t give 
your kids what you want to, , you have to send your children away, they’re, or you’re seeking 
asylum and your husband didn’t make it. 
 
M: Ok, so the emphasis is on both the physical and psychological? 
I: Yes, I think its physical separation and psychological separation, so a man who used to 
have a close loving relationship with his wife and his children who now can’t bear to see his 
children because he just gets angry and irritated and, or just hits his children and he’s 
horrified because he was not someone who would do that before. So they are still living 
together in the same house but the relationship between them has been changed. 
 
M: So the dynamic has changed? 
I: Yes, damaged or destroyed, changed or ... so I’m thinking trauma is about breaking those 
things. 
 
M: Ok, what typical thoughts do you think people from collectivistic cultures would 
have after the trauma? 
I: I hear a lot ... what thoughts do people have after trauma? That makes me think 
immediately people talking about roles. They don’t say I’ve lost my role but men ... typically 
... are rather saying or one way or another you’re led to a thought that this is somebody who 
had a place in the family, a place in society, erm, had a role who now doesn’t. So you know, 
going from provider and head of the family to being the one who is looked after because he’s 
… you know, he’s traumatized. 
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M: Yes, okay and what about typical thoughts about themselves after a trauma? 
I: Well that’s an interesting question, because my understanding in collectivistic cultures is 
that would be the same thing, role and selves would be very much intertwined, no? [Laughs] 
 
M: What typical thoughts do you think they would have about the world after a 
trauma? 
I: I think, I mean this is just of the top of my head but my immediate response to that is that 
that will be much more similar in terms of safety. That’s what’s changed. Well ... no actually, 
no, that depends, no that depends, for some people their world has gone from safe to unsafe, 
so the shattered assumptions idea, but actually what’s interesting is that that’s our 
assumption, that’s a safe cultures assumption, a lot of people are born into unsafe situations 
so that’s not the shift for them ... now I don’t know if I can, having said that I don’t know if I 
can now make a generalization about ... so for some group ... ok so I’m thinking, this is 
coming out randomly ... for, I’m thinking of Turkish men or similar who fought in the 
struggle, so who were born into the struggle and have fought with it, and then at some point 
for some reason have had to give up and immigrate. So for them ... it’s about ... for them the 
world hasn’t changed, they failed. So that may answer the previous question. 
For erm, , I mean for Kosovo women their danger was, well it really wasn’t danger it was 
depressing and misery as far as I would work out. Erm so their misery just shifted into a 
different type of misery. 
 
M: Ok, so the context of the misery changed but its still a constant for them? 
I: Em yes, although no, there’s an interesting story among Kosovo women which is a whole 
erm, opening out of their world, which intrigues me, when I did clinical work with them, with 
asylum seekers, I did a lot of work with women who had grown under this so completely 
oppressive regime of misogyny and who have come here and found out that there are 
different ways of being in the world and women are able to be different in the world, and for 
the, some have discovered it, and for some of the lucky ones their husbands have also 
discovered it. So it’s complicated and I’m quite intrigued to know whether is there a new 
Kosovo culture, because of the diasporas to other countries, whether that’s being taken back 
or whether it only exists outside of Kosovo, but that’s way beyond your question, but it is 
interesting isn’t it? 
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M: Yes, because women in Kosovo would have a very different view of the world than 
women who have come over here and been exposed to something quite different. 
I: Yeah, yeah, and so people, you’re talking about people in different cultures, I’m only 
talking about, because my own experience is with refugees, so that’s going to be very 
different than people who have left and moved rather than people who are traumatized and 
stay. So I’m getting away from your question. I don’t now if you’ve got enough on that one 
or if you want more? [Laughs] 
 
M: [Laughs] Ok, just so I have this right, in some instances you think thoughts on the 
world wouldn’t change, for instance the Turkish men who have left the fight so to speak 
and come here? So their perception of the world is as it was before? 
I: Yes, cause in a sense the fight carries on, some people are carrying on with the struggle 
over here, so yeah, exactly. Their view of the world hasn’t changed. 
 
M: But for some people it has? 
I: it’s all about safe to unsafe. 
 
M: Ok, and what typical thoughts do you think they would have about their futures 
after a trauma? 
I: People from collectivistic cultures who have been traumatized? 
 
M: Yes. 
I:  ... ... erm, well I wonder if that’s, there’s an advantage then, because if you have a sense of 
a bigger group, then the bigger group can survive even without you can’t it? 
 
M: Yes ... if you think like that. 
I: So, and where I see that played out in a therapy room is a woman saying my life’s over but 
for my children it is not … and that’s a migration story as well. I don’t care for myself but 
I’ve got my children here now and there’s this Kosovo woman’s story … its going to be 
different for my children because they’re living in this culture and have different 
opportunities to them, and I’m making sure that they work harder in school and you know? 
 
M: So she’s helping them help themselves but she’s, her life, has taken a back seat now? 
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I: Yes, so the future is not about her and that’s kind of a mother discourse anyway isn’t it? 
Erm but much stronger there for the women, especially you know if they’re had whatever 
experiences they see as shameful, so they don’t deserve to live anymore, but they can, the 
future for them is the children. 
 
M: Ok, so it’s all about social bonds again? That’s where the focus for the future is? 
I: Yeah, absolutely ... and then I’m speculating about whether that exists in a bigger way, 
whether those freedom fighters, erm, you know, say well ok, you know I’ve dropped out of 
the fight and I feel guilty and bad about that but erm it still carries on and I send money to the 
organization ... 
 
M: So their goals then stay the same, is that what you’re saying? 
I: I guess I am. I’m trying to think of er, if I’ve come across anybody who’s  ... like 
completely disillusioned in terms of their goals. There certainly are people who turned, again 
I’m thinking about Kosovo women, who, you know they’ve had sons and they do not want 
them to grow up like Kosovo men. They had it with them. 
 
M: Ok so in that sense it has changed their view? 
I: Hhmmm … change, yes. 
 
M: And that way their children would grow up in a different way? 
I: In a different way, yes exactly 
 
M: With different values? 
I: Yes 
 
M: Is that, am I understanding correctly? 
I: Yes you are understanding correctly, but it’s not a generalization, I suppose what I’m 
saying, I’m thinking, I’m drawing on different groups now ... so that’s one of the responses 
that I’ve had. 
 
M: Ok, so the next question I had was what typical thoughts would people have about 
their relationships with others? Which has been touched upon as we’ve been going 
through this. 
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I: Hmmm … well of course the most obvious one is people who don’t want to see anyone 
else in their culture. Erm, so, which, you know when you do a PTSD assessment it gets put 
down as avoidance. 
 
M: Yes. 
I: [Laughs] Yes that one ... which obviously is, I don’t know if it’s damaging or not, but its 
separating them from their culture and their society. Erm ... that is partly avoidance but the 
other thing is, the other reason it comes about is shame, so erm, you know again, the woman 
who had been raped thinks she has a big sign on her forehead saying I’ve been raped and 
everyone can see it and then people who can really see it are the other women from her 
culture. 
 
M: Ok I see what you mean. 
I: Yes do you see what I mean, yes they will know so I have to stay away ... and that keeps a 
lot of people away from what is probably, at least in part, social support. I’m no longer a 
believer in one’s lovely culture is a lovely place to be, there’s a lot of crap in ones cultural 
pressures. 
 
M: Yes so for somebody like that, where would they get their support from? Would 
they try and deal with it themselves? Or talk to a close friend? How would they go 
about it? 
I: Well the, again just drawing on people I remember working with, in extreme 
circumstances, they get it from their therapists, which is terrible (laughs) to have as your best 
friend but it certainly happens and that challenges psychologists and presumably other 
peoples’ way of working from your normal boundaries, I’m not your best friend to realizing 
that actually you probably are (laughs). 
 
M: Ok so there is a shift there in that dynamic? 
I: Absolutely. Erm, and the other thing I hear a lot of people talking about is people like erm 
you know the English classes, where the teacher is amazing and someone, some of those 
teachers are doing incredible semi-counseling work I think. Helping people to write things, 
helping people to feel a bit more confident about themselves. I’ve been astonished about 
some of the stories I’ve heard. 
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M: Ok, almost an untapped resource? 
I: Yes, well I think its being tapped [laughs]. 
 
M: [Laughs] Yes by the sounds it is very much, unrecognized yes, that’s the word. 
I: Yes unrecognized [laughs]. 
 
M: Ok, and do you think their relationships, with their community or their families can 
change quite drastically? 
I: I think that goes back to your first question and is quite the tragedy, where even if people 
have been through them together, they can’t talk about them, they can’t address them. 
 
M: Ok so its a huge challenge then, if it’s all about community and everything is for the 
community and then they can’t speak to the community, because they’re avoiding the 
shame that’s associated with the trauma, that is the challenge, am I understanding that 
correctly? 
I: You’re understanding it totally correctly, and then take that to the next step, that is why 
those things were done, the intention behind it. You destroy a community, and I don’t just 
mean in torture, I’m thinking the use of rape in war, that’s how it works. 
 
M: And how do you think these thoughts would influence adjustment? 
I: Well I suppose ... what we being psychologists in the western world ... are ... trying to do ... 
is and I think ... ok I don’t know how controversial this is going to be ... I think there’s a, 
what we’re doing is introducing the western individualistic ideas to try and help with these 
things and that’s been hugely criticized ... but I haven’t thought this trough before, so we’ll 
see if it makes sense, but I wonder actually if, without being unthinking about it, whether 
there are some differences of ideas that are helpful, because just as we’ve just described the 
culture which works on being together and collectivistic and thinking of the whole, but, but 
the downside of that is the way that you keep people together is, one way is shame so that 
you keep everyone conforming to the group, which preserves the group and devalues the 
individual, and that’s wonderful for lots of wonderful reasons … but … where its gone 
wrong, how do you fix it within that culture? So there are lots of ways in that culture of fixing 
it, but they will tend to fix the group. So if we want to help individuals then those ways ... 
that quite interesting, I probably should be writing this down shouldn’t I? [Laughs] I think, is 
it? I don’t know. 
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M: Yes. 
I: So those ways are not going to help the individual, so if you want to help the individual, the 
individual Kosovo woman, kind of getting her together in a group full of other women to 
make each other all feel ashamed is not going to work, getting them together and putting to 
them the idea that, that they can choose to stand back from that shame and think about well 
who’s shame is it? Whose idea is that that we should hold this shame for things that were 
done to us, which is a very challenging idea but it can only come from outside the culture. 
 
M: Yes, because if not it would only be perpetuating itself. 
I: Yes, and that’s its job [laughs] and, what was the question? 
 
M: How do these thoughts influence adjustment? 
I: Erm, so I’m arguing, I’m answering in terms of how do we help, which (laughs) is a 
different question. How does it influence adjustment? Well I suppose what I’m meaning is 
the adjustment is coming from outside ... from different ideas, that’s what I see because that’s 
where I’m located, outside, I don’t know how its happening within cultures. So that not just, 
that goes back to what I was saying, that not just sort of having an intervention, but also 
living in a different country, looking around and seeing different ways of being. 
 
M: Ok, I see, I’m just wondering, its slightly off topic, do you think they self-blame? 
I: The Kosovo women I’ve worked with totally self-blame. I mean you’ve got to think of the 
attitudes to rape that we had in this country, and its probably not that long ago, but that 
attitude of, well, one of my clients said a long way down the line one of the things that 
bothered her was she, because they were leaving the house the day she put on her best 
clothes, so was it because she was wearing nice clothes that she got raped? 
 
M: Ok so she sort of brought it back on herself? 
I: Totally, totally. To put the context on this with regards to Kosovo, the, well its not law, but 
its kind of, its kind of, the way is if a woman … ok if a woman has sex with someone outside 
of their marriage the husband takes the children and leaves and she’s left on her own and has 
no chance of anything or anybody or anything ever again. 
 
M: So she’s completely ostracized? 
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I: Yes she’s completely ostracized, and so if you don’t separate rape from having sex with 
someone, which they don’t, that’s still the situation, so when I say families can’t speak to 
each other, we had at the clinic I was working with, we’d be working with women and men 
who would, could not, could not talk about the fact that the woman had been raped, because 
then they would have to go through with him leaving and taking the children, however much 
he understood and didn’t want to, he didn’t want to hear it and she knew that she couldn’t tell 
him because that would destroy the family. You see? 
 
M: Yes, so she can’t help herself in that way by discussing it and try to move forward? 
I: No no no no no, absolutely cannot talk to her husband, because then they would be forced 
to break up the family. 
 
M: So it’s the cultural framework of what you do when these things happen? 
I: Exactly ... so nobody is acknowledging rape and the same in Bosnia, there’s no rape, I 
mean these programmes that are working in Kosovo and Bosnia now who have been raped 
they’re tiny and  you know, very, very courageous, very few women, and I don’t know but 
I’m guessing that a lot of them are single women, although that’s got its own problems. 
 
M: So in a sense they are then introducing the idea that you can look at it (referencing 
rape) from a different point of view and introducing sort of that outside influence 
almost? 
I: That’s what I mean about, exactly. Loads of my work was talking about different ways of 
thinking about rape, thinking about rape as an act of war or as an act of violence, as 
something that you don’t have any choice about as the person who is raped. 
 
M: Ok, well thank you so much for answering my questions, if I could just get you to 
look at this questionnaire and have a read through. 
[Overlaps with M] I: OK, all right. Do you want me to put any notes on here? 
 
M: Yes if you like. 
I: I’ll put something here to remind you. [reads] 
This is quite a tough intellectual challenge, I have to think about that, because it’s not 
whether somebody from a collectivistic culture who would have been traumatized would 
endorse that but the range of things they would endorse pre and post. [Reads]‘I feel like an 
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object not a person’ – depends on what we were saying about roles. [Reads] ‘I can’t rely on 
myself’ – yeah now there you can imagine somebody saying, well of course they don’t, I 
never relied on myself, so it’s pointless. [Reads] ‘My actions since the event mean that I am 
going crazy’ – yes I’ve met a lot of people that would say that. [Reads] ‘I’ll not be able to 
control my anger and do something terrible’ – now that’s something I hear a lot of. [Reads] 
‘You have to be especially careful because you can never know what can happen next’ – 
that’s not, that’s not the, that’s not the split that we were talking about. That’s the split you 
and I talked about earlier, to do with erm what you’ve grown up in, so Turkey comes down 
on the individualistic side of the thing doesn’t it, but look at all the erm, Kurdish fighters in 
that part of the world, they’ve grown up with political ... so … so that wouldn’t be 
discriminatory for them, I’ll make a note of unsafe backgrounds. I think what I’m saying is if 
you’ve had somebody that’s always believed that, as a child, I mean really developmentally, 
so they were taught that both implicitly and explicitly by their parents, because the police 
came randomly to their house for as long as, as far back as they can remember and beat 
people up and went away again, that’s it you don’t know why, so ... that, if you give them this 
question before and after some bomb it’s not going to change. 
 
M: Ok so it’s the context again, they’ve grown up with it, they’re used to it, somebody, 
who is, this is unique to them? 
I: Exactly, you measure me before and after 7/7 then it makes a difference, a change. 
[Reads] ‘I can’t rely on other people’ – yeah I think that shifts, and again it depends on the 
trauma because people may have let you down or worse you’ve been in a situation where you 
have let other people down and that’s much worse to handle … but also it teachers you that 
whole premise of relying on other people because you thought you were somebody who other 
people could rely on, above anyone you know, someone who has very strong morals, this is 
the kind of person I am, you can rely on me, some, some soldier type person or freedom 
fighter, the type of person you know, I’m solid, I’m not going to let my friends down. 
 
M: Ok so under pressure they’ve done something contrary to what they thought they 
would do? 
I: Yes and then their whole value goes. So what I’m trying to say is that can get generalized 
and then the whole value is rubbish. So I thought I could be relied on and then I wasn’t. So 
why would I think anyone else could? 
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M: Yes so you think you know yourself, and then you find out you don’t, how do you 
know other people? 
I: Exactly. [Reads] ‘The event happened because of the way I acted’ – well … yeah, no I 
think that’s more appropriate than ever, somebody who subjugates themselves to the, it’s my 
fault that everything’s destroyed. Which is odd isn’t it because that’s a very individualistic 
thought, hhmmm I still haven’t got my head completely around this yet. [Reads] There are 
passive and active statements. The event happened, but this is I should have done something 
and that’s very different. So that’s requiring a sense of being able to do something to change 
things … how interesting. [Reaches the end of the questionnaire] OK. 
 
M: Great, thank you, thanks for taking the time to do this. 
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Appendix J 
P14 Key Informant Interview 
 
Interview Key:     M = Moderator     I = Interviewee      [Actions]     … Pauses 
 
M: What does trauma mean in collectivistic cultures? 
I: Well I think the, the big difference I would notice is that, that trauma is possibly thought as, 
or experienced at the group level. I mean thinking very much of the cultures I deal with a lot, 
Turkish Kurds and Tamils, I suppose are what erm, the Kurds certainly I think you do, there 
is a lot of sense, of the what’s important is what happened to the group and how the group 
responded, the family, the party, the village, the town, or whatever it is, the Kurds as a whole, 
you do, I have worked with clients, who will … if you sort of think, if you listen very 
carefully to the contents of the session when you’re working with them, what you will get a 
lot of the time are, is Kurdish history, history of oppression of them as the Kurds; and I think 
this is to do with, is not, if you could possibly think about that as a defense mechanism, as 
avoidance of dealing with what actually happened to you, and in a certain sense it is, but 
there’s another element of it which is that actually that the “we” is more important than the 
“I” and if; I speak Turkish and Kurdish and certainly the Kurdish people are speaking to each 
other in either of those languages, the words they use are “we”, “us” and “our”, erm you very 
rarely hear anyone say “I”, “me”, about all  kinds of things and I think trauma is within that, 
and so its quite, it can be quite unusual to hear somebody talking very directly about 
themselves or me as an individual, what happens, there’s also among the erm, on the other 
side of everything erm,  if you haven’t,  have you come across the work of Daya 
Somsundaram, he’s a Tamil psychiatrist? 
 
M: Yes somebody recommended I look up his work, which I was going to do. 
I: Yes you really need to read him, because he’s written a lot about of collective trauma, he 
very much thinks about the only way you can think about trauma, erm to the Tamil, for the 
Tamil society, is to think about it at the community level, but in terms of the way everybody, 
in Tamil society has been traumatized and that hence interventions are at the community or 
the group level rather than at the individual level, in practical terms of the provision of 
psychotherapy, it often is more effective at the group level, and we find this, not overly, but 
we have found this here, that for instance, we have a Turkish speaking men’s group, which 
works very very well, because they have a natural affinity to be to exist, to interact, to 
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experience as a group rather than as individuals, and I think there is a very, it is a very 
northern European thing to do north European, American thing to do, to go and see a 
therapist on your own and talk about yourself, and talk about your family from a very 
particular perspective, so erm, I definitely would recommend you try and track down some of 
his work. 
 
M: Yes I will thank you, I’ve written his name down in my diary again, so I will do so. 
My next question is, what typical thoughts do you think somebody from a collectivistic 
culture would have after a trauma? 
I: Right, well, I mean … I suppose, it is really a difficult question … I think having said 
everything I’ve just said, it certainly is true that you would meet people, I’ve worked with 
Tamils and Kurds, who have, who come in and talk about nightmares and intrusive thoughts, 
all the classic PTSD symptoms, they’re all there, but I suppose it’s a question of whether, if 
they would feel, if symptoms are addressed, is that enough, the answer for me is no it isn’t, 
because the sort of people who are suffering, or erm… all these wrongs that have been done 
to my people over the years, and all of those needs to be addressed … erm,  I think erm … I 
think somebody from an individualistic culture will be worried about their family, their 
friends, but possibly in a slightly more exaggerated, and er there might be more erm … I 
suppose I don’t know if the thoughts would be different, but it might be more to do with the 
emphasis of where the worry lies. 
 
M: Ok, just to break down on the question I just asked, what typical thoughts do you 
think they would have about themselves following a trauma? 
I: Well erm … I suppose, it is very difficult to generalize, I think in terms of erm … it’s 
important not to think that to group people together, although it’s difficult not to given what 
we are talking about, erm … certainly with torture it effects everybody in slightly different 
ways, erm and its very easy erm one of the difficulties in starting to think about the collective 
cultures and the group, is that you lose sight of the individual, and you begin to think well all 
Kurds will respond in a certain way, all Tamils will respond in a different way and actually 
erm I think I’ve probably noticed for, that’s true to a certain extent, but you always have to 
particularly, you always have to allow for the fact that there are occasions that you might 
meet for instance somebody from a particular community who has been so badly disturbed 
and traumatized and damaged by what’s happened to them,  that they’re unable to play their 
part in the group any longer and this is the thing about collectivistic cultures,  the group is 
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everything, you don’t just take, you’ve got to give something into it and its often people who 
have come to that point that would come to us for some form of assistance, erm and erm … 
or the people who are here to make use of the group still , and have good support network and 
socialize and got to their community centers for particular cultural activities are coping fairly 
well as opposed the person is so depressed who can’t get out of bed and go and access it, or 
the person who is being rejected by the rest of the community because they’re perceived as 
being mad or etc so erm it’s a … there’s a range there, but I think, I agree, that the western 
medical construct of PTSD is a western medical construct and on its own it isn’t erm always 
used appropriately around the world, I certainly agree with that, however I disagree with 
those colleagues and some of whom have famously worked here in the past, Derek 
Summerfield, he worked very briefly, he, what he does,  he’s never provided an answer to the 
question I’ve had for years, which is, ok if this isn’t a western multicultural concept, lets 
accept that …  but then this man from the Ivory Coast who is setting in front of me, he’s been 
tortured, and is complaining quite spontaneously, without me prompting, he’s complaining of 
nightmares, flashbacks, avoidance, hyper-vigilance, intrusive thoughts, so now, and he’s in 
huge amounts of distress because of this and needs some kind of assistance,  and so I think 
you need to be quite sort of pragmatic, and if erm, its more, you know and possible because 
of this, you know as I was saying he’s not able to access community support, but that said, I 
would recognize, very much the power of group work and would bring him together with 
others who have had a similar experiences.  
 
M: Ok, so following on from the last question, what typical thoughts do you think they 
would have about the world in which they live following trauma?  
I: Erm … what I’m trying to get at is what would be different from somebody who is 
individualistic. 
 
M: Do you think there would be a difference? 
I: Will there be a difference? I think … there’s something, the most typical thing that you 
hear is expressed in many ways is the idea the world is no longer a safe place, the … erm and 
the, that erm … that other people can’t be trusted, men can’t be trusted, or whoever it is, erm 
that you hear, that can express itself in all sorts of different ways, it manifest very plainly in 
relation to the therapeutic relationship, can the therapist be trusted. The er … it’s also, erm at 
the moment with the riots in London, erm it’s a rational response to be frightened about the 
riots, but erm, that safely is a very big thing. I mean it could also be, you might find, erm, 
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possibly a sense, more of a sense of guilt having left, the country, they’ve left the struggle to 
come here, that may be more pronounced, I think its erm if you want to think in some 
psychoanalytic terms, to think of the superego, containing much more than simply the 
internalization of parents, it will include erm the internalized objects of much broader, 
broader range of objects, and relationships and responsibilities and things and community and 
society etc, and responsibility to society, and I think erm, I mean it was very interesting er 
watching the coverage of the riots, erm, where, I don’t know if you saw the news, in 
Kingston Rd in Hackney, where the Kurdish shopkeepers and friends and relatives came out 
in mass. 
 
M: Yes I did. 
I: To protect their shops and to chase people away, and erm, the er sort of I imagine the 
Pakistani community in Birmingham did the same thing, and so erm, this erm, and it being er 
kind of positive sort of something everybody expects, and it’s a positive thing, there wasn’t 
any sort of discussion about it, it sort of happened more or less spontaneously.  
 
M: Yes. 
I: But sort of English people do that, now ok, they may have been right wing, that’s fine fair 
enough, but instantly the response of the sort of community, society is that they’re vigilantes, 
or they’re racist or something, and so its interesting that in the Kurdish community it was an 
honorable and expected thing and they were in the news that evening, they were interviewing 
Kurdish waiters and they were talking about it, and he was making this very point, its very 
interesting, he was saying that you’ve got to understand that the culture, our culture, that if 
somebody attacks your home, or he attacks your village, or attacks you, your street, 
everybody will turn up and try to protect you. 
 
M: Ok, so social roles coming into play? 
I: Yes, and that’s what we were doing, that’s all that was happening here, its regarded as a 
positive thing about that community, whereas with, its very interesting to think about the 
different responses to the, you could, ok there did seem to be an element of involvement from 
the English defense league and other unsavory characters, but, you know really you need to 
think of the societal response to people doing that was different. 
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M: Yes. 
I: that’s why I’m telling you about the different ways. 
 
M: Ok, so you’re saying that although the action is the same, but because you’re coming 
from different cultural backgrounds it’s interpreted very differently. 
I: Yes yes. 
 
M: Ok, and what typical thoughts do you think they would have about their future after 
a trauma?  
I: Well, erm … you get that, the really noticeable thing is the absence of thoughts about the 
future, that’s the problem. In the sense that there isn’t a future. Some people can get so badly 
traumatized, so badly depressed they want to commit suicide, they can so badly lose their 
trust in the world and so they can’t actually see themselves surviving, which is extremely 
difficult, worrying, because that’s where people become very seriously suicidal. But I think 
that erm, you might, I mean saying, I’m thinking about young Tamil women who I’ve 
worked with over the years, who have been raped and will … erm shame coming into this at 
quite a communal level as an example, where a considerable story reminds me of a young 
woman who had been imprisoned in Sri Lanka and had been burned with cigarettes, on her 
upper back and arms and if you think if you are a Tamil you wear a Sari. 
 
M: Of course so it’s in the exposed areas. 
I: So she comes under scrutiny, so its a signal to the community that this young woman has 
been imprisoned and it was assumed that if you’re a young woman and you had been 
imprisoned then you would have been raped. And so what we discovered was happening, was 
that then because you had been raped shame falls on you and your family erm and women 
would talk to us about feelings that they were impure, they were never able to get married 
erm and as we got into it more and more we discovered that actually what would often 
happening is that they would have to flee for their own safety and their family would have to 
entirely relocate because of the sense of shame. 
 
M: Ok, so the shame stays with the family, so again affecting the entire group. 
I: Yes and then they would have to come here, and that’s a good example of how the trauma 
is shared and impacts on everybody and it can kind of erm and those who feel no thoughts 
about the future, and you can meet people who er, we’ve had cultures who have a belief in 
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karma, the Hindu’s they believe in karma and reincarnation, hence the idea that if something 
horrible happens to you in this life its because you did something terrible in the previous life, 
and this is quite an active belief, I work with people here, who talk about being blamed and 
judged by members of their community because of their misfortune, they’ve been tortured, or 
somebody’s been killed, or whatever, they’ve been blamed for it, because of what they did in 
a previous life. 
 
M: Ok right, so past transgressions coming back. 
I: Yes, yes and hence erm, and that they hold, its very difficult to shift because its on the level 
of a religious belief, its extremely hard to get over. Now, I don’t believe in reincarnation, and 
even if I did I don’t feel that the responsibility lies the torturer, in the same way the 
responsibility of a riot lies with the rioter you know … I guess I’ve gone off the question, 
trauma in London (laugh). So that element comes into it, plus also erm … I am a bad person, 
this is another thing that its like they phase into that thought, its my fault that this has 
happened; which I think and also as I said, the level of I’m a erm … I’ve let everybody down 
by leaving and coming here. 
 
M: Ok, so going back to the first question regarding thoughts they’d have about 
themselves after trauma, these appear to be self-blaming? 
I: Yes, yes, it can be, it affects everybody slightly differently, I’m generalizing, yes. 
 
M: OK and concerning relationships with others, what typical thoughts do you think 
they would have about their relationships with others after experiencing a trauma? 
Would that change or strengthen them? 
I: Err … well … erm … again there would be a massive variety, I think it would it can with 
certain people undermine their relationships or isolate it because of the feelings of guilt and 
shame, erm there is a lot of work about you know adversity activated developments, there’s 
ideas of posttraumatic growth, resilience, and whereby people eventually grow, when they 
come to realize and perceive themselves as survivors and it takes along time but when you’ve 
been working with a patient and they begin to realize that they’ve survived. That in itself is 
an extraordinary thing, then that’s where you see people grow and develop. But, as so what I 
think erm, and that can include people sort of being, coming closer, it can destroy 
relationships, having somebody, the trauma of, you know if you have a family, trauma is 
somebody leaving, being taken away, imprisoned and tortured then coming back into the 
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family, and when they come in could be perfectly normal, and the fact that they are 
traumatized, shaken, angry, frightened and not sleeping, shouting in their sleep, hyper-
vigilant, on a short fuse that can place enormous pressure on a relationships; and the, I think 
that er and that why we have here such a big family team, because we think about families 
even when people are referred to us as individual clients. Very often the families come in too. 
Erm … so, you can get situations where people are left feeling - unless you’ve been through 
this as well you can’t understand what I’ve been through. I think it does, erm they also can be 
all kinds of mistrust and suspicions, and particular as often happens when the family were all 
arrested and all tortured, dad was the one who was in front of everybody else, so they can 
directly affect the relationships of the family very seriously, which hence can have a knock 
on effect on the children. 
 
M: and lastly, all these thoughts that we have been talking about, the self, the world, 
future, how do these thoughts influence adjustment? 
I: Well, if, the community, erm if one exists, I thin certainly where, the Tamil community are 
extraordinary in how they look after each other, they’ve been amazing since about 2005, 
2009 that period of the war, and then afterwards, they are the biggest part of our clients here, 
and a very very high percentage of them are being taken in by friends and distant relatives, its 
extremely unusual to meet a homeless, destitute Tamil, somebody will take them in and look 
after them, and they are very organized, for instance they are old-boys and old-girls cricket 
team and you can find out who you went to school with and you can come here and find out 
and meet them and go and play cricket. The huge demonstrations in Trafalgar Square during 
the war, the Kurds do that as well, there’s a real sense of responsibility, and that I think being 
part of it, if you are at the stage of making use of it, is a wonderfully protective factor. Now it 
can be used as an idea within I think in both of those cultures, the predominant political 
parties, have exploited that collective spirit, they’ve in turn put pressure on people to support 
them. It can also mutate into something incredibly perverse, the honor killing, it is a 
mutation, that comes out of a collectivistic culture, in the sense of the, that the, a woman who 
looks at a boy or who has a boyfriend, or something ridiculous like that has brought shame on 
the family, and a lot of that goes on, and I think that it needs to be thought about, the 
downside, the shadow to be considered. It would be wrong to idealize this, but certainly most 
of the time I think it’s a very, and I think the events of it in Hackney the other evening was a 
very good example of it, where they said they’re not going to kill anybody but we are going 
to protect ourselves, which is a perfectly legitimate thing to do, a very positive thing to do. 
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Erm ... and there were, certainly when I worked in that community a long time ago in 
London, it was wonderful being a part of it, it was very seductive actually, to be pulled into 
and feeling this sort of living organism thing around you, the group, which is the community 
and feeling it can go to help very quickly. And so once you get your head around the way it 
works, you have to put something in and you get an awful lot back, lot of support, and but it 
does have its danger, its downside as well … but anyway I’m going off the point here. 
 
M: No, no, it’s been very helpful. If could ask you to please read through this 
questionnaire and fill it out. If there are any items on there you feel are inappropriate 
please let me know your thoughts on it. 
I: Nothing good has ever happened to me – yes I think that’s very appropriate. I think again 
when they are saying, my, I, my life has been destroyed, I have no future, it again depends 
really on what kind of level, distress or traumatization, or aggression I suppose, you can call 
it what you will, but you will meet people who you won’t ever hear that, what you’ll hear is 
sort of thinking about the future of the Tamil, or Kurds, or we are weak as a group. [Reads] 
I feel like an object not a person … yes I think, I don’t think that would make sense, another 
thing I think you need to factor is language, that Tamil and Turkish are very different 
languages, and the grammar and the vocabulary is very, very different. 
 
M: Ok, so they have very different nuances? 
I: Yes, yes, so you might have here, in Turkish, I don’t feel myself, but it would be 
interesting to see how this would be translated into Turkish. [Reads] I can’t deal with even 
the slightest upset, yeah – my reaction is that people as feeling that they are going mad, you 
suiciddo hear that. [Reads] I feel dead inside, yeah. [Reads] The world is a dangerous place, 
yeah. Yeah the guilty ones at the end, the event happened because of the way I acted, you 
hear that a lot, unrealistic guilt. We had a client who had been beaten unconscious by a group 
of soldiers who attacked his family and then his mother was killed, so he was actually 
unconscious at the time she was killed, so there was nothing he could have done and he was 
wracked by guilt. I suppose that I mean, have you read anything by Renos Papadopoulos? 
 
M: No, I haven’t at the moment. But any references would be much appreciated. 
I: There’s a book called therapies of care for refugees by Renos Papadopoulos, he’s a clinical 
psychologist and a systemic psychologist, he’s lovely, now I think he’s based in Essex, some 
centre there for refugees. He’s got his idea of a trauma grid, which is to do with tracking 
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responses at the individual, family and community level and also tracking the resilience; there 
are many lines of the grid and it’s a very good way at looking at it, you cannot just look at it 
at the individual level. He’s worth reading. 
 
M: Ok, thank you, I will do so. 
I: And Daya is preparing a book at the minute on trauma in Tamil community, which I 
contributed to as well. Part of what we were writing about were what clients were telling us 
about how their trauma was impacting on the people they were living with. So the types of 
experiences people had and how they were dealing with them. For a period of 3 years during 
the war we saw I think about 12% of all Tamil society who came through, but until its 
published I cant give you a copy but he’s based at the university of Adelaide, so you may be 
able to track him down if you wanted to.  Also they are a very topical people to be writing 
about, because of the cultural trauma. 
 
M: Yes definitely, I will look into that. Thank you again for the suggestions and for 
taking the time to do the interview, it’s been really helpful. 
I: That fine, yes, and what sounds interesting from what you’re doing is that it’s a much 
needed piece of work, there is a lot of interest in collectivistic cultures, especially from 
psychotherapy, but very rarely is it broken down in how it expresses itself and language is 
very important.  
 
